U.S. Department of State

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March 29, 2011Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Background Note: Serbia

PROFILE

Geography
Area: Serbia (77,474 sq. km.) is slightly smaller than Maine.
Cities: Capital--Belgrade. Other cities--Pancevo, Novi Pazar, Uzice, Novi Sad, Subotica, Bor, Nis.
Terrain: Varied; in the north, rich fertile plains; in the east, limestone ranges and basins; in the southeast, mountains and hills.
Climate: In the north, continental climate (cold winter and hot, humid summers with well-distributed rainfall); central portion, continental and Mediterranean climate; to the south, hot, dry summers and autumns and relatively cold winters with heavy snowfall inland.

People (2010 est.)
Nationality: Noun--Serb(s); adjective--Serbian.
Population (2010 Republic census): 7,306,677.
Population growth rate (2009): -0.4%.
Rate of natural increase (does not include migration, 2009): -4.6%.
Ethnic groups: Serbian, with Hungarian, Bosniak, Romany, Albanian, Montenegrin, and other minorities.
Religions: Orthodox, with Roman Catholic, Muslim, Protestant minorities.
Languages: Serbian 88.3%, Hungarian 3.8%, Bosnian 1.8%, Romany 1.1%, others 5%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--6.65 deaths/1,000. Life expectancy--males 71.1 yrs., female 76.4 yrs.

Government
Type: Republic.
Constitution: Adopted in an October 28-29, 2006 referendum.
Branches: Executive--President (chief of state) Boris TADIC (since July 11, 2004); Prime Minister (head of government) Mirko CVETKOVIC (since July 7, 2008), Council of Ministers (cabinet). Legislative--Parliament. Judicial--Supreme Court of Cassation and Constitutional Court.
Political parties: Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM), Christian Democratic Party of Serbia (DHSS), Coalition for Sandzak (KZS), Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM), Democratic Party (DS), Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSh), Democratic Union of the Valley (BDL-Albanians), Force of Serbia (PSS), G-17 Plus (G-17), League for Sumadija (LS), League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Movement for Democratic Progress (LDP--Albanians), New Serbia (NS), Party of Democratic Action (SDA--Bosniaks), Party of Democratic Action (PVD--Albanians), Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS), People's Party (NP), Roma Party (RP), Sandzak Democratic Party (SDP--Bosniaks), Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDPS), Social Democratic Union (SDU), Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS--former Communist Party), United Serbia (JS), Yugoslav United Left (JUL).
Suffrage: 16 years of age if employed; universal at 18.

Economy
GDP (2010 est.): $40.28 billion.
GDP growth rate (2010 est.): 1.8%.
GDP per capita (2010 est.): $5,370.
Inflation rate (2010): 10.3%.
Natural resources: Coal, petroleum, natural gas, antimony, copper, lead, zinc, timber, bauxite, gold, silver, navigable rivers.
GDP by sector (2009 percentages, latest data available): Agriculture 9.0%; mining and quarrying 1.2%; manufacturing 14.8%; electricity, gas, and water 3.2%; construction 4.7%; wholesale and retail trade, repair of vehicles 1.3%; hotels and restaurants 1%; transport, storage, and communication 7.5%; financial intermediation 2.8%; real estate, renting 15.6%; public administration and defense, compulsory social security 3.4%; education 4.2%; health and social work 5.4%; other community, social, and personal services 2.3%; private households with employed persons 0.1%.
Trade (2010): Exports--$9.79 billion. Major markets--Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Germany, Italy. Imports--$16.73 billion. Major suppliers--Russia, Germany, Italy, China.

PEOPLE AND HISTORY
The first Serbian kingdom was created in 1170 A.D. by Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the Nemanjic dynasty, whose son was canonized as St. Sava and became the patron saint of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church founded in 1219. Serbia's territories expanded under the rule of King Milutin, who seized territory in nearby Macedonia from the Byzantines, and reached their peak under Milutin's son, Stefan Dusan (1331-55). However, Serbian power waned after Stefan's death in 1355, and at the Battle of Kosovo (June 28, 1389) the Serbs were defeated by the Turks. Following the Battle of Smederevo in 1459, the Ottoman Empire exerted complete control over all Serb lands.

Serbs lived under the rule of the Ottoman sultans for nearly 370 years, though the Serbian Orthodox Church, with several disruptions, transmitted Serbian heritage and helped preserve Serbian identity during this period. Movements for Serbian independence began with uprisings led by Karadjordje Petrovic (1804-13) and Milos Obrenovic (1815-17), founders of two rival dynasties that would rule Serbia until World War I. Serbia became an internationally recognized principality under Turkish suzerainty and Russian protection after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829. After waging war against Turkey in support of Bosnian rebels in 1876, Serbia formally gained independence in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, largely thanks to Russian support. Following Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia, Serbia led a successful coalition of Montenegrin, Bulgarian, and Greek troops (the Balkan League) that in 1913 seized remaining Ottoman-controlled territory in Europe and established Serbia as a regional military leader.

The assassination of Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, set off a series of diplomatic and military actions among the great powers that culminated in World War I. Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces occupied Serbia soon after World War I began. After the collapse of Austria-Hungary at the war's end in 1918, Vojvodina and Montenegro united with Serbia, and former south Slav subjects of the Habsburgs sought the protection of the Serbian crown within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Serbia was the dominant partner in this state, which in 1929 adopted the name Yugoslavia.

The kingdom soon encountered resistance when Croats began to resent control from Belgrade. This pressure prompted King Alexander I to split the traditional regions into nine administrative provinces. During World War II, the Axis powers occupied Yugoslavia. Royal army soldiers, calling themselves Chetniks, formed a Serbian resistance movement, but the communist Partisans, with Soviet and Anglo-American help, succeeded in defeating the Chetniks and forcing German forces from Yugoslavia by 1944. In an effort to avoid Serbian domination during the postwar years, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro were given separate and equal republican status within the new socialist federation of Yugoslavia; Kosovo and Vojvodina were made autonomous provinces within Yugoslavia.

Despite the appearance of a federal system of government in Yugoslavia, Serbian communists ruled Yugoslavia's political life for the next 4 decades under Josip Broz Tito, a former Bolshevik and committed communist. In 1948 after Tito made several significant foreign policy decisions without consulting Moscow, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet bloc, signifying a split with Moscow that left Tito independent to accept aid from the Marshall Plan and become a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. Communist rule transformed Serbia from an agrarian into an industrial society; however, by the 1980s, Yugoslavia's economy started to fail. With the death of Tito in 1980, separatist and nationalist tensions emerged in Yugoslavia.

In the late 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic propelled himself to power in Belgrade by exploiting Serbian nationalism, especially over Kosovo. In 1989, he arranged the elimination of Kosovo's autonomy in favor of direct rule from Belgrade. Belgrade ordered the firing of large numbers of ethnic Albanian state employees, whose jobs were then taken by Serbs. As a result of this oppression, Kosovo Albanian leaders led a peaceful resistance movement in the early 1990s and established a parallel government funded mainly by the Albanian diaspora.

Between 1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia all seceded from Yugoslavia. On April 27, 1992, in Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro joined in passing the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.).

Kosovo's peaceful resistance movement failed to yield results, and in 1997 the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began an armed resistance. The KLA's main goal was to secure the independence of Kosovo.

In late 1998, Milosevic unleashed a brutal police and military campaign against the separatist KLA, which included atrocities against civilian noncombatants. For the duration of Milosevic's campaign, large numbers of ethnic Albanians were either displaced from their homes in Kosovo or killed by Serbian troops or police. These acts, and Serbia's refusal to sign the Rambouillet Accords, provoked 79 days of bombing by NATO forces from March to June 1999 and led the UN Security Council (UNSC) to authorize, through UNSC Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999), an international civil and military presence in Kosovo under UN auspices. The resolution called for UN interim administration of Kosovo and authorized the international civil presence to facilitate a process to determine Kosovo's status. Following Milosevic's capitulation, international forces--including the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led security force KFOR--moved into Kosovo.

Routine federal elections in September 2000 resulted in a narrow official victory for Slobodan Milosevic and his coalition against Vojislav Kostunica, the consensus presidential candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), an umbrella group of 18 anti-Milosevic political parties. After Milosevic's victory was documented to be fraudulent, citizens across Serbia turned out in street protests in support of Kostunica. On October 5, 2000, Milosevic was forced to concede defeat after mass protests across Serbia. The new F.R.Y. President Vojislav Kostunica was soon joined at the top of the domestic Serbian political scene by the Democratic Party's (DS) Zoran Djindjic, who was elected Prime Minister at the head of the DOS ticket in parliamentary elections that December. Although initial reform efforts were highly successful, especially in the economic and fiscal sectors, by the middle of 2002, the nationalist Kostunica and the pragmatic Djindjic were openly in conflict with each other.

Despite the initial euphoria of replacing Milosevic's autocratic regime, the Serbian population by mid-2002 slid into apathy and disillusionment with its leading politicians in reaction to this political maneuvering. Two rounds of voting for the republic presidency in late 2002 failed because of insufficient voter turnout (Serbian law required participation by more than 50% of registered voters).

On March 12, 2003, Prime Minister Djindjic was assassinated by organized crime elements threatened by his pursuit of anti-crime measures. Zoran Zivkovic, a vice-president of Djindjic's DS party, was elected Prime Minister in March 2003, but a series of scandals plagued the new government, which ultimately led to early elections.

Republic of Serbia presidential elections were held on November 16, 2003, but the results were declared invalid because of insufficient voter turnout. Following the December 2003 parliamentary elections, a new minority government was formed with the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), G17+, and the Serbian Renewal Movement/New Serbia (SPO/NS) coalition and the tacit support of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Former F.R.Y. president Vojislav Kostunica was named Prime Minister.

In March 2002, the heads of the federal and republican governments signed the Belgrade Agreement, setting forth the parameters for a redefinition of Montenegro's relationship with Serbia within a joint state. On February 4, 2003, the F.R.Y. parliament ratified the Constitutional Charter, establishing a new state union and changing the name of the country from Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro.

Also in 2002, the F.R.Y. Government established a commission to coordinate cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and began serving warrants for the arrest of persons indicted for war crimes who sought refuge in the country. The crackdown on organized crime following the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic also resulted in the apprehension and transfer to The Hague of several persons indicted for war crimes. In 2004 and 2005, a significant number of ICTY indictees surrendered to the tribunal. In 2007, Serbia assisted in the arrest of two of the remaining six persons indicted for war crimes, Zdravko Tolimir and Vlastimir Djordjevic, and in 2008 the government arrested and extradited Stojan Zupljanin and Radovan Karadzic. Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and Croatian Serb political leader Goran Hadzic remain at large, but the government has indicated its intention to apprehend these individuals. The United States and other countries continue to urge Serbia to apprehend and transfer to The Hague both Mladic and Hadzic.

On May 21, 2006, the Republic of Montenegro held a successful referendum on independence and declared independence on June 3. Thereafter, the parliament of Serbia stated that the Republic of Serbia was the continuity of the state union, changing the name of the country from Serbia and Montenegro to the Republic of Serbia, with Serbia retaining Serbia and Montenegro's membership in all international organizations and bodies.

In mid-2007, the UNSC deadlocked on a way forward on Kosovo status and how to act on UN Special Envoy Maarti Ahtisaari’s Kosovo status proposal. On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence following a 120-day last-ditch effort by the European Union (EU)-Russia-U.S. Troika to facilitate an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on the latter's status. The United States officially recognized Kosovo's independence the following day. Seventy-five nations had recognized Kosovo as of March 2011. Serbia has rejected its former province’s independence, and the Serbian Government challenged the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which issued an advisory opinion in July 2010 stating that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was in accordance with international law and did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Following the ICJ advisory opinion, Serbia agreed to engage in an EU-facilitated dialogue with Kosovo on practical issues, which began in Brussels in March 2011.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
After two rounds of voting in late 2002 and a third in November 2003 failed because of insufficient voter turnout, the election law was changed to allow for a valid election with turnout of less than 50% of registered voters. In elections held on June 27, 2004 Boris Tadic (DS) defeated Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolic by a slim margin and was elected President of Serbia.

Following the adoption of a new Constitution in October 2006, Serbia held parliamentary elections on January 21, 2007. A government was formed in May 2007, with a coalition of the DS, DSS, and G17+. The coalition chose Vojislav Kostunica to continue in his position as Prime Minister. On February 3, 2008, in run-off presidential elections, Boris Tadic again defeated Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolic by a slim margin and was re-elected President of Serbia. Following the collapse of the governing coalition in March 2008 in the wake of Kosovo’s independence, new parliamentary elections were held on May 11, 2008. The Democratic Party-led list, "For a European Serbia," won nearly 39% of the vote, and in July 2008 formed a coalition government with the Socialists and ethnic minority parties. The May 11, 2008 Serbian national election results are illustrated by the following chart:

Serbian Political Parties	Percentage of vote	Seats in Parliament
For a European Serbia--(ZES) DS, G-17, SPO, LSV, SDP	38.7%	102
Radicals (SRS)	29.1%	78
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)	11.3%	30
Socialists (SPS), (PUPS), (JS)	7.9%	20
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	5.2%	13
Hungarians (MK)	1.8%	4
Bosniaks Coalition	0.8%	2
Albanian Coalition	0.5%	1
Others--Below Threshold	4.7%
Total	100%	250

In September 2008, Radical Party (SRS) deputy president and two-time presidential candidate Tomislav Nikolic split from the SRS and formed the Forward Serbia caucus. Together with former Radical General Secretary Aleksandar Vucic, Nikolic officially formed the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in October 2008. As of March 2011, the SNS held 20 seats in parliament due to defections from the SRS, while the SRS maintained 58 seats. The SNS joined two local governments in western Serbia in early 2009 and in December 2009 scored a victory over the DS in the Belgrade municipality of Vozdovac. Local observers have described these electoral victories, as well as an SNS rally in February 2011 in Belgrade that drew an estimated 50,000 participants, as signs of the party’s consolidation.

Legislature
The Serbian National Assembly, a unicameral parliament, is the lawmaking body of the Republic of Serbia.

Principal Government Officials
President--Boris Tadic
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance--Mirko Cvetkovic
First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior--Ivica Dacic
Deputy Prime Minister--Bozidar Djelic
Deputy Prime Minister--Jovan Krkobabic
Deputy Prime Minister--Verica Kalanovic
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Vuk Jeremic
Minister of Defense--Dragan Sutanovac
Ambassador to the U.S.--Vladimir Petrovic

Serbia maintains an embassy in the United States at 2134 Kalorama Rd., NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-332-0333).

DEFENSE
The Serbian Armed Forces consist of two services--the Army, and the Air Force and Air Defense--comprising approximately 36,000 personnel. As of January 1, 2011 the force had been fully professionalized, and an active and passive reserve had been introduced. In 2010, the Ministry of Defense budget was 2.2% of the GDP, and in 2011 it dropped to 2.1%--around U.S. $900 million. Serbia has been a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) since 2006, and the Serbian military office at NATO headquarters in Brussels became fully functional and manned as of mid-2010.

ECONOMY
Since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia’s economic progress has been substantial, but economic reform and restructuring are continuing challenges for the Serbian Government. Unemployment, corruption, and labor unrest remain ongoing political and economic problems. The dinar has fallen by more than a third against the Euro since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, highlighting Serbia’s fragile and structurally weak economy. The economic crisis, and a concern over Serbia’s external financing gaps, also led Serbia to seek a $4 billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was approved in May 2009. The IMF conducted a series of periodic reviews of Serbia’s economic performance under the SBA and generally concluded that Serbia met most SBA conditions. The current SBA expires at the end of April 2011, and as of late March 2011 the Serbian Government had not yet decided whether to request a follow-on agreement with the IMF.

Serbia experienced relatively healthy GDP growth rates in 2007 (6.9%) and 2008 (5.5%), but the global economic crisis caused Serbia’s GDP to tumble 3% in 2009. A slow economic recovery commenced in 2010 (1.8% GDP growth), and the IMF projects growth to accelerate modestly in 2011 (3% GDP growth). In late 2010, Serbia adopted a new model of economic growth based on increased savings, investment, production in tradable goods, and exports. The model has achieved some success. Exports, for example, rose by 26% in 2010, due in significant measure to the depreciation of the dinar and the incipient recovery of the global economy.

Inflation is a growing concern, reaching 12.6% year-on-year in February 2011, significantly above the National Bank of Serbia’s (NBS) 3%-6% target range for this year. In response, the NBS has raised its benchmark interest rate several times since the summer of 2010. As of March 10, 2011, the NBS benchmark rate stood at 12.25%, the highest in Europe, which has helped curb rising inflation but also tended to inhibit domestic investment and growth. Growing inflation and official price increases for controlled products and services, such as public transportation, electricity, and natural gas, have compounded the economic difficulties facing Serbian citizens, whose average net incomes (minus taxes, medical insurance, and retirement contributions) have remained stagnant at approximately $440 per month. Poverty levels have risen steadily since the onset of the global financial crises, reaching approximately 8.8% of the population at the end of 2010. The official unemployment rate stood at 19.2% as of October 2010, and unemployment levels in many provincial cities and among women and minorities exceeds 30%. The projected 3% GDP growth rate for 2011 is not sufficiently robust to have a significant impact on reducing unemployment this year.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) was relatively strong prior to the global financial crisis ($2.2 billion in 2007 and $2.3 billion in 2008), but fell off in 2009 ($1.9 billion) and has remained at disappointing levels ($1 billion in 2010). Efforts to attract additional FDI were dealt a setback in March 2011, when a tender to sell a majority stake in the state telecommunications company, Telekom Srbija, failed to attract a minimally acceptable bid. On the other hand, a number of leading foreign investors, including Italian automotive manufacturer Fiat, U.S. Steel, and Ball Packaging, have recently announced significant expansions of their operations in Serbia. Total U.S. investment in Serbia exceeds $1.5 billion. Among the leading U.S. investors are Philip Morris, U.S. Steel, Ball Packaging, Coca-Cola, and Van Drunen Farms. Many other leading U.S. firms, from a broad variety of industrial and service sectors, have a significant presence in Serbia. Other major international investors include Norway’s Telenor, with well over $1 billion invested, and Russia’s Gazprom Neft, which acquired a majority stake in the formerly state-owned oil company, Naftna Industrija Srbija, for 400 million Euros ($555 million at the prevailing exchange rate) in 2008.

Economic reform has been moving forward in many areas, driven largely by Serbia’s decision to seek membership in the European Union (EU) and in the World Trade Organization. Serbia’s accomplishments in modernizing legislation to conform to EU and international standards in nearly all areas affecting the economy, from intellectual property rights to foreign trade, have been impressive. Implementation of these new laws, however, remains inconsistent. In addition, important sectors of the Serbian economy and society, such as education, health, and energy, have yet to undergo serious structural reforms. Political appointees preside over large, inefficient state enterprises that are run more as social welfare organizations than as modern businesses. Much of the economy and employment structure remains dominated by an inefficient public sector. More than 25% of all people employed in Serbia work for state-owned enterprises or the central and local governments. The World Bank estimates that two-thirds of all university graduates in Serbia work for the public sector, and only one-third in private enterprises. Privatization is far from complete. In addition to the unsuccessful effort to privatize Telekom Srbija in 2011, approximately 100 “socially-owned” companies whose privatization was scheduled to be completed by the end of 2008 remain under state stewardship. Competition remains limited in some key economic sectors, including certain agricultural subsectors (sugar, sunflower oil, soybean products, wheat seeds, mineral fertilizers, and some dairy products), food retailing, and energy, which are dominated by a handful of major market players. Property rights remain unsettled to a significant degree. Serbia has yet to adopt a restitution law to address the state’s seizure of private assets since the onset of World War II, and many structures in Serbia have been built without licenses or proper registration in official property records, tending to inhibit real estate development and other investment projects.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Serbia currently enjoys stable diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors except Kosovo.

Immediately preceding the NATO bombing campaign of the F.R.Y. in March 1999, the U.S. and most European countries severed relations with Belgrade, and the U.S. Embassy was closed. After October 5, 2000, foreign embassies, including that of the U.S., reopened and Serbia, as the successor state to the F.R.Y., regained its seat in such international organizations as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN, and is actively participating in International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank projects. In 2003, Serbia was admitted to the Council of Europe. Serbia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and in 2009 submitted its first Individual Partnership Program (IPP) to NATO. Public support for joining the Alliance remains low.

Serbia has strongly emphasized its desire to join the EU and has begun to implement a broad reform agenda to advance the government’s EU integration goals. The EU has made full ICTY cooperation a prerequisite for increased cooperation with Serbia, and war crimes fugitives Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic remain at large. Serbia and the EU signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)--the first step toward eventual accession--in April 2008, but the EU immediately froze the related Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) pending full cooperation with the ICTY. Following ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz’s reports to the UN Security Council that he was satisfied with Serbia’s level of cooperation with the ICTY, the EU agreed in December 2009 to implement the ITA. The EU also implemented visa liberalization for Serbian citizens in December 2009, allowing visa-free travel to Schengen countries for business and tourism. Serbia submitted its candidacy application to the EU on December 22, 2009, and in June 2010 the EU agreed to submit Serbia’s SAA to member state parliaments for ratification. Following Serbia’s agreement to engage with Kosovo on practical issues in September 2010, the EU formally accepted Serbia’s membership application in October 2010 and set several political conditions for Serbia’s continued EU integration, including continued reforms, dialogue with Kosovo, and full ICTY cooperation. The EU will review Serbia’s membership application in the second half of 2011 and decide whether to grant Serbia full candidate status, possibly by the end of the year.

Serbia's bilateral relationships with many countries were strained following Kosovo's independence in February 2008. In the days following Kosovo's independence, rioters in Belgrade attacked the embassies of several countries, including the United States, causing significant property damage. Serbia recalled its ambassadors for consultations from all countries that formally recognized Kosovo. Serbia returned its ambassadors to EU countries in July 2008 and to the remaining countries in October 2008.

Government officials declared their intent to pursue all peaceful, political, and diplomatic means to retain Kosovo and sought a UN General Assembly resolution to request that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issue an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence. After a vigorous lobbying campaign, on October 9, 2008, the Serbian resolution passed in the UN General Assembly. Serbia, the United States, and other UN member states presented their legal positions to the Court through written briefs and oral presentations in 2009. Kosovo, although not a UN member, was permitted to participate in the written and oral proceedings, as the authors of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. On July 22, 2010, the ICJ released its advisory opinion decisively affirming that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was in accordance with international law and did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

Aside from Kosovo, Belgrade has made efforts to improve relations with its regional neighbors. In March 2010, the National Assembly passed a resolution condemning the crimes committed at Srebrenica in 1995, which also reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serbian Government continues to state its full support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity. President Tadic has taken steps to improve relations with Croatia, working to resolve longstanding obstacles to greater cooperation, including refugee, property, border, and war crimes issues.

Foreign Aid
At the social, political, and geographic crossroads between Eastern and Western Europe, Serbia occupies a key strategic juncture in the Balkans. The U.S. has been engaged in assisting Serbia's transition to a market-oriented democracy since 1997. Despite political uncertainty, U.S. Government assistance to Serbia continues to promote opportunities for economic growth, build capacity with key counterparts, and work steadily to move the country toward stability and Euro-Atlantic integration.

U.S. assistance to Serbia is strategically targeted to address priority U.S. foreign policy objectives and to promote Serbia's successful transition to a functioning market economy and stable pluralistic democracy. These resources, although modest in comparison to the European Union and other multilateral donors, have proven to be instrumental in leveraging other investments and in focusing Serbia's reform agenda.

Annual congressional restrictions have been imposed on U.S. assistance to Serbia in order to ensure that the country meets its obligation to comply with the rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On June 7, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton certified that Serbia was cooperating with the ICTY.

U.S.-SERBIA RELATIONS
After severing diplomatic relations in March 1999, the U.S. Embassy formally reopened in May 2001. The Serbian Embassy in Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade have reestablished bilateral relations and provide a full range of consular services. Serbia withdrew its ambassador to Washington from February to October 2008 in protest of U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Vice President Joseph Biden visited Serbia in May 2009 and met with President Tadic, Prime Minister Cvetkovic, and Defense Minister Sutanovac. Vice President Biden’s visit was the highest-level U.S. visit to Serbia since Vice President George H.W. Bush’s visit in September 1983 and signaled an interest in energizing U.S.-Serbia relations. In 2009 and 2010, other high-ranking U.S. officials, including Secretary Clinton, visited Serbia and met with key leaders in an effort to bolster Serbia’s European integration path.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Mary Burce Warlick
Deputy Chief of Mission--Earle Litzenberger
Political Counselor--Deborah Mennuti
Economic Counselor--Douglas Apostol
Management Counselor--Jeffrey Cellars
Public Affairs Counselor--Conrad Turner
Consul General--Peter Marigliano
Defense Attache--Col. Paul Brotzen
Senior Commercial Officer--Bradley Harker
USAID Mission Director--Susan Fritz

The U.S. Embassy in Serbia is located at Kneza Milosa 50, 11000 Belgrade (tel. 381-11-361-9344).

TRAVEL AND BUSINESS INFORMATION
The U.S. Department of State's Consular Information Program advises Americans traveling and residing abroad through Country Specific Information, Travel Alerts, and Travel Warnings. Country Specific Information exists for all countries and includes information on entry and exit requirements, currency regulations, health conditions, safety and security, crime, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. Travel Alerts are issued to disseminate information quickly about terrorist threats and other relatively short-term conditions overseas that pose significant risks to the security of American travelers. Travel Warnings are issued when the State Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a certain country because the situation is dangerous or unstable.

For the latest security information, Americans living and traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs Internet web site at http://www.travel.state.gov, where the current Worldwide Caution, Travel Alerts, and Travel Warnings can be found. Consular Affairs Publications, which contain information on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad, are also available at http://www.travel.state.gov. For additional information on international travel, see http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Travel/International.shtml.

The Department of State encourages all U.S. citizens traveling or residing abroad to register via the State Department's travel registration website or at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate abroad. Registration will make your presence and whereabouts known in case it is necessary to contact you in an emergency and will enable you to receive up-to-date information on security conditions.

Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S. and Canada or the regular toll line 1-202-501-4444 for callers outside the U.S. and Canada.

The National Passport Information Center (NPIC) is the U.S. Department of State's single, centralized public contact center for U.S. passport information. Telephone: 1-877-4-USA-PPT (1-877-487-2778); TDD/TTY: 1-888-874-7793. Passport information is available 24 hours, 7 days a week. You may speak with a representative Monday-Friday, 8 a.m. to 10 p.m., Eastern Time, excluding federal holidays.

Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at 800-CDC-INFO (800-232-4636) and a web site at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx give the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. The CDC publication "Health Information for International Travel" can be found at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/contentYellowBook.aspx.

Further Electronic Information
Department of State Web Site. Available on the Internet at http://www.state.gov, the Department of State web site provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information, including Background Notes and daily press briefings along with the directory of key officers of Foreign Service posts and more. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) provides security information and regional news that impact U.S. companies working abroad through its website http://www.osac.gov

Export.gov provides a portal to all export-related assistance and market information offered by the federal government and provides trade leads, free export counseling, help with the export process, and more.

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March 30, 2011Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

Background Note: El Salvador

Official Name: Republic of El Salvador

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 20,742 sq. km. (8,008 sq. mi.); about the size of Massachusetts.
Cities: Capital--San Salvador (pop. 1.6 million). Other cities--Santa Ana, San Miguel, Soyapango, and Apopa.
Terrain: Mountains separate country into three distinct regions--southern coastal belt, central valleys and plateaus, and northern mountains.
Climate: Tropical, distinct wet and dry seasons.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Salvadoran(s).
Population (2009 est.): 7.2 million.
Annual population growth rate (2009 est.): 1.7%.
Ethnic groups: Mestizo 90%, indigenous 1%, Caucasian 9%.
Religion (2003 est.): About 57% Roman Catholic, with significant and growing numbers of Protestant groups.
Language: Spanish.
Education: Free through high school. Attendance (grades 1-9)--92.4%. Literacy--86.1% nationally; 77.6% in rural areas.
Health: Infant mortality rate (2006)--22/1,000 (source: UNICEF). Life expectancy at birth (2008)--72.1 years.
Work force (about 2.4 million, 2009): Agriculture--21%; retail, hotels, and restaurants--29%; industry--15%; construction--5%; other services--30% (2009).

Government
Type: Republic.
Constitution: December 20, 1983.
Independence: September 15, 1821.
Branches: Executive--president and vice president. Legislative--84-member Legislative Assembly. Judicial--independent (Supreme Court).
Administrative subdivisions: 14 departments.
Political parties (represented in the legislature): Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), National Conciliation Party (PCN), Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and Democratic Change (CD).
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy
GDP (2010): $21.8 billion; PPP GDP (2010): $43.98 billion.
GDP annual real growth rate (2010): 0.7%-1.0%.
Per capita income (2009): $3,429; PPP per capita income (2010): $7,300.
Agriculture (11% of GDP, 2010): Products--coffee, sugar, livestock, corn, poultry, and sorghum. Arable, cultivated, or pasture land--68% (2005).
Industry (29.1% of GDP, 2010): Types--textiles and apparel, medicines, food and beverage processing, clothing, chemical products, petroleum products, electronics, call centers.
Trade (2010): Exports--$4.5 billion: textiles and apparel, ethyl alcohol, coffee, sugar, medicines, iron and steel products, tuna, light manufacturing, and paper products. Major markets--U.S. 48.3%, Central American Common Market (CACM) 35.5%. Imports--$8.5 billion: petroleum, iron products, machines and mechanical devices, cars, medicines, consumer goods, foodstuffs, capital goods, and raw industrial materials. Major suppliers--U.S. 36.5%, CACM 19.5%.

PEOPLE
El Salvador's population numbers about 7.2 million. Almost 90% is of mixed Indian and Spanish extraction. About 1% is indigenous; very few Indians have retained their customs and traditions. The country's people are largely Roman Catholic and Protestant. Spanish is the language spoken by virtually all inhabitants. The capital city of San Salvador has about 1.6 million people; an estimated 37.3% of El Salvador's population lives in rural areas.

HISTORY
The Pipil Indians, descendants of the Aztecs, and the Pocomames and Lencas were the original inhabitants of El Salvador.

The first Salvadoran territory visited by Spaniards was Meanguera Island, located in the Gulf of Fonseca, where Spanish Admiral Andres Nino led an expedition to Central America and disembarked on May 31, 1522. In June 1524, the Spanish Captain Pedro de Alvarado started a war to conquer Cuscatlan. His cousin Diego de Alvarado established the village of San Salvador in April 1525. In 1546, Charles I of Spain granted San Salvador the title of city.

During the subsequent years, the country evolved under Spanish rule; however, toward the end of 1810 many people began to express discontent. On November 5, 1811, when Priest Jose Matias Delgado rang the bells of La Merced Church in San Salvador calling for insurrection, the people began to band together for freedom.

In 1821, El Salvador and the other Central American provinces declared their independence from Spain. When these provinces were joined with Mexico in early 1822, El Salvador resisted, insisting on autonomy for the Central American countries. In 1823, the United Provinces of Central America was formed of the five Central American states under Gen. Manuel Jose Arce. When this federation was dissolved in 1838, El Salvador became an independent republic. El Salvador's early history as an independent state--as with others in Central America--was marked by frequent revolutions; not until the period 1900-30 was relative stability achieved. Following a deterioration in the country's democratic institutions in the 1970s a period of civil war followed from 1980-1992. More than 75,000 people are estimated to have died in the conflict. In January 1992, after prolonged negotiations, the opposing sides signed peace accords which ended the war, brought the military under civilian control, and allowed the former guerillas to form a legitimate political party and participate in elections.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
El Salvador is a democratic republic governed by a president and an 84-member unicameral Legislative Assembly. The president is elected by universal suffrage by absolute majority vote and serves for a 5-year term. A second round runoff is required in the event that no candidate receives more than 50% of the first round vote. Members of the assembly are elected based on the number of votes that their parties obtain in each department (circumscriptive suffrage) and serve for 3-year terms. The country has an independent judiciary and Supreme Court. Legislative and municipal elections were held in January 2009, and presidential elections were held in March 2009.

Political Landscape
Hard-line conservatives, including some members of the military, created the Nationalist Republican Alliance party (ARENA) in 1981. ARENA almost won the election in 1984 with solid private sector and rural farmer support. By 1989, ARENA had attracted the support of business groups. Multiple factors contributed to ARENA victories in the 1988 legislative and 1989 presidential elections, including allegations of corruption in the ruling Christian Democratic party which had poor relations with the private sector, and historically low prices for the nation’s main agricultural exports.

The successes of Alfredo Cristiani's 1989-94 administration in achieving a peace agreement to end the civil war and in improving the nation's economy helped ARENA--led by former San Salvador mayor Armando Calderon Sol--keep both the presidency and a working majority in the Legislative Assembly in the 1994 elections. ARENA's legislative position was weakened in the 1997 elections, but it recovered its strength, helped by divisions in the opposition, in time for another victory in the 1999 presidential race, bringing President Francisco Guillermo Flores Perez to office. Flores concentrated on modernizing the economy and strengthening bilateral relations with the United States. Under his presidency El Salvador committed itself to combating international terrorism, including sending troops to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. El Salvador also played a key role in negotiations for the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).

Taking advantage of both public apprehension of Flores’ policies and ARENA infighting, the chief opposition party, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), was able to score a significant victory against ARENA in the March 2003 legislative and municipal elections. ARENA, left with only 29 seats in the 84-seat Legislative Assembly, was forced to court the right-wing National Conciliation Party (PCN) in order to form a majority voting bloc. However, in 2003 the PCN entered into a loose partnership with the FMLN, further limiting ARENA’s ability to maneuver in the legislature.

Despite these constraints, ARENA made a strong showing in the March 2004 presidential election, which was marked by an unprecedented 67% voter turnout. ARENA candidate Elias Antonio "Tony" Saca handily defeated the FMLN candidate and party head Shafik Handal, garnering 57.7% of the votes cast. The defeat of the FMLN’s presidential candidate rekindled an internal FMLN struggle between hardliners and more moderate members who saw the party’s 2004 defeat as a call for reform.

In January 2009 legislative and municipal elections, the incumbent ARENA party garnered 32 assembly deputies and 122 mayoralties, while the opposition FMLN won 35 legislative seats and 75 city halls (plus 21 additional mayoralties in which they participated as part of a coalition). The PCN, PDC, and CD carried 11, 5, and 1 assembly seats, respectively. The new assembly took office in May 2009. In October 2009, twelve ARENA deputies left the party to form a new movement, the Great Alliance for National Unity (GANA), and two other deputies (one each from ARENA and the PCN) left their parties to become independents. As of January 2010, the assembly was composed as follows: FMLN - 35 seats, ARENA - 19 seats, GANA - 12 seats, PCN - 10 seats, PDC - 5 seats, CD - 1 seat, independent deputies - 2 seats. In December 2009, former President Antonio Saca was expelled from ARENA for his suspected involvement in the defection of the GANA deputies.

On March 15, 2009, FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes won El Salvador’s presidential elections, defeating ARENA candidate Rodrigo Avila. Final vote totals were 51.3% for the FMLN and 48.7% for ARENA. The elections marked the first time since the 1992 peace agreement that ended the civil war that an FMLN candidate was elected president and the first left-of-center government in El Salvador’s history. President Funes was inaugurated on June 1, 2009.

Human Rights and Post-War Reforms
During the 12-year civil war, human rights violations by both the government security forces and left-wing guerillas were rampant. The accords established a Truth Commission under UN auspices to investigate the most serious cases. The commission recommended that those identified as human rights violators be removed from all government and military posts. Thereafter, the Legislative Assembly granted amnesty for political crimes committed during the war. Among those freed as a result were the Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) officers convicted in the November 1989 Jesuit murders and the FMLN ex-combatants held for the 1991 murders of two U.S. servicemen. The peace accords also established the Ad Hoc Commission to evaluate the human rights record of the ESAF officer corps.

In accordance with the peace agreements, the constitution was amended to prohibit the military from playing an internal security role except under extraordinary circumstances. Demobilization of Salvadoran military forces generally proceeded on schedule throughout the process. The Treasury Police, National Guard, and National Police were abolished, and military intelligence functions were transferred to civilian control. By 1993--9 months ahead of schedule--the military had cut personnel from a war-time high of 63,000 to the level of 32,000 required by the peace accords. By 1999, ESAF strength stood at less than 15,000, including uniformed and non-uniformed personnel, consisting of personnel in the army, navy, and air force. A purge of military officers accused of human rights abuses and corruption was completed in 1993 in compliance with the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations. The military's new doctrine, professionalism, and complete withdrawal from political and economic affairs have made it one of the most respected institutions in El Salvador.

More than 35,000 eligible beneficiaries from among the former guerrillas and soldiers who fought in the war received land under the peace accord-mandated land transfer program, which ended in January 1997. The majority of them also received agricultural credits.

National Civilian Police
The National Civilian Police (PNC), created to replace the discredited public security forces, deployed its first officers in March 1993 and was present throughout the country by the end of 1994. The PNC has about 16,000 officers. The United States, originally through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and subsequently through the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, led international support for the PNC and the National Public Security Academy (ANSP), providing about $32 million in non-lethal equipment and training since 1992.

Judiciary
Following the peace accords, both the Truth Commission and the Joint Group identified weaknesses in the judiciary and recommended solutions, including the replacement of all the magistrates on the Supreme Court. This recommendation was fulfilled in 1994 when an entirely new court was elected, but weaknesses remain. The process of replacing judges in the lower courts, and of strengthening the attorney generals' and public defender's offices, has moved slowly. The government continues to work in all of these areas with the help of international donors, including the United States. Action on peace accord-driven constitutional reforms designed to improve the administration of justice was largely completed in 1996 with legislative approval of several amendments and the revision of the Criminal Procedure Code--with broad political consensus.

Principal Government Officials
President--Carlos Mauricio FUNES Cartagena
Vice President--Salvador SANCHEZ CEREN
Minister of Foreign Relations--Hugo Roger MARTINEZ Bonilla
Ambassador to the United States--Francisco ALTSCHUL Fuentes
Representative to the OAS--Luis MENENDEZ Castro (interim)
Representative to the UN--Carmen Maria GALLARDO de Hernandez

El Salvador maintains an Embassy in the United States at 1400 16th Street NW, Washington, DC, 20036 (tel: 202-595-7500). There are consulates in Atlanta, GA; Brentwood, NY; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Dallas, TX; Elizabeth, NJ; Houston, TX; Las Vegas, NV; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New York, NY; Nogales, AZ; Santa Ana, CA; San Francisco, CA; and Woodbridge, VA.

ECONOMY
The Salvadoran economy continues to benefit from a commitment to free markets and careful fiscal management. The economy has been growing at a steady and moderate pace since the signing of peace accords in 1992, and poverty was cut from 66% in 1991 to 37.8% in 2009. Much of the improvement in El Salvador's economy is a result of the privatization of the banking system, telecommunications, public pensions, electrical distribution and some electrical generation; reduction of import duties; elimination of price controls; and improved enforcement of intellectual property rights. Capping those reforms, on January 1, 2001, the U.S. dollar became legal tender in El Salvador. The economy is now fully dollarized.

The Salvadoran Government has maintained fiscal discipline during post-war reconstruction and reconstruction following earthquakes in 2001 and hurricanes in 1998 and 2005. Taxes levied by the government include a value added tax (VAT) of 13%, income tax of 20%, excise taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, and import duties. The VAT accounted for about 49.7% of total tax revenues in 2010. El Salvador’s public external debt in December 2009 was about $11.2 billion, 53% of GDP.

Years of civil war, fought largely in the rural areas, had a devastating impact on agricultural production in El Salvador. The agricultural sector experienced significant recovery, buoyed in part by higher world prices for coffee and sugarcane and increased diversification into horticultural crops. Seeking to develop new growth sectors and employment opportunities, El Salvador created new export industries through fiscal incentives for free trade zones. The largest beneficiary has been the textile and apparel (maquila) sector, which directly provides approximately 80,000 jobs. Services, including retail and financial, have also shown strong employment growth, with about 59% of the total labor force now employed in the sector.

Remittances from Salvadorans working in the United States are an important source of income for many families in El Salvador. In 2010, the Central Bank estimated that remittances totaled $3.5 billion. UN Development Program (UNDP) surveys show that an estimated 22.3% of families receive remittances.

Under its export-led growth strategy, El Salvador has pursued economic integration with its Central American neighbors and negotiated trade agreements with the Dominican Republic, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Taiwan, Colombia, and the United States. In 2010, Central America signed an Association Agreement with the European Union that includes the establishment of a free trade area. The Central American countries are negotiating a free trade agreement with Canada. El Salvador is negotiating a partial-scope agreement with Cuba that is expected to be finalized during 2011. El Salvador also expects to begin Pacific Arc forum negotiations to reach a trade agreement aimed at creating a common production platform; forum members are Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador. Exports and Imports both grew by 17.8% in 2010. As in previous years, the large trade deficit was offset by family remittances.

The U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), implemented between El Salvador and the United States on March 1, 2006, provides El Salvador preferential access to U.S. markets. Textiles and apparel, shoes, and processed foods are among the sectors that benefit. In addition to trade benefits, CAFTA-DR also provides trade capacity building, particularly in the environment and labor areas, and a framework for additional reforms on issues such as intellectual property rights, dispute resolution, and customs that will improve El Salvador’s investment climate. For sensitive sectors such as agriculture, the agreement includes generous phase-in periods to allow Salvadoran producers an opportunity to become more competitive.

U.S. support for privatization of the electrical and telecommunications markets markedly expanded opportunities for U.S. investment in the country. More than 300 U.S. companies have established either a permanent commercial presence in El Salvador or work through representative offices in the country. The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains a Country Commercial Guide for U.S. businesses seeking detailed information on business opportunities in El Salvador.

On November 29, 2006, the Government of El Salvador and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a 5-year, $461 million anti-poverty Compact to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty in the country’s northern region. The grant seeks to improve the lives of approximately 850,000 Salvadorans through investments in education, public services, enterprise development, and transportation infrastructure. The Compact entered into force in September 2007, and it is expected that incomes in the region will increase by 20% over the 5-year term of the Compact, and by 30% within 10 years of the start of the Compact.

Natural Disasters
Located on the Pacific’s earthquake-prone Ring of Fire and at latitudes plagued by hurricanes, El Salvador’s history is a litany of catastrophe, including the Great Hurricane of 1780 that killed 22,000 in Central America and earthquakes in 1854 and 1917 that devastated El Salvador and destroyed most of the capital city. More recently, an October 1986 earthquake killed 1,400 and seriously damaged the nation’s infrastructure. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch killed 10,000 in the region, although El Salvador--lacking a Caribbean coast--suffered less than Honduras and Nicaragua. Major earthquakes in January and February of 2001 took another 1,000 lives and left thousands more homeless and jobless. El Salvador’s largest volcano, Santa Ana (also known by its indigenous name Ilamatepec), erupted in October 2005, spewing sulfuric gas, ash, and rock on surrounding communities and coffee plantations, killing two people and permanently displacing 5,000. Also in October 2005, Hurricane Stan unleashed heavy rains that caused flooding throughout El Salvador. In all, the flooding caused 67 deaths and more than 50,000 people were evacuated at some point during the crisis. Damages from the storm were estimated at $355.6 million. In November 2008, rains from Tropical Storm Ida caused flooding and mudslides that killed at least 199 and left extensive property damage in the departments of Cuscatlan, La Paz, San Vicente, and San Salvador. In 2010 property evacuation operations by the authorities prevented a higher number of deaths. In June 2010, Tropical Storm Alex killed 5 people and damaged 349 homes, and in September 2010, Tropical Storm Matthew killed 3 people and damaged 141 homes.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
El Salvador is a member of the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Central American Parliament, and the Central American Integration System (SICA). It actively participates in the Central American Security Commission (CASC), which seeks to promote regional arms control. From 2002-2003, El Salvador was chair of the OAS anti-terrorism coordinating body, CICTE. El Salvador also is a member of the World Trade Organization and is pursuing regional free trade agreements. An active participant in the Summit of the Americas process, El Salvador has chaired a working group on market access under the Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative. El Salvador has joined its six Central American neighbors in signing the Alliance for Sustainable Development, known as the Conjunta Centroamerica-USA or CONCAUSA to promote sustainable economic development in the region.

El Salvador enjoys normal diplomatic and trade relations with all of its neighboring countries including Honduras, with which it has previously had territorial disputes. While the two nations continue to disagree over the status of their maritime borders in the Gulf of Fonseca, they have agreed to settle their land-border disputes with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In September 1992, the Court awarded most of the territory in question to Honduras. In January 1998, Honduras and El Salvador signed a border demarcation treaty to implement the terms of the ICJ decree although delays continue due to technical difficulties.

U.S.-SALVADORAN RELATIONS
U.S.-Salvadoran relations remain close and strong. U.S. policy toward El Salvador promotes the strengthening of El Salvador's democratic institutions, rule of law, judicial reform, national reconciliation and reconstruction, and economic opportunity and growth. El Salvador was a committed member of the coalition of nations fighting against terrorism and sent 11 rotations of troops to Iraq to support Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 through 2008.

The U.S. and Salvadoran Governments cooperate closely to combat narcotics trafficking and organized crime. El Salvador hosts the International Law Enforcement Academy, which provides training to police, prosecutors, and other officials from across the Latin American region. El Salvador’s Air Force installation near Comalapa Airport houses a monitoring facility that surveils narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and El Salvador’s National Civilian Police jointly operate the Transnational Anti-Gang unit, which addresses the growing problem of street gangs in both countries. In January 2009, the U.S. and El Salvador signed letters of agreement committing both countries to work jointly under the Merida Initiative to fight crime and drug trafficking.

U.S. ties to El Salvador are dynamic and growing. More than 19,000 American citizens live and work full-time in El Salvador. Most are private business people and their families, but a small number of American citizen retirees have been drawn to El Salvador by favorable tax conditions. The Embassy's consular section provides a full range of citizenship services to this community. The American Chamber of Commerce in El Salvador is located at World Trade Center, Torre 2, local No. 308, 89 Av. Nte. Col. Escalon, phone: 2263-9494.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Mari Carmen Aponte
Deputy Chief of Mission--Robert Blau
Acting USAID Mission Director--Carl B. Derrick
Political Counselor--Maeve Dwyer
Economic Counselor--Mitchell Ferguson
Commercial Counselor--Michael L. McGee
Public Affairs Counselor--Marti Estell
Consul General--Kathryn Cabral

The U.S. Embassy in El Salvador is located at Final Blvd. Santa Elena, Antiguo Cuscatlan, La Libertad (phone (503) 2501-2999; fax number (503) 2501-2150). Website: http://sansalvador.usembassy.gov/

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March 31, 2011Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

Background Note: Saint Kitts and Nevis

Official Name: Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis

PROFILE

Geography
Area: St. Kitts 168 sq. km. (65 sq. mi.); Nevis 93 sq. km. (36 sq. mi.).
Cities: Capital--Basseterre (pop. about 15,000).
Terrain: Generally mountainous; highest elevations are 1,156 m. (3,792 ft.) at Mt. Liamuiga on St. Kitts and 985 m; (3,232 ft.) at Nevis peak on Nevis.
Climate: Tropical.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Kittitian(s), Nevisian(s).
Population (2007): 39,129.
Annual population growth rate (2007): 1%.
Ethnic groups: Predominantly of African origin; some of British, Portuguese, and Lebanese descent.
Religions: Principally Anglican, with Evangelical Protestant and Roman Catholic minorities.
Languages: English (official).
Education (2005): Adult literacy--97.8%.
Health (2007): Infant mortality rate--14.5/1,000. Life expectancy--men 68 years; women 72 years.
Unemployment (2006): 5.1%.

Government
Type: Parliamentary democracy; independent sovereign state within the Commonwealth.
Constitution: 1983.
Independence: September 19, 1983.
Branches: Executive--governor general (representing Queen Elizabeth II, head of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative--bicameral Parliament. Judicial--magistrate's courts, Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (High Court and Court of Appeals), final appeal to Privy Council in London.
Administrative subdivisions: 14 parishes.
Political parties: St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party (ruling), People's Action Movement (PAM), Concerned Citizens Movement (a Nevis-based party), and Nevis Reformation Party.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy
GDP (2007): $477.4 million.
GDP growth rate (2006): 5.8%.
Per capita GDP (2006): $8,546.
Inflation (2006): 5.25%.
Natural resources: Negligible.
Agriculture: Rice, yams, bananas, fish, cotton, peanuts, vegetables.
Industry: Financial and business services, tourism, construction, clothing, footwear, beverages, and tobacco.
Trade (2006): Exports--$31 million (merchandise) and $139 million (commercial services). Major markets--United States (91.9%), EU (3.0%), Trinidad and Tobago (2%), Netherlands Antilles (0.8%), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (0.3%). Imports--$210 million (merchandise) and $87 million (commercial services). Major suppliers--United States (57.9%), Trinidad and Tobago (14.1%), European Union (9.3%), Japan (3.8%), and Barbados (2.8%).
Official exchange rate: EC$2.70 = U.S. $1.

HISTORY
At the time of European discovery, Carib Indians inhabited the islands of St. Kitts and Nevis. Christopher Columbus landed on the larger island in 1493 on his second voyage and named it after St. Christopher, his patron saint. Columbus also discovered Nevis on his second voyage, reportedly calling it Nevis because of its resemblance to a snowcapped mountain (in Spanish, "nuestra senora de las nieves" or our lady of the snows). European settlement did not officially begin until 1623-24, when first English, then French settlers arrived on St. Christopher's Island, whose name the English shortened to St. Kitts Island. As the first English colony in the Caribbean, St. Kitts served as a base for further colonization in the region.

The English and French held St. Kitts jointly from 1628 to 1713. During the 17th century, intermittent warfare between French and English settlers ravaged the island's economy. Meanwhile Nevis, settled by English settlers in 1628, grew prosperous under English rule. St. Kitts was ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The French seized both St. Kitts and Nevis in 1782. The Treaty of Paris in 1783 definitively awarded both islands to Britain. They were part of the colony of the Leeward Islands from 1871-1956, and of the West Indies Federation from 1958-62. In 1967, together with Anguilla, they became a self-governing state in association with Great Britain; Anguilla seceded late that year and remains a British dependency. The Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis attained full independence on September 19, 1983.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
As head of state, Queen Elizabeth II is represented in St. Kitts and Nevis by a governor general, who acts on the advice of the prime minister and the cabinet. The prime minister is the leader of the majority party of the House of Representatives, and the cabinet conducts affairs of state. St. Kitts and Nevis has a bicameral legislature: An 11-member Senate appointed by the governor general (mainly on the advice of the prime minister and the leader of the opposition); and an 11-member popularly elected House of Representatives which has eight St. Kitts seats and three Nevis seats. The prime minister and the cabinet are responsible to the Parliament.

St. Kitts and Nevis has enjoyed a long history of free and fair elections, although the outcome of elections in 1993 was strongly protested by the opposition and the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) was briefly deployed to restore order. The elections in 1995 were contested by the two major parties, the ruling People's Action Movement (PAM) and the St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party. Labour won seven of the 11 seats, with Dr. Denzil Douglas becoming prime minister. In the 2010 elections, Denzil Douglas and the Labour Party were returned to power, winning six of the eight seats allotted to St. Kitts in the Parliament. The Nevis-based Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM) won two seats, the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) won one seat, and the PAM party won two seats. The next elections are constitutionally due by November 2015.

The constitution gives Nevis considerable autonomy. Nevis has an island assembly, a premier, and a deputy governor general. Under certain specified conditions, it may secede from the federation. In accordance with its rights under the Constitution, in 1996 the Nevis Island Administration under the Concerned Citizens' Movement (CCM) of Premier Vance Amory initiated steps towards secession from the Federation, the most recent being a referendum in 1998 that failed to secure the required two-thirds majority for secession. In the July 10, 2006 Nevis elections for the Nevis Island Administration, the NRP won three of the five seats; the CCM won two. The NRP's Joseph Parry assumed the premiership of Nevis. While opposing secession, the government acknowledged the constitutional rights of Nevisians to determine their future independence. Constitutional safeguards include freedom of speech, press, worship, movement, and association. Like its neighbors in the English-speaking Caribbean, St. Kitts and Nevis has an excellent human rights record. Its judicial system is modeled on British practice and procedure and its jurisprudence on English common law.

Principal Government Officials
Chief of State--Queen Elizabeth II
Governor General--Cuthbert M. Sebastian
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Sustainable Development, Information and Technology, Tourism, Culture and Sports--Denzil L. Douglas
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education--Sam Condor
Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the OAS--Jacinth L. Henry-Martin
Permanent Representative to the UN--Delano Bart
Principal Nevis Island Government Official, Premier--Joseph Parry

The embassy of St. Kitts and Nevis is located at 3216 New Mexico Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20016 (tel. 202-686-2636).

ECONOMY
St. Kitts and Nevis was the last sugar monoculture in the Eastern Caribbean until the government decided to close the sugar industry in 2005, after decades of losses at the state-run sugar company. To compensate for the loss of the sugar industry, the Government of St. Kitts and Nevis has begun exploring alternative energy uses for sugar cane. The United States and Brazil have agreed to develop biofuels programs in the region.

The economy of St. Kitts and Nevis experienced strong growth for most of the 1990s, but hurricanes in 1998 and 1999 and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks hurt the tourism-dependent economy. Economic growth picked up in 2004, with a real GDP growth rate of 6.4%, followed by 4.1% growth in 2005. The GDP growth rate rose to 5.8% in 2006, mostly as a result of diversification into tourism and construction related to the Cricket World Cup. Tourism has shown the greatest growth and is now a major foreign exchange earner for St. Kitts and Nevis, as evidenced by an 83% increase in foreign direct investment in a range of tourism-related projects. Recent significant investment included a 648-room Marriott hotel and convention center that opened in December 2002, as well as 2007 plans for "Christophe Harbor," a U.S. investor-funded $500 million resort project. The government instituted a program of investment incentives for businesses considering the possibility of locating in St. Kitts or Nevis, encouraging domestic and foreign private investment. Government policies provide liberal tax holidays, duty-free import of equipment and materials, and subsidies for training provided to local personnel.

However, the debt of public enterprises has increased, and total public and publicly guaranteed debt reached $290,740,000 in 2006. Consumer prices have risen marginally over the past few years. The rate of inflation, as measured by the change in the CPI, rose on average by 5.3% in 2006, compared with 3.6% in 2005 and 2.3% in 2004.

St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) issues the Eastern Caribbean dollar (EC$) for all members of the ECCU. The ECCB also manages monetary policy, and regulates and supervises commercial banking activities in its member countries. The ECCB has kept the EC$ pegged at EC$2.7 to U.S. $1.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
St. Kitts and Nevis maintains diplomatic relations with the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Taiwan, Cuba, and South Korea, as well as with many Latin American countries and neighboring Eastern Caribbean states. It is a member of the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of American States, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank is headquartered in St. Kitts. St. Kitts and Nevis has chosen to recognize Taiwan instead of the People's Republic of China.

U.S.-ST. KITTS AND NEVIS RELATIONS
Since St. Kitts and Nevis attained full independence in 1983, relations with the United States have been friendly. The United States seeks to help St. Kitts and Nevis develop economically and to help strengthen its moderate, democratic, parliamentary form of government. St. Kitts and Nevis is a beneficiary of the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative. U.S. assistance is primarily channeled through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) office in Bridgetown, Barbados. In addition, St. Kitts and Nevis benefits from U.S. military exercises and humanitarian civic action construction projects.

St. Kitts and Nevis is strategically placed in the Leeward Islands, near maritime transport lanes of major importance to the United States. St. Kitts and Nevis' location close to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands makes the two-island federation attractive to narcotics traffickers. To counter this threat, the Government of St. Kitts and Nevis cooperates with the United States in the fight against illegal narcotics. In 1995, the government signed a maritime law enforcement treaty with the United States, later amended with an overflight/order-to-land amendment in 1996. St. Kitts and Nevis also signed an updated extradition treaty with the United States in 1996, and a mutual legal assistance treaty in 1997.

St. Kitts and Nevis is a popular American tourist destination. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, tourism declined, but the islands have seen growing numbers of visitors in recent years. Fewer than 1,000 U.S. citizens reside on the island, although students and staff of Ross University Veterinary School and the Medical University of the Americas (Nevis) constitute a significant population of U.S. citizens.

The United States maintains no official presence in St. Kitts and Nevis. The Ambassador and Embassy officers are resident in Barbados and frequently travel to St. Kitts and Nevis. A U.S. consular agent residing in nearby Antigua, however, assists U.S. citizens in St. Kitts and Nevis.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials (resident in Barbados unless otherwise noted)
Ambassador--vacant
Deputy Chief of Mission--D. Brent Hardt
Political/Economic Chief--Brian Greaney
Consul General--Eugene Sweeney
Commercial Affairs--Greg Floyd
Public Affairs Officer--Rebecca Ross
Peace Corps Director--Kevin Carley (resident in St. Lucia)

The U.S. Embassy in Barbados is located in the Wildey Business Park, Wildey, St. Michael (tel: 246-227-4000; fax: 246-429-5246).

Mark C. Toner

Acting Deputy Department Spokesman
Daily Press Briefing

Washington, DC

April 4, 2011

Index for Today's Briefing

ANNOUNCEMENT
- Crash of UN Plane in the Democratic Republic of Congo
YEMEN
- U.S. Is Consulting with the Government and Opposition / Government Should Address Concerns of People of Yemen / U.S. Condemns All Acts of Violence / Goal Is Peaceful Solution / U.S. Continues Counterterrorism Cooperation with Yemen
LIBYA
- U.S. Continues to Communicate with the Opposition / U.S. Support for NATO Operation / Qadhafi Envoys' Meetings in Europe / Qadhafi Needs to Step Down
SYRIA
- Voluntary Authorized Departure foe Eligible Family Members / Not Aware if Any Flights Have Departed / Situation Is Volatile
LEBANON
- Assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces Continues / No Decision Had Been Made to Freeze Assistance
ISRAEL/PALESTINIANS
- Op Ed by Judge Goldstone / U.S. Saw No Evidence that Israel Had Intentionally Targeted Civilians / Engaged in War Crimes / Judge Goldstone Has Reached Same Conclusion
MEXICO
- Not Aware of a New Travel Warning
COLOMBIA/VENEZUELA
- Release of Drug Trafficker Walid Makled to Venezuela
NORTH KOREA
- Announced Existence of Enrichment Program / Violation of UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 / Contrary to Commitments under Joint Statement / Consulting with Five Party Partners on Next Steps
AFGHANISTAN
- U.S. Welcomes Statements by President Karzai / Quran Burning / Actions by Florida Pastor Were Contrary to the Values of the American People
CHINA
- Detention of Artist and Activist Ai Weiwei / Trend of Forced Disappearances / Extralegal Detentions / Arrests / Convictions of Rights Activists
VIETNAM
- Conviction and Sentencing of Activist Cu Huy Ha Vu

TRANSCRIPT:

MR. TONER: Good afternoon. I hope everybody has had or will have the chance to get outside today. I understand it’s beautiful, from gazing out the window upstairs.

Very quickly, just one thing to mention at the top: I’m sure all of you know or have seen reports that a UN plane crashed in the Congo. We’re deeply saddened to learn of the loss of life in the UN-contracted plane that was flying into Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo earlier today. Our deepest condolences go out to the families of the victims. We understand that rescue operations continue on the ground. And just to answer your follow-up – I’ll guess at it – but we are working with the UN to ascertain whether there were any U.S. citizens on the flight, but we don’t have any indication there were any at this time.

QUESTION: Can we start with Yemen?

MR. TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: Does the United States Government believe that President Saleh should step down?

MR. TONER: I think that’s not necessarily a decision for us to make, Arshad. What we’re trying to work for, or what we believe should be the final outcome, is that the Yemeni people should determine both the scope of change and the pace of change and when a transition, a peaceful transition of power, takes place that meets their aspirations.

QUESTION: Have you presented him with anything – a plan or a transition, ideas, proposals?

MR. TONER: I don’t want to get into the substance of our discussions with the Yemeni Government. I’d just say that we continue to consult intensively, both here and in Sana’a with the parties, and our – again, our ultimate goal is a peaceful solution.

QUESTION: There are --

QUESTION: Is it correct that the United States is speeding up that process? I mean, he said he has – he is going to step down at the end of the year. But is it correct to say that the U.S. wants that to happen sooner?

MR. TONER: Well, Jill, I’ve talked a lot from the podium last week, even, just saying that there is a gap between what President Saleh said and what the people have asked for. And certainly, in our discussions both in – both with the government and with the opposition, that we’re helping, or talking about bridging that gap. Again, our goal here is to see a peaceful solution to the violence and to the crisis, one that meets the – really, it’s the Yemeni people’s aspirations that need to be addressed.

QUESTION: Is the gap that you’re referring to the gap between people calling for him to go and his remaining in power, or is it a different gap?

MR. TONER: Well, part of it, as Jill mentioned, is the timeline. But again, it – this is something the Yemeni people have expressed and asked. And we, again, just feel that it’s really up to them to talk about the pace of this and the scope of it.

QUESTION: But Mark, right now, there are some Yemeni people who believe that it should be speeded up. I mean, you continue to have the president saying, “I’m not going any further,” you have more demonstrations, more people are dying, some people say it’s not enough for him eventually to step down. Is – can you possibly let this go on? I mean, can Yemen – but also with the urging of the United States, can this go on?

MR. TONER: Well – sure. Again, I don’t want to get into the substance of our diplomatic discussions, but we’ve made it clear to President Saleh, both in public as I’m doing now and in private, that violence is not a solution and that an agreement with the opposition needs to be reached as soon as possible.

QUESTION: For about --

MR. TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: For about how long has this policy been the policy of the Administration? That is, pushing for a peaceful transition with Saleh, not --

MR. TONER: All along.

QUESTION: Yeah. So a couple months, yeah?

MR. TONER: Yes.

QUESTION: So there’s not – so --

MR. TONER: I think that’s accurate. I mean, I don’t have a timeline here, but we’ve been calling for an end to the violence and for the Government of Yemen to address the concerns of its people in a timely fashion for some time.

QUESTION: And that includes this transition that you mentioned; correct?

MR. TONER: Agree, yes.

QUESTION: And so this is not something that happened in the last day or last week?

MR. TONER: I wouldn’t – no, I wouldn’t characterize it in that way.

QUESTION: Well, could --

MR. TONER: No.

QUESTION: Can you – well --

MR. TONER: This is not --

QUESTION: Can you talk – can you say --

MR. TONER: Okay, sure.

QUESTION: -- how long this has been the U.S. position?

MR. TONER: Again, I don’t have a timeline in front of me, but from the beginning of the crisis in Yemen --

QUESTION: Which was?

MR. TONER: -- which was several months or a couple months now, that we’ve been clear in saying that there – that it cannot be resolved through force nor through violence, and that President Saleh needs to take concrete steps to address the concerns of his people.

QUESTION: Okay. So just to put a fine – the finest point, I think, on it, is there anything new in your policy today or yesterday? Was there anything new yesterday?

MR. TONER: No, we’ve been consistent --

QUESTION: So – okay. And then my last question.

MR. TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: When was the last time that the ambassador attended one of these meetings between Saleh’s representatives and the representatives of the opposition? Was it last week?

MR. TONER: I will have to get back to you. I should have that, but I don’t. I believe it was as recently as last week, yes.

QUESTION: He has – do you know how many of those kinds of meetings he has attended?

MR. TONER: I don’t have a number, but he meets regularly with the Yemeni Government.

QUESTION: If it’s at all possible --

MR. TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: -- could you ask?

MR. TONER: I can do that.

QUESTION: Since – in particular since the Secretary went to Sana’a and met with the opposition.

MR. TONER: We can do that. Fair enough.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Just staying with this, I know you just said that violence is not the answer. Can you address specifically the reports that police and plainclothes – armed men in plain clothes have been firing on demonstrators in at least two Yemeni cities?

MR. TONER: This is Hodeidah and --

QUESTION: And Taiz. And we have reports of at least 15 dead and 30 wounded in Taiz. And in Hodeidah our report says three people were hit by bullets, around 30 stabbed with knives, and 270 suffered from the effects of inhaling tear gas.

MR. TONER: Well, we’re certainly aware of the violence, and thanks for raising it, Arshad. It’s appalling, as you just recounted. The violence is mounting and we’re very concerned. We condemn all acts of violence against peaceful protestors, and we obviously extend our condolences to the family and friends of those killed. And we urge the Yemeni authorities and the government to ensure security forces exercise maximum restraint.

QUESTION: Why not explicitly call for him to go when his police and, presumably, plainclothes operatives are firing on his own people?

MR. TONER: Well, again, just to go back to what I said previously, there has been – he has made overtures that we’re all aware of and talked about a timeline. And yet the problems there continue. The violence continues. But it’s really important to not make us the center of this, but to reiterate that it’s really – this is something that the Yemeni people need to dictate and demand, and that he needs to respond to their aspirations. It’s not for us to impose a solution.

QUESTION: Mark?

MR. TONER: Jill.

QUESTION: Are you concerned that if he does leave, or when he eventually leaves, it will be detrimental to the fight against al-Qaida?

MR. TONER: Well, I spoke to this last week. We continue our counterterrorism cooperation throughout the current situation, and we believe that our shared interests in fighting counterterrorism extends beyond one individual.

Anything else? Are we done with Yemen?

QUESTION: Yeah. Can we go to Libya?

MR. TONER: We can go to Libya.

QUESTION: The Italians today, or yesterday, said that they’re now recognizing the Transitional Council as the legitimate government.

MR. TONER: I saw that.

QUESTION: Interesting. Are you guys going to jump on the bandwagon?

MR. TONER: Well, nothing to announce here, but we continue to work closely with the opposition. We continue to advise them and communicate with them regularly. But nothing new on that front.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, I mean, it is being considered though still, right?

MR. TONER: Yes. I mean, one of many – yes. Yes, it is still being considered among other things as well. I mean, we’ve always talked about a range of options that we’re considering, which is also recognition.

QUESTION: Well, just to make sure that you’re not – you’re not saying you might change your mind and say --

MR. TONER: No.

QUESTION: -- go back to Qadhafi and say, well, you’re --

MR. TONER: No, no, no. Sorry, no.

QUESTION: That’s not an option that --

MR. TONER: No, I’m talking about other forms of assistance and counseling them and non-lethal forms of assistance is what I meant by that.

QUESTION: Gotcha.

MR. TONER: Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Just Libya and al-Qaida. There are – we have a report saying that al-Qaida is exploiting – excuse me – the conflict in Libya to acquire weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles, and is smuggling them into northern Mali. Do you have any reason to believe that is true?

MR. TONER: Well, again, we’re aware of these reports too, and it’s been one of the topics of our conversation with the opposition government and – or the opposition forces, rather. And we’ve made very clear of our concerns, and they have also pledged that they will look into it.

QUESTION: You’ve raised it with them because you believe that this is occurring or this may be occurring in portions of the --

MR. TONER: It may be occurring.

QUESTION: -- in portions of the country that are, at least in theory, under their control?

MR. TONER: Yes.

QUESTION: And did they – beyond saying that they would look into it, did they have any reason to believe that this was occurring?

MR. TONER: I don’t believe they confirmed it either way, but they said they would take our concerns into consideration and look into it. They pledged to look into it.

QUESTION: Do you have your own reporting suggesting this is happening, or is your raising these concerns a function of press reporting about it?

MR. TONER: That’s a fair question and one I’m not sure I can answer, frankly. Not that I’m aware of in terms of our own reporting, but that may involve other assets and other methods.

QUESTION: If it’s in the “you can address,” can you take it?

MR. TONER: Address. Yeah.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. TONER: Michel.

QUESTION: On Lebanon?

MR. TONER: Are we okay? Let’s finish with Libya first.

QUESTION: On Libya?

MR. TONER: Yeah, sure.

QUESTION: Mark, when all of the – all of this began, there was a briefing here at the State Department, in fact, in which a senior Administration official said that the transition to NATO wouldn’t affect operations. And yet now you have NATO asking the U.S. to continue flying some of the planes that have special capabilities – those A-10s and the AC-130s. Doesn’t that undercut that belief that NATO can do it on its own?

MR. TONER: I mean, I’m straying outside my expertise in trying to talk about operational details, and so I would refer you to the Department of Defense and to NATO Command Structure to address those concerns, but – or those questions, rather.

But look, I mean, we’ve – I don’t think that we ever said that we wouldn’t provide support whenever we could and that we would remain engaged, although our role would be – would gradually diminish. And I think this is an example where we could provide assistance, and we did.

Yeah, Kirit.

QUESTION: Do you have any insight into the credibility of – or readouts from some of the meetings that Qadhafi’s envoys – some of his sons’ envoys have had in their meetings with European countries over the past couple days?

MR. TONER: Yeah, I don’t. The meetings in Greece, you’re talking about?

QUESTION: Among others, but yeah.

MR. TONER: Yeah. Well, I don’t have any readouts. We didn’t participate in any way. And at least – and the ones in Greece, I’m not aware of any of them we have participated in. Our position throughout all of this remains that Qadhafi must go and must be held accountable for his actions.

QUESTION: Do you have any insight or do you lend any credibility to reports to – that his sons are seeking to find a way for the father to step aside and they take over?

MR. TONER: We’ve certainly heard those rumors, but I have nothing to confirm from here.

QUESTION: Would that be an acceptable outcome?

MR. TONER: That Qadhafi’s sons took over?

QUESTION: Mm-hmm.

MR. TONER: I mean, again, ultimately it’s not something that the U.S. needs to decide. This is something that the Libyan people need to decide. Our – again, our bottom line remains that we believe he’s delegitimized as a leader, he needs to step down, and he needs to be held accountable.

QUESTION: Okay. And then my last question was that there’s been other reports of bickering amongst the opposition, specifically on the military front. Are you concerned about that? Has that lent to any of your concerns about whether or not to provide arms to them?

MR. TONER: Well, as I said, we remain in close contact with them, and we’re working with them as best we can to help advise them as they do discuss the makeup of their government, their composition, their goals, their objectives, their capabilities. And this was among the things that they discussed with Secretary Clinton last week in London. They’ve issued a number of statements that – to try to define some of those capabilities and goals and objectives which I encourage all of you to look at. But we’re working closely working with them. It’s obviously a work in progress, but –

QUESTION: And can you say specifically whether you have any concerns about their cohesion as a unit, as a unified opposition?

MR. TONER: Well, again, I think that’s part of the reason why we continue to reach out to them, to talk to as broad an array of opposition figures as possible to get a better sense of that cohesion process, if you will – how they’re coming together, how they’re defining themselves, and how they’re evolving.

QUESTION: Can you say how you assess that at this point?

MR. TONER: Look, I mean, they’re clearly – I mean, it’s a very fluid situation. They’re under attack by Qadhafi’s forces, and obviously at the same time while they’re seeking to define themselves as an opposition and to create leadership and maintain that leadership. So it’s just very fluid.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Have you had any contact yet with Musa Kusa post-defection?

MR. TONER: We’ve not, Matt. I checked, and I don’t know that we’ve actually requested to talk to him yet.

Yeah, Michel – oh.

QUESTION: Not even – sorry, not even for law enforcement channels, seeing as how he’s wanted in an inquiry for the Pan Am thing?

MR. TONER: I’d check with DOJ but – Department of Justice, sorry – but I’m not aware of any movement on that front. There may well be, but –

QUESTION: Two questions, one on Syria and one on Lebanon. On Syria, have you evacuated any American families from there?

MR. TONER: It’s an excellent question. We did issue a voluntary authorized departure. I’m not aware that any flights have left today. Are you, Heide? Do you know if any flights have left?

I’ll find out, but we did obviously issue the updated Travel Warning yesterday approving authorized departure of eligible family members. But I’m not aware at this time that any planes have left.

QUESTION: What’s behind this decision?

MR. TONER: Well, I mean, the situation is increasingly volatile in Syria, and we obviously monitor these kinds of situations very closely, both for the welfare of our embassy family but also for the welfare of any Americans living in the country. That’s usually our – well, not usually – it always is our paramount goal in any kind of situation like this is the protection and welfare of American citizens abroad.

QUESTION: Did you talk to the Syrian Government about the –

MR. TONER: Yes, I’m sure we conveyed what we were doing to the Syrian Government.

QUESTION: Has Ambassador Ford had any luck in getting a meeting with anyone above the level of –

MR. TONER: I don’t have an update on his –

QUESTION: -- cafeteria worker in the Syrian foreign ministry? (Laughter.)

MR. TONER: I’m certain it’s higher than that, Matt, but I don’t know what level. But I know he meets regularly with –

QUESTION: Well, can you say who he’s met – who he last met with?

MR. TONER: I don’t know at what level he’s met with, but I’ll check on that.

QUESTION: On Lebanon.

MR. TONER: Oh, Lebanon, yes.

QUESTION: Yeah, Wall Street Journal has reported that the U.S. has frozen weapon shipments to the Lebanese army following the collapse of Hariri’s government. Can you confirm this report?

MR. TONER: Well, I could just say that our assistance programs to the Lebanese armed forces continue and that no decision regarding any kind of freeze has been made at this time.

QUESTION: But can you confirm that there are arms shipments at this time to the Lebanese army?

MR. TONER: Well, I think I just said our – we haven’t – I mean, they continue. Our assistance programs continue. I don’t know about specific shipments, but we haven’t made any decision to freeze our assistance.

QUESTION: Okay. So the review continues?

MR. TONER: No, the review has concluded, Matt, a while back.

QUESTION: Well, yeah, but then after the political developments back in January, there was another one undertaken.

MR. TONER: Right, but no decision is made. There’s no – right, freeze to – yeah –

QUESTION: So that suggests that the review continues if you say no decisions have been made.

MR. TONER: Yes. Yes, okay.

QUESTION: But the program includes training.

MR. TONER: Yeah, I’m not aware. I would imagine that would encompass training.

QUESTION: All the aspects of the program?

MR. TONER: As far as I’m aware, yes.

QUESTION: Can we stay in the region for just a bit?

MR. TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: I’m just wondering if you have any reaction or if you feel vindicated at all by Judge Goldstone’s apparent reassessment of his report.

MR. TONER: Well, we certainly read it with – his reflections in The Washington Post with great interest. We’ve made clear from when the Goldstone Report was initially presented and maintained ever since that we didn’t see any evidence that the Israeli Government had intentionally targeted civilians or otherwise engaged in any war crimes. And now that we see that Justice Goldstone has reached the same conclusion, and then also we believe that Israel has since undertaken credible internal processes to assess its own conduct of hostilities, and I think that’s something that he acknowledged as well.

QUESTION: What – considering that this had its origins in the Human Rights Council –

MR. TONER: Right.

QUESTION: Granted you weren’t on the council when the mandate was given. But the one main problem that you had with it was the mandate of – was the mandate he was given. Do you think – do you still think that this was the result – that the result, which he’s now essentially repudiated, was a function of the poor mandate or the problems with the mandate?

MR. TONER: I’ll just say that --

QUESTION: Or do you think that his team intentionally ignored evidence that would have supported the Israeli position?

MR. TONER: I can’t speak to his team’s work, but I can say that we remain concerned and will continue working to an end to the – what we believe is anti-Israeli – Israel bias in the Human Rights Council.

QUESTION: Well, wait a second. You just said that you don’t – you can’t comment on the team’s work?

MR. TONER: Well, I --

QUESTION: I mean, you just said that it was --

MR. TONER: I mean, I don’t comment how they --

QUESTION: -- you thought it was bad.

MR. TONER: What you implied by your question was their information gathering, and I don't have an assessment of that.

Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Andrew, Pacific News Service.

MR. TONER: I didn’t hear your – oh --

QUESTION: Andrew.

MR. TONER: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay. Pacific News Service. Has there been any travel warnings issued or advisories for Mexico regarding the surge of violence and the target of ICE agents?

MR. TONER: No. I don't believe there’s any – been – I’m not sure when the last updated travel warning was for – or travel alert was for Mexico. I don't believe there’s been any change.

Go ahead.

QUESTION: On Makled, this drug trafficker who is Colombia, detained in Colombia, is there anything new? He made some statements this weekend saying that he has lots of information concerning Venezuela corruption, but he’s going to make a statement only to U.S. officials. Is this changing the situation --

MR. TONER: I’m not aware of his latest comments, but it’s not something we would discuss. We don’t discuss extradition requests, certainly, but --

QUESTION: But there is anything new? Because Santos apparently said that he’s going to release him to Venezuela.

MR. TONER: I’m aware of those reports.

QUESTION: Nothing?

MR. TONER: But again, we don’t discuss extradition cases.

Yep.

QUESTION: Mark, there was a question on Friday, I think, about talking to the IAEA, going in and confirming the uranium enrichment program. Do you have anything on that?

MR. TONER: Well, yes. I mean, just to clarify or just to add to what I said on Friday, I’m not sure that – whether that was on camera or afterwards. I can’t remember now. But North Korea has publicly announced the existence of its enrichment program, as you know, and that constitutes a violation of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and 1874, and it also runs contrary to its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement. And we are still seeking an appropriate international response, and we continue to consult closely with our five- party partners on the next steps.

QUESTION: So have you actually talked to the IAEA about them going in or --

MR. TONER: Again, we’re working on an appropriate response, but nothing to announce or nothing to acknowledge or confirm.

Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about the situation in Afghanistan?

MR. TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: With the violence following the Qu’ran burning in Florida, it seems as if President Karzai is just inflaming this situation, first by talking about it when relatively few people even knew it had happened, and now by asking for apologies. Is he helping or hurting this situation?

MR. TONER: Well, we believe he’s made some constructive statements in the sense that he did come out after the Mazar e-Sharif demonstrations and killings. He did say that he considered them to be a destructive action on the – “of a group of partial people who abuse their right of demonstration” – I’m quoting from his statement – “and have participated in violent action against United Nations employees who are helping the Afghan people in that province as contrary to Islamic and Afghan values.” So we do appreciate his comments.

QUESTION: What can be done, do you think, to lessen the tensions over this?

MR. TONER: It’s a good question. Obviously, we need to continue our vital work in Afghanistan. It’s important, and these UN workers were obviously carrying out that commitment. And we need to be very clear that the actions of the Florida pastor were, we believe, contrary to the values and the tradition of the American people, and we need to keep communicating that message.

Yeah, go ahead in the back.

QUESTION: Mark, do you think Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell will discuss North Korea’s uranium enrichment program in Beijing later this week?

MR. TONER: Maybe. I mean, I can imagine that it would come up. I mean, he’ll certainly talk about North Korea and among other issues and topics. That certainly could very well come up.

QUESTION: He is heading to Seoul at this time?

MR. TONER: Is he traveling to Seoul?

QUESTION: He is traveling to Seoul at this time?

MR. TONER: I don't have his itinerary in front of me, I’m sorry. I’m not sure what – where he’s traveling after.

QUESTION: Also, do you have any update on your plans to send food aid to North Korea?

MR. TONER: No update.

QUESTION: A follow-up on North Korea?

MR. TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: A bill was submitted at the House last weekend to re-designate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. What’s your response to that move?

MR. TONER: I’m not aware of the bill. We’ll certainly look at it and get back to you.

Yeah, sure, Matt.

QUESTION: About Kurt Campbell’s visit, will he be raising human rights concerns during that visit? And also, do you have any --

MR. TONER: In Beijing, you’re --

QUESTION: In Beijing. And do you have any comment or information on the detention of the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei?

MR. TONER: I do. We obviously continue to be deeply concerned by the trend of forced disappearances, extralegal detentions, arrests, and convictions of rights activists for exercising their internationally recognized human rights, including freedom of expression and movement. The detention of artist and activist Ai Weiwei is inconsistent with the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all Chinese citizens, including China’s commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and we urge the Chinese Government to release him immediately. We – I can imagine it would be a topic. Human rights are always a topic of our conversations with Beijing.

QUESTION: What – sorry.

MR. TONER: Yeah, sure, go ahead.

QUESTION: You said you’re deeply concerned by the trend of what?

MR. TONER: Forced disappearances.

QUESTION: As opposed to un – I mean, what does that mean? Forced disappearance? How do you – I mean --

MR. TONER: Well --

QUESTION: How do you distinguish --

MR. TONER: -- between a forced and an unforced disappearance? Well, what we’re talking about is individuals who are forcibly removed from public, that they’re forcibly detained.

QUESTION: All right.

MR. TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: More broadly speaking, how is the U.S. responding to this pattern of detentions that has only sort of increased since Hu Jintao visited in January? And then at that time he said – acknowledged that China had progress to make in human rights, and the White House at the time played that up and said that it was admission of – a conciliatory gesture. Only things have got worse since then.

MR. TONER: Well, again, I would just reiterate what I just said, which is that we’re very concerned. We’re deeply concerned by this trend, and we raise it regularly with Chinese authorities. In terms of Ai Weiwei, I think it happened overnight, so I’m not sure that we’ve actually spoken to the Chinese authorities specifically about the latest incident, but we continue to make our concerns clear.

QUESTION: Is there anything else the U.S. can do, other than just raise those concerns? I mean --

MR. TONER: Well, we have the Human Rights Dialogue, and that’s – that provides a forum for this kind of conversation. But it’s – our relationship with China is obviously very broad and complex, but this is one issue where we disagree, and we’ll continue to make those concerns clear.

QUESTION: Mark --

MR. TONER: Yeah. Go ahead, Jill.

QUESTION: -- on that same subject, when you talk about a trend, is this a recent – that sounds crazy, but, I mean, I know you would say that this has gone on for many years. However, is there a recent trend that you would link this to in the wake of what’s going on in the Mideast and North Africa? In other words, do you see any sign that China could be worried about uprisings in the Mideast and North China – and North Africa?

MR. TONER: Look, I don’t want to attempt to analyze what may or may not be going on, but it is something we’ve watched with concern, and it does seem to be, as Matt pointed out, part of a trend. And we’ll continue to express --

QUESTION: I didn’t point that out. You did.

MR. TONER: Sorry, no, he --

QUESTION: Oh, Matt Lee (inaudible) – sorry.

MR. TONER: (Laughter.) There is more than one Matt in the room.

QUESTION: Would you say a recent trend?

MR. TONER: Sure, I would say that, yeah.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. TONER: I’m sorry, one VOA question, I apologize. Susanne, go ahead.

QUESTION: Yes, a VOA question.

MR. TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Thanks. It’s: Do you have any reaction to the sentencing and – the conviction and sentencing of Vietnamese lawyer Vu?

MR. TONER: I do.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. TONER: We’re deeply concerned by his April 4^th conviction and sentencing to seven years for – on charges of propagandizing against the government. We’re also troubled by the lack – apparent lack of due process in the conduct of the trial and the continued detention of several individuals who are peacefully seeking to observe the proceedings. Vu’s conviction runs counter to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and raises serious questions about Vietnam’s commitment to the rule of law and reform. No individual should be imprisoned for exercising the right to free speech.

QUESTION: Great, thank you.

MR. TONER: Yeah.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:25 p.m.)

# # #

On this page:

March 31, 2011Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Background Note: Macedonia

Official Name: Republic of Macedonia

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 25,713 square km. (slightly larger than Vermont).
Cities (2001 est.): Capital--Skopje (600,000); Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar, and Bitola (more than 100,000).
Geography: Situated in the southern region of the Balkan Peninsula, Macedonia is landlocked and mountainous.
Climate: Three climatic types overlap--Mediterranean; moderately continental; and mountainous, producing hot, dry summers and cold, snowy winters.

People
Population (end-2010 estimate): 2,055,947.
Population growth rate (2006 est.): 0.2%.
Ethnic groups (2002): Macedonian 64.18%, Albanian 25.17%, Turkish 3.85%, Roma 2.66%, Serb 1.78%.
Religions: Eastern Orthodox 65%, Muslim 29%, Catholic 4% and others 2%.
Languages: Macedonian 70%, Albanian 21%, Turkish 3%, Serbian 3%, and others 3%.
Education: Years compulsory--13 (9 primary and 4 secondary). Literacy--96.1% (98.2% for males, 94.1% for females).
Health: Infant mortality rate (2011 est.)--8.54 deaths/per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy (2011 est.)--males 72.61 years; females 77.87 years.
Labor force (third quarter 2010): 949,300; employed 648,773; services--58%; industry and commerce--22.1%; agriculture--19.9%.

Government
Type: Parliamentary democracy.
Constitution: Adopted November 17, 1991, effective November 20, 1991; amended 2001, 2005, and 2009. (Note: Amended November 2001 by a series of constitutional amendments strengthening minority rights, in 2005 with amendments related to the judiciary, and in 2009 related to the census for the election of president.)
Independence: September 8, 1991 (from Yugoslavia).
Branches: Executive--prime minister (head of government), council of ministers (cabinet), president (head of state). Legislative--unicameral parliament or Sobranie (120 members elected by popular vote to 4-year terms from party lists based on the percentage parties gain of the overall vote in each of six election units, with 20 seats per unit). Judicial--Supreme Court, State Judicial Council, Constitutional Court, Public Prosecutor's Office, Public Attorney. Legal system is based on civil law; judicial review of legislative acts.
Subdivisions: 84 opstini (municipalities) plus the city of Skopje.
Suffrage: Universal at age 18.
Main political parties: Democratic Alliance or DS (Pavie Trajanov), Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia (Ivan Stoiljkovic), Democratic Party of the Albanians PDSh/DPA (Menduh Thaci), Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia (Kenan Hasipi), Movement for Reconstruction of Macedonia or DOM (Liljana Popovska), Democratic Union for Integration or BDI/DUI (Ali Ahmeti), Liberal Democratic Party (Jovan Manasijevski), Liberal Party (Borce Stojanovski), New Alternative (Gjorgji Orovcanec), New Democracy or DR (Imer Selmani), New Social-Democratic Party or NSDP (Tito Petkovski), Party for Democratic Action in Macedonia or SDAM (Avdija Pepic), Party for European Future or PEI (Fijat Canoski), Social Democratic Union of Macedonia or SDSM (Branko Crvenkovski), Socialist Party (Ljubisav Ivanov Dzingo), Union of Roma of Macedonia (Amdi Bajram), VMRO-DPMNE Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (Nikola Gruevski), VMRO-Macedonian (Borislav Stojmenov), United for Macedonia or OM (Ljube Boskovski), VMRO-Peoples Party or VMRO-Narodna (Marjan Dodovski).

Economy
GDP (2010 est.): $9.17 billion.
Per capita GDP (2010 est.): $9,400.
Real GDP growth (2010 est.): 1.3%.
Annualized inflation rate (2010, Consumer Price Index): 1.6%.
Unemployment rate (third quarter 2009): 31.7%.
Trade: Significant exports--steel, textile products, chromium, lead, zinc, nickel, tobacco, lamb, and wine.
Official exchange rate (2010): 46.434 Macedonian denars (MKD) = U.S. $1.

GEOGRAPHY
Macedonia is located in the heart of south central Europe. It shares a border with Greece to the south, Bulgaria to the east, Serbia and Kosovo to the north, and Albania to the west. The country is 80% mountainous, rising to its highest point at Mt. Korab (peak 2,764 meters).

PEOPLE
Since the end of the Second World War, Macedonia's population has grown steadily, with the greatest increases occurring in the ethnic Albanian community. From 1953 through the time of the latest official census in 2002 (initial official results were released December 2003), the percentage of ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia rose threefold. The western part of the country, where most ethnic Albanians live, is the most heavily populated, with approximately 40% of the total population. As in many countries, people have moved into the cities in search of employment. Macedonia has also experienced sustained high rates of permanent or seasonal emigration.

HISTORY
Throughout its history, the present-day territory of Macedonia has been a crossroads for both traders and conquerors moving between the European continent and Asia Minor. Each of these transiting powers left its mark upon the region, giving rise to a rich and varied cultural and historical tradition.

After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the territory of Macedonia fell under the control of the Byzantine Empire in the 6th and 7th centuries. It was during this period that large groups of Slavic people migrated to the Balkan region. The Ottoman Turks conquered the territory in the 15th century; it remained under Ottoman Turkish rule until 1912.

After more than 4 centuries of rule, Ottoman power in the region began to wane, and by the middle of the 19th century, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia were competing for influence in the territory. During this time, a nationalist movement emerged and grew in Macedonia. The latter half of the 19th century, continuing into the early part of the 20th century, was marked by sporadic nationalist uprisings, culminating in the Ilinden Uprising of August 2, 1903.

Macedonian revolutionaries liberated the town of Krushevo and established the short-lived Republic of Krushevo, which was put down by Ottoman forces after 10 days. Following Ottoman Turkey's defeat by the allied Balkan countries--Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece--during the First Balkan War in autumn 1912, the same allies fought the Second Balkan War over the division of Macedonia. The August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest ended this conflict by dividing the territory between Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles sanctioned partitioning the geographic region of Macedonia among the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Bulgaria; and Greece. In the wake of the First World War, Vardar Macedonia (the present-day area of the Republic of Macedonia) was incorporated into the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Throughout much of the Second World War, Bulgaria and Italy occupied Macedonia. Many citizens joined partisan movements during this time and succeeded in liberating the region in late 1944. Following the war, Macedonia became one of the constituent republics of the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Marshall Tito. During this period, Macedonian culture and language flourished.

As communism fell throughout Eastern Europe in the late 20th century, Macedonia followed its other federation partners and declared its independence from Yugoslavia in late 1991. After independence, Prime Minister Nikola Kljusev remained Prime Minister, heading a government of experts, and Kiro Gligorov remained President. Macedonia was the only republic of the former Yugoslavia whose secession in 1991 was not clouded by ethnic or other armed conflict, although the ethnic Albanian population declined to participate in the referendum on independence. The new Macedonian constitution took effect November 20, 1991 and called for a system of government based on a parliamentary democracy. The first democratically elected coalition government was led by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM).

President Gligorov was the first president of a former Yugoslav republic to relinquish office. In accordance with the terms of the Macedonian constitution, his presidency ended in November 1999 after 8 years in office, which included surviving a car bombing assassination attempt on October 3in 1995. He was succeeded by former Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Trajkovski (VMRO-DPMNE), who defeated Tito Petkovski (SDSM) in a second-round run-off election for the presidency on November 14, 1999. Trajkovski's election was confirmed by a December 5, 1999 partial re-vote in 230 polling stations, which the Macedonian Supreme Court mandated due to election irregularities.

In November 1998 parliamentary elections, the SDSM lost its majority. A new coalition government emerged under the leadership of Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). The initial coalition included the ethnic Albanian Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA).

During the Yugoslav period, most of Macedonia's Slavic population identified themselves as Macedonians, while several minority groups, in particular ethnic Albanians, retained their own distinct political culture and language. Although interethnic tensions simmered under Yugoslav authority and during the first decade of its independence, the country avoided ethnically motivated conflict until several years after independence. Ethnic minority grievances, which had erupted on occasion (1995 and 1997), rapidly began to gain political currency in late 2000, leading many in the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia to question their minority protection under, and participation in, the government. Tensions erupted into open hostilities in Macedonia in February 2001, when a group of ethnic Albanians near the Kosovo border carried out armed provocations that soon escalated into an insurgency. Purporting to fight for greater civil rights for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, the group seized territory and launched attacks against government forces. Many observers ascribed other motives to the so-called National Liberation Army (NLA), including support for criminality and the assertion of political control over affected areas. The insurgency spread through northern and western Macedonia during the first half of 2001. Under international mediation, a cease-fire was brokered in July 2001, and the government coalition was expanded in July 2001 to form a grand coalition which included the major opposition parties.

The expanded coalition of ruling ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political leaders, with facilitation by U.S. and European Union (EU) diplomats, negotiated and then signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement on August 13, 2001, which brought an end to the fighting. The agreement called for implementation of constitutional and legislative changes, which laid the foundation for improved civil rights for minority groups. The Macedonian parliament adopted the constitutional changes outlined in the accord in November 2001. The grand coalition disbanded following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the passage of new constitutional amendments. A coalition led by Prime Minister Georgievski, including DPA and several smaller parties, completed its parliamentary term.

In September 2002 elections, an SDSM-led pre-election coalition won half of the 120 seats in parliament. Branko Crvenkovski was elected Prime Minister in coalition with the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) party, the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), and a number of smaller ethnic parties.

On February 26, 2004 President Trajkovski died in a plane crash in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Presidential elections were held April 14 and 28, 2004. Then-Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski won the second round and was inaugurated President on May 12, 2004. The parliament confirmed Hari Kostov, former Interior Minister, as Prime Minister June 2, 2004, but Kostov resigned on November 15 of the same year. On December 17, 2004, former Defense Minister Vlado Buckovski was confirmed by parliament as Prime Minister, maintaining the coalition with the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and the Liberal-Democratic (LDP) parties.

With international assistance, the SDSM-DUI-LDP governing coalition completed the legislative implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which is a precondition for Macedonia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. A November 7, 2004 referendum opposing the law on new municipal organization failed, freeing the way for the government to complete Framework Agreement implementation.

Local elections were held in March-April 2005 under a new territorial reorganization plan that consolidated the overall number of Macedonia's municipalities and created a number of ethnically-mixed municipalities in which ethnic Albanian populations were dominant. The process of decentralization began in the new municipalities in July 2005 and is continuing.

The July 2006 parliamentary elections resulted in a VMRO-DPMNE-led government under Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, in coalition with DPA, NSDP, and several smaller parties. The new government, which was confirmed in office by a parliamentary vote on August 26, 2006, stated its commitment to completing Framework Agreement implementation and reaffirmed its commitment to pursuing NATO and EU membership.

At NATO's Bucharest Summit in April 2008, all 26 NATO Allies agreed Macedonia had met the criteria for membership. Consensus on extending a NATO membership invitation could not be reached, however, due to the unresolved dispute with Greece over Macedonia's name.

Following the Bucharest Summit, the opposition DUI party, in collaboration with the governing VMRO-DPMNE and DPA parties, called for the dissolution of parliament and for early parliamentary elections, which were held in June 2008. On July 26, Prime Minister Gruevski was reconfirmed in office with a new coalition along with the DUI party and one smaller party.

In 2009, Macedonia held presidential and local elections in March (first round) and April (second round). In the presidential race, VMRO-DPMNE candidate Gjorge Ivanov won with 64% of the vote.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The unicameral assembly (Sobranie) consists of 120 seats. Members are elected by popular vote from party lists, based on the percentage parties gain of the overall vote in each of six election districts of 20 seats each. Members of parliament have a 4-year mandate.

The Prime Minister is the head of government and is selected by the party or coalition that gains a majority of seats in parliament. The Prime Minister and other ministers must not be members of parliament.

The President represents Macedonia at home and abroad. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces of Macedonia and heads its Security Council. He also appoints the Chief of the Defense Staff (CHOD), the head of the intelligence agency, and the Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia (NBRM). The President is elected by general, direct ballot and has a term of 5 years, with the right to one re-election.

The court system consists of a Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, local and appeals courts, and Administrative and Higher Administrative Courts. Judges appointed by the Judicial Council are appointed without a time limit. The Judicial Council also evaluates, promotes, disciplines, and removes judges. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and is responsible for the equal administration of laws by all courts. The Constitutional Court is responsible for the protection of constitutional and legal rights and for resolving conflicts of power among the three branches of government. Its 9 judges are appointed by parliament with a mandate of 9 years, without the possibility of re-election. The Public Prosecutor is appointed by parliament with a 6-year mandate.

Principal Government Officials
President--Gjorge Ivanov
Prime Minister--Nikola Gruevski
Deputy Prime Minister (Economic Affairs)--Vladimir Pesevski
Deputy Prime Minister (Euro-Atlantic Integration)--Vasko Naumovski
Deputy Prime Minister (Framework Agreement Implementation)--Abdulaqim Ademi
Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister--Zoran Stavreski
Foreign Minister--Antonio Milososki
Education Minister--Nikola Todorov
Information Society Minister--Ivo Ivanovski
Defense Minister--Zoran Konjanovski
Economy Minister--Fatmir Besimi
Interior Minister--Gordana Jankuloska
Culture Minister--Elizabeta Kanceska-Milevska
Agriculture, Forestry and Water Minister--Ljupco Dimovski
Justice Minister--Mihajlo Manevski
Ambassador to the United States--Zoran Jolevski
Ambassador to the United Nations--Slobodan Tasovski

The country maintains an embassy in the United States at 2129 Wyoming Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel: (202) 667-0501; fax: (202) 667-2131). It maintains a Consulate General in Detroit: 2000 Town Center, Suite 1130, Southfield, MI 48075 (tel: (248) 354-5537; fax: (248) 354-5538); and a Consulate General in Chicago: 121 West Wackor Drive, Suite 2036, Chicago, IL 60601 (tel: (312) 419-8020; fax: (312) 419-8040).

ECONOMY
Macedonia is a small economy with a gross domestic product (GDP) of about $9.17 billion (2010 est.), representing about 0.01% of the total world output. It is an open economy, highly integrated into international trade, with a total trade-to-GDP ratio of 81.6% at the end of 2009. Agriculture and industry had been the two most important sectors of the economy in the past, but the services sector has gained the lead in the last few years. Economic problems persist, even as Macedonia undertakes structural reforms to finish the transition to a market-oriented economy. Modernization of the largely obsolete infrastructure is happening slowly, and foreign investment has not kept pace with neighboring economies. Labor force education and skills are competitive in some technical areas and industries but significantly lacking in others. Without adequate job opportunities, many with the best skills seek employment abroad. A relatively low standard of living, high unemployment rate, and modest economic growth rate are the central economic problems.

Five years of continuous economic expansion in Macedonia was interrupted by the 2001 conflict, which led to a contraction of 4.5% in 2001. Growth started to pick up in 2003 (2.8%) and continued in 2004 (4.6%), 2005 (4.4%), 2006 (5.0%), 2007 (6.1%), and 2008 (5.0%). In 2009 and 2010, the economy slowed as a result of the world economic crisis, although the financial sector remained sound. This was largely due to conservative banking and financial regulation and limited exposure to global financial markets. Real GDP dropped by 0.9% in 2009. The economy slowly started to recover in 2010 as real GDP is estimated to have grown by 1.3%. Consumer Price Index (CPI)-based inflation was -0.8% in 2009 and 1.6% in 2010. Living standards still lag behind those enjoyed before independence. The United States is supporting Macedonia's transition to a democratic, secure, market-oriented society through targeted foreign assistance.

Background
After the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia, the former Yugoslavia's poorest republic, faced formidable economic challenges posed by both the transition to a market economy and a difficult regional situation. The breakup deprived Macedonia of key protected markets and large transfer payments from the central Yugoslav government. The war in Bosnia, international sanctions on Serbia, and the 1999 crisis in neighboring Kosovo delivered successive shocks to Macedonia's trade-dependent economy. The government's painful but necessary structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilization program generated additional economic dislocation. Macedonia's economy was hurt especially by a trade embargo imposed by Greece in February 1994 in a dispute over the country's name, flag, and constitution, and by international trade sanctions against Serbia that were not suspended until a month after conclusion of the Dayton Accords. The impact of the 2001 ethnic Albanian insurgency in Macedonia, decreased international demand for Macedonian products, canceled contracts in the textile and iron and steel industry, and poor restructuring of the private sector affected Macedonia's growth and foreign trade prospects through 2004.

Macedonia's political and security situation is stable. This has allowed the government to refocus energies on domestic reforms, boosting economic growth, and attracting increased levels of foreign investment. In 2004, the government passed a progressive Trade Companies Law aimed at easing impediments to foreign investment, providing tax and investment incentives, and guaranteeing shareholder rights. The government's fiscal policy, aligned with International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies, helped maintain a stable macroeconomic environment which sent promising signals to investors. However, economic growth remained sub-par in 2005 and 2006, due in part to poor government results in combating corruption, a weak judiciary, poor contract enforcement, and high domestic finance costs.

The new government that took office in August 2006 put the fight against corruption and attracting foreign investors at the very top of its priority list. In 2007, it launched an expensive marketing campaign promoting the country as a good investment destination and put in place a one-stop process for business registration that considerably shortened the time required to register a new business. It provided business incentives by cutting rates on profit tax and personal income tax and implemented a so-called "regulatory guillotine," an activity which reduced procedures and legislative requirements for doing business. Reinvested profits became tax free, social contributions rates on salaries are being gradually reduced, and a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) procedure is being carried out to re-evaluate legislation for doing business.

Macedonia's moderate economic growth was halted by the world economic crisis in 2009, which hit the real sector strongly, although the financial sector remained sound and stable. Exports dropped dramatically and the economy entered into a recession, albeit one that was shorter and, given the already low level of economic development, far less severe than in many other transitional and developed economies.

Macroeconomy
Real GDP in the third quarter of 2010 increased by 1.3% on annual basis. This modest growth was driven by an 18.4% rise in the construction sector, a 3.8% rise in financial intermediation services, 2.7% higher wholesale and retail trade, and 2.4% growth in agriculture. At the same time, industrial output in 2010 was 4.8% lower than in 2009. In 2010, low government and external debt and a comfortable level of foreign exchange reserves allowed for a slight relaxation of the monetary policy. The CPI moved from negative to positive, with the cumulative CPI rising moderately to 1.6% at end-2010. Due to rising prices for energy, fuel, and food on international markets, inflation continued an upward trend, reaching 3.9% at end-February 2011. The official unemployment rate dropped to 31.7% in the third quarter of 2010. Many people work in the gray economy, and many experts estimate Macedonia’s actual unemployment as being somewhere between 20%-25%.

Revenue collection fell well below government projections in the first half of 2010, leading the government to finance the budget through domestic borrowing. In July the government amended the budget to decrease projected expenditures and bring it in line with the budget deficit target of 2.5% of GDP. A dividend received from the government’s shares in Macedonian Telekom later in the summer boosted revenue collection, and at the end of 2010 total budget revenues were 2.8% higher than in 2009. This allowed expenditures to increase by 2.4% and still keep the deficit within the target. Public debt increased from 32.1% in 2009 to 34.5% in 2010, a level still considered moderate, but one that could raise concerns if fiscal performance were to continue this pattern in the mid- to long term. The Central Bank kept the liquidity indicators for banks and the reserve requirement unchanged from 2009, but significantly reduced the Central Bank bills rate from 9% in December 2009 to 4% at the end of 2010. This relaxed monetary policy was reflected in a 7.1% growth in private-sector credit.

Although slightly improved from 2009, Macedonia’s external trade still struggled in 2010 due to the slow recovery from the economic crisis by its main trading partners, particularly EU members. Starting from a very low base, in 2010 exports grew by 22.7% and imports rose by 8.1%, leaving a trade deficit of 23.4% of GDP. At the same time, the current account balance significantly improved in the second half of 2010 and was estimated at 2.3% of GDP at the end of 2010. This was primarily due to a 19.1% higher inflow of private transfers, most of which came in the second half of 2010, despite poor foreign direct investment (FDI) of about $236.6 million by end-November 2010. Foreign currency reserves remained at about $2.3 billion, a level that comfortably covers 4 months of imports.

After the conclusion of its 3-year Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in August 2008, the Government of Macedonia decided not to request additional financial assistance from the IMF. In October 2010, the World Bank Board of Directors approved a new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) with Macedonia for the period 2011-2014, which could potentially bring to the country assistance of about $200 million in funding for improving competitiveness, strengthening employability and social protection, and using more sustainable energy resources. Part of that assistance is a commitment of $30 million in direct budget support.

Macedonia became the first country eligible for the IMF’s Precautionary Credit Line in January 2011. This program gives Macedonia a line of credit worth 475 million euros (about $675 million) over 2 years. The credit is intended to be accessed only in case of need brought about by external shocks. The credit line was agreed to following extensive consultations with the IMF in October and December 2010.

Trade
Macedonia remains committed to pursuing membership in the European Union and NATO. It became a full World Trade Organization (WTO) member in April 2003. Following a 1997 cooperation agreement with the European Union (EU), Macedonia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in April 2001, giving Macedonia duty-free access to European markets. In December 2005, it moved a step forward, obtaining candidate country status for EU accession. Macedonia has had a foreign trade deficit since 1994, which reached a record high of $2.873 billion in 2008, or 30.2% of GDP. Total trade in 2010 (imports plus exports of goods and services) was $8.752 billion, and the trade deficit amounted to $2.149 billion, or 23.4% of GDP. A significant 56.2% of Macedonia's total trade was with EU 27 countries. By individual countries, Macedonia's major trading partners are Germany, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Italy. In 2010, total trade between Macedonia and the United States was $116.6 million. U.S. exports accounted for 1.9% of Macedonia's total imports. U.S. meat, mainly poultry, and electrical machinery and equipment have been particularly attractive to Macedonian importers. Principal Macedonian exports to the United States are tobacco, apparel, and iron and steel.

Macedonia has bilateral free trade agreements with Ukraine, Turkey, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA--Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein). Bilateral agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and Moldova were replaced by membership in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Macedonia also has concluded an “Agreement for Promotion and Protection of Foreign Direct Investments” with: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Egypt, Iran, Italy, India, Spain, Serbia, Montenegro, People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Hungary, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Croatia, Czech Republic, Switzerland, and Sweden.

DEFENSE
Macedonia established its armed forces following independence and the complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in March 1992. The Macedonian Armed Forces consist of an army, navy, air and air defense force, and a police force (under the Ministry of Interior). Under its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Membership Action Plan, Macedonia has made strong strides on major reforms and reconstruction of its armed forces toward the goal of building and sustaining a modern, professional defense force of about 12,000 troops.

Successive Macedonian governments have viewed integration into Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security institutions as the country's primary foreign policy goal. In pursuit of these goals, Macedonia is restructuring its military to be smaller, more affordable, defensively oriented, and interoperable with NATO. The Macedonian Government has welcomed close cooperation with the U.S. military and seeks to deepen this relationship as it restructures its forces.

Macedonia continues to play an indispensable role as the Kosovo Force's (KFOR) rear area, hosting the logistical supply line for KFOR troops in Kosovo. As part of these efforts, Macedonia hosts NATO troops, including U.S. troops, in support of NATO operations in Kosovo and to assist Macedonia's efforts to reform its military to meet NATO standards. Close U.S.-Macedonian bilateral defense cooperation continues. Macedonia has contributed troops to international coalition operations in Iraq, and continues to have troops in Afghanistan and in the EU peace support operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 4% of its military.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
In February 1994, Greece imposed a trade embargo on Macedonia due to disputes over the use of the name "Macedonia" and other issues. Greece and Macedonia signed an interim accord in October 1995 ending the embargo and opening the way to diplomatic recognition and increased trade. After signing the agreement with Greece, Macedonia joined the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). Athens and Skopje began talks on the name issue in New York under UN auspices in December 1995, opening liaison offices in respective capitals January 1996. These talks continue.

The stability of the young state was gravely tested during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, when Macedonia temporarily hosted about 360,000 refugees from the violence and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The refugee influx put significant stress on Macedonia's weak social infrastructure. With the help of NATO and the international community, Macedonia ultimately was able to accommodate the influx. Following the resolution of the conflict, the overwhelming majority of refugees returned to Kosovo. A small number of Roma refugees from Kosovo remains in Macedonia, most of them housed in the predominantly Roma municipality of Suto Orizari in the Skopje suburbs, and supported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Macedonia enjoys good relations with its neighbors. It has strong trade and tourism ties with Greece, and has developed similarly robust political and trade ties with Albania and Bulgaria. Relations between Belgrade and Skopje are good overall, although a dispute between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Serb Orthodox Church has strained ties over the past several years. Relations with Kosovo are good, with Macedonia having signed an Interim Free Trade Agreement with UNMIK in 2005 and with regular bilateral political contacts occurring between Pristina and Skopje since 2005. Macedonia recognized Kosovo’s independence in October 2008. Macedonia and Kosovo completed demarcation of their shared border and established formal diplomatic relations in October 2009.

Macedonia has made important strides toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Macedonia is an active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan, the OSCE, and United Nations, and was accepted as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2002. In May 2003, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, and the U.S. created the Adriatic Charter, modeled on the Baltic Charter, as a mechanism for promoting regional cooperation to advance each country's NATO candidacy. Since then, the Adriatic Charter countries have cooperated closely in regional military exercises, and have deployed a joint medical team to support international coalition operations in Afghanistan. The Adriatic Charter expanded to include Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro as members in December 2008. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Albania and Croatia received invitations to join the Alliance. NATO Allies noted that Macedonia met NATO membership criteria, but could not reach consensus on issuing an invitation for membership, in the absence of a solution to Macedonia's dispute with NATO member Greece over Macedonia's name. The United States believes Macedonia has met the performance-based standards for membership.

At the April 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl Summit and the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies re-confirmed the commitment to invite Macedonia to join NATO as soon as the name issue is resolved.

In 1999, the EU agreed to pursue a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Macedonia; negotiations with Macedonia were launched April 5, 2000. The SAA was signed in April 2001 and came into force in April 2004. Its trade and trade-related provisions have been in force since June 2001. In December 2005, the European Council granted candidate country status to Macedonia. In March 2008, the Council provided the Government of Macedonia a list of benchmarks to guide Macedonia's preparations to open formal accession negotiations. In October 2009, the European Commission recommended that Macedonia commence EU accession negotiations, but the European Council decided in December 2009 to defer discussion of a start date for negotiations.

U.S.-MACEDONIAN RELATIONS
The United States and Macedonia have enjoyed good bilateral relations since Macedonia gained its independence in 1991. The United States formally recognized Macedonia on February 8, 1994, and the two countries established full diplomatic relations on September 13, 1995. The U.S. Liaison Office was upgraded to an Embassy in February 1996, and the first U.S. Ambassador to Skopje arrived in July 1996. The development of political relations between the United States and Macedonia has ushered in a host of other contacts between the two states.

The United States, together with its European allies, strongly condemned the initiators of the 2001 insurgency in Macedonia and closely supported the government and major parties' successful efforts to forge a peaceful, political solution to the crisis through the Ohrid Framework Agreement. In partnership with the EU and other international organizations active in Macedonia, the United States is facilitating the Macedonian Government's implementation of the Framework Agreement and fostering long-term peace and stability in the country. Macedonia continues to make an important contribution to regional stability by facilitating the logistical supply of NATO (including U.S.) peacekeepers in Kosovo.

The United States strongly supports Macedonia's aspirations for full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Today, Macedonia and the United States enjoy a cooperative relationship across a broad range of political, economic, cultural, military, and social issues. With targeted technical assistance for democracy and economic reforms, defense reforms, and projects to strengthen rule of law and improve education, the United States has supported Macedonia's progress in building a democratic, secure, and market-oriented multiethnic society. Bilateral assistance budgeted to Macedonia under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act totaled over $500 million from 1990 to 2010. Macedonia received approximately $19 million in SEED Act assistance in 2009 and was scheduled to receive approximately $23 million in 2010.

With SEED funds, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs in Macedonia promote accelerated growth, support stronger democratic institutions, and help educate Macedonians for a modern economy.

USAID’s democracy assistance focuses on helping Macedonia to prepare for European Union (EU) and NATO accession by enhancing democratic political competition, strengthening civil society, supporting government decentralization, and promoting the rule of law. The assistance to local governments in Macedonia prioritizes fiscal decentralization, including the development of the necessary planning, management, and accounting skills to allow municipalities to access private credit markets and achieve EU standards. USAID also works to support the development of the judiciary into a stronger, more effective, and independent branch of government by introducing modern court administration practices and by improving court organization and performance. Technical assistance, training and operational support is provided to the Macedonian national legislature to increase the accountability of elected officials and strengthen their ability to represent the public. USAID’s assistance to the civil society sector to date has focused on promoting reforms in the legal framework, advancing individual and corporate philanthropy and volunteerism, and improving the public image of the sector. USAID helped strengthen political party organizations at the local level to enhance their ability to serve as advocates of local issues and to foster increased reliance by political parties on issue-based politics and political communications. USAID also supported the State Commission for Prevention of Corruption in developing a comprehensive State Program for Prevention of Conflict of Interest and assisted in training over 150 judges and prosecutors in dealing with conflict of interest cases.

A further priority of U.S. assistance is to facilitate Macedonia's transition to a market economy and increase employment and growth levels. USAID economic assistance is focused on two levels. At the macro-level, programs target improvements in the business-enabling environment by helping to bring legislative and regulatory frameworks in line with EU standards, build the capacity of the administration to implement them, and improve the transparency and efficiency of government services through technology. At the micro-level, assistance is given to firms and agribusinesses to increase their competitiveness and productivity, coupled with initiatives to attract foreign investment and stimulate local investment and support creation of new jobs and enterprises. Training programs that provide career-enhancing education to prepare youth and adults for growth sectors are also supported. In the energy area, USAID will support the Government of Macedonia to align the domestic energy system to EU norms, build institutional capacity to develop and implement energy policies, and help introduce energy efficiency interventions in households and the business sector.

Complementing its assistance in Macedonia's political and economic transition, USAID programs have been improving education and human capacity in Macedonia through projects on the primary, secondary, and post-secondary education levels. Activities include improving teaching techniques; math, science, and technical curricula; and information and communication technology (ICT) use in the classroom; as well as applying quality assessment techniques. USAID also works on improving employability and soft skills of youth to prepare them for the needs of the modern labor market. A small program implemented by a local non-governmental organization (NGO) is training teachers to use assistive computer peripherals to better integrate children with special needs into regular classes. USAID is currently designing a project on ethnic integration in education. Other programs address crosscutting issues; assistance to the Roma minority; and performance improvement of key institutions, such as the Bureau for Development of Education, State Education Inspectorate, and the national Vocational Education and Training Center.

On May 7, 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki signed a joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation affirming the determination of our governments to further expand and deepen the partnership between our two countries based upon common goals, interests, and values. The full text of the declaration is available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/104441.htm.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Philip T. Reeker
Deputy Chief of Mission--Brian Aggeler
USAID Mission Director--Robert Wuertz
Political and Economic Affairs--David Burger
Economic/Commercial Affairs--Darren Hultman
Consul--Carolyn Gorman
Management Affairs--Matthew Spivak
Public Affairs--Angela Aggeler
Defense Attache--Col. Todd Brown

The U.S. Embassy in Macedonia is located at Str. “Samoilova” Nr. 21. 1000 Skopje (tel: [389] (2) 310-2000; fax: [389] (2) 310-2299).

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April 4, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Background Note: Namibia

Official Name: Republic of Namibia

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 823,145 sq. km. (320,827 sq. mi.); the size of Texas and Louisiana combined.
Cities: Capital--Windhoek (2001 census) pop. 233,529. Other cities--Grootfontein, Katima Mulilo, Keetmanshoop, Luderitz, Ondangwa, Oranjemund, Oshakati, Otjiwarongo, Swakopmund, Tsumeb, Walvis Bay.
Terrain: Varies from coastal desert to semiarid mountains and plateau.
Climate: Semidesert and high plateau.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Namibian(s).
Population (2010 est.): 2.3 million.
Average annual population growth rate (2001 est.): 2.6%. The population growth rate is depressed by an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate estimated to be 17.8%. (Source: UNAIDS Namibia 2010 Country Progress Report)
Ethnic groups: About 50% of the population belong to Ovambo ethnic group, and 9% to the Kavango ethnic group. Other ethnic groups are: Herero 7%, Damara 7%, Nama 5%, Caprivian 4%, San 3%, Baster 2%, and Tswana 0.5%.
Religions: Predominantly Christian; also Muslim, Jewish, Baha’i, and indigenous beliefs.
Languages: English (official); Oshivambo, Afrikaans, German, Herero, Nama/Damara, other indigenous languages.
Education: Years compulsory--to age 16. Primary school attendance (2005-2009)--89%. Adult literacy rate (2005-2008)--88%. (UNICEF)
Work force (2008): 678,681.

Government
Type: Republic.
Independence: March 21, 1990.
Branches: Executive--president (elected for 5-year term), prime minister. Legislative--bicameral Parliament: National Assembly and National Council. Judicial--Supreme Court, the High Court, and lower courts.
Subdivisions: 13 administrative regions.
Registered political parties: South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), United Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF), Congress of Democrats (COD), Republican Party (RP), National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), Monitor Action Group (MAG), Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), South West African National Union (SWANU), All People’s Party (APP), Democratic Party of Namibia (DPN), Namibia Democratic Movement for Change (NDMC).
Suffrage: Universal adult.

Economy
GDP (2009): $9.4 billion. (World Bank)
Annual growth rate (2009): 1%. (World Bank)
Per capita GNI (2009): $4,338. (World Bank)
Average annual inflation rate (2010): 4.5%. (Namibia Central Bureau of Statistics)
Natural resources: Diamonds, uranium, zinc, gold, copper, lead, tin, fluorspar, salt, fisheries, and wildlife.
Agriculture (5.1% of GDP, 2009): Products--livestock and meat products, crop farming and forestry. (Namibia Central Bureau of Statistics)
Mining (10% of GDP, 2009): Gem-quality diamonds, uranium, zinc, copper, other. (Namibia Central Bureau of Statistics)
Fishing and fish processing on board (3.6% of GDP, 2009): Hake, horse mackerel, lobster, other. (Namibia Central Bureau of Statistics)
Trade: Exports (2010)--$5.71 billion: diamonds, uranium, zinc, copper, lead, beef, cattle, fish, karakul pelts, grapes. Imports (2010)--$5.14 billion: foodstuffs, construction material, manufactured goods. Major partners--South Africa, Angola, European Union (EU), U.S., Canada, China, India. (World Trade Organization)

PEOPLE
Namibians are of diverse ethnic origins. The principal groups are the Ovambo, Kavango, Herero/Himba, Damara, Colored (including Rehoboth Baster), White (Afrikaner, German, English, and Portuguese), Nama, Caprivian, San, and Tswana.

The Ovambo make up about half of Namibia's people. The Ovambo, Kavango, and East Caprivian peoples, who occupy the relatively well-watered and wooded northern part of the country, are settled farmers and herders. Historically, these groups had little contact with the Nama, Damara, and Herero, who roamed the central part of the country vying for control of sparse pastureland. German colonial rule destroyed the war-making ability of the tribes but did not erase their identities or traditional organization. People from the more populous north have settled throughout the country in recent decades as a result of urbanization, industrialization, and the demand for labor.

Missionary work during the 1800s drew many Namibians to Christianity. While most Namibian Christians are Lutheran, there also are Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Jewish, African Methodist Episcopal, and Dutch Reformed Christians represented.

Education and services have been extended in varying degrees to most rural areas in recent years. Although the national literacy rate is quite high (estimated to be 88%), it is important to note that the number of Namibians that are functionally literate and have the skills that the labor market needs is significantly lower.

HISTORY
The San are generally assumed to have been the earliest inhabitants of the region. Later inhabitants include the Nama and the Damara or Berg Dama. The Bantu-speaking Ovambo and Herero migrated from the north in about the 14th century A.D.

The inhospitable Namib Desert constituted a formidable barrier to European exploration until the late 18th century, when successions of travelers, traders, hunters, and missionaries explored the area. In 1878, the United Kingdom annexed Walvis Bay on behalf of Cape Colony, and the area was incorporated into the Cape of Good Hope in 1884. In 1883, a German trader, Adolf Luderitz, claimed the rest of the coastal region after negotiations with a local chief. Negotiations between the United Kingdom and Germany resulted in Germany's annexation of the coastal region, excluding Walvis Bay. The following year, the United Kingdom recognized the hinterland up to 20 degrees east longitude as a German sphere of influence. A region later known as the Caprivi Strip became a part of South West Africa after an agreement on July 1, 1890, between the United Kingdom and Germany. The British recognized that the strip would fall under German administration to provide access to the Zambezi River and German colonies in East Africa. In exchange, the British received the islands of Zanzibar and Heligoland.

German colonial power was consolidated, and prime grazing land passed to white control as a result of the Herero and Nama wars of 1904-08. German administration ended during World War I following South African occupation in 1915.

On December 17, 1920, South Africa undertook administration of South West Africa under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and a mandate agreement by the League Council. The mandate agreement gave South Africa full power of administration and legislation over the territory. It required that South Africa promote the material and moral well-being and social progress of the people.

When the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946, the newly formed United Nations inherited its supervisory authority for the territory. South Africa refused UN requests to place the territory under a trusteeship agreement. During the 1960s, as the European powers granted independence to their colonies and trust territories in Africa, pressure mounted on South Africa to do so in Namibia, which was then known as South West Africa. In 1966, the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate.

Also in 1966, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) began its armed struggle to liberate Namibia, in part from bases abroad. After Angola became independent in 1975, SWAPO established bases in the southern part of that country. Hostilities intensified over the years, particularly in the north.

In a 1971 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice upheld UN authority over Namibia, determining that the South African presence in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa therefore was obligated to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately. The Court also advised UN member states to refrain from implying legal recognition or assistance to the South African presence.

International Pressure for Independence
In 1977, Western members of the UN Security Council, including Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (known as the Western Contact Group), launched a joint diplomatic effort to bring an internationally acceptable transition to independence for Namibia. Their efforts led to the presentation in April 1978 of Security Council Resolution 435 for settling the Namibian problem. The proposal, known as the UN Plan, was worked out after lengthy consultations with South Africa, the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), SWAPO, UN officials, and the Western Contact Group. It called for the holding of elections in Namibia under UN supervision and control, the cessation of all hostile acts by all parties, and restrictions on the activities of South African and Namibian military, paramilitary, and police.

South Africa agreed to cooperate in achieving the implementation of Resolution 435. Nonetheless, in December 1978, in defiance of the UN proposal, it unilaterally held elections in Namibia that were boycotted by SWAPO and a few other political parties. South Africa continued to administer Namibia through its installed multiracial coalitions. Negotiations after 1978 focused on issues such as supervision of elections connected with the implementation of the UN Plan.

Negotiations and Transition
Intense discussions between the concerned parties continued during the 1978-88 period, with the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari, playing a key role. The 1982 Constitutional Principles, agreed upon by the front-line states, SWAPO, and the Western Contact Group created the framework for Namibia's democratic constitution.

In May 1988, a U.S. mediation team, headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker, brought negotiators from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and observers from the Soviet Union together in London. Intense diplomatic maneuvering characterized the next 7 months, as the parties worked out agreements to bring peace to the region and make implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 possible. On December 13, Cuba, South Africa, and the People's Republic of Angola agreed to a total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. The protocol also established a Joint Commission, consisting of the parties with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers, to oversee implementation of the accords. A bilateral agreement between Cuba and the People's Republic of Angola was signed in New York on December 22, 1988. On the same day a tripartite agreement, in which the parties recommended initiation of the UN Plan on April 1 and the Republic of South Africa agreed to withdraw its troops, was signed. Implementation of Resolution 435 officially began on April 1, 1989, when South African-appointed Administrator Gen. Louis Pienaar officially began administrating the territory's transition to independence. Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari arrived in Windhoek to begin performing his duties as head of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

The transition got off to a shaky start on April 1 because, in contravention to SWAPO President Sam Nujoma's written assurances to the UN Secretary General to abide by a cease-fire and repatriate only unarmed insurgents, about 2,000 armed members of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO's military wing, crossed the border from Angola. The Special Representative authorized a limited contingent of South African troops to aid the South West African police in restoring order. A period of intense fighting followed, during which 375 PLAN fighters were killed. At Mt. Etjo, a game park outside Windhoek, in a special meeting of the Joint Commission on April 9, a plan was put in place to confine the South African forces to base and return PLAN elements to Angola. While the problem was solved, minor disturbances in the north continued throughout the transition period. In October, under order of the UN Security Council, Pretoria demobilized members of the disbanded counterinsurgency unit, Koevoet (Afrikaans for "crowbar"), who had been incorporated into the South West African police.

The 11-month transition period went relatively smoothly. Political prisoners were granted amnesty, discriminatory legislation was repealed, South Africa withdrew all its forces from Namibia, and some 42,000 refugees returned safely and voluntarily under the auspices of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Almost 98% of registered voters turned out to elect members of the Constituent Assembly. The elections were held in November 1989 and were certified as free and fair by the Special Representative, with SWAPO taking 57% of the vote, just short of the two-thirds necessary to have a free hand in drafting the constitution. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the opposition party, received 29% of the vote. The Constituent Assembly held its first meeting on November 21 and its first act unanimously resolved to use the 1982 Constitutional Principles as the framework for Namibia's new constitution.

By February 9, 1990, the Constituent Assembly had drafted and adopted a constitution. March 21, independence day, was attended by Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who represented President George H.W. Bush. On that same day, he inaugurated the U.S. Embassy in Windhoek in recognition of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

On March 1, 1994, the coastal enclave of Walvis Bay and 12 offshore islands were transferred to Namibia by South Africa. This followed 3 years of bilateral negotiations between the two governments and the establishment of a transitional Joint Administrative Authority (JAA) in November 1992 to administer the 300-square mile territory. The peaceful resolution of this territorial dispute, which dated back to 1878, was praised by the United States and the international community, as it fulfilled the provisions of UN Security Council 432 (1978) which declared Walvis Bay to be an integral part of Namibia.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Namibia is a multiparty, multiracial democracy, with a president who is elected for 5-year term. The constitution establishes a bicameral Parliament and provides for general elections every 5 years and regional elections every 6 years. Members of the 72-seat National Assembly are elected on a party list system on a proportional basis. Members of the 26-seat National Council are elected from within popularly elected Regional Councils. The three branches of government are subject to checks and balances, and provision is made for judicial review. The judicial structure in Namibia comprises a Supreme Court, the High Court, and lower courts. Roman-Dutch law has been the common law of the territory since 1919. Namibia's unitary government is currently in the process of decentralization.

The constitution provides for the private ownership of property and for human rights protections, and states that Namibia should have a mixed economy and encourage foreign investment.

Sam Nujoma, leader of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), was President from Namibia's independence in 1990 until 2005. In November 2004, citizens elected Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Hifikepunye Pohamba to be the next President. Pohamba was re-elected in November 2009 for his second and final term in office. The inauguration was held in March 2010, in conjunction with celebrations marking the country's 20th anniversary.

Namibia's 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections were held on November 27-28. The Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) released the official results on December 4. The ruling SWAPO party and incumbent President Pohamba won with 75% and 76% respectively. The Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) won 11 % of the vote, the most by a single opposition party. While some procedural irregularities were observed, international and domestic observers pronounced the elections to be generally free and fair. The RDP, along with eight other opposition parties, however, claimed that ECN manipulated the election results and challenged the results in the High Court. On March 4, 2010, the High Court dismissed the petition on a technicality, but the opposition parties appealed to the Supreme Court. On September 6, 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously decided to return the case to the High Court, where its merits were heard. On February 14, 2011, the High Court ruled that the opposition did not show enough evidence that the elections had been fraudulent. However, the court criticized the Electoral Commission of Namibia for conducting elections in a manner that could arouse suspicion. The opposition parties announced in February that they will appeal the High Court’s ruling to the Supreme Court.

With 54 seats, SWAPO retained its two-thirds majority in the new Parliament, which was sworn in March 21, 2010. The RDP, which won eight seats; the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), which won two seats; and the Republican Party, which won one seat, boycotted the swearing-in ceremony and remain outside Parliament while the appeal is unresolved. The Congress of Democrats (CoD), the United Democratic Front (UDF), Namibian Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), All Peoples Party (APP), and South West Africa National Union (SWANU) are represented in the National Assembly.

Principal Government Officials
President--Hifikepunye Pohamba
Prime Minister--Nahas Angula
Deputy Prime Minister--Marco Hausiku
National Assembly Speaker--Theo-Ben Gurirab
National Council Chairperson--Asser Kapere
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Utoni Nujoma
Minister for Presidential Affairs--Albert Kawana
Minister of Defense--Major General Charles Namoloh
National Planning Commission Director--Tom Alweendo
Namibia Central Intelligence Service Director--Lukas Hangula
Minister of Education--Abraham Iyambo
Minister of Finance--Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila
Minister of Safety and Security--Nangolo Mbumba
Minister of Trade and Industry--Hage Geingob
Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration--Rosalia Nghindinwa
Minister of Information and Communication Technology--Joel Kaapanda
Minister of Justice--Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana
Minster of Mines and Energy--Isak Katali
Minister of Labor and Social Welfare--Immanuel Ngatjizeko
Minister of Health and Social Service--Richard Kamwi
Minister of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry--John Mutorwa
Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources--Bernard Esau
Minister of Environment and Tourism--Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah
Minister of Lands and Resettlement--Alpheus Naruseb
Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing--Jerry Ekandjo
Minister of Works and Transport--Erkki Nghimtina
Minister of Gender Equality and Child Welfare--Doreen Sioka
Minister of Youth, National Service, Sport, and Culture--Kazenambo Kazenambo
Ambassador to UN--Wilfred Emvula
Ambassador to U.S.--Martin Andjaba

Namibia maintains an embassy in the United States at 1605 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington DC 20009 (tel: (202) 986-0540; fax: (202) 986-0443).

ECONOMY
The Namibian economy has a modern market sector, which produces most of the country's wealth, and a traditional subsistence sector. Namibia's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is relatively high among developing countries but obscures one of the most unequal income distributions on the African continent. Although the majority of the population depends on subsistence agriculture and herding, Namibia has more than 200,000 skilled workers, as well as a small, well-trained professional and managerial class.

The country's sophisticated formal economy is based on capital-intensive industry and farming. However, Namibia's economy is heavily dependent on the earnings generated from primary commodity exports in a few vital sectors, including minerals, livestock, and fish. Furthermore, the Namibian economy remains integrated with the economy of South Africa, as the bulk of Namibia's imports originate there.

Since independence, the Namibian Government has pursued free-market economic principles designed to promote commercial development and job creation to bring disadvantaged Namibians into the economic mainstream. To facilitate this goal, the government has actively courted donor assistance and foreign investment. The liberal Foreign Investment Act of 1990 provides for freedom from nationalization, freedom to remit capital and profits, currency convertibility, and a process for settling disputes equitably.

Namibia is part of the Common Monetary Area (CMA) comprising Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa. Both the South African rand and the Namibian dollar are legal tender in Namibia, but the Namibian dollar is not accepted in South Africa. As a result of the CMA agreement, the scope for independent monetary policy in Namibia is limited. The Bank of Namibia regularly follows actions taken by the South African central bank.

Given its small domestic market but favorable location and a superb transport and communications base, Namibia is a leading advocate of regional economic integration. In addition to its membership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Namibia presently belongs to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Within SACU, no tariffs exist on goods produced in and moving among the member states. In July 2008, SACU signed a Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) with the United States. SACU also has plans to negotiate free trade agreements with China, India, Kenya, and Nigeria. The SACU Secretariat is located in Windhoek.

Over 80% of Namibia's imports originate in South Africa, and many Namibian exports are destined for the South African market or transit that country. Outside of South Africa, the EU (primarily the U.K.) is the chief market for Namibian exports. Namibia's exports consist mainly of diamonds and other minerals, fish products, beef and meat products, grapes and light manufactures.

Namibia is seeking to diversify its trading relationships away from its heavy dependence on South African goods and services. Europe has become a leading market for Namibian fish and meat, while mining concerns in Namibia have purchased heavy equipment and machinery from Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. Namibia is an eligible country under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), but has had limited success with exports under this program.

In 1993, Namibia became a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signatory, and the Minister of Trade and Industry represented Namibia at the Marrakech signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement in April 1994. Namibia has been a member of the World Trade Organization since its creation in 1995 and is a strong proponent of the Doha Development Agenda announced at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. Namibia also is a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In December 2007 Namibia initialed an interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union, but has not yet signed the interim agreement. The EPA provides duty- and limited quota-free access to European markets for Namibian exports, thereby continuing many of the expiring trade benefits from the Cotonou Agreement. Negotiations continue over the new EPA.

State-owned enterprises operate in many key sectors of the Namibian economy. The government has stakes (often 100% ownership) in companies in the following sectors: telecommunications (fixed and mobile voice and data services), energy, water, transport (air, rail, and road), postal services, fishing, mining, and tourism.

Mining and Energy
As was the case for many countries, Namibia’s extractive industries, particularly the diamond industry, experienced a significant decline due to the recent global economic downturn, although uranium was an exception. Mining contributed approximately 10% of GDP in 2009. While Namibia recovered over 2 million carats of diamonds in 2008, it mined only 929,000 carats in 2009, a 58% drop in production. Diamond mining rebounded in 2010, with close to 1.5 million carats recovered. Namibia is the world’s fourth-largest producer of uranium oxide, representing approximately 10% of global uranium production. Namibia has two operational uranium mines. Two or three new uranium mines may open over the next 5 years. Other important mineral resources are zinc, copper, lead, gold, fluorspar, and salt. The country also is a source of natural stones such as granite and marble. Semiprecious stones are mined on a smaller scale.

During the pre-independence period, large areas of Namibia, including offshore, were leased for oil prospecting. Natural gas was discovered in 1974 in the Kudu Field off the mouth of the Orange River. The field is thought to contain reserves of over 1.3 trillion cubic feet. In 2009, the government announced changes to the ownership structure of the Kudu project. Tullow Oil Plc, which had owned 70% of the Kudu gas field, saw its stake drop to 31%. Japanese firm Itochu Corporation, which owned 20% in the project, now owns 15%. The Namibian Government through state petroleum firm NAMCOR has partnered with the Russian firm Gazprom to take a 54% stake in Kudu. NAMCOR had previously held a 10% interest. Plans are also underway to build the country's first combined cycle power station near Oranjemund. With power shortages facing the Southern African region, the government has stated its commitment to develop the Kudu gas field. However, supply of electricity in the short to medium term remains a challenge.

Namibia has a well-developed legislative framework governing the upstream and downstream oil business. Currently there are eight companies exploring for oil and gas.

Agriculture
Although Namibian agriculture--excluding fishing--contributed between 5% and 6% of Namibia's GDP for the past 5 years, a large percentage of the Namibian population depends on agricultural activities for livelihood, mostly in the subsistence sector. Animal products, live animals, and crop exports constituted roughly 10.7% of total Namibian exports. The government encourages local sourcing of agriculture products. Retailers of fruits, vegetables, and other crop products must purchase 27.5% of their stock from local farmers.

In the largely white-dominated commercial sector, agriculture consists primarily of livestock ranching. Cattle raising is predominant in the central and northern regions, while karakul sheep and goat farming are concentrated in the more arid southern regions. Subsistence farming is mainly confined to the "communal lands" of the country's populous north, where roaming cattle herds are prevalent and the main crops are millet, sorghum, corn, and peanuts. Table grapes, grown mostly along the Orange River in the country's arid south, are becoming an increasingly important commercial crop and a significant employer of seasonal labor.

The government's land reform policy is shaped by two key pieces of legislation: the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 and the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002. The government remains committed to a "willing seller, willing buyer" approach to land reform and to providing just compensation as directed by the Namibian constitution. As the government addresses the vital land and range management questions, water use issues and availability are considered.

Fishing
The clean, cold South Atlantic waters off the coast of Namibia are home to some of the richest fishing grounds in the world, with the potential for sustainable yields of up to 1.5 million metric tons per year. Commercial fishing and fish processing is one of the significant sectors of the Namibian economy in terms of employment, export earnings, and contribution to GDP. In 2009, fishing contributed almost 3.6% of GDP, while on-shore processing of fish products contributed another 1.4%. The Namibian Government has actively pursued value-addition policies aimed at increasing on-shore processing of fish products.

The main species found in abundance off Namibia are pilchards (sardines), anchovy, hake, and horse mackerel. There also are smaller but significant quantities of sole, squid, deep-sea crab, rock lobster, and tuna. However, at the time of independence, fish stocks had fallen to dangerously low levels due to the lack of protection and conservation of the fisheries and the overexploitation of these resources. This trend appears to have been halted and reversed since independence, as the Namibian Government is now pursuing a conservative resource management policy along with an aggressive fisheries enforcement campaign. Namibia is a signatory to the Convention on Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources in the South-East Atlantic (Seafo Convention). The country is also part of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCLME) program, which is designed to help the Governments of Namibia, Angola, and South Africa manage their shared marine resources in an integrated and sustainable way.

Manufacturing and Infrastructure
In 2009, Namibia's manufacturing sector (including meat and fish processing) contributed about 13.5% of GDP. Namibian manufacturing has historically been inhibited by a small domestic market, dependence on imported goods, limited supply of local capital, widely dispersed population, small skilled labor force and high relative wage rates, and subsidized competition from South Africa.

Walvis Bay has a well-developed, deepwater port, considered by many one of the best in Western Africa, and Namibia's fishing infrastructure is most heavily concentrated there. The Namibian Government expects Walvis Bay to become an important commercial gateway to the Southern African region. However, government officials acknowledge that many segments of Namibia’s more than 2,300 kilometers of rail infrastructure require urgent rehabilitation. Upgrades to Namibia’s rail infrastructure are considered a critical element in the government’s plan to expand the port of Walvis Bay.

Namibia also boasts modern civil aviation facilities and an extensive, well-maintained land transportation network. Construction continues to expand two major arteries--the Trans-Caprivi and Trans-Kalahari Highways--which will further open up the region's access to Walvis Bay.

Tourism
Tourism is a rapidly growing sector of the Namibian economy and a significant generator of employment. It is the third-largest source of foreign exchange after mining and fisheries. Although the majority of Namibia's international visitors originate in the region, other international travelers are increasingly attracted by the country's unique mix of political stability, cultural diversity, and geographic beauty. Tourism in Namibia has had a positive impact on resource conservation and rural development. As of 2007, there were 50 communal conservancies established across the country, resulting in enhanced land management while providing tens of thousands of rural Namibians with much needed income.

Labor
While most Namibians are economically active in one form or another, the bulk of this activity is in the informal sector, primarily subsistence agriculture. In the formal economy, the official estimate of unemployment is 51.2% of the work force. In March 2011, the government introduced a 3-year budget that contains significant (30%) additional spending over prior years with a focus on public works and infrastructure to stimulate economic growth and generate employment opportunities, primarily for Namibia’s unskilled workers. A large number of Namibians seeking jobs in the formal sector are held back due to a lack of necessary skills or training. The government is aggressively pursuing education reform to address this problem.

There are two main trade union federations in Namibia representing workers: the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), which is affiliated with the ruling SWAPO party, and the Trade Union Congress of Namibia (TUCNA), which is not affiliated with any party. A new labor law went into effect in November 2008. The new law prohibited employers from using “labor hire” (third-party hiring of temporary or contract workers); however, the Supreme Court declared this provision unconstitutional in December 2009.

NATIONAL SECURITY
The constitution defines the role of the military as "defending the territory and national interests." Following independence, Namibia formed the National Defense Force (NDF), comprised of former enemies in a 23-year bush war, the PLAN and South West African territorial force. The NDF consists of five battalions and a small headquarters element. The NDF has a modest air wing and a maritime wing. Namibia contributed 900 troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in Liberia.

Namibia has had defense cooperation at various levels with several countries, including the United States. It also participates in regional peacekeeping efforts. The U.S. does not have an Article 98 agreement with Namibia.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Namibia follows a largely independent foreign policy, but has close relations with states that aided its independence struggle, including the People's Republic of China, Russia, and Cuba.

Namibia is developing trade and strengthening economic and political ties within the Southern African region. As a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Namibia is a vocal advocate for greater regional integration.

Namibia became the 160th member of the United Nations on April 23, 1990, and the 50th member of the British Commonwealth upon independence.

U.S.-NAMIBIAN RELATIONS
U.S.-Namibian relations are good and continue to improve. Characterized by shared democratic values, commitment to rule of law, and respect for human rights, the bilateral relationship has been strengthened through trade ties and U.S.-Namibian partnerships. Namibia is a focus country under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and on September 3, 2010 the United States and Namibia signed a PEPFAR Partnership Framework. Since 2004, PEPFAR assistance to Namibia has exceeded $300 million. A $304 million Millennium Challenge Account Compact entered into force on September 16, 2009. On average, there are 128 Peace Corps Volunteers in country. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Defense, and Treasury Department also are represented in Windhoek.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Wanda L. Nesbitt
Deputy Chief of Mission--Ava Rogers
Public Affairs Officer--Anthony Deaton
Political Officer--Emily Plumb
Economic/Commercial Officer--Frank DeParis
Consular Officer--Charles Jarrett
USAID Director--Debra Mosel (acting)
CDC Director--Jeff Hanson
Defense Attache--Major Cheryl Korver, U.S. Army
Peace Corps Country Director--Gilbert Collins

The U.S. Embassy in Namibia is located at 14 Lossen Street, Windhoek (tel. +264 61-295-8500).

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April 6, 2011Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

Background Note: Sri Lanka

Official Name: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 65,610 sq. km. (25,332 sq. mi.); about the size of West Virginia.
Cities: Capital--Colombo (pop. est. 1.3 million--urban area). Sri Jayewardenepura-Kotte is the officially designated capital and is the site of Parliament. Other cities--Kandy (150,000), Galle (110,000), Jaffna (100,000).
Terrain: Coastal plains in the northern third of country; hills and mountains in south-central Sri Lanka rise to more than 2,133 meters (7,000 ft.).
Climate: Tropical. Rainy seasons--light in northeast, fall and winter, with average rainfall of 50 in.; heavy in southwest, summer and fall, with average rainfall of 200 in.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Sri Lankan(s).
Population: 21.3 million.
Annual population growth rate: 0.9%.
Ethnic groups (2002): Sinhalese (74%), Tamils (18%), Muslims (7%), others (1%).
Religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity.
Languages: Sinhala and Tamil (official), English.
Education: Years compulsory--to age 14. Primary school attendance--96.5%. Literacy--91%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--18.57/1,000. Life expectancy--73 yrs. (male); 77 yrs. (female).
Work force: 7.6 million (excluding northern provinces).

Government
Type: Republic.
Independence: February 4, 1948.
Constitution: August 31, 1978.
Suffrage: Universal over 18.
Branches: Executive--president, chief of state and head of government, elected for a 6-year term. Legislative--unicameral 225-member Parliament. Judicial--Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court, subordinate courts.
Administrative subdivisions: Nine provinces and 25 administrative districts.
Political parties: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, National Freedom Front, Jathika Hela Urumaya, Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Tamil National Alliance, United National Party, Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, National Unity Alliance, Ceylon Workers' Congress, Up-Country People's Front, several small Tamil and Muslim parties, Marxists, and others.

Economy (2010 est.)
GDP: $49.55 billion.
Annual growth rate: 8%.
Natural resources: Limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, and phosphate.
Agriculture (11% of GDP): Major products--rice, tea, rubber, coconut, and spices.
Services (59% of GDP): Major types--tourism, wholesale and retail trade, transport, telecom, financial services.
Industry (29% of GDP): Major types--garments and leather goods, rubber products, food processing, chemicals, refined petroleum, gems and jewelry, non-metallic mineral-based products, and construction.
Trade: Exports--$8.3 billion: garments, tea, rubber products, jewelry and gems, refined petroleum, and coconuts. Major markets--U.S. ($1.77 billion), U.K., India. Imports--$13.5 billion. Major suppliers--India, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Iran, Malaysia, Japan, U.K., U.A.E., Belgium, Indonesia, South Korea, U.S. ($178 million).

PEOPLE
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon) is an island in the Indian Ocean about 28 kilometers (18 mi.) off the southeastern coast of India with a population of about 21 million. Density is highest in the southwest where Colombo, the country's main port and industrial center, is located. The net population growth rate is about 1%. Sri Lanka is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse.

Sinhalese make up 74% of the population and are concentrated in the densely populated southwest. Sri Lankan Tamils, citizens whose South Indian ancestors have lived on the island for centuries, total about 12%, live throughout the country, and predominate in the Northern Province.

Indian Tamils, a distinct ethnic group, represent about 5% of the population. The British brought them to Sri Lanka in the 19th century as tea and rubber plantation workers, and they remain concentrated in the "tea country" of south-central Sri Lanka. In accordance with a 1964 agreement with India, Sri Lanka granted citizenship to 230,000 "stateless" Indian Tamils in 1988. Under the pact, India granted citizenship to the remainder, some 200,000 of whom now live in India. Another 75,000 Indian Tamils, who themselves or whose parents once applied for Indian citizenship, chose to remain in Sri Lanka and have since been granted Sri Lankan citizenship.

Other minorities include Muslims (both Moors and Malays), at about 7% of the population; Burghers, who are descendants of European colonists, principally from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (U.K.); and aboriginal Veddahs. Most Sinhalese are Buddhist; most Tamils are Hindu. The majority of Sri Lanka's Muslims practice Sunni Islam. Sizable minorities of both Sinhalese and Tamils are Christians, most of whom are Roman Catholic. The 1978 constitution--while assuring freedom of religion--grants primacy to Buddhism.

Sinhala, an Indo-European language, is the native tongue of the Sinhalese. Tamils and most Muslims speak Tamil, part of the South Indian Dravidian linguistic group. Use of English has declined since independence, but it continues to be spoken by many in the middle and upper middle classes, particularly in Colombo. The government is seeking to reverse the decline in the use of English, mainly for economic but also for political reasons. Both Sinhala and Tamil are official languages.

HISTORY
The actual origins of the Sinhalese are shrouded in myth. Most believe they came to Sri Lanka from northern India during the 6th century BC. Buddhism arrived from the subcontinent 300 years later and spread rapidly. Buddhism and a sophisticated system of irrigation became the pillars of classical Sinhalese civilization (200 BC-1200 AD) that flourished in the north-central part of the island. Invasions from southern India, combined with internecine strife, pushed Sinhalese kingdoms southward.

The island's contact with the outside world began early. Roman sailors called the island Taprobane. Arab traders knew it as "Serendip," the root of the word "serendipity." Beginning in 1505, Portuguese traders, in search of cinnamon and other spices, seized the island's coastal areas and spread Catholicism. The Dutch supplanted the Portuguese in 1658. Although the British ejected the Dutch in 1796, Dutch law remains an important part of Sri Lankan jurisprudence. In 1815, the British defeated the king of Kandy, last of the native rulers, and created the Crown Colony of Ceylon. They established a plantation economy based on tea, rubber, and coconuts. In 1931, the British granted Ceylon limited self-rule and a universal franchise. Ceylon became independent on February 4, 1948.

Post-Independence Politics
Sri Lankan politics since independence have been strongly democratic. Two major parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), have generally alternated rule.

The UNP ruled first from 1948-56 under three Prime Ministers--D.S. Senanayake, his son Dudley, and Sir John Kotelawala. The SLFP ruled from 1956-65, with a short hiatus in 1960, first under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and then, after his assassination in 1959, under his widow, Sirimavo, the world's first female chief executive in modern times. Dudley Senanayake and the UNP returned to power in 1965.

In 1970, Mrs. Bandaranaike again assumed the premiership. A year later, an insurrection by followers of the Maoist "Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna" (JVP, or "People's Liberation Front") broke out. The SLFP government suppressed the revolt and declared a state of emergency that lasted 6 years.

In 1972, Mrs. Bandaranaike's government introduced a new constitution, which changed the country's name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, declared it a republic, made protection of Buddhism a constitutional principle, and created a weak president appointed by the prime minister. Its economic policies during this period were highly socialist and included the nationalization of large tea and rubber plantations and other private industries.

The UNP, under J.R. Jayewardene, returned to power in 1977. The Jayewardene government opened the economy and, in 1978, introduced a new constitution based on the French model, a key element of which was the creation of a strong executive presidency. J.R. Jayewardene was elected President by Parliament in 1978 and by nationwide election in 1982. In 1982, a national referendum extended the life of Parliament another 6 years.

The UNP's Ranasinghe Premadasa, Prime Minister in the Jayewardene government, narrowly defeated Mrs. Bandaranaike (SLFP) in the 1988 presidential elections. The UNP also won an absolute majority in the 1989 parliamentary elections. Mr. Premadasa was assassinated on May 1, 1993 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE" or "Tigers"), and was replaced by then-Prime Minister Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, who appointed Ranil Wickremasinghe Prime Minister.

The SLFP, the main party in the People's Alliance (PA) coalition, returned to power in 1994 for the first time in 17 years. The PA won a plurality in the August 1994 parliamentary elections and formed a coalition government with Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Kumaratunga later won the November 1994 presidential elections and appointed her mother (former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike) to replace her as Prime Minister. President Kumaratunga won re-election to another 6-year term in December 1999. In August 2000, Mrs. Bandaranaike resigned as Prime Minister for health reasons, and Ratnasiri Wickramanayake was appointed to take her place. In December 2001, the UNP assumed power, led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe. Chandrika Kumaratunga remained as President. In November of 2003, President Kumaratunga suddenly took control of three key ministries, triggering a serious cohabitation crisis.

In January 2004, the SLFP and the JVP formed a political grouping known as the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA). In February, President Kumaratunga dissolved Parliament and called for fresh elections. In these elections, which took place in April 2004, the UPFA received 45% of the vote, with the UNP receiving 37% of the vote. While it did not win enough seats to command a majority in Parliament, the UPFA was able to form a government and appoint a cabinet headed by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. The JVP later broke with the SLFP and left the government, but has often supported it from outside.

Presidential elections were held in November 2005, with Mahinda Rajapaksa becoming President, and Ratnasiri Wickramanayake becoming Prime Minister. President Rajapaksa stood for re-election 2 years before the end of his term, in January 2010, and was reelected by a margin of 18% over the opposition candidate, retired Army General Sarath Fonseka. The presidential elections were soon followed by a large victory for Rajapaksa’s UPFA coalition in April 2010 parliamentary elections, where it captured 144 out of 225 seats possible, just shy of a two-thirds majority. The remaining parliamentary seats were secured by the United National Front (60), the Tamil National Alliance (14), and the Democratic National Alliance (7).

Communal Crisis
Historical divisions continue to have an impact on Sri Lankan society and politics. From independence, the Tamil minority has been uneasy with the country's unitary form of government and apprehensive that the Sinhalese majority would abuse Tamil rights. Those fears were reinforced when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike triumphed in the 1956 elections after appealing to Sinhalese nationalism. His declaration that Sinhala was the country's official language--an act felt by Tamils to be a denigration of their own tongue--was the first in a series of steps over the following decades that appeared discriminatory to Tamils. Tamils also protested government educational policies and agriculture programs that encouraged Sinhalese farmers from the south to move to newly irrigated lands in the east. The decades following 1956 saw intermittent outbreaks of communal violence and growing radicalization among Tamil groups. By the mid-1970s Tamil politicians were moving from support for federalism to a demand for a separate Tamil state--"Tamil Eelam"--in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, areas of traditional Tamil settlement. In the 1977 elections, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) won all the seats in Tamil areas on a platform of separatism. Other groups--particularly the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers)--sought an independent state by force.

In 1983, the death of 13 Sinhalese soldiers at the hands of the LTTE unleashed the largest outburst of communal violence in the country's history. Hundreds of Tamils were killed in Colombo and elsewhere, tens of thousands were left homeless, and more than 100,000 fled to south India. The north and east became the scene of bloodshed as security forces attempted to suppress the LTTE and other militant groups. Terrorist incidents occurred in Colombo and other cities. Each side in the conflict accused the other of violating human rights. The conflict assumed an international dimension when the Sri Lankan Government accused India of supporting the Tamil insurgents.

In October 1997, the U.S. Government designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization under provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and has maintained this designation since then, most recently redesignating the group in October of 2003. The U.S. Government in November 2007 froze the U.S.-held assets of the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation, a charitable organization associated with the LTTE, and in February 2009, the U.S. froze the assets of the Maryland-based Tamil Foundation, on suspicion that they were funneling money to the LTTE.

Indian Peacekeeping
By mid-1987, India intervened in the conflict by air-dropping supplies to prevent what it felt was harsh treatment and starvation of the Tamil population in the Jaffna Peninsula caused by an economic blockade by Colombo. Under a July 29, 1987, accord (the Indo-Lanka Accord) signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayewardene, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, which included devolution of power to the provinces, merger--subject to later referendum--of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil language. India agreed to establish order in the north and east with an Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. Militant groups, although initially reluctant, agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF.

Within weeks, however, the LTTE declared its intent to continue its armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The IPKF found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE. Further complicating the return to peace was a burgeoning Sinhalese insurgency in the south. The JVP, relatively quiescent since the 1971 insurrection, began to reassert itself in 1987. Capitalizing on opposition to the Indo-Lankan Accord in the Sinhalese community, the JVP launched an intimidation campaign against supporters of the accord. Numerous UNP and other government supporters were assassinated. The government, relieved of its security burden by the IPKF in the north and east, intensified its efforts in the south. The JVP was crushed but at a high cost in human lives.

From April 1989 through June 1990, the government engaged in direct communications with the LTTE leadership. In the meantime, fighting between the LTTE and the IPKF escalated in the north. India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka in early 1990, and fighting between the LTTE and the government resumed. Both the LTTE and government forces committed serious human rights violations. In January 1995, the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE agreed to a cessation of hostilities as a preliminary step in a government-initiated plan for peace negotiations. After 3 months, however, the LTTE unilaterally resumed hostilities. The government then adopted a policy of military engagement with the Tigers, with government forces liberating Jaffna from LTTE control by mid-1996 and moving against LTTE positions in the northern part of the country called the Vanni. An LTTE counteroffensive begun in October 1999 reversed most government gains and by May 2000 threatened government forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued into 2001.

Peace Process, Resumption of Conflict, and Conclusion of Fighting
In December 2001, with the election of a new UNP government, the LTTE and government declared unilateral cease-fires. In February 2002, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement sponsored by peace process facilitator Norway. Peace talks began in Norway in December 2002. The Tigers dropped out of talks in February 2003, however, claiming they were being marginalized. In July 2004, the first suicide bomb since 2001 struck Colombo.

In March 2004, Eastern Tiger commander Karuna broke with the LTTE, going underground with his supporters. In March 2006, the Karuna faction registered a political party, the Tamil People's Liberation Tigers (TMVP). The LTTE and the Karuna faction began targeting each other in low-level attacks. In late 2007, Sivanesethurai Chandrakanthan ("Pillaiyan") took over the leadership of the TMVP. In March 2008, Karuna left the TMVP and joined President Rajapaksa’s SLFP as Minister for National Reconciliation.

Over 30,000 Sri Lankans died in the December 2004 tsunami, and hundreds of thousands of others fled their homes. In June 2005, the GSL and LTTE reached an agreement to share $3 billion in international tsunami aid. However, the agreement was challenged in court and was never implemented. In August 2005, the LTTE assassinated Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, an ethnic Tamil. Parliament passed a state of emergency regulation that has been renewed every month since then.

During the November 2005 presidential election, the LTTE enforced a voting boycott in areas under its control. As a result, perceived hard-liner and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) leader Mahinda Rajapaksa won by a narrow margin. Low-level violence between the LTTE and security forces escalated. In December 2005, pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance Member of Parliament (MP) Joseph Pararajasingham was assassinated within a GSL high-security zone in the eastern town of Batticaloa.

In February 2006, exactly 4 years after the ceasefire agreement was signed, the GSL and LTTE renewed their commitment to the agreement at talks in Geneva. There was a lull in violence until April 2006, when an explosion rocked a Sinhalese market in Trincomalee, followed by limited Sinhalese backlash against Tamils. Several days later, an LTTE suicide bomber attacked the main army compound in Colombo, killing eight soldiers and seriously wounding Army Commander General Fonseka. The government retaliated with air strikes on Tiger targets. In June 2006, an LTTE suicide bomber succeeded in killing Army third-in-command General Kulatunga in a suburb of Colombo.

The European Union (EU) banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization on May 30, 2006. In June 2006, GSL and LTTE delegations flew to Oslo to discuss the future of the Scandinavian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The Tigers refused to sit for talks with the GSL and instead demanded the SLMM remove any monitors from EU-member nations.

Heavy fighting in August 2006, the worst since the 2002 ceasefire, killed hundreds of people and caused tens of thousands to flee their homes when the Tamil Tiger rebels clashed with government forces in the north and east. In September 2006, the government carried out the first major seizure of enemy territory by either side since the 2002 ceasefire when it drove Tamil Tiger rebels from the entrance of the strategic Trincomalee harbor.

In October 2006, the LTTE attacked a Navy bus convoy at a transit point in Habarana, killing 90 sailors, and a few days later, attacked the Sri Lankan Navy Headquarters in Galle, a major tourist destination in the far south. Peace talks in Geneva at the end of October ended with no progress. The LTTE attempted to assassinate the Defense Secretary by bombing his motorcade in December 2006, but he escaped unharmed.

Government troops took control of the LTTE's eastern stronghold of Vakarai in January 2007, resulting in thousands more internally displaced persons (IDPs). In March 2007, the Tamil Tiger rebels launched their first-ever air attack, which targeted the Katunayake Air Force base adjacent to Bandaranaike International Airport. By July 2007, however, the government had recaptured the remaining territory held in the Eastern Province from the Tigers. In November 2007, a Sri Lankan Air Force bomb killed LTTE political chief and number two leader, S.P. Tamilchelvan. Also during that month, the LTTE detonated a bomb in a busy Colombo shopping center, killing 17 and wounding many more.

In January 2008, the government announced that it was unilaterally abrogating the 2002 ceasefire agreement. Government forces stepped up their campaign to assert control over the northern areas still led by the LTTE. The LTTE resisted government advances into the north and carried out attacks on economic and civilian targets in the south.

In May 2008, elections were held for the first time to fill the newly created Eastern Provincial Council covering the Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee districts. Although opposition parties alleged widespread vote-rigging, the government's United People's Freedom Alliance in a coalition with the TMVP secured the majority in the new Provincial Council, and TMVP leader Sivanesethurai Chandrakanthan ("Pillaiyan") was sworn in by President Rajapaksa as Chief Minister.

The conflict entered a new phase in September 2008 when government forces initiated an offensive on LTTE, resulting in significant losses of LTTE territory. The government continued to capture territory in northern Sri Lanka through May 2009, when fighting became confined to a small area of land near Mullaitivu, where thousands of civilians were forcibly held by the LTTE in a government-designated “no fire zone”. On May 19, the government declared victory over the LTTE as they reported the capture of remaining Tiger-held territory and the death of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The end of the military conflict resulted in nearly 300,000 internally displaced persons and allegations of potential violations of international humanitarian law and other harms committed by both sides in the final stages of the conflict. IDPs were initially detained at camps, primarily in Vavuniya area, but IDPs have been permitted freedom of movement since December 2009. Most IDPs have since returned to their home districts, staying primarily with host families. But many have not been resettled in their homes, due to the lingering presence of land mines and government-enforced high-security zones. To date, international non-governmental organizations, working in coordination with the Government of Sri Lanka and the United Nations, have removed a reported 1.1 million land mines. The humanitarian effort continues to progress--as of May 2010 it was estimated that 68,000 IDPs remained within the camps.

GOVERNMENT
Under the 1978 constitution, the president of the republic, directly elected for a 6-year term, is chief of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Responsible to Parliament for the exercise of duties under the constitution and laws, the president may be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of Parliament with the concurrence of the Supreme Court.

The president appoints and heads a cabinet of ministers responsible to Parliament. The president's deputy is the prime minister, who leads the ruling party in Parliament. A parliamentary no-confidence vote requires dissolution of the cabinet and the appointment of a new one by the president.

Parliament is a unicameral 225-member legislature elected by universal suffrage and proportional representation to a 6-year term. The president may summon, suspend, or end a legislative session and dissolve Parliament. Parliament reserves the power to make all laws.

Sri Lanka's judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court, and a number of subordinate courts. Sri Lanka's legal system reflects diverse cultural influences. Criminal law is fundamentally British. Basic civil law is Roman-Dutch. Laws pertaining to marriage, divorce, and inheritance are communal.

Under the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 and the 13th amendment to the constitution, the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to devolve significant authority to the provinces. Provincial Councils are directly elected for 5-year terms. The leader of the council majority serves as the province's chief minister; a provincial governor is appointed by the president. The councils possess limited powers in education, health, rural development, social services, agriculture, security, and local taxation. Many of these powers are shared or subject to central government oversight. As a result, the Provincial Councils have never functioned effectively. Devolution proposals under consideration as a means of finding a political solution to the ethnic conflict foresee a strengthening of the Provincial Councils, with greater autonomy from central control. Predating the accord are municipal, urban, and rural councils with limited powers.

Principal Government Officials
President--Mahinda Rajapaksa
Prime Minister--Dissanayake Mudiyanselage Jayaratne
Ambassador to the United States--Jaliya Wickramasuriya
Ambassador to the United Nations--Palitha T.B. Kohona

Sri Lanka maintains an embassy in the United States at 2148 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-483-4025).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Sri Lanka's two major political parties--the UNP and the SLFP--have historically embraced democratic values, international nonalignment, and encouragement of Sinhalese culture. However, the SLFP-led coalition government under President Rajapaksa, aided by emergency regulations, has consolidated political power in the executive and limited media freedom and the role of civil society in Sri Lankan politics.

Sri Lanka has a multi-party democracy that enjoys considerable stability despite relatively high levels of political violence during its 26-year civil conflict. In May 2009, the government declared victory over the LTTE and the LTTE’s longtime leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed. The LTTE’s terrorist activities had generally been aimed at destabilizing Sri Lanka politically, economically, and socially. Economic targets included the airport in July 2001, the Colombo World Trade Center in October 1997, and the central bank in January 1996. In January 1998, the LTTE detonated a truck bomb in Kandy, damaging the Temple of the Tooth relic, the holiest Buddhist shrine in the country. After a lull following the 2002 ceasefire, LTTE-perpetrated terrorist bombings directed against politicians and civilian targets became more common in Colombo, Kandy, and elsewhere in the country. LTTE attacks on key political figures included the attempted assassinations of Social Affairs Minister Douglas Devananda in November 2007 and of Secretary of Defense Gothabaya Rajapaksa in December 2006, the assassination of Army General Kulatunga in June 2006, the attempted assassination of Army Commander General Fonseka in April 2006, the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005, the killing of the Industrial Development Minister by suicide bombing in June 2000, and the December 1999 attempted assassination of President Kumaratunga. The LTTE is also suspected of being behind the assassinations of two government ministers in early 2008.

In the year following the defeat of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Government has faced widespread criticism on human rights issues. Shortly after his defeat in the January 2010 presidential election, retired Army General Sarath Fonseka was arrested and sequestered without facing formal charges. He eventually was charged with engaging in politics while still a serving military officer and corruption in military procurements and tried by two courts martial, which found him guilty in September 2010 and sentenced him to 30 months in prison and stripped him of his pension and all military honors. The Government of Sri Lanka received appeals from the international community that any action against the former Army general be pursued in accordance with Sri Lankan law and consistent with Sri Lanka’s political traditions, but many observers regarded Fonseka's prosecution and conviction as politically motivated. The Sri Lankan Government received praise for pardoning Tamil journalist J.S. Tissanayagam in May 2010, but concerns remain about the state of media freedom and the ability of Sri Lankans to express dissent against government policies and actions.

ECONOMY
Sri Lanka is a lower-middle income developing nation with a gross domestic product of about $50 billion (official exchange rate). This translates into a per capita income of $5,100 (purchasing power parity). Sri Lanka's 91% literacy rate in local languages and life expectancy of 75 years rank well above those of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. English language ability is relatively high, but has declined significantly since the 1970s.

Sri Lanka's income inequality is severe, with striking differences between rural and urban areas. About 15% of the country's population remains impoverished. The effects of 26 years of civil conflict, falling agricultural labor productivity, lack of income-earning opportunities for the rural population, high inflation, and poor infrastructure outside the Western Province were impediments to poverty reduction. There are reports that poverty has been decreasing significantly in the last few years.

In 1978, Sri Lanka shifted away from a socialist orientation and opened its economy to foreign investment. But the pace of reform has been uneven. A period of aggressive economic reform under the UNP-led government that ruled from 2002 to 2004 was followed by a more statist approach under President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Despite a brutal civil war that began in 1983, economic growth has averaged around 5% in the last 10 years. Due to the global recession and escalation of violence during the final stages of the war, GDP growth slowed to 3.5% in 2009 and foreign reserves fell sharply. Business confidence rebounded quickly with the end of the war and an International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement in July 2009. Consequently, Sri Lanka recorded strong growth in 2010, as GDP grew by 8%. Official foreign reserves, including borrowings, reached $6.6 billion (5.9 months of imports). The post-war economic re-integration of northern and eastern provinces has boosted agriculture and fisheries, although a large area of agricultural land was damaged by floods in early 2011. Reconstruction of the war-damaged areas as well as infrastructure development throughout the country is also fueling growth. Tourism has rebounded strongly to record levels. Exports grew by a healthy 17% in 2010. Foreign remittance inflows from Sri Lankans working abroad swelled to $4.1 billion in 2010 from $3.3 billion in 2009. The Colombo Stock Exchange was the second-best performing market for the second year in a row. Inflation, which had reached double digit levels during the war years, was around 7% in 2010. Inflation pressures are building, and inflation reached 8.6% in March 2011. Foreign direct investment (FDI) remained relatively low in 2010 at about $450 million. The FDI target for 2011 is $1 billion, including investments in the tourism sector.

Government fiscal control remains a concern. The budget deficit reached almost 10% of GDP in 2009, but was forecast to fall to around 8% of GDP in 2010.

President Rajapaksa's broad economic strategy outlined in his 2005 and 2010 election manifestos, "Mahinda Chintana" (Mahinda's Thoughts), guides government economic policy. Mahinda Chintana policies focus on poverty alleviation and steering investment to disadvantaged areas; developing the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector; promotion of agriculture; and developing Sri Lanka to become the regional hub of ports, aviation, commerce, knowledge, and energy. The government has developed a 10-year development framework to boost growth through a combination of large infrastructure projects. The Rajapaksa government rejects the privatization of state enterprises, including "strategic" enterprises such as state-owned banks, airports, and electrical utilities. Instead, it plans to retain ownership and management of these enterprises and make them profitable.

The Mahinda Chintana plan aims to double Sri Lanka’s per capita income to $4,000 within 6 years. To do so, Sri Lanka requires GDP growth well over 8%, and the investment rate needs to rise from 25% of GDP to 35% of GDP.

Sri Lanka’s economy will continue its post-war resurgence and is expected to grow strongly in the immediate term. Although Sri Lanka should maintain moderate economic growth, Sri Lanka needs to enact important policy reforms to reach its full economic potential. Sri Lanka has set the goal of improving its business climate, but must follow through with reforms to decrease bureaucratic red tape; increase transparency, particularly in government procurement; and increase the predictability of government policies. Sri Lanka must also continue to improve its fiscal discipline. The 26-year conflict and high government expenditure have contributed to Sri Lanka's high public debt load (83% of GDP in 2009).

Sri Lanka depends on a strong global economy for investment and for expansion of its export base. It has been advised to diversify export products and destinations to make use of the Indo-Lanka and Pakistan-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreements and to benefit from rapid economic growth in emerging East Asia. Sri Lanka's exports to the European Union qualified for duty-free entry under the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Plus market access program, granted in 2005 to help Sri Lanka rebuild after the 2004 tsunami. However, after a lengthy review process, the European Union suspended the GSP Plus market access benefit in August 2010, due to Sri Lanka’s poor human rights record. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka’s exports grew strongly by over 17% in 2010, despite the loss of this benefit. Sri Lanka continues to receive limited tariff preferences under the EU GSP program. Sri Lanka also receives preferential access to the U.S. market under the U.S. GSP program. This program has been temporarily suspended pending congressional approval.

The service sector is the largest component of GDP at almost 60%. In 2010, service sector growth increased to 8% from about 3% in 2009. Tourism, shipping, aviation, telecom, trading, and financial services were the main contributors to growth. Public administration and defense expenditures increased in recent years due to hostilities, and there has been an expansion of public sector employment. Despite the end of the war, defense expenditures remain at around 3.9% of GDP. There is a growing information technology sector, especially information technology training and software development.

Industry accounts for almost 30% of GDP. Manufacturing is the largest industrial subsector, accounting for 17% of GDP. The construction sector accounts for 7% of GDP. Mining and quarrying account for 2% of GDP. Electricity, gas, and water account for 2% of GDP. Within the manufacturing sector, food, beverage, and tobacco is the largest subsector in terms of value addition. Textiles, apparel, and leather is the second-largest sector. The third-largest sector in value added terms is chemical, petroleum, rubber, and plastic products.

Agriculture has lost its relative importance to the Sri Lankan economy in recent decades. It employs 31% of the working population, but accounts for only about 11% of GDP. Rice, the staple cereal, is cultivated extensively. The plantation sector consists of tea, rubber, and coconut; in recent years, the tea crop has made significant contributions to export earnings. Domestic agriculture such as rice and other food crops improved significantly with the return of peace to the eastern and northern provinces. However, floods in early 2011 destroyed many crops and livestock, including rice, in the main cultivation period.

Trade and Foreign Assistance
Sri Lanka's exports (mainly apparel, tea, rubber, gems and jewelry) were estimated at $8.3 billion and imports (mainly oil, textiles, food, and machinery) were estimated at $13.5 billion for 2010. The resulting large trade deficit was financed primarily by remittances from Sri Lankan expatriate workers, foreign assistance, and commercial borrowing. Sri Lanka must diversify its exports beyond garments and tea. The information technology (IT) and business process outsourcing (BPO) sector is small but growing.

Exports to the United States, Sri Lanka's most important single-country market, were estimated to be around $1.77 billion for 2010, or 21% of total exports. The United States is Sri Lanka's second-biggest market for garments, taking almost 40% of total garment exports. (The EU as a whole is Sri Lanka's biggest export market and largest apparel buyer.) India is Sri Lanka's largest source of imports, accounting for over 20% of imports. United States exports to Sri Lanka were estimated to be around $178 million for 2010, consisting primarily of machinery and mechanical appliances, medical and scientific equipment, electrical apparatus, wheat, plastics, lentils, and paper.

Sri Lanka is a large recipient of foreign assistance, with China, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Japan, and other donors disbursing loans totaling almost $1.0 billion in 2009. China is a major lender for infrastructure projects, such as a new port, a coal power plant, and roads. Iran is also a major lender to Sri Lanka and has committed $450 million for the Uma Oya multipurpose irrigation project and $111 for rural electrification. Iran provides an interest-free credit facility for oil imports. Iran has also promised assistance for modernization of Sri Lanka's only oil refinery, though no firm commitments are in place. The Government of India is providing loans for the railway sector. Foreign grants amounted to $230 million in 2009. There continue to be problems with projects awarded without tenders.

Labor
The unemployment rate declined to 4.5% in fourth-quarter 2010, from 5.7% in fourth-quarter 2009. Unemployment is highest in the 20-29 age group. The rate of unemployment among women and high school and college graduates has been proportionally higher than the rate for less-educated workers. The government has embarked on educational reforms it hopes will lead to better preparation of students and better matches between graduates and jobs.

Approximately 20% of the 7.6 million-strong work force is unionized, but union membership is declining. There are more than 1,900 registered trade unions, many of which have 50 or fewer members, and 19 federations. Many unions have political affiliations. The Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) and Lanka Jathika Estate Workers Union are the two largest unions, representing workers in the plantation sector. The president of the CWC also is Minister of Livestock and Rural Community Development. Other strong and influential trade unions include the Ceylon Mercantile Union, Sri Lanka Nidhahas Sevaka Sangamaya, Jathika Sevaka Sangayama, Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions, Ceylon Bank Employees Union, Union of Post and Telecommunication Officers, Conference of Public Sector Independent Trade Unions, and the JVP-aligned Inter-Company Trade Union.

Public sector trade unions usually resist government moves to restructure state-owned corporations. The Government of Sri Lanka has no plans to privatize any state-owned enterprises, and in some cases the government has reversed prior privatizations.

There are 1.7 million Sri Lankan citizens working abroad. A majority are women working as housemaids. Remittances from migrant workers, estimated at around $4.1 billion in 2010, is the most important source of foreign exchange for Sri Lanka, surpassing earnings from apparel exports.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Sri Lanka traditionally follows a nonaligned foreign policy but has been seeking closer relations with the United States since December 2001. It participates in multilateral diplomacy, particularly at the United Nations, where it seeks to promote sovereignty, independence, and development in the developing world. Sri Lanka was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It also is a member of the Commonwealth, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, and the Colombo Plan. Sri Lanka continues its active participation in the NAM, while also stressing the importance it places on regionalism by playing a strong role in SAARC.

U.S.-SRI LANKAN RELATIONS
The United States enjoys cordial relations with Sri Lanka that are based, in large part, on shared democratic traditions. U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka is characterized by respect for its independence, sovereignty, and moderate nonaligned foreign policy; support for the country's unity, territorial integrity, and democratic institutions; and encouragement of its social and economic development. The United States is a strong supporter of ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

U.S. assistance has totaled more than $2 billion since Sri Lanka's independence in 1948. Through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), it has contributed to Sri Lanka's economic growth with projects designed to reduce unemployment, improve housing, develop the Colombo Stock Exchange, modernize the judicial system, and improve competitiveness. At the June 2003 Tokyo Donors' Conference on Sri Lanka, the United States pledged $54 million, including $40.4 million of USAID funding. Following the 2004 tsunami, the United States provided $135 million in relief and reconstruction assistance. The United States provided over $51.4 million in humanitarian assistance in 2009, and pledged at least $34.5 million for 2010.

In addition, the International Broadcast Bureau (IBB)--formerly Voice of America (VOA)--operates a radio-transmitting station in Sri Lanka. The U.S. Armed Forces maintain a limited military-to-military relationship with the Sri Lanka defense establishment.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Patricia A. Butenis
Deputy Chief of Mission--Valerie Crites Fowler
Head of Political Section--Paul M. Carter, Jr.
Head of Economic/Commercial Section--Edward Heartney
Management Officer--Kevin A. Weishar
Consular Officer--William Dowers
Defense Attache--Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith
Director, USAID--James Bednar
Public Affairs Officer--Jeffrey Anderson
IBB Station Manager--William Martin

The U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka is located at 210 Galle Road, Colombo 3 (tel: 94-11-249-8500, fax: 94-11-243-7345). U.S. Agency for International Development offices are located at the American Center, 44 Galle Road, Colombo 3 (tel: 94-11-249-8000; fax: 94-11-247-2850/247-2860). Public Affairs offices also are located at the American Center (tel: 94-11-249-8100, fax: 94-11-244-9070).

IBB offices are located near Chilaw, 75 kms north of Colombo (94-32-225-5931 to 34/fax: 94-32-225-5822).

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April 6, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Background Note: Equatorial Guinea

Official Name: Republic of Equatorial Guinea

PROFILE

Geography
Location: Western Africa, bordering the Bay of Biafra. Bordering nations--Cameroon, Gabon.
Area: 28,051 sq. km; slightly smaller than Maryland.
Cities: Capital--Malabo. Other cities--Bata (also capital of Littoral province on the mainland).
Terrain: Varies. Bioko Island is volcanic, with three major peaks of 9,876 feet, 7,416 feet, and 6,885 feet. Behind the coastal plain, the mainland provinces are hilly at a level of approximately 2,000 feet, with some 4,000-foot peaks. Annobon Island is volcanic.
Climate: Tropical; always warm, humid. The weather alternates between wet and dry seasons over the course of a year.

People
Nationality: Noun--Equatorial Guinean(s), Equatoguinean(s) Adjective--Equatorial Guinean, Equatoguinean.
Population (July 2011 est.): 668,225.
Annual population growth rate (2011 est.): 2.641%.
Ethnic groups: The Fang ethnic group of the mainland constitutes the great majority of the population and dominates political life and business. The Bubi group comprises about 50,000 people living mainly in Bioko Island. The Annobonese on the island of Annobon are estimated at about 3,000 in number. The other three ethnic groups are found on the coast of Rio Muni and include the Ndowe and Kombe (about 3,000 each) and the Bujebas (about 2,000). The pygmy populations have long been integrated into the dominant Bantu-speaking cultures. Europeans number around 2,000, primarily Spanish and French. There is a thriving Lebanese community, other Arabs (primarily Egyptians and Moroccans), a large number of Filipinos, and a rapidly expanding Chinese presence. Many guest workers from other African countries are drawn to service industry jobs boosted by the country’s oil boom.
Languages: Official--Spanish, French; other--pidgin English, Fang, Bubi, Ibo.
Religion: Nominally Christian and predominantly Roman Catholic; pagan practices.
Education: Primary school compulsory for ages 6-12. Attendance (2007 est.)--90%. Adult literacy (2008 est.)--87%.
Health (2011 est.): Life expectancy--62.37 years. Infant mortality rate--81.58/1,000.

Government
Type: Nominally multi-party Republic with strong domination by the executive branch.
Independence: October 12, 1968 (from Spain).
Constitution: Approved by national referendum November 17, 1991; amended January 1995.
Branches: Executive--President (Chief of State), Prime Minister, and a Council of Ministers appointed by the president. Legislative--100-member Chamber of People's Representatives (members directly elected by universal suffrage to serve 5-year terms). Judicial--Supreme Tribunal; appointed and removed by the president.
Administrative subdivisions: Seven provinces--Annobon, Bioko Norte, Bioko Sur, Centro Sur, Kie-Ntem, Littoral, Wele-Nzas.
Political parties: The ruling party is the Partido Democratico de Guinea Ecuatorial (PDGE), formed July 30, 1987. There are 12 other recognized parties that formed in the early 1990s.
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal adult.

Economy
GDP (2010 est.): $24.66 billion.
Real GDP growth rate (2010 est.) 0.9%.
Inflation rate (2010 est.): 8.2%.
Unemployment rate: N/A.
Natural resources: Petroleum, natural gas, timber, small, unexploited deposits of gold, manganese, and uranium.
Agriculture (2010 est.): 2.2% of GDP. Products--coffee, cocoa, rice, yams, cassava (tapioca), bananas, palm oil nuts, manioc, livestock, and timber.
Industry (2010 est.): 93.9% of GDP. Types--petroleum, natural gas, fishing, lumber.
Services (2010): 3.8% of GDP.
Trade: Exports (2010 est.)--$10.24 billion: hydrocarbons (97%), timber (2%), others (1%). Imports (2010 est.)--$5.743 billion. Major trading partners--United States, Spain, China, France, and Italy.
Currency: Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) franc.

GEOGRAPHY
The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is located in west central Africa. Bioko Island lies about 40 kilometers (25 mi.) from Cameroon. Annobon Island lies about 595 kilometers (370 mi.) southwest of Bioko Island. The larger continental region of Rio Muni lies between Cameroon and Gabon on the mainland; Equatorial Guinea includes the islands of Corisco, Elobey Grande, Elobey Chico, and adjacent islets.

Bioko Island, called Fernando Po until the 1970s, is the largest island in the Gulf of Guinea--2,017 square kilometers (780 sq. mi.). It is shaped like a boot, with two large volcanic formations separated by a valley that bisects the island at its narrowest point. The 195-kilometer (120-mi.) coastline is steep and rugged in the south but lower and more accessible in the north, with excellent harbors at Malabo and Luba, and several scenic beaches between those towns.

On the continent, Rio Muni covers 26,003 square kilometers (10,040 sq. mi.). The coastal plain gives way to a succession of valleys separated by low hills and spurs of the Crystal Mountains. The Rio Benito (Mbini), which divides Rio Muni in half, is not navigable except for a 20-kilometer stretch at its estuary. Temperatures and humidity in Rio Muni are slightly lower than on Bioko Island.

Annobon Island, named for its discovery on New Year's Day 1472, is a small volcanic island covering 18 square kilometers (7 sq. mi.). The coastline is abrupt except in the north; the principal volcanic cone contains a small lake. Most of the estimated 1,900 inhabitants are fisherman specializing in traditional, small-scale tuna fishing and whaling. The climate is tropical--heavy rainfall, high humidity, and frequent seasonal changes with violent windstorms.

PEOPLE
The majority of the Equatoguinean people are of Bantu origin. The largest tribe, the Fang, is indigenous to the mainland, but substantial migration to Bioko Island has resulted in Fang dominance over the earlier Bantu inhabitants. The Fang constitute 80% of the population and are themselves divided into 67 clans. Those in the northern part of Rio Muni speak Fang-Ntumu, while those in the south speak Fang-Okah; the two dialects are mutually unintelligible. The Bubi, who constitute 15% of the population, are indigenous to Bioko Island. In addition, there are coastal tribes, sometimes referred to as "Playeros," consisting of Ndowes, Bujebas, Balengues, and Bengas on the mainland and small islands, and "Fernandinos," a Creole community, on Bioko. Together, these groups comprise 5% of the population. There are also foreigners from neighboring Cameroon, Nigeria, and Gabon.

Spanish and French are both official languages, though use of Spanish predominates. The Roman Catholic Church has greatly influenced both religion and education.

Equatoguineans tend to have both a Spanish first name and an African first and last name. When written, the Spanish and African first names are followed by the father's first name (which becomes the principal surname) and the mother's first name. Thus people may have up to four names, with a different surname for each generation.

HISTORY
The first inhabitants of the region that is now Equatorial Guinea are believed to have been Pygmies, of whom only isolated pockets remain in northern Rio Muni. Bantu migrations between the 17th and 19th centuries brought the coastal tribes and later the Fang. Elements of the latter may have generated the Bubi, who immigrated to Bioko from Cameroon and Rio Muni in several waves and succeeded former Neolithic populations. The Annobon population, native to Angola, was introduced by the Portuguese via Sao Tome.

The Portuguese explorer, Fernando Po (Fernao do Poo), seeking a route to India, is credited with having discovered the island of Bioko in 1471. He called it Formosa ("pretty flower"), but it quickly took on the name of its European discoverer. The Portuguese retained control until 1778, when the island, adjacent islets, and commercial rights to the mainland between the Niger and Ogoue Rivers were ceded to Spain in exchange for territory in South America (Treaty of El Pardo). From 1827 to 1843, Britain established a base on the island to combat the slave trade. The Treaty of Paris settled conflicting claims to the mainland in 1900, and the mainland territories were united administratively under Spanish rule.

Spain did not develop an extensive economic infrastructure in what was commonly known as Spanish Guinea during the first half of the 20th century. However, through a paternalistic system, particularly on Bioko Island, Spain developed large cacao plantations for internal consumption for which thousands of Nigerian workers were imported as laborers. At independence in 1968, largely as a result of this artificial system, Equatorial Guinea had one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa. The Spanish also helped Equatorial Guinea achieve one of the continent's highest literacy rates and developed a good network of health care facilities.

In 1959, the Spanish territory of the Gulf of Guinea was established with status similar to the provinces of metropolitan Spain. As the Spanish Equatorial Region, a governor general ruled it exercising military and civilian powers. The first local elections were held in 1959, and the first Equatoguinean representatives were seated in the Spanish parliament. Under the Basic Law of December 1963, limited autonomy was authorized under a joint legislative body for the territory's two provinces. The name of the country was changed to Equatorial Guinea. Although Spain's commissioner general had extensive powers, the Equatorial Guinean General Assembly had considerable initiative in formulating laws and regulations.

In March 1968, under pressure from Equatoguinean nationalists and the United Nations, Spain announced that it would grant independence to Equatorial Guinea. A constitutional convention produced an electoral law and draft constitution. In the presence of a UN observer team, a referendum was held on August 11, 1968, and 63% of the electorate voted in favor of the constitution, which provided for a government with a General Assembly and a Supreme Court with judges appointed by the president.

In September 1968, Francisco Macias Nguema was elected first president of Equatorial Guinea, and independence was granted in October. In July 1970, Macias created a single-party state and by May 1971, key portions of the constitution were abrogated. In 1972 Macias took complete control of the government and assumed the title of President-for-Life. The Macias regime was characterized by abandonment of all government functions except internal security, which was accomplished by terror; this led to the death or exile of up to one-third of the country's population. Due to pilferage, ignorance, and neglect, the country's infrastructure--electrical, water, road, transportation, and health--fell into ruin. Religion was repressed, and education ceased. The private and public sectors of the economy were devastated. Nigerian contract laborers on Bioko, estimated to have been 60,000, left en masse in early 1976. The economy collapsed, and skilled citizens and foreigners left.

On August 3, 1979 a lieutenant colonel in charge of military police, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, led a successful coup d’etat; Macias was arrested, tried, and executed. Obiang assumed the Presidency in October 1979. Obiang initially ruled Equatorial Guinea with the assistance of a Supreme Military Council. A new constitution, drafted in 1982 with the help of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, came into effect after a popular vote on August 15, 1982; the Council was abolished, and Obiang remained in the presidency for a 7-year term. He was reelected in 1989. In February 1996, he again won reelection with 98% of the vote; several opponents withdrew from the race, however, and international observers criticized the election. Subsequently, Obiang named a new cabinet, which included some opposition figures in minor portfolios.

Despite the formal ending of one-party rule in 1991, President Obiang and a circle of advisors (drawn largely from his own family and ethnic group) maintain real authority. The president names and dismisses cabinet members and judges, ratifies treaties, leads the armed forces, and has considerable authority in other areas. He appoints the governors of Equatorial Guinea's seven provinces. The opposition had few electoral successes in the 1990s. By early 2000, President Obiang's Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) party fully dominated government at all levels. In December 2002, President Obiang won a new 7-year mandate with 97% of the vote. Reportedly, 95% of eligible voters voted in this election, although many observers noted numerous irregularities and opposition parties boycotted. In November 2009, President Obiang won a new 7-year mandate with 95.4% of the vote in an election that was not boycotted by the opposition. The main opposition leader won 3.6% of the vote. He stated that he viewed the elections as neither fair nor free, but with the approval of the executive committee of his party, did not formally object to the election results.

GOVERNMENT
The 1982 constitution gives the president extensive powers, including naming and dismissing members of the cabinet, making laws by decree, dissolving the Chamber of Representatives, negotiating and ratifying treaties and calling legislative elections. The president retains his role as commander in chief of the armed forces and maintains close supervision of military activity. In June 2004, President Obiang reorganized the cabinet and created two new positions: Minister of National Security and Director of National Forces. The prime minister is appointed by the president and operates under powers designated by the president. The prime minister coordinates government activities.

The Chamber of Representatives is comprised of 100 members elected by direct suffrage for 5-year terms. In practice, the Chamber has not demonstrated independence, and it rarely acts without presidential approval or direction. National assembly elections were held in May 2008; 99 of the 100 seats went to the PDGE. In July 2008, the government appointed a new cabinet, including a new Prime Minister. Following the 2009 presidential election results additional, though minor, changes to the cabinet were made in February 2010.

The president appoints the governors of the seven provinces. Each province is divided administratively into districts and municipalities. The internal administrative system falls under the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Administration; several other ministries are represented at the provincial and district levels.

The judicial system follows similar administrative levels. At the top are the president and his judicial advisors (the Supreme Court). In descending rank are the appeals courts, chief judges for the divisions, and local magistrates. Tribal laws and customs are honored in the formal court system when not in conflict with national law. The current court system, which often uses customary law, is a combination of traditional, civil, and military justice, and it operates in an ad hoc manner for lack of established procedures and experienced judicial personnel.

The other official branch of the government is the State Council. The State Council's main function is to serve as caretaker in case of death or physical incapacity of the president. It comprises the following ex officio members: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the President of the national assembly, and the Chairman of the Social and Economic Council.

Although the many abuses and atrocities that characterized the Macias years have been eliminated, the government continues to be dominated by the presidency. Religious freedom is tolerated.

Principal Government Officials
President--Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
Prime Minister--Ignacio Milam Tang
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation--Pastor Micha Ondo Bile
Ambassador to the United States--Purificacion Angue Ondo

Equatorial Guinea maintains an embassy at 2020 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20009 (Tel. (202) 518-5700, Fax. (202) 518-5252). Its mission to the United Nations is at 801 Second Avenue, Suite 1403, New York, N.W. 10017 (Tel. 212-599-1523). It opened a Consulate in Houston, Texas in 2009 at 6401 Southwest Freeway, Houston, 77074-2205 (Tel. 713-776-9900).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS
In the period following Spain's grant of local autonomy to Equatorial Guinea in 1963, there was a great deal of political party activity. Bubi and Fernandino parties on the island preferred separation from Rio Muni or a loose federation. Ethnically based parties in Rio Muni favored independence for a united country comprising Bioko and Rio Muni, an approach that ultimately won out. (The Movimiento para la Auto-determinacion de la Isla de Bioko (MAIB), which advocates independence for the island under Bubi control, is one of the offshoots of the era immediately preceding independence). After the accession of Macias to power, political activity largely ceased in Equatorial Guinea. Opposition figures who lived among the exile communities in Spain and elsewhere agitated for reforms; some of them had been employed in the Macias and Obiang governments. After political activities in Equatorial Guinea were legalized in the early 1990s, some opposition leaders returned, but repressive actions continued sporadically.

The country's first freely contested municipal elections were held in September 1995. Most observers agree that the elections themselves were relatively free and transparent and that the opposition parties garnered between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total vote. The government, however, delayed announcement of the results and then claimed a highly dubious 52% victory overall and the capture of 19 of 27 municipal councils. In early January 1996 Obiang called for presidential elections. International observers agreed that the campaign was marred by fraud, and most of the opposition candidates withdrew in the final week. Obiang claimed re-election with 98% of the vote. In an attempt to mollify his critics, Obiang gave minor portfolios in his cabinet to people identified as opposition figures. In the legislative election in March 1999, the party increased its majority in the 80-seat parliament from 68 to 75. The main opposition parties refused the seats they had allegedly won. In May 2000, the ruling PDGE overwhelmed its rivals in local elections. Opposition parties rejected the next election, the December 2002 presidential election, as invalid. During this election, President Obiang was re-elected with 97% of the vote. Following his re-election Obiang formed a government based on national unity encompassing all opposition parties, except for the CPDS, which declined to join after Obiang refused to release one of their jailed leaders.

In April 2004, parliamentary and municipal elections took place. President Obiang's Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) and allied parties won 98 of 100 seats in parliament and all but seven of 244 municipal posts. International observers criticized both the election and its results.

While President Obiang's rule--in which schools reopened, education and health care expanded, religious activity was respected, and public utilities and roads were restored--compares favorably with Macias' tyranny and terror, it has been criticized for not implementing genuine democratic reforms. Corruption and a dysfunctional judicial system disrupt the development of Equatorial Guinea's economy and society. In 2004, President Obiang appointed a new Prime Minister, Miguel Abia Biteo, and replaced several ministers; however, the government budget still did not include all revenues and expenditures. The United Nations Development Program proposed a broad governance reform program, but the Equatoguinean Government was not moving rapidly to implement it. In August 2006 a new Prime Minister, Ricardo Mangue, was named and the pace of reform accelerated.

On May 4, 2008, legislative elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the PDGE. Ninety-nine of the 100 seats in the assembly went to the PDGE while the opposition party, the Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS), only received one. (This is one less seat than the 2004 elections that granted the CPDS two seats.) Results were similar in the municipal elections held the same day, granting PDGE 319 councilor seats while CPDS only gained 13. Some international elections observers reported that the elections were generally conducted in a free and fair manner. Nevertheless, irregularities were reported, which included the barring of certain members of the international press.

In May 2002 a special tribunal convicted 68 prisoners and their relatives and sentenced them to 6 to 20 years in prison for an alleged attempted coup d’etat. Among the prisoners were leaders of the three main opposition parties that had remained independent from President Obiang's ruling party. There were numerous irregularities associated with the trial, including evidence of torture and a lack of substantive proof. In August 2003, 31 of these convicted prisoners were granted a presidential amnesty.

In March 2004, Zimbabwean police in Harare impounded a plane from South Africa with 64--mercenaries on board. The group said they were providing security for a mine in Democratic Republic of the Congo, but a couple of days later an Equatorial Guinean minister said they had detained 15 more men who he claimed were the advance party for the group captured in Zimbabwe. Nick du Toit, the leader of the group of South Africans, Armenians, and one German in Equatorial Guinea, said at his trial in Equatorial Guinea that he was playing a limited role in a coup bid organized by Simon Mann, the leader of the group held in Zimbabwe, to remove Obiang from power and install an exiled opposition politician, Severo Moto.

In September 2004, Mann was sentenced to 7 years in jail in Zimbabwe after being convicted of illegally trying to buy weapons. In subsequent legal proceedings, three Equatoguineans and three South Africans were acquitted. In June 2005, President Obiang granted amnesty to the six Armenian pilots. In Harare, Mann obtained a reduced sentence based on good behavior in late 2007. Zimbabwe consented to Equatorial Guinea's extradition request and flew Mann to Malabo in early 2008. His trial began in June 2008. During the trial he reportedly confessed to the attempted coup, implicating Severo Moto, Sir Mark Thatcher, and Ely Calil, a nationalized British citizen of Lebanese ancestry with connections to Nigeria. Mann was sentenced in July 2008; he was allowed visits by western media and family members. Mann was pardoned in November 2009, and he returned to the United Kingdom.

On February 17, 2009, gunmen in boats attacked the Presidential Palace in Malabo. Equatorial Guinean security forces successfully repelled the attack, and President Obiang was on the mainland in Bata during this unsuccessful attack. The government accused the Nigerian rebel group, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), of carrying out the attack.

Although Equatorial Guinea lacks a well-established democratic tradition, it has broken with the anarchic, chaotic, brutal, and repressive pattern of the Macias years and is slowly improving its human rights and political performance. On June 5, 2008 President Obiang granted amnesty to 37 political prisoners, and the government has indicated a willingness to grant amnesty to other political prisoners. In addition, the country is undertaking an ambitious, multi-billion dollar development program that is slowly improving the quality of life and providing greater opportunities for employment for its citizens. Equatorial Guinea was a candidate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims to strengthen governance by improving transparency and accountability in the oil, gas, and minerals sector. Unfortunately Equatorial Guinea was the only country in the world not granted an extension to complete its EITI candidacy in April 2010. It was “de-listed” because the country did not demonstrate “sufficient commitment to the goals and spirit of the initiative,” according to an EITI board member. Subsequent to the de-listing, President Obiang has twice publicly stated his intention to have the country re-apply for EITI candidacy at an appropriate time.

ECONOMY
Oil and gas exports will drive the economy for years to come. Real GDP growth was estimated at 0.9% for 2010, a drop from 5.3% for 2009. Per capita income rose from about $590 in 1998 to approximately $37,900 in 2010. Equatorial Guinea has other resources, including its tropical climate, fertile soils, rich expanses of water, deepwater ports, and reserves of unskilled labor. However, its hydrocarbon riches dwarf all other economic activity. The government is seeking to diversify the economy by encouraging agriculture and financial services. The ongoing construction boom is also enhancing related skills. The once-significant economic mainstays of the colonial era--cocoa, coffee, and timber--are also receiving attention, though they remain miniscule in comparison to the energy sector.

Equatorial Guinea's economic policies comprise an open investment regime. Qualitative restrictions on imports, non-tariff protection, and many import licensing requirements were lifted in 1992 when the government adopted a public investment program endorsed by the World Bank. The Government of Equatorial Guinea has sold some state enterprises. It is attempting to create a more favorable investment climate, and its investment code contains numerous incentives for job creation, training, promotion of nontraditional exports, support of development projects and indigenous capital participation, freedom for repatriation of profits, exemption from certain taxes and capital, and other benefits. Trade regulations have been further liberalized since Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) reform codes in 1994. This included elimination of quota restrictions and reductions in the range and amounts of tariffs. The CEMAC countries agreed to the introduction of a value added tax (VAT) in 1999.

While business laws promote a liberalized economy, the business climate remains difficult. Application of the laws remains selective. Corruption among officials is widespread, and many business deals are concluded under nontransparent circumstances. A wage law now regulates separate wage levels for the petroleum, private, and government sector.

There is little industry in the country, and the local market for industrial products is small. The government seeks to expand the role of free enterprise and to promote foreign investment but has had little success in creating an atmosphere conducive to investor interest.

The Equatoguinean budget has grown enormously in the past 5 years as royalties and taxes on foreign company oil and gas production have provided new resources to a once poor government. The 2010 government revenue was about $6.739 billion. Oil revenues account for more than 81% of government revenue. Value added tax and trade taxes are other large revenue sources for the government.

The Equatoguinean Government has undertaken a number of reforms since 1991 to reduce its predominant role in the economy and promote private sector development. Its role is a diminishing one, although many government interactions with the private sector are at times capricious. Beginning in early 1997, the government initiated efforts to attract significant private sector involvement through cooperative efforts with the Corporate Council on Africa visit and numerous ministerial efforts. In 1998, the government privatized distribution of petroleum products. There are now Total stations in the country. The maritime border with Nigeria was settled in 2000, allowing Equatorial Guinea to continue exploitation of its oil fields. In October 2002, the government launched operations of a national oil company, GEPetrol, under the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons. The government is anxious for greater U.S. investment, and a new Marathon Oil liquefied natural gas (LNG) production refinery was the biggest new step in that direction to date. Much more is on the way, as U.S. hydrocarbon producers announced $7 billion in new investments, starting in 2008. In addition, China recently won exploration and drilling rights in a new offshore block, and began drilling in 2009.

The government has expressed interest in privatizing the outmoded electricity utility. Several ports and a new terminal were built to accommodate the needs of the oil industry. Considerable funds have been invested in improving transportation, including paving most roads in the country; new airfields in Annobon, Corisco, and Mongomo; and a new port on Annobon. A French company operates cellular telephone service in cooperation with a state enterprise, though the sector was opened to competition in 2007.

Equatorial Guinea's balance-of-payments situation has improved substantially since the mid-1990s because of new oil and gas production and favorable world energy prices. Exports totaled $10.24 billion in 2010. Crude oil exports now annually account for more than 94% of export earnings. Timber exports, by contrast, now represent only about 2% of export revenues. Imports into Equatorial Guinea are growing quickly. Imports totaled $5.743 billion in 2010.

Equatorial Guinea in the 1980s and 1990s received foreign assistance from numerous bilateral and multilateral donors, including European countries, the United States, and the World Bank. Many of these aid programs have ceased altogether or have diminished. Spain, France, and the European Union (EU) continue to provide some project assistance, as do China, Brazil, and Cuba. The government also has discussed working with World Bank assistance to develop government administrative capacity.

Equatorial Guinea operated under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) until 1996; since then the IMF has held regular Article IV consultations (periodic country evaluations). In 2008, IMF executive directors praised Equatorial Guinea’s strong economic performance and macroeconomic policies that they felt had strengthened fiscal stability. However, the directors also noted that the country needed to strengthen governance and transparency in order to create a business environment more conducive to sustain growth, generate employment, and reduce poverty, which remains widespread.

In 2007, the government undertook a $336 million Social Development Fund project, which engaged U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) expertise and regulation, to improve the quality of life and raise standards in education and health care. The contract between the Government of Equatorial Guinea and USAID was scheduled to expire in December 2010, with Equatorial Guinea assuming full responsibility for the management of the fund.

Trade and Investment
With investments estimated at over $12 billion, the United States is the largest cumulative bilateral foreign investor in Equatorial Guinea. Exports to the U.S. totaled over $2.39 billion in 2009 and consisted overwhelmingly of petroleum products. In the same year, U.S. exports to Equatorial Guinea totaled $304 million (making the country the seventh-largest export market for U.S. products in Sub-Saharan Africa) and consisted mainly of machinery, articles of iron or steel, measuring instruments, and chemical products.

Infrastructure
Infrastructure has improved dramatically in the last few years. Numerous, large-scale infrastructure investments have recently been completed or are underway. Surface transport options are increasing as the government has invested heavily in road pavement projects. In 2002, the African Development Bank and the European Union co-financed two projects to improve the paved roads from Malabo to Luba and Riaba; and to build an interstate road network to link Equatorial Guinea to Cameroon and Gabon. A Chinese construction company is completing a project to link Mongomo to Bata on the mainland. In November 2003, the government announced an ambitious ten-project program to upgrade the country's road network and improve the airport facilities at Bata, the country's second city. These projects have since been completed and additional airport expansion and new-city corridors are now under construction.

Equatorial Guinea's electricity sector is owned and operated by the state-run monopoly, SEGESA. Equatorial Guinea's electricity generating capacity is more than adequate to meet demand on both the continent and the island of Bioko, although the power supply has been unreliable. The country's distribution network has been incapable of delivering reliable electricity to end users, due to aging equipment and poor management, as demonstrated by regular blackouts in Malabo. As a result, small diesel generators have been widely used as a back-up power source. A project to modernize the grid was scheduled for completion by 2010. Equatorial Guinea is estimated to have 2,600 megawatts (MW) of hydropower potential.

Potable water is available in the major towns but is not always reliable because of poor maintenance and aging infrastructure; consequently, supply interruptions are frequent and prolonged in some neighborhoods. A major project to upgrade the public water system in the cities of Malabo and Bata was expected to be completed in 2010. Some villages and rural areas are equipped with generators and water pumps, usually owned by private individuals.

Telecommunications have improved dramatically in recent years. Parastatal GETESA, a joint venture with a 40% ownership stake held by France Telecom, provides telephone service in the major cities through an efficient, digital fixed network and good mobile coverage. GETESA's fixed-line service has 20,000 subscribers and the mobile service is used by over 200,000. Internet access is widely available and is increasing, providing improved access to information.

Equatorial Guinea has two of the deepest Atlantic seaports of the region, including the main business and commercial port city of Bata. The ports of both Malabo and Bata have been severely overextended. A half-billion dollar renovation project for the Port of Malabo is nearing completion, and a renovation of the Bata port was scheduled to begin soon. In partnership with the U.S. petroleum company Amerada Hess, the British company Incat made significant progress in a project to renovate and expand Luba, the country's third-largest port, located on Bioko Island. Luba has become a major transportation hub for offshore oil and gas companies operating in the Gulf of Guinea. Luba is located some 50 kilometers from Malabo and was previously virtually inactive except for minor fishing activities and occasional use to ease congestion in Malabo.

The influx of oil workers has increased international air activity. Major international carriers now connect Malabo directly to Paris, Madrid, Frankfurt, and Casablanca. A major American airline announced that it is interested in beginning service to the airport in the capital, Malabo. The runway at Malabo's international airport (3,200 meters) is equipped with lights and can service Boeing 747s. The runway at Bata (2,400 meters) does not currently operate at night but can accommodate aircraft as large as B737s. Bata is undergoing an upgrade with runway extension and expansion. Two minor airstrips (800 meters) located at Mongomo and on the island of Annobon have been extended and can now accommodate B737s. Air service between the island and continental territories is restricted to 5 small airlines. In March 2006 the European Union blacklisted airlines based in Equatorial Guinea from flying into the EU. A project to gain International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) accreditation for various parts of the airline industry is underway and a contract has been signed to bring both Bata and Malabo up to ICAO and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) standards.

Energy Developments
Equatorial Guinea is now the fourth-largest producer of crude oil in Sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria, Angola, and Sudan. Equatorial Guinea's oil reserves are located mainly in the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf of Guinea. Large amounts of foreign investment primarily by U.S. companies have poured into the country's oil sector in recent years. Equatorial Guinea's total proven oil reserves are estimated at 1.1 billion barrels.

In October 2004, the government capped oil production at 350,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) to extend the life of the country's petroleum reserves, but lifted the cap the next year to allow expansion. With the addition of LNG production that came on line in 2007, total hydrocarbon production peaked in 2008. It is now in decline. Three fields--Zafiro, Ceiba, and Alba--currently account for the majority of the country's oil output.

In 2001, GEPetrol was established as Equatorial Guinea's national oil company. It was originally to be the primary state-run institution responsible for the country's downstream oil sector activities. However, since 2001 its primary focus has become managing the government's stakes in various Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) with foreign oil companies. GEPetrol also partners with foreign firms to undertake exploration projects and has a say in the country's environmental policy implementation. In its recent block-licensing negotiations, Equatorial Guinea has pursued increases in the government's stake in new PSCs. In early 2008 it announced a $2.2 billion purchase of U.S.-based Devon Energy's stake in the country's oil fields, increasing its participation to 20% in the Zafiro field operation.

The Zafiro field is Equatorial Guinea's largest oil producer, with output rising from an initial level of 7,000 bbl/d in August 1996 to approximately 280,000 bbl/d by 2004. Ceiba, Equatorial Guinea's second major producing oil field, is located just offshore of Rio Muni and is estimated to contain 300 million barrels of oil. Production at Ceiba rose dramatically during the 2-3 year period following improvements and upgrades to the facility. Alba, Equatorial Guinea's third significant field was discovered in 1991. Original estimates of reserves at Alba were around 68 million barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), but recent exploration has increased estimates significantly to almost 1 billion BOE. Unlike the Zafiro or Ceiba fields, exploration and production at Alba has focused on natural gas, including condensates.

Ceiba's discovery has significantly increased interest in petroleum exploration of surrounding areas, with many new companies acquiring licenses in exploration blocks further offshore in the Rio Muni basin. International companies with interests in one or more exploration blocks include Chevron (U.S.), Vanco Energy (U.S.), Atlas Petroleum International (U.S.), Roc Oil (Australia), Petronas (Malaysia), Sasol Petroleum (South Africa), and Glencore (Switzerland). In October 2004, Noble Energy Equatorial Guinea, an Equatoguinean subsidiary of American Noble Energy, Inc. signed a contract to exploit a new oil field off the island of Bioko. Recently, Equatorial Guinea gave the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) the rights to its newest oil field but Chinese exploration has to date been unsuccessful.

Equatorial Guinea's natural gas reserves are located offshore Bioko Island, primarily in the Alba and Zafiro oil and gas fields. Natural gas and condensate production in Equatorial Guinea expanded rapidly in the 5-year period following new investments by major stakeholders in the Alba natural gas field. Alba, the country's largest natural gas field, contains 1.3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven reserves, with probable reserves estimated at 4.4 Tcf or more.

Marathon Oil, other investors, and the state-owned gas company, SONOGAS, joined together in a $1.5 billion deal to construct a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility on Bioko Island. The world-class facility shipped its first product in May 2007. In early 2008 Marathon and the government announced tentative plans to construct and operate LNG trains 2 and 3, pending confirmation of feedstock gas from national and neighboring gas fields.

DEFENSE
The Equatoguinean military consists of approximately 2,500 service members. The largest contingent is the Army with 1,400 soldiers; the police have 400 para-military policemen, the Navy has 200 members, and the Air Force has approximately 120. The Gendarmerie numbers approximately 300. In 2009, military expenditures were estimated at 0.1% of GDP. In 2005, the American consulting firm MPRI, Inc. was licensed to contract with the government to begin extensive training of the military and police forces. The primary purpose has been to professionalize security personnel, and a strong human rights and anti-trafficking provision was included in the curriculum. The program has been effective and continues to expand.

Between 1984 and 1992, service members went regularly to the United States on the International Military Education and Training program, after which funding for this program for Equatorial Guinea ceased. U.S. military-to-military engagement has been dormant since 1997 (the year of the last Joint Combined Exchange Training Exercise), although representatives from Equatorial Guinea attended a military-hosted conference on Gulf of Guinea Security Cooperation in November 2006, and participate in other multilateral events with the U.S. military. Several U.S. ships have also visited Equatorial Guinea ports.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
A transitional agreement, signed in October 1968, implemented a Spanish pre-independence decision to assist Equatorial Guinea and provided for the temporary maintenance of Spanish forces there. A dispute with President Macias in 1969 led to a request that all Spanish troops immediately depart, and a large number of civilians left at the same time. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were never broken but were suspended by Spain in March 1977 in the wake of renewed disputes. After Macias' fall in 1979, President Obiang asked for Spanish assistance, and since then, Spain has regained its place of influence in Equatorial Guinea. The two countries signed permanent agreements for economic and technical cooperation, private concessions, and trade relations. Spain maintained a bilateral assistance program in Equatorial Guinea. Most Equatoguinean opposition elements (including a purported government-in-exile) are based in Spain, to the annoyance of the Equatoguinean Government. Relations between the two countries grew difficult after the March 2004 coup attempt due to Spain's hosting opposition figure Severo Moto and the Equatoguinean Government's belief that Spain had foreknowledge of the coup. However, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, visited Equatorial Guinea in March 2005, and President Obiang visited Spain in 2007.

Equatorial Guinea has had generally cordial relations with its neighbors. It is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), which includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo/Brazzaville, and Gabon, and of the larger Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS, also known by CEEAC, its French acronym). Equatorial Guinea is part of the central Africa CFA franc zone, and the Cameroon-based Bank of Central African States (BEAC) coordinates monetary policy. At the 10th CEMAC heads of state summit in Bangui in January 2010, Equatoguinean-born Lucas Abaga Nchama was appointed as BEAC governor, following a policy adopted by member states of rotating bank governors in alphabetical order. The Bank of France guarantees the CFA franc, and French technical advisers work in the finance and planning ministries. France, Spain, Cuba, and China have participated in infrastructure and technical development projects.

Relations with the Nigerian Government became cordial as the two countries delineated their offshore borders to facilitate development of nearby gas fields. Equatorial Guinea had a minor border dispute with Cameroon that was resolved by the International Court of Justice in 2002. The Corisco border dispute with Gabon was resolved by an agreement signed with the help of UN mediation in January 2004, but the small island of Mbane and potentially oil-rich waters surrounding it remain contested, and the case was submitted to the International Court of Justice in 2006. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon opened up mediation efforts on June 10, 2008 to facilitate a settlement between the two countries over the disputed island.

The majority Fang ethnic group of mainland Equatorial Guinea extends both north and south into the forests of Cameroon and Gabon. Cameroon exports many food products to Equatorial Guinea and imports oil from Equatorial Guinea for its refinery at nearby Limbe. The development of the oil industry by U.S.-based companies and the lack of a well-trained work force have provided motivation for an influx of English-speaking workers (legal and illegal) from Cameroon, Nigeria, and Ghana. Roundups and expulsion of foreigners following the March 2004 coup attempt caused tensions between these neighbors. A brazen daylight attack on two banks in Bata by two boatloads of armed bandits in December 2007 was presumed to originate in the Niger Delta or neighboring Cameroon, temporarily leading to heightened tensions.

The country is using its oil wealth to expand its overseas presence, establishing diplomatic missions in over 30 countries around the world. It has also become more active in the CEMAC, building the CEMAC regional parliament in Malabo and using the leverage of its growing reserves to gain reforms.

U.S.-EQUATORIAL GUINEA RELATIONS
Following the reopening of the United States Embassy in Malabo, the first resident U.S. Ambassador in 12 years arrived in November 2006. The second resident Ambassador, Alberto M. Fernandez, arrived in February 2010. The Equatoguinean Government views the U.S. Government and American companies favorably. The United States is the largest single foreign investor in Equatorial Guinea. U.S. companies have the largest and most visible foreign presence in the country, though the Chinese presence is growing rapidly. In an effort to attract increased U.S. investment, American passport-holders are entitled to visa-free entry for short visits. The United States is the only country with this privilege. With the increased U.S. investment presence, relations between the U.S. and the Government of Equatorial Guinea have been characterized as positive and constructive.

Equatorial Guinea maintains an embassy in Washington, DC, and recently opened a consulate in Houston, Texas. President Obiang has worked to cultivate the Equatorial Guinea-U.S. relationship with regular visits to the U.S. for meetings with senior government and business leaders, as well as to the opening sessions of the United Nations.

Despite improvements in its record, the 2009 U.S. State Department Human Rights report on Equatorial Guinea cited shortcomings in basic human rights, political freedom, and labor rights. U.S. Government policy involves constructive engagement with Equatorial Guinea to encourage an improvement in the human rights situation and positive use of petroleum funds directed toward the development of a working civil society. Equatoguineans visit the U.S. under programs sponsored by the U.S. Government, American oil companies, and educational institutions. The Ambassador's Self-Help Fund annually finances a number of small grassroots projects.

In view of growing ties between U.S. companies and Equatorial Guinea, the U.S. Government's overseas investment promotion agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), has concluded the largest agreement in Sub-Saharan Africa for a major U.S. project in Equatorial Guinea. The U.S. Agency for International Development has no U.S.-funded projects ongoing, but USAID has provided technical assistance for the Social Needs Fund financed by the Equatorial Guinean Government. The Peace Corps has had no presence in the country since the mid-1990s. American-based non-governmental organizations and other donor groups have very little involvement in the country.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Alberto M. Fernandez
Deputy Chief of Mission--Frances Chisholm
Management Officer--Marinda Harpole
General Services Officer--Scott McDow
Consular/Public Affairs Officer--Nadia Sbeih
Defense Attache-LTC Scott H. Morgan

The U.S. Embassy website is at http://malabo.usembassy.gov/. Inquiries should be directed to: Tel: +240 333 09 88 95. The street/mailing address is: Carretera de Aeropuerto KM-3 (El Paraiso), Apt. 95, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The U.S. mailing address is American Embassy-Malabo, Department of State, Washington, DC 20521-2320. Business hours are Monday to Thursday: 08:00 to 17:30; Friday: 08:00 to 12:00.

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April 6, 2011Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Background Note: Romania

Official Name: Romania

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 237,499 sq. km. (91,699 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than Wyoming.
Cities: Capital--Bucharest (pop. 1.94 million). Other cities--Iasi (309,000), Constanta (302,000), Timisoara (316,000), Cluj-Napoca (306,000), Craiova (299,000), Galati (291,000), Brasov (278,000).
Terrain: Consists mainly of rolling, fertile plains; hilly in the eastern regions of the middle Danube basin; and major mountain ranges running north and west in the center of the country, which collectively are known as the Carpathians.
Climate: Moderate.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Romanian(s).
Population (2010): 21.49 million.
Annual population growth rate: -0.247%.
Ethnic groups: Romanians 89.5%, Hungarians 6.6%, Germans 0.3%, Ukrainians 0.3%, Serbs, Croats, Russians 0.2%, Turks 0.2%, and Roma 2.5%.
Religions: Orthodox 86.8%; Roman Catholic 5%; Reformed Protestant, Baptist, and Pentecostal 5%; Greek Catholic (Uniate) 1% to 3%; Muslim 0.2%; Jewish less than 0.1%.
Languages: Romanian (official). Other languages--Hungarian, German.
Education: Years compulsory--9. Attendance--98%. Literacy--97.3%.
Health: Infant mortality rate (2010)--11.32/1,000. Life expectancy--men 70.26 yrs., women 77.42 yrs.
Work force (2010): 9.72 million. Agriculture--3.0 million, industry and construction--2.8 million, services--3.3 million, other--0.3 million.

Government
Type: Republic.
Constitution: December 8, 1991, amended by referendum October 18-19, 2003.
Branches: Executive--president (head of state), prime minister (head of government), Council of Ministers. Legislative--bicameral Parliament. Judicial--Constitutional Court, High Court of Cassation and Justice, and lower courts.
Subdivisions: 41 counties plus the city of Bucharest.
Political parties represented in the Parliament are: Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat--PSD); National Liberal Party (Partidul National Liberal--PNL); Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat Liberal--PDL); Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrata Maghiara din Romania--UDMR); National Union for the Advancement of Romania (Uniunea Nationala pentru Progresul Romaniei--UNPR); Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator--PC).
Suffrage: Universal from age 18.
Defense (2010): 1.4% of GDP.

Economy
GDP (2010): $162 billion.
Annual GDP growth rate (2010): -1.3%; latest IMF 2011 growth forecast: +1.5%.
GDP per capita: $7,538.
Natural resources: Oil, timber, natural gas, coal, salt, iron ore.
Agriculture (2010): Percentage of GDP--6.0%. Products--corn, wheat, potatoes, oilseeds, vegetables, livestock, fish, and forestry.
Industry (2010): Percentage of GDP--26.4%. Types--machine building, mining, construction materials, metal production and processing, chemicals, food processing, textiles, clothing. Industrial output increased by 0.9% in 2008, decreased 5.5% in 2009, and rebounded with a 5.5% increase in 2010.
Services (2010): Percentage of GDP--47.6%.
Construction (2010): Percentage of GDP--8.9%.
Trade: Exports--$48.8 billion. Types--textiles, chemicals, light manufactures, wood products, fuels, processed metals, machinery and equipment. Exports to the U.S. (2010)--$734.0 million. Major markets--Germany, Italy, France, Turkey, Hungary. Imports--$61.2 billion. Types--machinery and equipment, textiles, fuel, coking coal, iron ore, machinery and equipment, and mineral products. Imports from the U.S. (2010)--$750.4 million. Major suppliers--Germany, Italy, Hungary, France, China.
Exchange rate (March 2011): 3.01 new Lei=U.S. $1.

GEOGRAPHY
Extending inland halfway across the northern limits of the Balkan Peninsula and covering a large elliptical area of 237,499 square kilometers (91,699 sq. mi.), Romania occupies the greater part of the lower basin of the Danube River system and the hilly eastern regions of the middle Danube basin. It lies on either side of the mountain systems collectively known as the Carpathians, which form the natural barrier between the two Danube basins.

Romania's location gives it a continental climate, particularly in Moldavia and Wallachia (geographic areas east of the Carpathians and south of the Transylvanian Alps, respectively) and to a lesser extent in centrally located Transylvania, where the climate is more moderate. A long and at times severe winter (December-March), a hot summer (April-July), and a prolonged autumn (August-November) are the principal seasons, with a rapid transition from spring to summer. In Bucharest, the daily minimum temperature in January averages -7^oC (20^oF), and the daily maximum temperature in July averages 29^oC (85^oF).

PEOPLE
About 89% of the people are ethnic Romanians, a group that--in contrast to its Slav or Hungarian neighbors--traces itself to Latin-speaking Romans, who in the second and third centuries A.D. conquered and settled among the ancient Dacians, a Thracian people. As a result, the Romanian language, although containing elements of Slavic, Turkish, and other languages, is a Romance language related to French and Italian.

Hungarians and Roma are the principal minorities, with a declining German population and smaller numbers of Serbs, Croats, Ukrainians, Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Great Russians, and others. Minority populations are greatest in Transylvania and the Banat, areas in the north and west, which belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire until World War I. Even before union with Romania, ethnic Romanians comprised the overall majority in Transylvania. However, ethnic Hungarians and Germans were the dominant urban population until relatively recently, and ethnic Hungarians still are the majority in a few districts.

Before World War II, minorities represented more than 28% of the total population. During the war that percentage was halved, largely by the loss of the border areas of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (to the former Soviet Union--now Moldova and a portion of southwest Ukraine) and southern Dobruja (to Bulgaria), as well as by the postwar flight or deportation of ethnic Germans. In the last several decades, more than two-thirds of the remaining ethnic Germans in Romania emigrated to Germany.

Romanian troops during World War II participated in the destruction of the Jewish communities of Bessarabia and Transnistria (both now comprising the independent Republic of Moldova) and northern Bukovina (now part of Ukraine). Jews in areas now comprising Romania also were subject to harsh persecution, including government-sanctioned pogroms and killings, and about 30% did not survive the Holocaust. Mass emigration, mostly to Israel, has reduced the surviving Jewish community from over 300,000 to less than 10,000.

Religious affiliation tends to follow ethnic lines, with most ethnic Romanians identifying with the Romanian Orthodox Church. Also ethnically Romanian is the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church, reunified with the Orthodox Church by fiat in 1948, and restored after the 1989 revolution. The 2002 census indicates that 1%-3% of the population is Greek Catholic, as opposed to about 10% prior to 1948. Roman Catholics, largely ethnic Hungarians and Germans, constitute about 5% of the population; Calvinists, Baptists, Pentecostals, and Lutherans make up another 5%. There are smaller numbers of Unitarians, Muslims, and other religions.

Romania's cultural traditions have been nourished by many sources, some of which predate the Roman occupation. The traditional folk arts, including dance, music, wood-carving, ceramics, weaving and embroidery of costumes and household decorations still flourish in many parts of the country. Despite strong Austrian, German, and especially French influence, many of Romania's great artists, such as the painter Nicolae Grigorescu, the poet Mihai Eminescu, the composer George Enescu, and the sculptor Constantin Brancusi, drew their inspiration from Romanian folk traditions.

The country's many Orthodox monasteries, as well as the Transylvanian Catholic and Evangelical Churches, some of which date back to the 13th century, are repositories of artistic treasures. The famous painted monasteries of southern (Romanian) Bukovina make an important contribution to European architecture.

Poetry and the theater play an important role in contemporary Romanian life. Classic Romanian plays, such as those of Ion Luca Caragiale, as well as works by modern or avant-garde Romanian and international playwrights, find sophisticated and enthusiastic audiences in the many theaters of the capital and smaller cities.

HISTORY
Since about 200 B.C., when it was settled by the Dacians, a Thracian tribe, Romania has been in the path of a series of migrations and conquests. Under the emperor Trajan early in the second century A.D., Dacia was incorporated into the Roman Empire, but was abandoned by a declining Rome less than 2 centuries later. Romania disappeared from recorded history for hundreds of years, to reemerge in the medieval period as the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Heavily taxed and badly administered under the Ottoman Empire, the two principalities were unified under a single native prince, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, in 1859, and had their full independence ratified in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. A German prince, Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, was crowned the first King of Romania in 1881.

The new state, squeezed between the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires, looked to the West, particularly France, for its cultural, educational, and administrative models. Romania was an ally of the Entente Powers and the U.S. in World War I, and was granted substantial territories with Romanian populations, notably Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina, after the war.

Most of Romania's pre-World War II governments maintained the forms, but not always the substance, of a liberal constitutional monarchy. The virulently anti-Semitic and Fascist Iron Guard movement, exploiting a quasi-mystical nationalism, fear of communism, and resentment of alleged foreign and Jewish domination of the economy, was a key destabilizing factor, which led to the creation of a royal dictatorship in 1938 under King Carol II. In 1940, the authoritarian General Antonescu took control and pursued pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic policies similar to those advocated by the Iron Guard. Romania entered World War II on the side of the Axis Powers in June 1941, invading the Soviet Union to recover Bessarabia and Bukovina, which had been annexed in 1940.

In August 1944, a coup led by King Mihai (Michael), with support from opposition politicians and the army, deposed the Antonescu dictatorship and put Romania's battered armies on the side of the Allies. Romania incurred additional heavy casualties fighting alongside the Soviet Union against the Germans in Transylvania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

A peace treaty, signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, confirmed the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, but restored the part of northern Transylvania granted to Hungary in 1940 by Hitler. The treaty also required massive war reparations by Romania to the Soviet Union, whose occupying forces did not leave until 1958.

According to the officially recognized 2004 Wiesel Commission report, Romanian authorities were responsible for the deaths of between 280,000 and 380,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews in the territories under Romanian jurisdiction (including Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria) out of a population of approximately 760,000. In addition, 132,000 Romanian Jews were killed by the pro-Nazi Hungarian authorities in the area of Transylvania that the Nazi government had placed in Hungarian control at the time.

The Soviets pressed for inclusion of Romania's heretofore negligible Communist Party in the post-war government, while non-communist political leaders were steadily eliminated from political life. King Mihai abdicated under pressure in December 1947, when the Romanian People's Republic was declared, and went into exile.

By the late 1950s, Romania's communist government began to assert some independence from the Soviet Union. Nicolae Ceausescu became head of the Communist Party in 1965 and head of state in 1967. Ceausescu's denunciation of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and a brief relaxation in internal repression helped give him a positive image both at home and in the West. Seduced by Ceausescu's "independent" foreign policy, Western leaders were slow to turn against a regime that, by the late 1970s, had become increasingly harsh, arbitrary, and capricious. Rapid economic growth fueled by foreign credits gradually gave way to economic autarchy accompanied by wrenching austerity and severe political repression.

After the collapse of communism in the rest of Eastern Europe in the late summer and fall of 1989, a mid-December protest in Timisoara against the forced relocation of an ethnic Hungarian pastor grew into a country-wide protest against the Ceausescu regime, sweeping the dictator from power. Ceausescu and his wife were executed on December 25, 1989, after a cursory military trial. About 1,500 people were killed in confused street fighting. An impromptu governing coalition, the National Salvation Front (FSN), installed itself and proclaimed the restoration of democracy and freedom. The Communist Party was dissolved and its assets transferred to the state. Ceausescu's most unpopular measures, such as bans on private commercial entities and independent political activity, were repealed.

Ion Iliescu, a former Communist Party official demoted by Ceausescu in the 1970s, emerged as the leader of the FSN. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on May 20, 1990. Running against representatives of the pre-war National Peasants' Party and National Liberal Party (PNL), Iliescu won 85% of the vote. The FSN captured two-thirds of the seats in Parliament (66.31% of the votes), and named a university professor, Petre Roman, as prime minister. The strongest parties in opposition in the election were the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) with 7.23% of the votes, and the National Liberal Party with 6.41%. The new government began cautious free-market reforms such as opening the economy to consumer imports and establishing the independence of the National Bank.

Over 200 new political parties sprang up after 1989, gravitating around personalities rather than programs. All major parties espoused democracy and market reforms, with the governing National Salvation Front proposing slower, more cautious economic reforms. In contrast, the opposition's main parties--the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant-Christian Democrat Party (PNTCD)--favored quick, sweeping reforms, immediate privatization, and reducing the role of the ex-communist elite. Nevertheless, the legacy of 44 years of communist rule could not be eliminated quickly. Membership in the Romanian Communist Party usually had been the prerequisite for higher education, foreign travel, or a good job, while the extensive internal security apparatus had subverted normal social and political relations. To the few active dissidents, who suffered gravely under Ceausescu and his predecessors, many of those who came forward as politicians after the revolution seemed tainted by association with the previous regime.

Unhappy at the continued political and economic influence of members of the Ceausescu-era elite, anti-communist protesters camped out in University Square in April 1990. When miners from the Jiu Valley descended on Bucharest 2 months later and brutally dispersed the remaining "hooligans," President Iliescu expressed public thanks, thus convincing many that the government had sponsored the miners' actions. The miners also attacked the headquarters and houses of opposition leaders. Petre Roman’s government fell in late September 1991, when the miners returned to Bucharest to demand higher salaries and better living conditions. Theodor Stolojan was appointed to head an interim government until new elections could be held.

Parliament drafted a new democratic constitution, approved by popular referendum in December 1991. The FSN split into two groups, one led by Ion Iliescu (FDSN) and the other by Petre Roman (FSN), in March 1992. Roman's party subsequently adopted the name Democratic Party (PD), and the FDSN became the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR) in July 1993.

National elections in September 1992 returned President Iliescu by a clear majority; he easily won reelection over a field of five other candidates. His party, the FDSN, won a plurality in both chambers of Parliament. The 1992 elections revealed a continuing political cleavage between major urban centers and the countryside. Rural voters, who were grateful for the restoration of most agricultural land to farmers but fearful of change, strongly favored President Ion Iliescu and the FDSN, while the urban electorate favored the CDR (a coalition made up of several parties--among which the PNTCD and the PNL were the strongest--and civic organizations) and quicker reform. With the CDR, the second-largest parliamentary group, reluctant to take part in a national unity coalition, the FDSN formed a technocratic government in November 1992 under Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, an economist, with parliamentary support from the nationalist Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) and Greater Romania Party (PRM), and the ex-communist Socialist Labor Party (PSM). PRM and PSM left the government in October and December 1995, respectively, and all three smaller parties had abandoned the coalition by the time elections were held in November 1996.

The 1996 local elections demonstrated a major shift in the political orientation of the Romanian electorate. Opposition parties swept Bucharest and many of the larger cities. This trend continued in the national elections that same year, when the opposition dominated the cities and made deep inroads into rural areas up until then dominated by President Iliescu and the PDSR, which lost many voters in their traditional strongholds outside Transylvania. The campaign of the opposition hammered away on the twin themes of the need to squelch corruption and to launch economic reform. The message resonated with the electorate, which swept Emil Constantinescu and parties allied with him to power in free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections. The coalition government formed in December 1996 took the historic step of inviting the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and its Hungarian ethnic backers into government. The coalition government retained power for 4 years despite constant internal frictions and going through three prime ministers, the last being the Governor of the National Bank, Mugur Isarescu.

In elections in November 2000, the electorate punished the coalition parties for their corruption and failure to improve the standard of living. The PDSR came back into power, albeit as a minority government. In the concurrent presidential elections, former President Ion Iliescu decisively defeated the extreme nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor. The PDSR was renamed PSD--Social Democratic Party--at a June 16, 2001 congress after it merged with the tiny yet historical Romanian Social Democratic Party.

The PSD government, led by Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, forged a de facto governing coalition with the ethnic Hungarian UDMR, ushering in 4 years of relatively stable government. The PSD guided Romania toward greater macroeconomic stability, although endemic corruption remained a major problem. In September 2003, the center-right National Liberal Party (PNL) and centrist Democratic Party (PD) formed an alliance at a national and local level in anticipation of the 2004 local and national elections, and Romania moved closer to a political system dominated by two large political blocs.

In October 2003, citizens voted in favor of major amendments to the constitution in a nationwide referendum to bring Romania's organic law into compliance with European Union standards.

On November 28, 2004, Romania again held parliamentary and the first round of presidential elections. In the December 12 presidential run-off election, former Bucharest Mayor Traian Basescu, representing the center-right PNL/PD alliance, delivered a surprise defeat to PSD candidate Nastase. Basescu appointed PNL leader Calin Popescu-Tariceanu as prime minister, whose government was approved by the Parliament on December 28, 2004.

This coalition unraveled by April 2007 due to enmity between the president and prime minister. From 2007 until December 2008, former Prime Minister Tariceanu's PNL ran an ultra-minority government in coalition with the UDMR and tacit support of the PSD. Following parliamentary elections on November 30, 2008, in which the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) and PSD virtually tied, a majority PDL/PSD coalition led by PDL Prime Minister Emil Boc governed until October 2009, when it disbanded. The PDL ruled as a caretaker government until a new coalition government was formed in December 2009, made up of the PDL, UDMR, and some National Union for the Advancement of Romania (UNPR) members and independents.

Presidential elections were held in November 2009. Since no candidate garnered a majority of the votes of eligible voters, the top two vote getters--incumbent President Traian Basescu and Senate President Mircea Geoana (PSD)--went on to a second-round runoff. The December 2009 runoff election resulted in a narrow victory for Basescu, who was inaugurated later that month for a second 5-year term.

GOVERNMENT
Romania's 1991 constitution proclaims Romania a democracy and market economy, in which human dignity, civic rights and freedoms, the unhindered development of human personality, justice, and political pluralism are supreme and guaranteed values. The constitution directs the state to implement free trade, protect the principle of competition, and provide a favorable framework for production. The constitution provides for a president, a Parliament, a Constitutional Court, and a separate system of ordinary courts that includes a Supreme Court.

The two-chamber Parliament, consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, is the law-making authority. Deputies and senators are elected for 4-year terms by universal suffrage. The president, mayors, and county council presidents are elected individually; members of Parliament are elected under a mixed election system (majority and proportional); and local and county council members are elected on party slates, in proportion to party choices made by the electorate.

The president is elected by popular vote for a maximum of two terms. The length of the term was extended from 4 to 5 years in an October 2003 constitutional referendum. He is the head of state, charged with safeguarding the constitution, foreign affairs, and the proper functioning of public authorities. He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairman of the Supreme Defense Council. According to the constitution, he acts as mediator among the power centers within the state, as well as between the state and society. The president nominates the prime minister, who in turn appoints the government, which must be confirmed by a vote of confidence from Parliament.

The Constitutional Court adjudicates the constitutionality of challenged laws and decrees. The court consists of nine judges, appointed for non-concurrent terms of 9 years. Three judges are appointed by the Chamber of Deputies, three by the Senate, and three by the president of Romania.

The Romanian legal system is based on the Napoleonic Code. The judiciary is to be independent, and judges appointed by the president are not removable. The president and other judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice are appointed for terms of 6 years and may serve consecutive terms. Proceedings are public, except in special circumstances provided for by law.

The Ministry of Justice represents "the general interests of society" and defends the legal order as well as citizens' rights and freedoms. The ministry is to discharge its powers through independent, impartial public prosecutors.

For territorial and administrative purposes, Romania is divided into 41 counties and the city of Bucharest. Each county is governed by an elected county council. Local councils and elected mayors are the public administration authorities in villages and towns. The county council is the public administration authority that coordinates the activities of all village and town councils in a county.

The central government appoints a prefect for each county and the Bucharest municipality. The prefect is the representative of the central government at the local level and directs any public services of the ministries and other central agencies at the county level. A prefect may block the action of a local authority if he deems it unlawful or unconstitutional. The matter is then decided by an administrative court.

Under legislation in effect since January 1999, local councils have control over the spending of their allocations from the central government budget, as well as authority to raise additional revenue locally.

Principal Government Officials
President of Romania--Traian Basescu
Prime Minister--Emil Boc
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Teodor Baconschi

Other Ministers
Minister of Regional Development and Tourism--Elena Udrea
Minister of Justice--Catalin Predoiu
Minister of Defense--Gabriel Oprea
Minister of Administration and Interior--Traian Igas
Minister of Economy, Trade and Business Climate--Ion Ariton
Minister of Public Finance--Gheorghe Ialomitianu
Minister of Labor, Family and Social Protection--Nelu Ioan Botis
Minister of Agriculture, Forests, and Rural Development--Valeriu Tabara
Minister of Transportation and Infrastructure--Anca Boagiu
Minister of Education, Research, Youth and Sports--Daniel Petru Funeriu
Minister of Culture and National Heritage--Kelemen Hunor
Minister of Public Health--Cseke Attila
Minister of Communication and Information Technology--Valerian Vreme
Minister of Environment--Laszlo Borbely

Romania maintains an embassy in the United States at 1607 23rd St., NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-332-4846 or 202-332-4848; fax: 202-232-4748).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS
November 2008 parliamentary elections resulted in a virtual tie between the center-right PDL and the center-left PSD, with each holding between 34%-37% of the seats in each chamber. The ruling center-right PNL finished a distant third, and PNL Prime Minister Calin Tariceanu resigned. After intense negotiations among various configurations of the PDL, PSD, and PNL, a majority PDL/PSD coalition government was formed in December 2008 with Emil Boc as new prime minister. Among the new government’s top priorities were addressing the effects of global economic turmoil on Romania’s economic development, and coping with significant fiscal challenges facing the Romanian Government’s budget.

In October 2009, the PNL, PSD, and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) filed a no-confidence motion after Prime Minister Boc dismissed Deputy Prime Minister/Interior Minister Dan Nica of the PSD. The no-confidence motion carried, ousting Boc’s minority government, and marking the first time since the revolution of 1989 that a no-confidence motion toppled a Romanian government. However, difficulty in nominating and approving a new cabinet allowed Boc to remain in power as a caretaker through both the November and December 2009 rounds of the presidential election.

Concerns over Romania’s economic situation dominated the November 2009 presidential election, contested by incumbent Traian Basescu of the PDL, Mircea Geoana of the PSD, and Crin Antonescu of the PNL. Basescu (32.8%) and Geoana (29.8%) advanced to the second round of elections in December. Despite charges of electoral irregularities, the Constitutional Court certified Basescu the winner over Geoana by 0.7%, or 70,000 votes. Following his victory, Basescu asked acting Prime Minister Boc to again form a new cabinet. The Parliament approved the new government in late December, alleviating 2 months of political instability. Dedicated to modernization, education, and judicial and government reform, the Basescu administration’s main focus remains Romania’s continued recovery from economic recession.

Romania has made great progress in institutionalizing democratic principles, civil liberties, and respect for human rights since the 1989 revolution. Political parties represent a broad range of views and interests, and elected officials and other public figures freely express their views. Civil society watchdog groups remain relatively small but have grown in influence. The press is free and outspoken, although there have been incidents of politically motivated intimidation and even violence against journalists and media management, particularly prior to the 2004 national elections. Independent radio networks have proliferated, and several private television networks now operate nationwide. In addition, a large number of local private television networks have emerged.

Through support of or participation in consecutive government coalitions, the UDMR has ensured the continuing influence of the ethnic Hungarian minority in national government, and presently serves as part of the ruling coalition government. Consecutive governments have sought to improve the socio-economic situation of the Roma minority, which continues to suffer from severe poverty in many areas and from discrimination. According to government statistics Roma officially represent 2.5% of the population, although Romani organizations claim the figure may be as high as 10%.

The restitution of private and religious property seized under communism or during World War II continues to move very slowly. Particularly problematic is the return of Greek-Catholic churches, which were given to the Romanian Orthodox Church by the communist regime. The Romanian Orthodox Church thus far has turned over very few of these churches, many of which had belonged to the Greek Catholic community for hundreds of years. Romania has repealed communist-era legislation criminalizing homosexual acts and banned xenophobic and racist groups and their activities. Romanian law does not prohibit women's participation in government or politics, but societal attitudes remain a significant barrier. Women hold some high positions in government and roughly 10% of the seats in each chamber in the Parliament.

ECONOMY
Romania is a country of considerable potential: rich agricultural lands, diverse energy sources (coal, oil, natural gas, hydro, and nuclear), a substantial industrial base encompassing almost the full range of manufacturing activities, an educated work force, and opportunities for expanded development in tourism on the Black Sea and in the Carpathian Mountains.

The Romanian Government borrowed heavily from the West in the 1970s to build a substantial state-owned industrial base. Following the 1979 oil price shock and a debt rescheduling in 1981, Ceausescu decreed that Romania would no longer be subject to foreign creditors. By the end of 1989, Romania had paid off a foreign debt of about $10.5 billion through an unprecedented effort that wreaked havoc on the economy and living standards. Vital imports were slashed and food and fuel strictly rationed, while the government exported everything it could to earn hard currency. With investment slashed, Romania's infrastructure fell behind its historically poorer Balkan neighbors.

Since the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989, successive governments sought to build a Western-style market economy. The pace of restructuring was slow, but by 1994 the legal basis for a market economy was largely in place. After the 1996 elections, the coalition government attempted to eliminate consumer subsidies, float prices, liberalize exchange rates, and put in place a tight monetary policy. The Parliament enacted laws permitting foreign entities incorporated in Romania to purchase land. Foreign capital investment in Romania had been increasing rapidly until 2008, although it remained less in per capita terms than in some other countries of East and Central Europe.

Romania was the largest U.S. trading partner in Eastern Europe until Ceausescu's 1988 renunciation of most favored nation (MFN, or non-discriminatory) trading status resulted in high U.S. tariffs on Romanian products. Congress approved restoration of MFN status effective November 8, 1993, as part of a new bilateral trade agreement. Tariffs on most Romanian products dropped to zero in February 1994, with the inclusion of Romania in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Major Romanian exports to the U.S. include shoes, clothing, steel, and chemicals. Romania signed an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) in 1992 and a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1993, codifying Romania's access to European markets and creating the basic framework for further economic integration.

At its Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the European Union invited Romania to formally begin accession negotiations. In December 2004, the European Commission concluded pre-accession negotiations with Romania. In April 2005, the EU signed an accession treaty with Romania and its neighbor, Bulgaria, and in January 2007, they were both welcomed as new EU members.

Romania suffered through a deep economic recession beginning with the 2008 global financial crisis, but should return to positive if very modest growth by the end of 2011. Due to rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, a ballooning budget deficit, and large external imbalances, the Romanian Government was forced to conclude a 2-year, $27 billion financial assistance package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission, and the World Bank in March 2009. Under the terms agreed with the IMF, the Romanian Government embarked on a difficult austerity program to reduce the budget deficit, cut public sector employment, and restructure local and national government agencies. Austerity measures included a 25% cut in public sector wages, a hike in the national value added tax (VAT) rate from 19% to 24%, and thousands of layoffs. GDP declined by 7.1% in 2009 and a further 1.3% in 2010, but the government succeeded in meeting IMF-agreed deficit targets despite strong opposition to the austerity measures from labor unions. In late 2010 and early 2011 the government also pushed several important pieces of reform legislation through Parliament, including pension reforms, an overhaul of public sector pay systems, and modernization of the labor code. The final IMF review under the 2009 agreement, conducted in February 2011, declared the agreement a “success” in stabilizing the economy and setting the stage for a return to growth. A new 2-year “precautionary” agreement between Romania and the IMF, effective March 2011, focuses on deepening structural reforms and restructuring or privatizing unprofitable state-owned enterprises.

Privatization of industry was first pursued with the transfer in 1992 of 30% of the shares of some 6,000 state-owned enterprises to five private ownership funds, in which each adult citizen received certificates of ownership. The remaining 70% ownership of the enterprises was transferred to a state ownership fund. With the assistance of the World Bank, European Union, and IMF, Romania succeeded in privatizing most industrial state-owned enterprises, including some large state-owned energy companies. Romania completed the privatization of the largest commercial bank (BCR) in 2006. Two state-owned banks remain in Romania, Eximbank and the National Savings Bank (CEC), after an attempt to privatize CEC Bank was indefinitely postponed in 2006. Four of the country's eight regional electricity distributors have now been privatized. Privatization of natural gas distribution companies also progressed with the sale of Romania's two regional gas distributors, Distrigaz Nord (to E.ON Ruhrgas of Germany) and Distrigaz Sud (to Gaz de France). Further progress in energy sector privatization has been delayed as the government is contemplating the creation of two integrated, state-owned energy producers. However, this “bundling” scheme has been challenged in court and is also under review by the Romanian Competition Council and by competition authorities at the European Commission. Romania has a nuclear power plant at Cernavoda, with one nuclear reactor in operation since 1996 and a second one commissioned in the fall of 2007.

The return of collectivized farmland to its cultivators, one of the first initiatives of the post-December 1989 revolution government, resulted in a short-term decrease in agricultural production. Some four million small parcels representing 80% of the arable surface were returned to original owners or their heirs. Many of the recipients were elderly or city dwellers, and the slow progress of granting formal land titles remains an obstacle to leasing or selling land to active farmers.

Financial and technical assistance continues to flow from the U.S., European Union, other industrial nations, and international financial institutions facilitating Romania's reintegration into the world economy. The IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and European Investment Bank (EIB) all have programs and resident representatives in Romania. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs were phased out completely in 2008, except for Small Project Assistance Grants, which are still available through the Peace Corps. According to the National Office of the Trade Register, which measures foreign direct capital registered and disbursed to firms, between 1990 and November 2010 Romania attracted a total of $37.91 billion in foreign direct investment, of which the U.S. represented 2.59%. The actual level of U.S. investment, however, is underreported as much of it flows to Romania through European subsidiaries of U.S. companies.

After years of consistently high inflation in the 1990s, Romania's inflation rate steadily decreased through 2004, only to rise again along with high GDP growth rates of 4% to 8% through 2008. The deep recession beginning in late 2008 dramatically reduced inflationary pressures, but the VAT tax hike from 19% to 24% imposed in mid-2010 reversed that trend and pushed prices higher. Stoked also by rising global food and energy prices, inflation hit an annualized rate of 8% at the end of 2010, the highest in the EU. The IMF has been critical of Romania's low rate of tax collection and poor enforcement mechanisms as a medium- to long-term impediment to growth. Tax arrears are slightly decreasing, but Romania still has one of the lowest percentages in the EU of revenues collected, at 33% of GDP in 2010. The current account deficit had been a concern, as it reached 13.6% of GDP in 2007 and 12.4% of GDP in 2008. However, due to the recession, the current account deficit dropped to 4.2% of GDP in 2010. Deteriorating education and health services and aging and inadequate physical infrastructure continue to be seen as threats to future growth.

Romania's budget deficit dropped steadily from 4% of GDP in 1999 to only 0.8% in 2005, but then skyrocketed, peaking at 7.2% in 2009. The major culprits for the rising deficit were tax evasion and lax enforcement; runaway government procurement spending; and big increases in public sector wages, retirement pensions, and social assistance. Under the IMF agreement the deficit was pared to 6.5% of GDP in 2010 and is on track to reach the target of 4.4% in 2011, though additional austerity measures may be needed to get the deficit under 3% by 2012.

Driven by the recession, official unemployment peaked at 7.8% in December 2009 but then dropped to 6.9% by the end of 2010 despite substantial layoffs in the public sector, and declined further to 6.74% in January 2011. More public sector layoffs are expected in 2011, though a gradual return to growth in the private sector should fuel a correspondingly gradual recovery in job creation.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Since December 1989, Romania has actively pursued a policy of strengthening relations with the West in general, and specifically with the U.S. and the European Union. Romania was a helpful partner to the allied forces during the first Gulf War, particularly during its service as president of the UN Security Council. Romania has been active in peace support operations in Afghanistan, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), the Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, and in Albania. Romania also offered important logistical support to allied military operations in Iraq in 2003 and, after the cessation of organized hostilities, has participated in coalition security and reconstruction activities. Romania is a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which it chaired in 2001.

In 1996, Romania signed and ratified a basic bilateral treaty with Hungary that settled outstanding issues and laid the foundation for closer, more cooperative relations. In June 1997, Romania signed a bilateral treaty with Ukraine that resolved certain territorial and minority issues, among others. Romania also signed a basic bilateral treaty with Russia in July 2003.

Romania formally joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, and hosted a NATO Summit from April 2-4, 2008. The venue symbolized the expansion of the Alliance from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and set new goals for years to come.

Romania acceded to the European Union on January 1, 2007 along with Bulgaria, bringing the number of EU states to 27. Romania is a strong advocate for a "larger Europe," encouraging other countries that were formerly part of the Soviet sphere to integrate into both NATO and the EU.

Romania has been actively involved in regional organizations, such as the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, and has been a positive force in supporting stability and cooperation in the area.

Romania maintains good diplomatic relations with Israel and was supportive of the Middle East peace negotiations initiated after the Gulf conflict in 1991. Romania also is a founding member of the Black Sea Consortium for Economic Development. It joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1972, and is a member of the World Trade Organization.

Romanian Missions in the United States
Embassy of Romania
1607 23rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20008
Tel. 202-332-4846 or 202-332-4848; fax: 202-232-4748

Romanian Mission to the UN
573 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10016
Tel. 212-682-3273

Romanian National Tourist Office
573 Third Avenue
New York, NW 10016
Tel. 212-697-6971

Romanian Cultural Center
200 E. 38th Street
New York, NY 10016
Tel. 212-687-0180

DEFENSE
In accordance with the December 1991 Romanian constitution, the Romanian armed forces have the defensive mission of ensuring the territorial integrity of the country. The military enjoys popular support, partly because of its role in supporting the December 1989 revolution. The army is the largest service. Romania has an all-volunteer military force; conscription ended in 2007. The Romanian armed forces have about 75,000 military personnel and 15,000 civilians, for a total of 90,000 men and women. Out of these 75,000, about 45,800 are in the Land Forces. In 1993, the U.S. military began training of Romanian military and civilian officials through International Military Education and Training (IMET) and other exchange programs, emphasizing civilian democratic control over the military.

U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS
Cold during the early post-war period, U.S. bilateral relations with Romania began to improve in the early 1960s with the signing of an agreement providing for partial settlement of American property claims. Cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges were initiated, and in 1964 the legations of both nations were promoted to full embassies.

Responding to Ceausescu's calculated distancing of Romania from Soviet foreign policy, particularly Romania's continued diplomatic relations with Israel and denunciation of the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, President Richard Nixon paid an official visit to Romania in August 1969. Despite political differences, high-level contacts continued between U.S. and Romanian leaders throughout the decade of the 1970s, culminating in the 1978 state visit to Washington by President and Mrs. Ceausescu.

In 1972, a consular convention to facilitate protection of citizens and their property in both countries was signed. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) facilities were granted, and Romania became eligible for U.S. Export-Import Bank credits.

A trade agreement signed in April 1975 accorded most favored nation (MFN) status to Romania under Section 402 of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that links MFN to a country's performance on emigration). This status was renewed yearly after congressional review of a presidential determination that Romania was making progress toward freedom of emigration.

In the mid-1980s, criticism of Romania's deteriorating human rights record, particularly regarding mistreatment of religious and ethnic minorities, spurred attempts by Congress to withdraw MFN status. In 1988, to preempt congressional action, Ceausescu renounced MFN treatment, calling Jackson-Vanik and other human rights requirements unacceptable interference with Romanian sovereignty.

After welcoming the revolution of December 1989 with a visit by Secretary of State James Baker in February 1990, the U.S. Government expressed concern that opposition parties had faced discriminatory treatment in the May 1990 elections, when the National Salvation Front won a sweeping victory. The slow progress of subsequent political and economic reform increased that concern, and relations with Romania cooled sharply after the June 1990 intervention of the miners in University Square. Anxious to cultivate better relations with the U.S. and Europe, and disappointed at the poor results from its gradualist economic reform strategy, the Theodor Stolojan government undertook some economic reforms and conducted free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections in September 1992. Encouraged by the conduct of local elections in February 1992, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger paid a visit in May 1992. Congress restored MFN status in November 1993 in recognition of Romania's progress in instituting political and economic reform. In 1996, the U.S. Congress voted to extend permanent MFN graduation to Romania.

As Romania's policies became unequivocally pro-Western, the United States moved to deepen relations. President Bill Clinton visited Bucharest in 1997. The two countries initiated cooperation on shared goals, including economic and political development, defense reform, and non-traditional threats such as trans-border crime and non-proliferation.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Romania has been fully supportive of the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts. Romania became the first country to enroll in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, and it was invited to join the alliance in November 2002. Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Romania pledged to commit troops, and they remained there until July 2009. Romania formally acceded to NATO on March 29, 2004 after depositing its instruments of treaty ratification in Washington, DC. President George W. Bush helped commemorate Romania's NATO accession when he visited Bucharest in November 2002. On that occasion he congratulated the Romanian people on building democratic institutions and a market economy following the fall of communism. Romanian troops have served alongside U.S. troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

In March 2005, President Traian Basescu made his first official visit to Washington to meet with President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and other senior U.S. officials. In December 2005, Secretary Rice visited Bucharest to meet with President Basescu and to sign a base use and access agreement that allows for the use of Romanian military facilities by U.S. troops. The first proof of principle exercise took place at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base from August to October 2007. In February 2010, following a visit to Bucharest by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, Romania agreed to host elements of the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense within the 2015 timeframe.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Mark Gitenstein
Deputy Chief of Mission--Jeri Guthrie-Corn
Public Affairs Officer--Patricia Guy
Consul General--James Gray
Political Section Chief--David T. Morris
Economic Section Chief--Blair LaBarge
Defense Attache--Bruce West
Commercial Section Chief--Keith Kirkham
Management Counselor--Brian Moran
Peace Corps Director--Sheila Crowley

The U.S. Embassy in Romania is located at Strada Tudor Arghezi 7-9, Bucharest (tel. 40-21 200-3300, fax 40-21 200-3442, consular fax 40-21 200-3381).

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April 6, 2011Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Background Note: Ireland

Official Name: Ireland

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 70,282 sq. km. (27,136 sq. mi.); slightly larger than West Virginia.
Terrain: Arable 10%, meadows and pastures 77%, rough grazing in use 11%, inland water 2%.
Climate: Temperate maritime.

People
Nationality: Noun--Irishman, Irishwoman. Adjective--Irish.
Population (April 2010): 4,470,700.
Cities: Capital--Dublin (pop. 506,211). Other cities--Cork (119,418), Galway (72,414), Limerick (52,539), Waterford (45,748).
Population breakdown: 0-14 years (22%), 15-24 years (12%), 25-44 years (32%), 45-64 years (23%), 65 years and over (11%).
Population growth rate (2010 est.): 0.3%.
Ethnic groups: Irish, with English minority.
Religions: Roman Catholic 86.8%; Church of Ireland 3%; Presbyterian 0.5%; Methodist 0.25%; Muslim 1%; Jewish 0.1%; other 8.35%.
Languages: English, Irish (Gaelic).
Education: Compulsory up to age 16. Enrollment rates--first (primary) level 498,914; second (high school and vocational) level 341,312; third (university and college) level 139,134. Literacy--99%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--3.71/1,000. Life expectancy at birth--male 76.8 yrs., female 81.6 yrs.
Work force: Services--74%, industry--21%, agriculture--5%.

Government
Type: Parliamentary republic.
Independence: December 6, 1921.
Constitution: December 29, 1937.
Branches: Executive--president, head of state; prime minister (taoiseach--pronounced "TEE-shuck"), head of government. Legislative--bicameral national parliament (Oireachtas--pronounced "o-ROCK-tas"): House of Representatives (Dail--pronounced "DOIL") and Senate (Seanad--pronounced "SHAN-ad"). Judicial--Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeal, High Court, Circuit Court, and District Court.
Administrative subdivisions: 26 counties, 34 local authorities.
Major political parties: Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Labour, Green Party, Sinn Fein (pronounced “FEE-na Fall,” “FEE-na Gale,” and “SHIN Fane”).
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy
Nominal GDP (2010): $208.3 billion.
Real GDP growth (2010): -1.6%.
Nominal GDP per capita (2010): $46,592.
Natural resources: Zinc, lead, natural gas, barite, copper, gypsum, limestone, dolomite, peat.
Agriculture (2% of GDP): Products--cattle, meat, and dairy products; barley; hay; silage; wheat.
Industry (29% of GDP): Types--food processing, beverages, engineering, computer equipment, textiles and clothing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals.
Trade (2010, Ireland Central Statistics Office data): Exports--$119.9 billion (excluding services): machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, food, manufactured materials, beverages. Imports--$59.9 billion (excluding services): grains, petroleum products, machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, textile yarns. Major suppliers--Great Britain and Northern Ireland 30%, U.S. 18%, France 5%, Germany 7%, China 6%, Japan 2%; rest of the world (including other EU member states) 32%.

PEOPLE AND HISTORY
The Irish people are mainly of Celtic origin, with the country's only significant sized minority having descended from the Anglo-Normans. English is the common language, but Irish (Gaelic) is also an official language and is taught in schools.

Anglo-Irish writers such as Swift, Sheridan, Goldsmith, Burke, Wilde, Joyce, Yeats, Shaw, and Beckett have made a major contribution to world literature over the past 300 years.

The earliest inhabitants--people of a mid-Stone Age culture--arrived about 6000 BC. About 4,000 years later, tribes from southern Europe arrived and established a high Neolithic culture, leaving behind gold ornaments and huge stone monuments. The Bronze Age people, who arrived during the next 1,000 years, produced elaborate gold and bronze ornaments and weapons.

The Iron Age arrived abruptly in the fourth century BC with the invasion of the Celts, a tall, energetic people who had spread across Europe and Great Britain in the preceding centuries. The Celts, or Gaels, and their more numerous predecessors divided into five kingdoms in which, despite constant strife, a rich culture flourished.

The coming of Christianity from across the Irish Sea brought major changes and civilizing influences. Tradition maintains that St. Patrick arrived on the island in AD 432 and, in the years that followed, worked to convert the Irish to Christianity.

The pagan druid tradition collapsed before the spread of the new faith, and Irish scholars excelled in the study of Latin learning and Christian theology in the monasteries that flourished. Missionaries went forth from Ireland to England and the continent, spreading news of the flowering of learning, and scholars from other nations came to Irish monasteries. The excellence and isolation of these monasteries helped preserve Latin and Greek learning during the Dark Ages. The arts of manuscript illumination, metalworking, and sculpture flourished and produced such treasures as the Book of Kells, ornate jewelry, and the many carved stone crosses that dot the island.

Two hundred years of Viking invasion and settlement was later followed by a Norman conquest in the 12th century. The Norman conquest resulted in the assimilation of the Norman settlers into Irish society. The early 17th century saw the arrival of Scottish and English Protestants, sent as colonists to the north of Ireland and the Pale around Dublin.

In 1800 the Irish parliament passed the Act of Union with Great Britain, and Ireland was an official part of the United Kingdom until 1921. Religious freedom, outlawed in the 18th century, was restored in 1829, but this victory for the Irish Catholic majority was overshadowed by a severe economic depression and the great famine of 1846-48 when the potato crop failed. Millions died, and millions more emigrated, spawning the first mass wave of Irish emigration to the United States. A decade later, in 1858, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB--also known as the Fenians) was founded as a secret society dedicated to armed rebellion against the British. An above-ground political counterpart, the Home Rule Movement, was created in 1874, advocating constitutional change for independence.

Galvanized by the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell, the party was able to force British governments after 1885 to introduce several home rule bills. The turn of the century witnessed a surge of interest in Irish nationalism, including the founding of Sinn Fein ("Ourselves Alone") as an open political movement.

Nationalism was and is a potent populist force in Irish politics. A home rule bill passed in 1914, but its implementation was suspended until war in Europe ended. Believing the mantra: "England's problem is Ireland's opportunity," and tapping into a mood of Gaelic revivalism, Padraic Pearse and James Connolly led the unsuccessful Easter Rising of 1916. Pearse and the other 1916 leaders declared an independent Irish republic, but a lack of popular support doomed the rebellion, which lasted a week and destroyed large portions of Dublin. The decision by the British military government to execute the leaders of the rebellion, coupled with the British Government's threat of conscripting the Irish to fight in the Great War, alienated public opinion and produced massive support for Sinn Fein in the 1918 general election. Under the leadership of Eamon de Valera, the elected Sinn Fein deputies constituted themselves as the first Dail. Tensions only increased: British attempts to smash Sinn Fein ignited the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921.

The end of the war brought the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, which established the Irish Free State of 26 counties within the British Commonwealth and recognized the partition of the island into Ireland and Northern Ireland, although this was supposedly a temporary measure. The six predominantly Protestant counties of northeast Ulster--Northern Ireland--remained a part of the United Kingdom with limited self-government. A significant Irish minority repudiated the treaty settlement because of the continuance of subordinate ties to the British monarch and the partition of the island. This opposition led to further hostilities--a civil war (1922-23), which was won by the pro-treaty forces.

In 1932, Eamon de Valera, the political leader of the forces initially opposed to the treaty, became Prime Minister, and a new Irish constitution was enacted in 1937. The last British military bases were soon withdrawn, and the ports were returned to Irish control. Ireland was neutral in World War II. The government formally declared Ireland a republic in 1948; however, it does not normally use the term "Republic of Ireland," which tacitly acknowledges the partition, but refers to the country simply as "Ireland."

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic state with a parliamentary system of government. The president, who serves as head of state in a largely ceremonial role, is elected for a 7-year term and can be re-elected only once. The current president is Mary McAleese, who is serving her second term after having succeeded President Mary Robinson--the first instance worldwide where one woman followed another as an elected head of state. In carrying out certain constitutional powers and functions, the president is aided by the Council of State, an advisory body. On the taoiseach's (prime minister's) advice, the president also dissolves the Oireachtas (parliament).

The prime minister (taoiseach) is elected by the Dail (lower house of parliament) as the leader of the political party, or coalition of parties, that wins the most seats in the national elections, which are held approximately every 5 years (unless called earlier). Executive power is vested in a cabinet whose ministers are nominated by the taoiseach and approved by the Dail.

The bicameral Oireachtas (parliament) consists of the Seanad Eireann (Senate) and the Dail Eireann (House of Representatives). The Seanad is composed of 60 members--11 nominated by the prime minister, six elected by the national universities, and 43 elected from panels of candidates established on a vocational basis. The Seanad has the power to delay legislative proposals and is allowed 90 days to consider and amend bills sent to it by the Dail, which wields greater power in parliament. The Dail has 166 members popularly elected to terms of 5 years under a complex system of proportional representation. A member of the Dail is known as a Teachta Dala, or TD.

Judges are appointed by the president on nomination by the government and can be removed from office only for misbehavior or incapacity and then only by resolution of both houses of parliament. The ultimate court of appeal is the Supreme Court, consisting of the chief justice and five other justices. The Supreme Court also can decide upon the constitutionality of legislative acts if the president asks for an opinion.

Local government is by elected county councils and, in the cities of Dublin, Cork, Limerick, and Waterford, by county borough corporations. County councils/corporations in turn select city mayors. In practice, however, most authority remains with the central government.

Irish politics remain dominated by the two political parties that grew out of Ireland's bitter 1922-23 civil war. Fianna Fail was formed by those who opposed the 1921 treaty that partitioned the island. Although treaty opponents lost the civil war, Fianna Fail soon became Ireland's largest and pre-eminent political party, generally dominating government since the 1930s. Fine Gael, representative of the pro-treaty forces, has been Ireland’s perennial second party, holding government only intermittently. The 2011 general election saw a sharp reversal of fortune for both major parties. Labour, Sinn Fein, and the Greens are the other significant parties.

The May 2007 national elections brought the Fianna Fail party and its leader Bertie Ahern back to power in a coalition government for an unprecedented third 5-year term. Coalition members joining Fianna Fail were the Green Party and the Progressive Democrats. Ahern appointed Finance Minister Brian Cowen Deputy Prime Minister (Tanaiste, pronounced "TAW-nish-tuh").

The June 2004 local and European elections featured a referendum on citizenship. Until that time, Ireland had granted citizenship on the basis of birth on Irish soil. Concerns about security and social welfare abuse prompted the government to seek to bring citizenship laws in line with the more restrictive policies prevalent in the rest of Europe, and the 2004 referendum measure passed by a wide majority. Now, persons with non-Irish parents can acquire Irish citizenship at birth on Irish soil only if at least one parent has been resident in Ireland for 3 years preceding the birth.

The February 2011 national elections brought a considerable change to Ireland’s political landscape. Fianna Fail suffered its worst defeat in the party’s history. By contrast, Fine Gael and Labour both secured their best-ever results in a general election. Fine Gael and Labour entered into a coalition government; Fine Gael leader Enda Kenny became Taoiseach, and Labour leader Eamon Gilmore became Tanaiste and Foreign Minister.

Northern Ireland
U.S. priorities remain supporting the peace process and devolved political institutions in Northern Ireland and encouraging the implementation of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, also known as the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), and the 2006 St. Andrews Agreement.

The conflict in Northern Ireland stems from a history of British rule, historical animosity between Catholics and Protestants, and the various armed and political attempts to unite Northern Ireland with the rest of the island. "Nationalist" and "Republican" groups seek a united Ireland, while "Unionists" and "Loyalists" want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. After decades of violence by both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, most notably the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the British and Irish Governments negotiated a PIRA ceasefire in 1994, which was followed by the landmark U.S.-brokered Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

The GFA established a power-sharing executive and assembly to serve as the devolved local government of Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Assembly has 108 elected members. The power-sharing executive is led by a first minister and deputy first minister, one each from the largest unionist and nationalist parties, and an 11-minister executive. The GFA also provided for both Ireland and the U.K. to accept that Northern Ireland could become part of Ireland if a majority (north and south) so voted in the future. The GFA provided a blueprint for "normalization," to include reduction in the numbers and role of armed forces, devolution of police and justice authorities, and guarantees of human rights and equal opportunity for all individuals. The agreement was approved in a 1998 referendum by 71% of Northern Ireland voters and 95% of Irish voters.

The major political parties in Northern Ireland are the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Fein, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), and the Alliance Party. The UUP and SDLP are centrist Unionist and Nationalist parties, respectively, while Sinn Fein is strongly Republican and the DUP is strongly Unionist. The Alliance Party is the only non-sectarian party.

Since June 2008, Northern Ireland's First Minister has been DUP party leader Peter Robinson and deputy First Minister has been Martin McGuinness, who is a Sinn Fein member of the British Parliament and a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The DUP, UUP, Sinn Fein, and SDLP currently make up the power-sharing executive. The next Northern Ireland Assembly election will be held in May 2011.

In September 2009, Declan Kelly was appointed as the Economic Envoy to Northern Ireland, a new position created by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton aimed at expanding Northern Ireland's relatively small private sector and furthering economic ties between Northern Ireland and the United States. The Economic Envoy coordinates economic collaboration for the mutual benefit of Northern Ireland and the United States, underpinning the Northern Ireland peace process by focusing on the economic dividends of peace.

The United States also continues to provide funding ($17 million in FY 2010) for projects administered under the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986 to generate cross-community engagement and economic opportunity in Northern Ireland and the southern border counties (Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, and Sligo). Since the IFI's establishment, the U.S. Government has contributed over $486 million, roughly half of total IFI funding. The other major donor to IFI is the European Union (EU).

For more information, see the United Kingdom Background Note at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm

Principal Government Officials
President--Mary McAleese
Taoiseach (Prime Minister)--Enda Kenny
Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister)--Eamon Gilmore
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade--Eamon Gilmore
Ambassador to the United States--Michael Collins

The Irish Embassy in the United States is located at 2234 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-462-3939). Irish Consulates are located in New York, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco.

ECONOMY
Until 2008, Ireland boasted one of the most vibrant, open economies in the world. The "Celtic Tiger" period of the mid- to late 1990s saw several years of double-digit GDP growth, driven by a progressive industrial policy that boosted large-scale foreign direct investment and exports. GDP growth dipped during the immediate post-September 11, 2001 global economic slowdown, but averaged roughly 5% yearly between 2004 and 2007, the best performance for this period among the original EU 15 member states. During that period, the Irish economy generated roughly 90,000 new jobs annually and attracted over 200,000 foreign workers, mostly from the new EU member states, in an unprecedented immigration influx. The construction sector accounted for approximately one-quarter of these jobs. However, the Irish economy began to experience a slowdown in 2008. The Irish property market collapsed, putting pressure on the Irish banks, which had a significant portion of their loan books in real estate. This, in turn, caused a collapse in the government’s finances because of a large dip in the amount of revenue raised from value-added tax and tax on property transactions.

In 2010, the Irish economy experienced double-digit unemployment, deflation, a virtual standstill in credit availability, and a widening government budget deficit. With the effective collapse of the construction industry, unemployment levels continued to rise. Fragile consumer confidence and weak domestic spending further contributed to bleak economic conditions. Exports grew, albeit slowly, but GDP growth remained negative. Despite lower tax receipts and rising welfare costs, the government remained committed to cutting both capital and day-to-day spending costs. Thus, the December 2010 budget for 2011 was again austere, building on 2010 spending cuts of U.S. $5.8 billion (4 billion euro) put in place in December 2009.

The Irish banking sector, like many worldwide, came under intense pressure in 2007 and 2008 following the collapse of the construction industry and an end to Ireland’s property boom. Subsequently, it was determined that a number of Ireland’s financial institutions were severely under-capitalized and required government intervention to survive. The government introduced temporary guarantees to personal depositors in 2008 to ensure that deposits remained in Ireland and has so far continued these guarantees. One of the main banks involved in property lending, Anglo Irish Bank, was nationalized and the government has taken majority stakes in several others, some of which have now become effectively nationalized as a result. The Irish Government also created the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA)--a government-run organization--into which the Irish banks have transferred most of their property-related loan books. Overall, NAMA is expected to acquire U.S. $117 billion (88 billion euro) in loans for some U.S. $49 billion (37 billion euro).

With increased exposure to bank debts, the government found it difficult to place sovereign debt on international bond markets and had to seek International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU intervention in November 2010. Ireland accepted a 3-year, 85 billion euro (U.S. $113 billion) EU-IMF bailout package to cover future government funding shortfalls, as well as a short-term recapitalization of its failing banks. The funds were approved by EU finance ministers in Brussels on November 28 and carry an average interest rate of 5.8%. External assistance in the package totals 67.5 billion euro ($89.7 billion), coming from the IMF, the EU Stabilization Fund, and bilateral loans from the U.K., Sweden, and Denmark. Ireland itself will contribute 17.5 billion euro ($23.2 billion) from its own National Pension Reserve Fund and cash reserves. In return for the bailout, Ireland will be required to stick to an austere economic plan designed to reduce its deficit to 3% of GDP in 4 years. This entails cutting at least 15 billion euro ($20 billion) from its budget over the 4 years, of which 6 billion euro ($8 billion) was front-loaded in 2011. Following further government capitalization of Allied Irish Banks, the effective control of the bank transferred to the Irish Government by the end of 2010. Irish Nationwide Building Society and EBS have also been taken into state control. The government has also helped re-capitalize the Bank of Ireland, and it is anticipated that the government may have to further increase its shareholding in Bank of Ireland in 2011.

Economic and trade ties are an important facet of overall U.S.-Irish relations. In 2010, U.S. exports to Ireland were valued at U.S. $7.27 billion, while Irish exports to the U.S. totaled U.S. $33.9 billion, according to the U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics. The range of U.S. exports includes electrical components and equipment, computers and peripherals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, and livestock feed. Irish exports to the United States represent approximately 17% of all Irish exports and include alcoholic beverages, chemicals and related products, electronic data processing equipment, electrical machinery, textiles and clothing, and glassware. Irish investment in the United States steadily increased during the economic boom times. Ireland is one of the top 20 sources of foreign direct investment in the U.S., with Irish food processing firms, in particular, expanding their presence.

U.S. investment has been particularly important to the growth and modernization of Irish industry over the past 25 years, providing new technology, export capabilities, and employment opportunities. As of year-end 2009, (according to official Irish data) the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Ireland stood at U.S. $235 billion , more than the U.S. total for China, India, Russia, and Brazil--the BRIC countries--combined. There are approximately 600 U.S. subsidiaries currently in Ireland that employ roughly 100,000 people and span activities from manufacturing of high-tech electronics, computer products, medical supplies, and pharmaceuticals to retailing, banking, finance, and other services. In more recent years, Ireland has also become an important research and development center for U.S. firms in Europe.

Many U.S. businesses find Ireland an attractive location to manufacture for the EU market, since it is inside the EU customs area and uses the euro. U.S. firms year after year account for over half of Ireland's total exports. Other reasons for Ireland's attractiveness include: a 12.5% corporate tax rate for domestic and foreign firms; the quality and flexibility of the English-speaking work force; cooperative labor relations; political stability; pro-business government policies; a transparent judicial system; strong intellectual property protection; and the pulling power of existing companies operating successfully (a "clustering" effect). Factors that negatively affect Ireland's ability to attract investment include: high labor and energy costs (especially when compared to low-cost countries in Eastern Europe and Asia), skilled labor shortages, inadequate infrastructure (such as in the transportation and Internet/broadband sectors), and price levels that are ranked among the highest in Europe.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Ireland is a member of numerous international organizations, including the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union. Ireland has been an important contributor to numerous international peacekeeping missions, such as in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (UNIMIL), the Balkans (KFOR and EUFOR), and Chad (EUFOR). Ireland's overseas development assistance focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa and stands at 0.5% of GDP.

U.S.-IRISH RELATIONS
U.S. relations with Ireland have long been based on common ancestral ties and shared values. Besides regular dialogue on political and economic issues, the U.S. and Irish Governments have official exchanges in areas such as medical research and education.

With Ireland's membership in the European Union, discussions of EU trade and economic policies as well as other aspects of EU policy have also become key elements in the U.S.-Irish relationship. In recent years, Ireland has acted as a diplomatic bridge between the United States and European Union. During its 2004 EU presidency, Ireland worked to strengthen U.S.-EU ties that had been strained by the Iraq war.

Emigration, a foundation of the U.S.-Irish relationship, declined significantly with Ireland's economic boom in the 1990s. For the first time in its modern history, Ireland experienced high levels of inward migration, a phenomenon with political, economic, and social consequences. This trend has now reversed. As increasing numbers of unemployed Irish workers are emigrating for economic reasons, concerns have been raised by the government about a possible “brain drain” similar to what happened in the 1970s and 1980s.

Irish citizens have continued a common practice of taking temporary residence overseas for work or study, mainly in Australia, the U.S., Canada, U.K., and elsewhere in Europe. Along with the increased interest in long-term emigration, there has been a surge of interest in “mid-term” emigration for 3-5 years, which has been mirrored in Irish Government interest in a specialized extended-stay visa for mid-career professionals to live/work in the U.S. The U.S. J-1 visa program remains a popular means for Irish youths to work temporarily in the United States; a bilateral program expansion in 2008 that provides further opportunities for recent graduates to spend up to 1 year in the United States has been undersubscribed. The Irish Government continues to consider a high priority the need to find a legal remedy for those Irish living out of status in the United States.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Daniel M. Rooney
Deputy Chief of Mission--John Hennessey-Niland
Consular Section Chief--Jennifer Duval
Defense Attache--Lt. Col. Shawn Purvis
Public Affairs Officer--Karyn Posner-Mullen
Senior Commercial Officer--Stephen Anderson
Political/Economic Section Chief--Brian Siler
Management Section Chief--Jeff Smith
Regional Security Officer--Stephen Marquette
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Port Director--Juan Soltero

The U.S. Embassy in Ireland is located at 42 Elgin Road, Ballsbridge, Dublin 4 (tel. 668-7122; fax 668-9946).

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April 6, 2011Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Background Note: Croatia

Official Name: Republic of Croatia

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 56,542 sq. km. land area (slightly smaller than West Virginia), 31,067 sq. km. coastal sea area.
Major cities (2009 est.): Capital--Zagreb (790,298). Others--Split (180,200), Rijeka (144,043), Osijek (114,616).
Terrain: Croatia is situated between central and eastern Europe. Its terrain is diverse, containing rocky coastlines, densely wooded mountains, plains, lakes, and rolling hills.
Climate: Croatia has a mixture of climates. In the north it is continental, Mediterranean along the coast, and a semi-highland and highland climate in the central region.

People
Population (July 2009 est.): 4,429,078.
Population growth rate (2009 est.): -0.12%.
Ethnic groups: Croat 89.6%, Serb 4.5%, other 5.9% (including Bosniak, Hungarian, Slovene, Czech, and Roma) (2001 census).
Religions: Catholic 87.8%, Orthodox 4.4%, Slavic Muslim 1.28%, others 6.52%.
Language: Croatian (South Slavic language, using the Roman script).
Health (2009 est.): Life expectancy--male 72.3 years; female 79.2 years. Infant mortality rate--5.58 deaths/1,000 live births.

Government
Type: Parliamentary democracy.
Constitution: Adopted December 22, 1990.
Independence (from Yugoslavia): June 25, 1991.
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet of ministers. Legislative--unicameral Parliament or Sabor. Judicial--three-tiered system.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Political parties (represented in Parliament): Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), Croatian People's Party-Liberal Democrats (HNS), Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS), Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU), Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB), Party of Democratic Action of Croatia (SDAH), Croatian Labor (HL), and Croatian Social Democrats (HSD).

Economy
Real GDP growth (2010): -1.2%.
Inflation rate (2010): 1.9%.
Unemployment rate (average for 2010): 17.6%.
Natural resources: Oil, bauxite, low-grade iron ore, calcium, natural asphalt, mica, clays, salt, and hydropower.

GEOGRAPHY
Croatia serves as a gateway to eastern Europe. It lies along the east coast of the Adriatic Sea and shares a border with Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, and Slovenia. The republic has a distinct boomerang shape, arching from the Pannonian Plains of Slavonia between the Sava, Drava, and Danube Rivers, across hilly, central Croatia to the Istrian Peninsula, then south through Dalmatia along the rugged Adriatic coast. Croatia is made up of 20 counties plus the city of Zagreb and controls 1,185 islands in the Adriatic Sea, 67 of which are inhabited.

PEOPLE AND HISTORY
The Croats are believed to be a Slavic people who migrated from Ukraine and settled in present-day Croatia during the 6th century. After a period of self-rule and the establishment of an independent kingdom, Croatians agreed to the Pacta Conventa in 1091, submitting themselves to Hungarian authority. By the mid-1400s, concerns over Ottoman expansion led the Croatian Assembly to invite the Habsburgs, under Archduke Ferdinand, to assume control over Croatia. Habsburg rule proved successful in thwarting the Ottomans, and by the 18th century, much of Croatia was free of Turkish control. The Austrian monarchy also acquired control over Dalmatia at the close of the Napoleonic wars following centuries of rule by the Venetian Republic.

In 1868, Croatia gained domestic autonomy under Hungarian authority. Following World War I and the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Croatia joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became Yugoslavia in 1929). During World War II, German and Italian troops invaded and occupied Yugoslavia and set up a puppet, Fascist regime to rule a nominally-independent Croatian state. This regime, under the hard-line nationalist Croatian Ustasha party, was responsible for the deaths of large numbers of ethnic Serbs, Jews, Roma, and other civilians in a network of concentration camps. It was eventually defeated by the Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, in what was essentially a civil war as well as a struggle against the Axis occupiers. The pro-Yugoslav Partisans included many ethnic groups, including a large number of Croatians, and were supplied in large part by the United States and the United Kingdom. Yugoslavia changed its name once again after World War II. The new state became the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and united Croatia and several other republics together under the communist leadership of Marshal Tito.

After the death of Tito and with the fall of communism throughout eastern Europe, the Yugoslav federation began to unravel. Croatia held its first multi-party elections since World War II in 1990. Long-time Croatian nationalist Franjo Tudjman was elected President, and 1 year later, Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Conflict between Serbs and Croats in Croatia escalated, and 1 month after Croatia declared independence, the Yugoslav Army intervened and war erupted.

The United Nations mediated a cease-fire in January 1992, but hostilities resumed the next year when Croatia fought to regain one-third of the territory lost the previous year. A second cease-fire was enacted in May 1993, followed by a joint declaration the next January between Croatia and Yugoslavia. However, in September 1993, the Croatian Army led an offensive against the Serb-held self-styled "Republic of Krajina." A third cease-fire was called in March 1994, but it, too, was broken in May and August 1995, after which Croatian forces regained large portions of the Krajina, prompting an exodus of Serbs from this area. In November 1995, Croatia agreed to peacefully reintegrate Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium under terms of the Erdut Agreement, and the Croatian government re-established political and legal authority over those territories in January 1998. In December 1995, Croatia signed the Dayton peace agreement, committing itself to a permanent cease-fire and the return of all refugees.

The death of President Tudjman in December 1999, followed by the election of a coalition government and President in early 2000, brought significant changes to Croatia. The government, under the leadership of then-Prime Minister Racan, progressed in implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, regional cooperation, refugee returns, national reconciliation, and democratization.

On November 23, 2003, national elections were held for Parliament, and the Croatian Democratic Union party (HDZ), which had governed Croatia from independence until 2000, came back into power. The HDZ government, headed by Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, was narrowly re-elected in a November 2007 ballot, and the new government assumed office on January 12, 2008. The Sanader government's priorities included membership for Croatia in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Croatia joined NATO in April 2009. In July 2009, Prime Minister Sanader unexpectedly resigned, and Deputy Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor took over as Croatia’s first female Prime Minister. Since that time, Prime Minister Kosor has focused on tackling corruption at home, while pushing to overcome the last remaining hurdles to Croatia’s EU accession. In January 2010, Ivo Josipovic won the final round of presidential elections to replace two-term President Stjepan Mesic. In December 2010, former Prime Minister Sanader fled the country in the face of a corruption investigation and was arrested in Austria, where he is being held in detention pending a separate investigation by Austrian authorities and possible extradition to Croatia.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The Croatian Parliament, also known as the Sabor, became a unicameral body after its upper house (Chamber of Counties) was eliminated by constitutional amendment in March 2001. The remaining body, the Chamber of Representatives, consists of 153 members who serve 4-year terms elected by direct vote. The Sabor includes 140 members from 10 geographic districts within Croatia (each district holds 14 seats), as well as eight seats guaranteed to representatives of national minorities (three for the Serb minority, and five for other smaller groups), and seats for Croatians abroad without fixed residence in Croatia, the large majority of whom reside in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of the November 2007 parliamentary elections, the diaspora representatives held five Sabor seats. Following changes to the constitution in 2010, diaspora representatives would be guaranteed three seats in the Sabor. The Sabor meets twice a year--from January 15 to July 15 and from September 15 to December 15.

The powers of the legislature include enactment and amendment of the constitution, passage of laws, adoption of the state budget, declarations of war and peace, alteration of the boundaries of the republic, and carrying out elections and appointments to office.

Following the death of President Tudjman, the powers of the presidency were curtailed and greater responsibility was vested in Parliament. The president is the head of state and is elected by direct popular vote for a term of 5 years. The president is limited to serving no more than two terms. In addition to being the commander in chief, the president nominates the prime minister-designate based on election results.

The prime minister, who is nominated by the president, assumes office following a parliamentary vote of confidence in the new government. The prime minister and government are responsible for proposing legislation and a budget, executing the laws, and guiding the foreign and internal policies of the republic. The HDZ-led government that assumed office in January 2008 represented a coalition agreement between the HDZ (66 seats), the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) (6 seats), the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS) (3 seats), and other minority representatives. The Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), which had two seats in the Sabor, decided to leave the coalition in June 2010 but the two HSLS deputies split with their party and reached an agreement to cooperate with the ruling coalition. The lone representative of the Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU) previously left the coalition government in July 2009. The current government has, in addition to Prime Minister Kosor, 18 ministers, which includes six deputy prime ministers. Minor coalition partners hold three cabinet seats: tourism and two deputy prime minister seats, including one responsible for regional development and returns held by a representative of the Croatian Serb SDSS party. This is the highest-ranking government position held by a Croatian Serb since Croatia's independence in 1991.

Croatia has a three-tiered judicial system, consisting of the Supreme Court, county courts, and municipal courts. Croatia's Supreme Court is the highest court in the republic. The Supreme Court assures the uniform application of laws. Members of the high court are appointed by the National Judicial Council, a body of 11 members, and justices on the Supreme Court are appointed for life. The court's hearings are generally open to the public.

The Constitutional Court is a body of 13 judges appointed by Parliament for an 8-year term. The Constitutional Court works to assure the conformity of all laws to the constitution.

Principal Government Officials
President--Ivo Josipovic
Prime Minister--Jadranka Kosor (HDZ)
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development--Petar Cobankovic (HDZ)
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Health and Social Welfare--Darko Milinovic (HDZ)
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration--Gordan Jandrokovic (HDZ)
Deputy Prime Minister (for investment)--Domagoj Ivan Milosevic
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Regional Development, Forestry and Water Management--Bozidar Pankretic (HSS)
Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues and Human Rights--Slobodan Uzelac (SDSS)
Minister of Defense--Davor Bozinovic (no party affiliation)

Croatia maintains an embassy in the United States at 2343 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20008-2853, tel. (202) 588-5899, fax: (202) 588-8936. Consulates General of the Republic of Croatia are located in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Honorary consulates are located in St. Paul, New Orleans, Seattle, Pittsburgh, and Kansas City.

ECONOMY
Following World War II, rapid industrialization and diversification occurred within Croatia. Decentralization came in 1965, allowing growth of certain sectors, particularly the tourist industry. Profits from Croatian industry were used to develop poorer regions in the former Yugoslavia. This, coupled with austerity programs and hyperinflation in the 1980s, contributed to discontent in Croatia.

Privatization and the drive toward a market economy had barely begun under the new Croatian Government when war broke out in 1991. As a result of the war, the economic infrastructure sustained massive damage, particularly the revenue-rich tourism industry. From 1989 to 1993, GDP fell 40.5%. With the end of the war in 1995, tourism and Croatia's economy recovered moderately. However, corruption, cronyism, and a general lack of transparency stymied meaningful economic reform, as well as much-needed foreign investment.

Croatia's economy grew strongly in the 2000s, stimulated by a credit boom led by newly privatized and foreign-capitalized banks, some capital investment (most importantly road construction), further growth in tourism, and gains by small- and medium-sized private enterprises. One downside to these steadily improving trends was a strong growth in Croatia’s stock of foreign debt, which by 2010 had reached almost 100% of GDP.

Despite the gains, substantial challenges remain. Croatia’s economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis, and has recovered more slowly than many of its neighbors. The country experienced a drop from 2.4% GDP growth in 2008 to a 5.8% contraction in 2009. GDP fell a further 1.2% in 2010 (about $62.25 billion), while estimates for growth in 2011 range from around 1.3% to 1.8%. Official unemployment is 17.6%. Croatia's external imbalances and high foreign debt present long-term risks to its economic well-being, as continued access to foreign credit may be severely limited. An inefficient bureaucracy, relatively high labor costs, and lack of transparency in taxes, fees, and the public tender process have all led to a generally unfavorable climate for foreign investment. To address this, the government has begun to eliminate certain non-tax fees on business, consolidate overlapping government agencies, and identify administrative barriers to foreign investment, but progress is slow. Improvements to Croatia’s judicial system are not yet fully achieved, another hindrance to economic development.

The privatization process, begun in the 1990s, has been unsteady, largely as a result of public mistrust engendered when many state-owned companies were sold to the politically well-connected at below-market prices. The government sold three large metals plants in early 2007, but the Croatian state still controls a significant part of the economy, with government spending accounting for as much as 50% of GDP. Some large, state-owned industries continue to rely on government subsidies, crowding out investment in education and technology needed to ensure the economy's long-term competitiveness. The government is trying to privatize several state-owned shipyards as part of its European Union accession bid. As of April 2011, there were signs of progress in this area, but the process has not yet been finalized.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Croatia has made great strides on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration. NATO and EU membership have been strategic goals, as Croatia seeks to forge stronger ties with the west. Croatia received an invitation to join NATO at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania in April 2008; it became a full member of the Alliance in April 2009. Croatia is now in the final stage of its EU accession negotiations, which it hopes to conclude by June 2011,

One of the EU accession requirements is for Croatia to demonstrate full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). One of the central cases associated with this requirement involves former General Ante Gotovina, currently standing trial for war crimes in The Hague. A fugitive from justice since 2002, Gotovina was arrested in December 2005 by Spanish authorities in the Canary Islands, partially as a result of intelligence information provided by the Croatian Government. More recently, Croatia’s ICTY cooperation has been assessed, in part, based on its ability to track down missing documents requested by the ICTY for use in the prosecution of Gotovina. The ICTY is scheduled to announce a verdict in the case, which includes two other Croatian generals, on April 15, 2011.

In May 2003, the United States joined Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia to sign the Adriatic Charter, in which the three NATO aspirants pledged their commitment to NATO values and their cooperative efforts to further their collective NATO aspirations. In 2008, the Adriatic Charter expanded to include two new countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

Croatia has been a member of the United Nations since 1992, and contributes troops to a number of UN operations, including those in the Golan Heights, Cyprus, Sudan, Liberia, Lebanon, Western Sahara, and Kashmir. In December 2009, Croatia ended a 2-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Croatia also contributes troops to support NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and since 2003 has participated in the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Croatian Parliament in December 2010 approved raising the ceiling on the number of soldiers in Afghanistan to 350. Croatia is a member of the World Trade Organization and the Central European Free Trade Organization.

Croatia is also active in the region, particularly in supporting its neighbors' Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Croatia has made progress on dealing with a number of post-conflict issues. Some of these, such as the status of refugees displaced during the 1991-95 war and determining the fate of missing persons from the war, remain key issues influencing Croatia’s relations with its neighbors.

U.S.-CROATIAN RELATIONS
Bilateral relations between the U.S. and Croatia are very strong. The United States opened its Embassy in Zagreb in 1992. U.S. engagement in Croatia is aimed at fostering a democratic, secure, and market-oriented society that will be a strong partner in Euro-Atlantic institutions. The U.S. also welcomes Croatia’s desire to play a positive and stabilizing role in the region.

In an effort to promote regional stability through refugee returns, the United States has given more than $27 million since 1998 in humanitarian demining assistance. Croatia hopes to remove an estimated 90,000 remaining mines by 2019. The United States has also provided additional financial assistance to Croatia through the Southeastern European Economic Development Program (SEED) to facilitate democratization and restructuring of Croatia's financial sector, largely through programs managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Most SEED funding and USAID programs in Croatia concluded in 2008. USAID closed its offices in Croatia in 2008.

The Department of Defense has a robust military-to-military relationship with Croatia. The U.S. provides military assistance to Croatia in the form of training, equipment, equipment loans, and education in U.S. military schools. Croatia also has a state partnership with the Minnesota National Guard, and participates in a joint training team with U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--James Foley
Deputy Chief of Mission--Hoyt Yee
Political/Economic Officer--Michael Sears
Public Affairs Officer--Robert Post
Consular Officer--Kent Healy
Commercial Officer--Pamela Ward
Management Officer--John Madden

The U.S. Embassy in Croatia is located in Zagreb at Ul. Thomasa Jeffersona 2, 10010 Zagreb; telephone: [385] (1) 661-2200.

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April 6, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Background Note: Zimbabwe

Official Name: Republic of Zimbabwe

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 390,580 sq. km. (150,760 sq. mi.), slightly larger than Montana.
Cities: Capital--Harare (pronounced Ha-RAR-e), pop. 1.5 million. Other towns--Bulawayo, Chitungwiza, Mutare, Gweru, Kwekwe, Masvingo, Marondera.
Terrain: Desert and savanna.
Climate: Mostly subtropical.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Zimbabwean (sing.), Zimbabweans (pl.).
Population: 11.39 million.
Annual population growth rate (2005-2010 UN est.): 0.3%. (Note: the population growth rate is depressed by an HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate estimated to be 14.3% and a high level of emigration.)
Ethnic groups: Shona 71%, Ndebele 16%, other African 11%, white 1%, mixed and Asian 1%.
Religions: Christianity 75%, offshoot Christian sects, animist, and Muslim.
Languages: English (official), Shona, Ndebele.
Education: Attendance--mandatory for primary level. Adult literacy--91% (2008 UNICEF est.).
Health: Infant mortality rate--62/1,000 (2008 est.). Life expectancy--44 years (2008 UNICEF est.).

Government
Type: Parliamentary.
Constitution: December 21, 1979.
Independence: April 18, 1980.
Branches: Executive--President (head of state and head of government), Prime Minister (co-head of government), Cabinet. Legislative--bicameral (House of Assembly and Senate). Judicial--Supreme Court, High Court, Magistrates Courts, Labor Court, customary courts.
Administrative subdivisions: Town Councils and District Councils.
Main political parties: Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF); Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai (MDC-T); Movement for Democratic Change - Mutambara (MDC-M); Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).

Economy
GDP (2010 IMF est.): U.S. $5.6 billion.
Real GDP growth rate (2010 IMF est.): 2.2%.
GDP per capita (2010 IMF est., U.S. dollars, current prices): $475.
Avg. inflation rate (2010 IMF estimate): 4.7%.
Natural resources: Deposits of more than 40 minerals including diamonds, ferrochrome, gold, silver, platinum, copper, asbestos, nickel, graphite, coal, lithium, palladium, vermiculite; 19 million hectares of forest (2000).
Agriculture (19% of GDP): Types of crops and livestock--corn, cotton, tobacco, wheat, coffee, tea, sugarcane, peanuts, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs.
Industry (24% of GDP): Manufacturing, public administration, commerce, mining, transport and communication.
Trade (2010): U.S. exports--U.S. $67.5 million. U.S. imports--U.S. $58.9 million. Partners (2009 est.)--Democratic Republic of the Congo 14.82%, South Africa 13.39%, Botswana 13.23%, China 7.82%, Zambia 7.3%, Netherlands 5.39%, U.K. 4.93%. Total imports (2010)--U.S. $2.87 billion: most of these imports were food, machinery, fertilizers, and general manufactured products. Major suppliers--South Africa 60%, China 4%, Botswana 4%.

PEOPLE AND HISTORY
Primarily of the Bantu group of south and central Africa, the black Zimbabweans are divided into two major language groups, which are subdivided into several ethnic groups. The Mashona (Shona speakers), who constitute about 75% of the population, have lived in the area the longest and are the majority language group. The Matabele (Sindebele speakers), representing about 20% of the population and centered in the southwest around Bulawayo, arrived within the last 150 years. An offshoot of the South African Zulu group, they maintained control over the Mashona until the white occupation of Rhodesia in 1890.

More than half of white Zimbabweans, primarily of English origin, arrived in Zimbabwe after World War II. Afrikaners from South Africa and other European minorities, including Portuguese from Mozambique, also are present. Until the mid-1970s, there were about 1,000 white immigrants per year, but from 1976 to 1985 a steady emigration resulted in a loss of more than 150,000, leaving about 100,000 in 1992. Renewed white emigration in the late 1990s and early 2000s reduced the white population to less than 50,000. English, the official language, is spoken by the white population and understood, if not always used, by more than half of the black population.

Zimbabwe boasts one of Africa's highest literacy rates. Primary and secondary schools were segregated until 1979. In the first decade after independence in 1980, the educational system was systematically enlarged by the Zimbabwean Government, which was committed to providing free public education to all citizens on an equal basis. Though in the late 1970s only 50% of the black children (5-19 years old) were listed officially as attending rural schools, today most children attend primary school despite the fact that school fees are now charged for all schools at all levels. Primary through post-secondary enrollment has expanded from 1 million to about 2.9 million since independence. There is an impressive network of independent private schools and church-run mission schools that have significantly more resources and thus significantly higher school fees than government-run schools. Higher education is offered at seven state-run universities, the most prominent being the University of Zimbabwe in Harare and the National University of Science and Technology in Bulawayo, and three private church-run universities, Africa University (Methodist), Catholic University, and Solusi University (Seventh Day Adventist). There is also a large network of teacher-training, nursing, and polytechnic colleges.

Early History
Archaeologists have found Stone-Age implements and pebble tools in several areas of Zimbabwe, a suggestion of human habitation for many centuries, and the ruins of stone buildings provide evidence of early civilization. The most impressive of these sites is the "Great Zimbabwe" ruins, after which the country is named, located near Masvingo. Evidence suggests that these stone structures were built between the 9th and 13th centuries A.D. by indigenous Africans who had established trading contacts with commercial centers on Africa's southeastern coast.

In the 16th century, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to attempt colonization of south-central Africa, but the hinterland lay virtually untouched by Europeans until the arrival of explorers, missionaries, ivory hunters, and traders some 300 years later. Meanwhile, mass migrations of indigenous peoples took place. Successive waves of more highly developed Bantu peoples from equatorial regions supplanted the original inhabitants and are the ancestors of the region's Africans today.

British Settlement and Administration
In 1888, Cecil Rhodes obtained a concession for mineral rights from local chiefs. Later that year, the area that became Southern and Northern Rhodesia was proclaimed a British sphere of influence. The British South Africa Company was chartered in 1889, and the settlement of Salisbury (now Harare, the capital) was established in 1890. In 1895, the territory was formally named Rhodesia after Cecil Rhodes under the British South Africa Company's administration.

Following the abrogation of the company's charter in 1923, Southern Rhodesia's white settlements were given the choice of being incorporated into the Union of South Africa or becoming a separate entity within the British Empire. The settlers rejected incorporation, and Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed by the United Kingdom that year. Until 1980, Rhodesia was an internally self-governing colony with its own legislature, civil service, armed forces, and police. Although Rhodesia was never administered directly from London, the United Kingdom always retained the right to intervene in the affairs of the colony, particularly in matters affecting Africans.

After 1923, European immigrants concentrated on developing Rhodesia's rich mineral resources and agricultural potential. The settlers' demand for more land led in 1934 to the passage of the first of a series of land apportionment acts that reserved certain areas for Europeans.

In September 1953, Southern Rhodesia was joined in a multiracial Central African Federation with the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in an effort to pool resources and markets. Although the federation flourished economically, the African population, who feared they would not be able to achieve self-government with the federal structure dominated by White Southern Rhodesians, opposed it. The federation was dissolved at the end of 1963 after much crisis and turmoil, and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became the independent states of Zambia and Malawi in 1964.

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)
The European electorate in Rhodesia, however, showed little willingness to accede to African demands for increased political participation and progressively replaced more moderate party leaders. In April 1964, Prime Minister Winston Field, accused of not moving rapidly enough to obtain independence from the United Kingdom, was replaced by his deputy, Ian Smith. Prime Minster Smith led his Rhodesian Front Party to an overwhelming victory in the 1965 elections, winning all 50 of the first roll seats and demoralizing the more moderate European opposition.

Although prepared to grant independence to Rhodesia, the United Kingdom insisted that the authorities at Salisbury first demonstrate their intention to move toward eventual majority rule. Desiring to keep their dominant position, the white Rhodesians refused to give such assurances. On November 11, 1965, after lengthy and unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, Prime Minister Smith issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom.

Post-UDI Events
The British Government considered the UDI unconstitutional and illegal but made clear that it would not use force to oppose it. On November 12, 1965, the United Nations also determined the Rhodesian Government and UDI to be illegal and called on member states to refrain from assisting or recognizing the Smith regime. The British Government imposed sanctions on Rhodesia and requested other nations to do the same.

On December 16, 1966, the UN Security Council, for the first time in history, imposed mandatory economic sanctions on a state. Rhodesia's primary exports including ferrochrome and tobacco, were placed on the selective sanctions list, as were shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles, petroleum, and petroleum products to Rhodesia. On May 29, 1968, the Security Council unanimously voted to broaden the sanctions by imposing an almost total embargo on all trade with, investments in, or transfers of funds to Rhodesia and imposed restrictions on air transport to the territory.

In the early 1970s, informal attempts at settlement were renewed between the United Kingdom and the Rhodesian administration. Following the April 1974 coup in Portugal and the resulting shifts of power in Mozambique and Angola, pressure on the Smith regime to negotiate a peaceful settlement increased. In addition, sporadic antigovernment guerilla activity, which began in the late 1960s, increased dramatically after 1972, causing destruction, economic dislocation, casualties, and a slump in white morale. In 1974, the major African nationalists groups--the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which split away from ZAPU in 1963--were united into the "Patriotic Front" and combined their military forces, at least nominally.

In 1976, because of a combination of embargo-related economic hardships, the pressure of guerilla activity, independence and majority rule in the neighboring former Portuguese territories, and a U.K.-U.S. diplomatic initiative, the Smith government agreed in principle to majority rule and to a meeting in Geneva with black nationalist leaders to negotiate a final settlement of the conflict. Blacks represented at the Geneva meeting included ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, ZANU leader Robert Mugabe, United African National Council (UANC) chairman bishop Abel Muzorewa, and former ZANU leader Rev. Nadabaningi Sithole. The meeting failed to find a basis for agreement because of Smith's inflexibility and the inability of the black leaders to form a common political front.

On September 1, 1977 a detailed Anglo-American plan was put forward with proposals for majority rule, neutrally administered with pre-independence elections, a democratic constitution and the formation of an integrated army. Reactions were mixed, but no party rejected them. In the interim, on March 3, 1978, the Smith administration signed the "internal settlement" agreement in Salisbury with Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau. The agreement provided for qualified majority rule and elections with universal suffrage. Following elections in April 1979, in which his UANC party won a majority, Bishop Muzorewa assumed office on June 1, becoming "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's" first black prime minister. However, the installation of the new black majority government did not end the guerilla conflict that had claimed more than 20,000 lives since 1972.

Shortly after British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's conservative government took power in May 1979, the British began a new round of consultations that culminated in an agreement among the Commonwealth countries as the basis for fresh negotiations among the parties and the British involving a new constitution, free elections, and independence.

The British and the African parties began deliberations on a Rhodesian settlement at Lancaster House in London on September 10, 1979. On December 10, 1979, in preparation for the transition under British authority to officially recognized independence, the "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" reverted de facto to colonial status. On December 12, British Governor Lord Christopher Soames arrived in Salisbury to reassert British authority over the colony. His arrival signaled the end of the Rhodesian rebellion and the "internal settlement," as well as the beginning of Zimbabwe's transition to independence. The United Kingdom lifted all remaining sanctions against Zimbabwe that day. The United States lifted sanctions effective December 16.

On December 21, after 3 months of hard bargaining, the parties signed an agreement at Lancaster House calling for a cease-fire, new elections, a transition period under British rule, and a new constitution implementing majority rule while protecting minority rights. The agreement specified that upon the granting of independence, the country's name would be Zimbabwe. The same day, the UN Security Council endorsed the settlement agreement and formally voted unanimously to call on member nations to remove sanctions.

During the transition period, nine political parties campaigned for the February 27-29 pre-independence elections. The elections were supervised by the British Government and monitored by hundreds of observers, most of whom concluded that, under the prevailing circumstances, the elections were free and fair and reflected the will of the people. Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party won an absolute majority and was asked to form Zimbabwe's first government.

In a series of public statements during the transition period, Prime Minister Mugabe indicated that he was committed to a process of national reconciliation and reconstruction as well as moderate socioeconomic change. His priorities were to integrate the various armed forces, reestablish social services and education in rural areas, and resettle the estimated one million refugees and displaced persons. Mugabe also announced that his government would begin investigating ways of reversing past discriminatory policies in land distribution, education, employment, and wages.

Mugabe stated that Zimbabwe would follow a nonaligned foreign policy and would pursue a pragmatic relationship with South Africa. He noted that while Zimbabwe opposed apartheid and would support democratic change in South Africa, it would not provide bases for anti-South African guerillas.

The British Government formally granted independence to Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980. Most nations recognized Zimbabwe following independence. The United States was the first nation to open an embassy in Salisbury (Harare) on that day. Parliament convened for the first time on May 13, 1980. Zimbabwe became a member of the United Nations on August 25, 1980.

In seeking national reconciliation, Prime Minister Mugabe's first cabinet comprised members of ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU, and independent white members of parliament (MPs) and senators. The government embarked on an ambitious reconstruction and development program and instituted increases in minimum wages. Land redistribution proceeded under four experimental models on land that the government had purchased at market rates from willing sellers.

Zimbabwe Since Independence
Prime Minister Mugabe's policy of reconciliation was generally successful during the country's first 2 years of independence, as the former political and military opponents began to work together. Although additional blacks were hired to fill new places in the civil service, there was no retribution for those whites who had worked for the Smith regime. Smith and many of his associates held seats in the parliament where they participated freely in debates. Likewise, Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe's rival as leader of the nationalist forces, was included in the first cabinet along with several other members of PF-ZAPU.

Splits soon developed, however. In 1981, several MPs from Smith's party left to sit as "independents," signifying that they did not automatically accept his anti-government posture. More importantly, government security officials discovered large caches of arms and ammunition on properties owned by ZAPU, and Nkomo and his followers were accused of plotting to overthrow Mugabe's government. Nkomo and his closest aides were expelled from the cabinet.

As a result of what they perceived as persecution of Nkomo (known as "Father Zimbabwe") and of his party, PF-ZAPU supporters, some of them deserters from the army, began a loosely organized and ill-defined campaign of dissidence against the government. Centering primarily in Matabeleland, home of the Ndebeles who were PF-ZAPU's main followers, this dissidence continued through 1987 and involved attacks on government personnel and installations, armed banditry aimed at disrupting security and economic life in the rural areas, and harassment of ZANU-PF members. Occasionally, some demanded that Nkomo and his colleagues be reinstated in the cabinet. More frequently, however, dissidents called for the return of farms and other properties seized from PF-ZAPU.

Because of the unsettled security situation immediately after independence and the continuing anti-government dissidence, the government kept in force a "state of emergency," which was first declared before UDI. This gave government authorities widespread powers under the "Law and Order Maintenance Act," including the right to detain persons without charge.

In 1983-84, the government declared a curfew in areas of Matabeleland and sent in the army in an attempt to suppress dissidents. Credible reports surfaced of widespread violence and disregard for human rights by the security forces during these operations, and the level of political tension rose in the country as a result. The pacification campaign, known as the "Gukuruhundi," or strong wind, resulted in as many as 20,000 civilian deaths. Nkomo and his lieutenants repeatedly denied any connection with the dissidents and called for an all-party conference to discuss the political problems facing the country. In the 1985 elections, ZANU-PF increased its majority, holding 67 of the 100 seats. ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU agreed to unite in December 1987, and the parties formally merged in December 1989.

In October 1987, in accordance with the Lancaster House Accords, the constitution was amended to end the separate roll for white voters and to replace the whites whose reserved seats had been abolished; among the new members were 15 whites in the Senate and House of Assembly. Elections in March 1990 resulted in another overwhelming victory for Mugabe and his party, which won 117 of the 120 election seats. However, voter turnout was only 54%, and the campaign was not free and fair although the actual balloting was. Not satisfied with a de facto one-party state, Mugabe called on the ZANU-PF Central Committee to support the creation of a de jure one-party state in September 1990 and lost. The state of emergency was lifted in July 1990.

After the remaining restrictions of the Lancaster House agreement expired on April 18, 1990, the government embarked on a campaign of amending the existing constitution. Both the judiciary and human rights advocates fiercely criticized some of the first amendments, which were enacted in April 1991, because they restored corporal and capital punishment and denied recourse to the courts in cases of compulsory purchase of land by the government.

During the 1990s students, trade unionists and workers often demonstrated to express their discontent with the government. Students protested in October 1990 against proposals for an increase in government control of universities and again in May 1991 and May 1992, when they clashed with police. Trade unionists and workers were also vocal critics of the government during this time. In June 1992, police prevented trade unionists from holding anti-government demonstrations. In 1994, there was widespread industrial unrest. In August and September 1996, thousands of civil servants demanding salary increases organized a national strike and in October and November of the same year, nurses and junior doctors went on strike over salary issues. On November 14, 1997, about 50,000 war veterans demanded and received compensation equivalent to about U.S. $1,300 per person for their war service. This immense and unbudgeted expenditure created a huge fiscal deficit. The Zimbabwe dollar lost more than half its value on that day, and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange collapsed. This event marked the beginning of Zimbabwe's ongoing macro-economic crisis.

In part through its control of the media, the huge parastatal sector of the economy, and the security forces, the government managed to keep organized political opposition to a minimum through most of the 1990s. Beginning in 1999, however, Zimbabwe experienced a period of considerable political and economic upheaval. Opposition to President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government had grown, in part due to worsening economic and human rights conditions. The opposition was led by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which was established in September 1999.

The MDC's first opportunity to test opposition to the Mugabe government came in February 2000, when a referendum was held on a draft constitution proposed by the government. Among its elements, the new constitution would have permitted President Mugabe to seek two additional terms in office, granted government officials immunity from prosecution, and authorized government seizure of white-owned land. The referendum was handily defeated. Shortly thereafter, the government, through a loosely organized group of war veterans, sanctioned an aggressive land redistribution program often characterized by forced expulsion of white farmers and violence against both farmers and farm employees.

Parliamentary elections held in June 2000 were marred by localized violence, and claims of electoral irregularities and government intimidation of opposition supporters. Nonetheless, the MDC succeeded in capturing 57 of 120 seats in the National Assembly.

The March 2002 presidential election was preceded by months of intensive violence and intimidation against MDC supporters, and more than 50 people, mostly opposition supporters, were killed. President Mugabe was declared the winner over challenger Morgan Tsvangirai by a 56% to 42% margin. Most international observers condemned the election as seriously flawed--the pre-election environment was neither free nor fair, and the election itself was marred by significant fraud and rigging--but regional opinions were mixed. Soon after the election, the MDC filed a petition challenging Mugabe's victory, citing flaws in electoral laws, electoral irregularities and pre-election violence. As of the end of 2004, the case had not yet been decided.

As a result of the 2002 election, the United States, the EU, and other European countries imposed travel restrictions against senior Zimbabwean officials and embargoed the sale of arms to Zimbabwe. The U.S. and the EU also froze the financial assets of selected ruling party officials. The Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe from council meetings for 1 year after its election observer team found the election neither free nor fair. At the mid-term suspension review in March 2003, the three-country committee charged with deciding Zimbabwe's fate decided to continue the suspension until the next Commonwealth meeting in December 2003. At this meeting, despite vigorous campaigning by South Africa, Zimbabwe was not invited to attend the meeting and the Commonwealth decided to continue with the suspension. Immediately after this, Mugabe withdrew Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth.

Following the 2002 presidential election, the political climate remained tense and intensely polarized. Violence escalated in the run up to rural council elections in September 2002 and various parliamentary by-elections that year. Parliamentary by-elections in Kuwadzana, Highfield, Zengeza, and Lupane in 2003 were marred by widespread intimidation and beatings. The government also passed legislation that curtailed free speech, free press, and rights of assembly. In March 2003, MDC leaders Morgan Tsvangirai, Welshman Ncube, and Renson Gasela went on trial for treason. Charges against Ncube and Gasela were subsequently dropped and in October 2004 Tsvangirai was found not guilty. In August 2005, the government dropped a second charge of treason against Tsvangirai.

The government subscribed to the electoral principles of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 2004 but failed to implement key elements of the principles in advance of the 2005 parliamentary elections. The campaign period and election day were largely non-violent, but the elections were not free and fair. The election process was marred by repressive legislation that limits freedom of speech and assembly; millions of expatriate Zimbabweans were not permitted to vote; the government used food distributions to influence an increasingly hungry population; an astonishingly high 10% (as high as 30% in some areas) of would-be voters were turned away; and discrepancies in officially announced results and the government's refusal to release key voting data led to questions about the possibility of fraud.

In May 2005, the government began Operation Murambatsvina (also known as Operation Restore Order), ostensibly to rid urban areas of illegal structures, illegal business enterprises, and criminal activities. A UN Special Envoy sent to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of operation estimated that some 700,000 people nationwide lost their homes, their source of livelihood, or both. Families and traders, especially at the beginning of the operation, were often given no notice before police destroyed their homes and businesses. Others were able to salvage some possessions and building materials but often had nowhere to go, despite the government's statement that people should be returning to their rural homes. Thousands of families were left unprotected in the open in the middle of Zimbabwe's winter. The government interfered with non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts to provide emergency assistance to the displaced in many instances. Some families were removed to transit camps, where they had no shelter or cooking facilities and minimal food, supplies, and sanitary facilities. The operation continued into July 2005, when the government began a program to provide housing for the newly displaced. As of September 2007, housing construction fell far short of demand, and there were reports that beneficiaries were mostly civil servants and ruling party loyalists, not those displaced. The government campaign of forced evictions continued in 2006, 2007, and 2008 albeit on a lesser scale.

In April 2007, South African President Thabo Mbeki, at the behest of SADC and the international community, was designated to serve as mediator between Robert Mugabe's government and the MDC. The mediation aimed to define a mutually agreed upon election date and procedures to rewrite the constitution. While the mediations were ongoing, Mugabe announced that "harmonized" elections would be held on March 29, 2008, despite Morgan Tsvangirai's protests that the mediation was still underway and that there was not enough time to campaign. As in 2005, the pre-election period was not free and fair. The environment was characterized by violence and a media environment that heavily favored Mugabe. Although Tsvangirai was allowed to campaign, Zimbabwean police did not grant permission to MDC to hold all of its rallies, and some MDC activists were intimidated and beaten in the weeks before the election. Foreign journalists were not granted permission to cover the story from Zimbabwe. Election day was largely peaceful, with international observers from the African Union, SADC, and the Pan African Parliament present; observers from Western nations, including the United States, were not invited.

The "harmonized" elections for the presidency, House of Assembly, Senate, and local government demonstrated a significant shift in the political environment. MDC secured a majority in the parliament, giving the MDC control of the legislative branch. In the presidential race, MDC's Tsvangirai secured 47.9%, while Mugabe came in second with 43.2%. Simba Makoni, who left Mugabe's ZANU-PF party in February 2008 to run as an independent, received 8.3%. The results in the presidential race were not released until May 2, 2008. This lengthy delay called into question the credibility and independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). Initially the MDC challenged the results, asserting that Tsvangirai had secured the majority of votes needed to win the presidency. Because no candidate secured the 50%-plus-one needed, a runoff was set for June 27, 2008.

As of early June 2008, over 50 Zimbabweans had been killed, at least 2,000 injured, and over 30,000 displaced as a result of widespread post-election violence, including state-sponsored violence. Due to these and other events, and out of concern for the lives of his MDC supporters, Tsvangirai announced in late June that he would not contest the runoff election. Voters went to the polls on June 27, and Mugabe was inaugurated for a new term as president on June 29. By the end of 2008, over 193 citizens had been killed in political violence that targeted members of the opposition party. The MDC claimed that approximately 200 other members and supporters were missing and presumed dead at year's end. NGOs also estimated security forces killed between 200 and 300 citizens in the Chiadzwa diamond fields in Manicaland Province.

Following domestic and international protests of Mugabe’s inauguration, ZANU-PF and MDC resumed negotiations, with Mbeki as lead SADC mediator. On July 21, 2008 the leaders of the two MDC factions and ZANU-PF signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which set terms for the forthcoming dialogue. The MOU, unlike the agenda of the 8-month-long SADC negotiations that ended in failure in January 2008, envisaged that the parties would form an inclusive government. On September 15, Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and Mutambara signed a Global Political Agreement (GPA) to establish an “inclusive” or transitional government. Under the agreement, Mugabe would retain the presidency and Tsvangirai would become prime minister. Each would have two deputies. Ministries would be divided among the three political parties.

Between late October and mid-December 2008, approximately 32 MDC and civil society members were abducted by suspected state agents. On December 22, some of these abductees surfaced in jails and were accused of various plots including mounting an armed insurgency from Botswana and committing bombings of police stations in preceding months. In subsequent court hearings and affidavits, these people have testified they were seriously beaten and some were tortured by state security agents in order to extract confessions to these alleged crimes. These events led many to question Mugabe’s sincerity in negotiations. In December 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer called on Mugabe to step down. Prominent Africans, including South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, also called on Mugabe to step down.

After 5 months of negotiations to resolve issues left unaddressed by the September 15, 2008 GPA, the MDC agreed to enter into government alongside ZANU-PF. Many key issues remained unresolved such as the appointment of senior government officials, the release of political detainees, and the creation of a National Security Council to curtail the authorities of the security chiefs. Despite these issues, Constitutional Amendment 19 was passed by parliament on February 5, 2009, paving the way for the creation of a transitional government. On February 11, MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn in as Prime Minister, alongside Deputy Prime Ministers Arthur Mutambara and Thokozani Khupe. During the following week, 41 ministers and 20 deputy ministers were sworn into office.

Since February 2009, the new government has suffered fits and starts. While dollarization spurred economic recovery, political progress toward GPA implementation stalled. By late 2010 and early 2011, speculation about early presidential elections spurred renewed incidents of political violence and arbitrary arrests of political and civil society activists. In light of stalled implementation of the GPA, South African President Jacob Zuma is leading efforts on behalf of SADC to establish an electoral roadmap with tangible benchmarks for progress that the parties would agree to. In January 2011, the MDC-M Party Congress elected Welshman Ncube to replace Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara as its party president; however, Mutambara refused to step down from the post of Deputy Prime Minister. In March 2011, the Supreme Court nullified the 2008 election of MDC-T’s Lovemore Moyo as the Speaker of Parliament, granting an appeal by ZANU-PF politburo member and former Information Minister Jonathon Moyo. At the time of the ruling, five other MDC-T MPs were in police custody on various charges as were numerous civil society activists. On March 29, 2011, Moyo was re-elected as Speaker of Parliament by a vote of 105-93. On the morning of the election, the MDC-T’s chief whip claimed at a press conference that ZANU-PF had attempted to bribe five MDC-T MPs with $5,000 each, and the MPs stepped forward to return the money.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Since independence, Zimbabwe has enunciated and follows a policy of "active nonalignment." In practice, this has meant that Zimbabwe usually adhered to positions established by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union; or, until it withdrew in 2003, the Commonwealth. Zimbabwe took a particular interest in the search for independence for Namibia (South-West Africa) from South Africa. In addition, as chairman of the front-line states in southern Africa, Zimbabwe spoke out vigorously against the policies of apartheid in South African and frequently called for the imposition of economic sanctions against Pretoria. In November 1982, Zimbabwe was chosen by the OAU to hold one of the non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council for the following 2 years, which brought it onto the center stage of world events and gave it much-needed experience in international affairs. In 1986, Zimbabwe was the site of the NAM summit meeting; Prime Minister Mugabe became chairman of that organization, giving both Mugabe and Zimbabwe added international visibility and responsibility.

Zimbabwe maintains embassies in the Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, China, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, United Kingdom, the United States, Serbia, Zambia, Indonesia, Brazil, and Libya. Fifty-three countries are represented in Harare, as are several international organizations including UN institutions, the European Union, and the World Bank. Zimbabwe is a member of many international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF); African Development Bank; The World Trade Organization; Southern African Development Community (SADC); Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA); African Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP, in association with the EU); Group of 77 (G-77); Group of 15 (G-15); NAM; African Union (AU); Customs Cooperation Council (CCC); and the World Federation of Trade Unions. Shortly after the March 2002 presidential election, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe from leadership councils for 1 year after the Commonwealth's election observer team found the conduct of the election seriously flawed. After this suspension was upheld in December 2003, Mugabe withdrew Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. The IMF closed its Zimbabwe office in October 2004.

Historically, Zimbabwe's closest links have been with the U.K.; however, this relationship became very strained when violent land invasions of white-owned farms began in 2000. The government has demonized Britain in the press, blaming the country for Zimbabwe's problems, and claiming that Britain reneged on promises made at Lancaster House to provide money for land reform. As with the U.S., thousands of Zimbabweans studied in the U.K., and private links remain close; however, official relations are strained.

Other West European countries have ties with Zimbabwe. The Scandinavian countries share certain philosophical affinities and have provided much assistance, as have France, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Portugal and Greece maintain links partly because of the sizable Portuguese and Greek communities in the country. Similar historical ties have led to the establishment of relations with India and Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, with Bangladesh. The government's "Look East" policy has led to closer diplomatic relations with East Asian countries such as Malaysia and China.

Zimbabwe maintains diplomatic relations with virtually every African country, although some ties are closer than others. African nations with embassies in Harare are Algeria, Angola, Botswana, D.R.C., Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Zimbabwe developed and maintains close ties with a number of revolutionary states and organizations. Among these are the People's Republic of China, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

GOVERNMENT
According to Zimbabwe's constitution, the president is head of state and head of government, and is elected by popular majority vote. Constitutional Amendment 19 requires that the president consult with the prime minister on many key issues of state, including senior appointments. Parliament is bicameral and sits for up to a 5-year term. On October 1, 2007 Constitutional Amendment 18, which provides for significant changes in the country's electoral dispensation, went into effect. The amendment set out the framework to harmonize presidential and parliamentary elections, to reduce the presidential term of office from 6 years to 5, to increase the number of seats in the House of Assembly and in the Senate, to empower parliament to serve as an electoral college should the office of president become vacant for any reason, and to empower the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to delimit parliamentary and local constituencies. The 214-member House of Assembly is filled by direct election in 210 constituencies and the appointments of 4 other MPs. Sixty of the 100 Senators are directly elected by voters. Other Senators include 10 provincial governors, 5 others that are appointed by the president, 7 new appointments created by Constitutional Amendment 19, 16 chiefs that are elected by other chiefs, plus the president and deputy president of the Council of Chiefs.

The Zimbabwean constitution institutionalizes majority rule and protection of minority rights. The elected government controls senior appointments in the public service, including the military and police, and the independent Public Service Commission is charged with making appointments at lower levels on an equitable basis.

The judiciary is headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court who, like the other justices, is appointed by the president on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. The constitution has a bill of rights containing extensive protection of human rights. The bill of rights could not be amended for the first 10 years of independence except by unanimous vote of the parliament.

Zimbabwe is divided into 10 provinces, each administered by a provincial governor appointed by the president. The provincial administrator and representatives of several service ministries assist the provincial governor.

Principal Government Officials
President--Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF)
Prime Minister--Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T)
Vice Presidents--Joice Mujuru (ZANU-PF); John Nkomo (ZANU-PF)
Deputy Prime Minister--Thokozani Khupe (MDC-T)
Deputy Prime Minister--Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M)
Foreign Minister--Simbarashe Mumbengegwi (ZANU-PF)
Ambassador to the U.S.--Machivenyika Tobias Mapuranga (ZANU-PF)

Zimbabwe maintains an embassy in the United States at 1608 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20009 (tel. 202-332-7100). A Zimbabwean mission to the United Nations is located at 19 East 47th St., New York, NY.

ECONOMY
Zimbabwe's wide range of natural resources makes agriculture and mining the main pillars of the economy. In 2009 agriculture and industry accounted for about 19% and 24% of gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. Zimbabwe has an important percentage of the world's known reserves of metallurgical-grade chromite. Other commercial mineral deposits include coal, platinum, asbestos, copper, nickel, gold, and iron ore. In order to develop these mineral deposits, Zimbabwe relies on foreign investment.

In the early 1970s, the economy experienced a modest boom. Real per capita earnings for both blacks and whites reached record highs, although the disparity in incomes between blacks and whites remained, with blacks earning only about one-tenth as much as whites. After 1975, however, the cumulative effects of sanctions, declining earnings from commodity exports, worsening guerilla conflict, and increasing white emigration undermined Rhodesia’s economy. When Mozambique severed economic ties, the Smith regime was forced to depend on South Africa for access to the outside world. Real GDP declined between 1974 and 1979. An increasing proportion of the national budget (an estimated 30%-40% per year) was allocated to defense, and a large budget deficit raised the public debt burden substantially.

Following the Lancaster House settlement in December 1979, Zimbabwe enjoyed a brisk economic recovery. Zimbabwe inherited one of the strongest and most complete industrial infrastructures in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as rich mineral resources and a strong agricultural base. Real growth for 1980-81 exceeded 20%. However, depressed foreign demand for the country's mineral exports and the onset of a drought cut sharply into the growth rate from 1982 through 1984. In 1985 the economy rebounded strongly due to a 30% jump in agricultural production. But drought and a foreign-exchange crisis triggered another slump in 1986 and 1987. Annual real GDP growth from 1988 through 1990 averaged about 4.5%.

Since the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe’s infrastructure has been deteriorating rapidly, but it remains better than that of most African countries. Political turmoil and poor management of the economy have led to considerable economic hardships. The Government of Zimbabwe's chaotic land reform program, recurrent interference with the judiciary, and imposition of unrealistic price controls and exchange rates caused a sharp drop in investor confidence. Since 1999 the national economy has contracted by as much as 40%. Foreign direct investment has all but stopped. In July 2007, the government had made a desperate attempt to control inflation, which brought persistent shortages fuel, food, and other goods, by forcing firms and supermarkets to reduce prices by half, which resulted in severe shortages of basic commodities. Inflation vaulted over 200 million percent (year on year) in July 2008, according to official estimates; independent economists estimated inflation was at least in the quadrillions of percent. In January 2009, official recognition of dollarization stopped hyperinflation. Investor confidence remains low due to insecurity of land tenure and indigenization laws that require, in theory if not always in practice, 51% of investments to be owned by Zimbabwean citizens.

Agriculture is no longer the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. Large-scale commercial farming has nearly collapsed over the course of the last 9 years under the government's controversial land reforms. Corn is the largest food crop and tobacco had traditionally been the largest export crop, followed by cotton. Tobacco production in 2006, however, slumped to its lowest level--about 50 million kg--since independence, off from a peak in 2000 of 237 million kg, before recovering to 57 million kg in 2009. Gold production, another former key foreign currency source, has also slumped. In 2009, the country produced only 4.2 tons of gold. Poor government management has exacerbated meager corn harvests in years of drought or floods, resulting in significant food shortfalls every year since 2001.

Paved roads link the major urban and industrial centers, but the condition of urban roads and the unpaved rural road network has deteriorated significantly since 1995 for lack of maintenance. Rail lines connect with an extensive central African railroad network, although railway track condition has also worsened in recent years, along with locomotive availability and utilization. The electric power supply has become erratic and blackouts are common due to unreliable or nonexistent coal supplies to the country's large thermal plants and power plant breakdowns. Telephone service is problematic, and new lines are difficult of obtain. Municipal water supply is also erratic.

The largest industries are metal products, food processing, chemicals, textiles, clothing, furniture and plastic goods. Most manufacturers have sharply scaled back operations due to the poor operating climate and foreign exchange shortages. Zimbabwe is not eligible for preferred trade status under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Zimbabwean producers still export lumber products, certain textiles, chrome alloys, and automobile windscreens to the U.S.

Zimbabwe is endowed with rich mineral resources. Exports of gold, diamonds, asbestos, chrome, coal, platinum, nickel, and copper could lead to an economic recovery one day. No commercial deposits of petroleum have been discovered, although the country is richly endowed with coal-bed methane gas that has yet to be exploited.

With international attractions such as Victoria Falls, the Great Zimbabwe stone ruins, Lake Kariba, and extensive wildlife, tourism historically has been a significant segment of the economy and contributor of foreign exchange. The sector has contracted sharply since 1999, however, due to the country's declining international image.

Energy Resources
With considerable hydroelectric power potential and plentiful coal deposits for thermal power station, Zimbabwe is less dependent on oil as an energy source than most other comparably industrialized countries, but it still imports 40% of its electric power needs from surrounding countries--primarily Mozambique. Only about 15% of Zimbabwe's total energy consumption is accounted for by oil, all of which is imported. Zimbabwe imports about 1.2 billion liters of oil per year. Zimbabwe also has substantial coal reserves that are utilized for power generation, and coal-bed methane deposits recently discovered in Matabeleland province are greater than any known natural gas field in Southern or Eastern Africa. In recent years, poor economic management and low foreign currency reserves have led to serious fuel shortages.

DEFENSE
At independence, then-Prime Minister Mugabe declared integrating Zimbabwe's then three armed forces as one of his government's top priorities. A unified army was created by combining the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). In July 1994, the combined Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) Headquarters was created. Currently the armed forces of Zimbabwe are completely integrated and are composed of an army (ZNA) and an air force (AFZ).

The Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) is under the command of the president, who is the commander-in-chief of the Defense Forces. He is assisted by the Minister of Defense, who is responsible for the administrative and logistical support of the Defense Forces, and the commander of the Defense Forces, who maintains operational control of the Defense Forces. Subordinate to the commander of the Defense Forces are the commander of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the commander of the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ).

The ZNA is authorized 40,000 members but end strength estimates as of January 2009 indicated the ZNA had about 30,000 members serving. The ZNA's operational forces are based in Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo, and Mutare. Operational forces include five infantry brigades, artillery brigade, mechanized brigade, field artillery regiment, engineer regiment, air defense regiment, commando regiment, and one airborne battalion. Today, the ZNA is beset by shortages of supplies, including food. It is mostly under-trained and its equipment is aged, not particularly reliable, and largely immobile.

The AFZ is authorized 5,000 members, but only 4,000 were on active duty as of January 2009. It is estimated that half of Zimbabwe's aircraft are mission capable.

The Zimbabwe Republic Police numbers 25,000. The force is organized by province, and is comprised of uniformed national police, the Criminal Investigation Department, and traffic police. It also includes specialized support units including the (paramilitary) Police Support Unit and riot police and a Police Internal Security and Intelligence unit. The police commissioner-general exercises overall command of the force.

The U.S. Congress terminated support for military cooperation programs in 2001. Presently, the U.S. has no military-to-military cooperation with Zimbabwe other than through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program.

U.S.-ZIMBABWEAN RELATIONS
After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, the United States recalled its Consul General from Salisbury, closed the U.S. Information Service (USIS) library, and withdrew its Agency for International Development (USAID) and trade promotion officials. After 1965, the small remaining American consular staff continued to operate under authority of exequaturs issued by Queen Elizabeth II. Following declaration of a republic, the United States closed its Consulate General on March 17, 1970.

In 1971, despite Administration opposition, the U.S. Congress passed legislation permitting the United States to import strategic materials, such as chrome, from Rhodesia. The legislation, which took effect January 1, 1972, was of little real economic benefit to the Rhodesian economy, and the United States continued to support the balance of the sanctions program. After the legislation was repealed in March 1977, the United States once again enforced all sanctions.

The United States supported the United Nations and the United Kingdom consistently in their efforts to influence Rhodesian authorities to accept the principles of majority rule. Beginning in 1976, the United States began to take a more active role in the search for a settlement in cooperation with the British. The Anglo-American proposals of late 1977, aimed at bringing a negotiated end to the dispute, lent the weight of the United States to the search for a peaceful settlement and were a counterpart to the Soviet-Cuban use of military power to increase their influence in southern Africa. The United States supported British efforts to bring about and implement the settlement signed at Lancaster House on December 21, 1979 and extended official diplomatic recognition to the new government immediately after independence. A resident Embassy was established in Harare on Zimbabwe's Independence Day, April 18, 1980. The first U.S. Ambassador arrived and presented his credentials in June 1980. Until the arrival in 1983 of a resident Ambassador in Washington, Zimbabwe's relations with the U.S. were handled by its Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in New York.

At the Zimbabwe conference on reconstruction and development (ZIMCORD) in March 1981, the United States pledged $225 million over a 3-year period toward the government's goals of postwar reconstruction, distribution and development of land, and the development of skilled manpower. By the end of FY 1986, the United States had contributed $380 million, the majority in grants, with some loans and loan guarantees. However, in July 1986, the U.S. Government decided to discontinue future bilateral aid to Zimbabwe as a result of a continuing pattern of uncivil and undiplomatic statements and actions by the Government of Zimbabwe in the United Nations and elsewhere. Aid programs previously agreed upon were not affected by the decision, nor were regional development programs that might benefit Zimbabwe. Full programming was restored in 1988.

USAID assistance to Zimbabwe since 2002 has focused on family planning, HIV/AIDS prevention, democracy and governance programs, emergency food aid, and assistance to internally displaced persons. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began a direct assistance program in August 2000. CDC's program consists of prevention of HIV transmission; improved care of persons with HIV/AIDS; surveillance, monitoring, and evaluation of the epidemic; and health sector infrastructure support.

Since 2000, the United States has taken a leading role in condemning the Zimbabwean Government's increasing assault on human rights and the rule of law, and has joined much of the world community in calling for the Government of Zimbabwe to embrace a peaceful democratic evolution. In 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2008, the United States imposed targeted measures on the Government of Zimbabwe, including financial and visa sanctions against selected individuals, a ban on transfers of defense items and services, and a suspension of non-humanitarian government-to-government assistance. Despite strained political relations, the United States continues as a leading provider of humanitarian assistance to the people of Zimbabwe, providing more than $900 million in humanitarian assistance from 2002-2008, most of which was food aid.

Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai visited Washington in June 2009, meeting with President Barack Obama. President Mugabe visited Washington informally in September 1980, and on official working visits in September 1983, July 1991, and in 1995, meeting with Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton respectively. He has also led the Zimbabwean delegation to the UN on several occasions, including the UN General Assembly in 2010. Vice President George H.W. Bush visited Harare in November 1982 on a trip to several African countries.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Charles A. Ray
Deputy Chief of Mission--David Abell
USAID Mission Director--Karen Freeman
Management Counselor--Don Curtis
Political/Economic Chief--Michael Gonzales
Public Affairs Officer--Sharon Hudson-Dean
Consular Chief--Jim Jimenez
Defense Attache--LTC Patrick Anderson

Offices of the U.S. Mission
U.S. Embassy (Chancery)
172 Herbert Chitepo Avenue, Harare
Tel: 263-4-250-593
Fax: 263-4-796-488

U.S. Agency for International Development
1 Pascoe Avenue Belgravia, Harare
Tel: 263-4-252-401
Fax: 263-4-252-478

Public Affairs Section
7th Floor, Gold Bridge
Eastgate, Harare
Tel: 263-4-758-800

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April 8, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Background Note: Sudan

Official Name: Republic of the Sudan

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 2.5 million sq. km. (967,500 sq. mi.); the largest country in Africa and almost the size of continental U.S. east of the Mississippi River.
Cities: Capital--Khartoum (pop. 1.4 million). Other cities--Omdurman (2.1 million), Port Sudan (pop. 450,000), Kassala, Kosti, Juba (capital of southern region).
Land boundaries: Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda.
Terrain: Generally flat with mountains in east and west. Khartoum is situated at the confluence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers. The southern regions are inundated during the annual floods of the Nile River system (the Suud or swamps).
Climate: Desert and savanna in the north and central regions and tropical in the south.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective (sing. and pl.)--Sudanese.
Population (July 2009 est.): 41,087,825; 43% urban.
Annual population growth rate (2009 est.): 2.143%.
Ethnic groups: Arab/Muslim north and black African/Christian and animist south.
Religions: Islam (official), indigenous beliefs (southern Sudan), Christianity.
Languages: Arabic (official), English (official), tribal languages.
Education: Years compulsory--8. Attendance--35%-40%. Literacy--61.1%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--82.43/1,000. Life expectancy--51.42 yrs.
Work force: Agriculture--80%; industry and commerce--7%; government--13%.

Government
Independence: January 1, 1956.
Type: Provisional Government established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 that provides for power sharing pending national elections. The national elections took place from April 11-15, 2010.
Constitution: The Interim National Constitution was adopted on July 6, 2005. It was drafted by the National Constitutional Review Commission, as mandated by the January 2005 CPA. The Government of Southern Sudan also has a constitution adopted in December 2005; it was certified by the Ministry of Justice to be in conformity with the Interim National Constitution and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Branches: Executive--executive authority is held by the president, who also is the prime minister, head of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces; effective July 9, 2005, the executive branch includes a first vice president and a vice president. As stipulated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Interim National Constitution, the first vice president position is held by the president of Southern Sudan, assuming the president is from the North. Legislative--National Legislature. The National Assembly, the lower house, has 450 elected members; an additional 46 seats will be appointed under a political agreement between the two CPA parties to resolve disputes over the accuracy of districting based on the May 2008 census. There is also an upper house, the Council of States, which is composed of two representatives from each of the nation's 25 states, and two observers from the Abyei Area. Judicial--High Court, Minister of Justice, Attorney General, civil and special tribunals.
Administrative subdivisions: Twenty-five states, most with an elected governor, along with a state cabinet and elected state legislative assembly.
Political parties: Currently there are many political parties in both the nation's north and south. Seventy-two parties registered to take part in the April 2010 elections. All political parties were banned following the June 30, 1989 military coup. Political associations, taking the place of parties, were authorized in 2000. Some parties are in self-imposed exile. The principal national parties are the National Congress Party (NCP), which attracts mainly northern support, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a southern Sudan-based party. These two parties are signatories to the CPA.
Central government budget (2007 est.): $9.201 billion.
Defense (2005 est.): 3% of GDP.

Economy
GDP (2009 est.): $92.81 billion
GDP annual growth rate (2009 est.): 3.8%.
Per capita income GDP (2009 est.): $2,300.
Avg. annual inflation rate (2009 est.): 12.3%.
Natural resources: Modest reserves of oil, natural gas, gold, iron ore, copper, and other industrial metals.
Agriculture: Products--cotton, peanuts, sorghum, sesame seeds, gum arabic, sugarcane, millet, livestock.
Industry: Types--motor vehicle assembly, cement, cotton, edible oils and sugar refining.
Trade: Exports (2009 est.)--$8.464 billion f.o.b.: crude oil and petroleum products, cotton, gold, sorghum, peanuts, gum arabic, sugar, meat, hides, live animals, and sesame seeds. Major markets China, Japan, Indonesia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, South Korea. Imports (2009 est.)--$6.823 billion f.o.b.: oil and petroleum products, oil pipeline, pumping and refining equipment, chemical products and equipment, wheat and wheat flour, transport equipment, foodstuffs, tea, agricultural inputs and machinery, industrial inputs and manufactured goods. Major suppliers--European Union, China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and India.
Fiscal year: January 1-December 31.

PEOPLE
Sudan’s population is one of the most diverse on the African continent. Within two distinct major cultures--Arab and black African--there are hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions and language groups, which make effective collaboration among them a major political challenge.

The northern states cover most of the Sudan and include most of the urban centers. Most of the 30 million Sudanese who live in this region are Arabic-speaking Muslims, though the majority also uses a non-Arabic mother tongue--e.g., Nubian, Beja, Fur, Nuban, Ingessana, etc. Among these are several distinct tribal groups: the Kababish of northern Kordofan, a camel-raising people; the Ja’alin and Shaigiyya groups of settled tribes along the rivers; the semi-nomadic Baggara of Kordofan and Darfur; the Hamitic Beja in the Red Sea area and Nubians of the northern Nile areas, some of whom have been resettled on the Atbara River; and the Nuba of southern Kordofan and Fur in the western reaches of the country.

The southern region has a population of around 8 million and a predominantly rural, subsistence economy. Except for a 10-year hiatus, southern Sudan has been embroiled in conflict, resulting in major destruction and displacement since independence. The conflict has severely affected the population of the South, resulting in over 2 million deaths and more than 4 million people displaced between 1983 and 2005. The Southern Sudanese practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although Christian missionaries have converted some. The South also contains many tribal groups and many more languages than are used in the north. The Dinka--whose population is estimated at more than 1 million--is the largest of the many black African tribes in Sudan. The Shilluk and the Nuer are among the Nilotic tribes. The Azande, Bor, and Jo Luo are Sudanic tribes in the west, and the Acholi and Lotuhu live in the extreme south, extending into Uganda.

According to new census results released in early 2009, Sudan’s population has reached an estimated 41.1 million.

HISTORY
Sudan was a collection of small, independent kingdoms and principalities from the beginning of the Christian era until 1820-21, when Egypt conquered and unified the northern portion of the country. However, neither the Egyptian nor the Mahdist state (1883-1898) had any effective control of the southern region outside of a few garrisons. Southern Sudan remained an area of fragmented tribes, subject to frequent attacks by slave raiders.

In 1881, a religious leader named Muhammad ibn Abdalla proclaimed himself the Mahdi, or the "expected one," and began a religious crusade to unify the tribes in western and central Sudan. His followers took on the name "Ansars" (the followers) which they continue to use today and are associated with the single largest political grouping, the Umma Party, led by a descendant of the Mahdi, Sadiq al Mahdi.

Taking advantage of dissatisfaction resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian exploitation and maladministration, the Mahdi led a nationalist revolt culminating in the fall of Khartoum in 1885. The Mahdi died shortly thereafter, but his state survived until overwhelmed by an invading Anglo-Egyptian force under Lord Kitchener in 1898. While nominally administered jointly by Egypt and Britain, Britain exercised control, formulated policies, and supplied most of the top administrators.

Independence
In February 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. The transitional period toward independence began with the inauguration of the first parliament in 1954. With the consent of the British and Egyptian Governments, Sudan achieved independence on January 1, 1956, under a provisional constitution. This constitution was silent on two crucial issues for southern leaders--the secular or Islamic character of the state and its federal or unitary structure. However, the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that launched 17 years of civil war (1955-72).

Sudan has been at war with itself for more than three-quarters of its existence. Since independence, protracted conflict rooted in deep cultural and religious differences have slowed Sudan’s economic and political development and forced massive internal displacement of its people. Northerners, who have traditionally controlled the country, have sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam despite the opposition of non-Muslims, southerners, and marginalized peoples in the west and east. The resultant civil strife affected Sudan’s neighbors, as they alternately sheltered fleeing refugees or served as operating bases for rebel movements.

In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power and pursued a policy of Arabization and Islamicization for both North and South Sudan that strengthened Southern opposition. General Abboud was overthrown in 1964 and a civilian caretaker government assumed control. Southern leaders eventually divided into two factions, those who advocated a federal solution and those who argued for self-determination, a euphemism for secession since it was assumed the south would vote for independence if given the choice.

Until 1969, there was a succession of governments that proved unable either to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope with problems of factionalism, economic stagnation, and ethnic dissidence. These regimes were dominated by "Arab" Muslims who asserted their Arab-Islamic agenda and refused any kind of self-determination for southern Sudan.

In May 1969, a group of communist and socialist officers led by Colonel Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, seized power. A month after coming to power, Nimeiri proclaimed socialism (instead of Islamism) for the country and outlined a policy of granting autonomy to the South. Nimeiri in turn was the target of a coup attempt by communist members of the government. It failed and Nimeiri ordered a massive purge of communists. This alienated the Soviet Union, which withdrew its support.

Already lacking support from the Muslim parties he had chased from power, Nimeiri could no longer count on the communist faction. Having alienated the right and the left, Nimeiri turned to the south as a way of expanding his limited powerbase. He pursued peace initiatives with Sudan’s hostile neighbors, Ethiopia and Uganda, signing agreements that committed each signatory to withdraw support for the other’s rebel movements. He then initiated negotiations with the southern rebels and signed an agreement in Addis Ababa in 1972 that granted a measure of autonomy to the South. Southern support helped him put down two coup attempts, one initiated by officers from the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan who wanted for their region the same privileges granted to the south.

However, the Addis Ababa Agreement had no support from either the secularist or Islamic Northern parties. Nimeiri concluded that their lack of support was more threatening to his regime than lack of support from the south so he announced a policy of national reconciliation with all the religious opposition forces. These parties did not feel bound to observe an agreement they perceived as an obstacle to furthering an Islamist state. The scales against the peace agreement were tipped in 1979 when Chevron discovered oil in the south. Northern pressure built to abrogate those provisions of the peace treaty granting financial autonomy to the south. Ultimately in 1983, Nimeiri abolished the Southern region, declared Arabic the official language of the South (instead of English) and transferred control of Southern armed forces to the central government. This was effectively a unilateral abrogation of the 1972 peace treaty. The second Sudan civil war began in January 1983 when southern soldiers mutinied rather than follow orders transferring them to the North.

In September 1983, as part of an Islamicization campaign, President Nimeiri announced that traditional Islamic punishments drawn from Shari’a (Islamic Law) would be incorporated into the penal code. This was controversial even among Muslim groups. Amputations for theft and public lashings for alcohol possession became common. Southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north were also subjected to these punishments.

In April 1985, while out of the country, Nimeiri was overthrown by a popular uprising in Khartoum provoked by a collapsing economy, the war in the south, and political repression. Gen. Suwar al-Dahab headed the transitional government. One of its first acts was to suspend the 1983 constitution and disband Nimeiri’s Sudan Socialist Union.

Elections were held in April 1986, and a civilian government took over power. There were tentative moves towards negotiating peace with the south. However, any proposal to exempt the south from Islamic law was unacceptable to those who supported Arabic supremacy. In 1989, an Islamic army faction led by General Umar al-Bashir mounted a coup and installed the National Islamic Front. The new government’s commitment to the Islamic cause intensified the North-South conflict.

The Bashir government combined internal political repression with international Islamist activism. It supported radical Islamist groups in Algeria and supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Khartoum was established as a base for militant Islamist groups: radical movements and terrorist organizations like Osama Bin Laden’s al Qaida were provided a safe haven and logistical aid in return for financial support. In 1996, the UN imposed sanctions on Sudan for alleged connections to the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak.

Meanwhile, the period of the 1990s saw a growing sense of alienation in the western and eastern regions of Sudan from the Arab center. The rulers in Khartoum were seen as less and less responsive to the concerns and grievances of both Muslim and non-Muslim populations across the country. Alienation from the "Arab" center caused various groups to grow sympathetic to the southern rebels led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and in some cases, prompted them to flight alongside it.

The policy of the ruling regime toward the South was to pursue the war against the rebels while trying to manipulate them by highlighting tribal divisions. Ultimately, this policy resulted in the rebels’ uniting under the leadership of Colonel John Garang. During this period, the SPLM/A rebels also enjoyed support from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. The Bashir government's "Pan-Islamic" foreign policy, which provided support for neighboring radical Islamist groups, was partly responsible for this support for the rebels.

The 1990s saw a succession of regional efforts to broker an end to the Sudanese civil war. Beginning in 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya pursued a peace initiative for the Sudan under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), but results were mixed. Despite that record, the IGAD initiative promulgated the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) that aimed to identify the essential elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement; i.e., the relationship between religion and the state, power sharing, wealth sharing, and the right of self-determination for the south. The Sudanese Government did not sign the DOP until 1997 after major battlefield losses to the SPLA. That year, the Khartoum government signed a series of agreements with rebel factions under the banner of "Peace from Within." These included the Khartoum, Nuba Mountains, and Fashoda Agreements that ended military conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Many of those leaders then moved to Khartoum where they assumed marginal roles in the central government or collaborated with the government in military engagements against the SPLA. These three agreements paralleled the terms and conditions of the IGAD agreement, calling for a degree of autonomy for the south and the right of self-determination.

End to the Civil War
In July 2002, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A reached an historic agreement on the role of state and religion and the right of southern Sudan to self-determination. This agreement, known as the Machakos Protocol and named after the town in Kenya where the peace talks were held, concluded the first round of talks sponsored by the IGAD. The effort was mediated by retired Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. Peace talks resumed and continued during 2003, with discussions focusing on wealth sharing and three contested areas.

On November 19, 2004, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed a declaration committing themselves to conclude a final comprehensive peace agreement by December 31, 2004, in the context of an extraordinary session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Nairobi, Kenya--only the fifth time the Council has met outside of New York since its founding. At this session, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1574, which welcomed the commitment of the government and the SPLM/A to achieve agreement by the end of 2004, and underscored the international community’s intention to assist the Sudanese people and support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement. In keeping with their commitment to the UNSC, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A initialed the final elements of the comprehensive agreement on December 31, 2004. The two parties formally signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005. The U.S. and the international community welcomed this decisive step forward for peace in Sudan.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Elections
National elections took place from April 11-15, 2010. The elections were largely peaceful. However, there were widespread irregularities reported during the polling and counting periods, as well as serious restrictions on political space in both north and south leading up to and during the elections. The NCP and SPLM won the overwhelming majority of the electoral races, and incumbent presidents were elected for the Government of Sudan and the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement
The 2005 CPA established a new Government of National Unity and the interim Government of Southern Sudan and called for wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and security arrangements between the two parties. The historic agreement provides for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops from southern Sudan, and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. It also stipulated that by the end of the fourth year of an interim period there would be elections at all levels, including for national and southern Sudan president, state governors, and national, southern Sudan, and state legislatures. These elections were held in April 2010.

On July 9, 2005, the Presidency was inaugurated with al-Bashir sworn in as President and John Garang, SPLM/A leader, installed as First Vice President of Sudan. Ratification of the Interim National Constitution followed. The Constitution declares Sudan to be a “democratic, decentralized, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual State.”

On July 30, 2005, the charismatic and revered SPLM leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash. The SPLM/A immediately named Salva Kiir, Garang’s deputy, as First Vice President of the Government of National Unity and President of the Government of Southern Sudan.

Implemented provisions of the CPA include the formation of the National Legislature, appointment of Cabinet members, establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan and the signing of the interim Southern Sudan Constitution, and the appointment of state governors and adoption of state constitutions. The electoral law paving the way for national elections was passed in July 2008, and elections were held at six levels in April 2010. Laws governing the Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda and the popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were passed in December 2009, and the parties agreed in February 2010 to begin demarcation of the north-south border.

New CPA-mandated commissions have also been created. Thus far, those formed include the National Electoral Commission, Assessment and Evaluation Commission, National Petroleum Commission, Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission, and the North-South Border Commission. The Ceasefire Political Commission, Joint Defense Board, and Ceasefire Joint Military Committee were also established as part of the security arrangements of the CPA.

With the establishment of the National Population Census Council, a population census was conducted in April/May 2008 in preparation for national elections that took place from April 11-15, 2010. The results from the census were released in early 2009. The CPA mandated that a referendum be held no later than January 2011, giving southerners the opportunity to vote either for unity within Sudan or separation, and that a parallel referendum be held for the people of Abyei to determine whether they wish to remain in the North or join the South.

On January 15, 2011 the week-long Southern Sudan referendum concluded, and official results were announced on February 7, 2011. More than 3.85 million people, or 97.58% of registered voters, participated with 98.83% voting for secession according to the final results. During the February 7, 2011 announcement ceremony, the Government of Sudan thanked the international community and issued the following statement: "In accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Constitution of 2005, we accept the referendum result, and we renew our commitment to building constructive relations with the new state in the South." On the same day, President Barack Obama congratulated the people of Southern Sudan, and announced the United States' intent to formally recognize Southern Sudan as a sovereign, independent state in July 2011. In a separate statement on February 7, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton congratulated all of Sudan, and signaled the United States would initiate the process of withdrawing Sudan’s state sponsor of terrorism designation.

While significant progress has been made since 2005, and completion of the referendum is a major achievement, several post-referendum issues--including citizenship, security, debt, oil management, wealth sharing, and currency--remained unresolved as of April 2011. The parties continue to work through these issues, and the United States remains actively engaged through its support of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and its chairman, President Thabo Mbeki.

The status of Abyei also remained unresolved as of April 2011. Although the boundaries of Abyei were defined through arbitration in The Hague in July 2009, and both sides have accepted the arbitration decision, issues persist and the Abyei boundary has not been demarcated. In August 2009, in conjunction with discussions facilitated by the United States, the two CPA parties signed an agreement charting a path forward on 10 points critical to implementation of the CPA. The parties continue to work through issues related to CPA implementation.

Popular consultations in Blue Nile are underway, citizen hearings have been completed, and technical hearings should begin in April 2011. The process in Southern Kordofan remains on hold until state-level elections scheduled for May are concluded; voter registration for the May elections was completed in February 2011.

In March 2011, Princeton N. Lyman became U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, replacing J. Scott Gration.

Darfur
In 2003, while the historic north-south conflict was on its way to resolution, increasing reports began to surface of attacks on civilians, especially aimed at non-Arab tribes in the extremely marginalized Darfur region of Sudan. A rebellion broke out in Darfur, led by two rebel groups--the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These groups represented agrarian farmers who are mostly non-Arabized black African Muslims. In seeking to defeat the rebel movements, the Government of Sudan increased arms and support to local, rival tribes and militias, which have come to be known as the "Janjaweed." Their members were composed mostly of Arabized black African Muslims who herded cattle, camels, and other livestock. Attacks on the civilian population by the Janjaweed, often with the direct support of Government of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), have led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people in Darfur, with an estimated 2 million internally displaced people and another 250,000 refugees in neighboring Chad.

On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility--and that genocide may still be occurring." President George W. Bush echoed this in July 2005, when he stated that the situation in Darfur was "clearly genocide."

Intense international efforts to solve the crisis got underway, and a cease-fire between the parties was signed in N’Djamena, Chad, on April 8, 2004. However, despite the deployment of an African Union (AU) military mission to monitor implementation of the cease-fire and investigate violations, violence continued. The SLM/A and JEM negotiated with the Government of Sudan under African Union auspices, resulting in an agreement being signed regarding additional protocols addressing the humanitarian and security aspects of the conflict on November 9, 2004. Like previous agreements, however, these were violated by both sides. Talks resumed in Abuja on June 10, 2005, resulting in a July 6 signing of a Declaration of Principles. Further talks were held in the fall and early winter of 2005 and covered power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. These negotiations were complicated by a split that occurred in SLM/A leadership. The SLM/A now had a faction loyal to Minni Minawi and a faction loyal to Abdel Wahid.

The African Union, with the support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the U.S., and the rest of the international community, began deploying a larger monitoring and observer force in October 2004. The UNSC had passed three resolutions (1556, 1564, and 1574), all intended to compel the Government of Sudan to rein in the Janjaweed, protect the civilian population and humanitarian participants, seek avenues toward a political settlement to the humanitarian and political crisis, and recognize the need for the rapid deployment of an expanded African Union mission in Darfur. The U.S. has been a leader in pressing for strong international action by the United Nations and its agencies.

A series of UNSC resolutions in late March 2005 underscored the concerns of the international community regarding Sudan's continuing conflicts. Resolution 1590 established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial period of 6 months and decided that UNMIS would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel. It requested UNMIS to coordinate with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to foster peace in Darfur, support implementation of the CPA, facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, provide humanitarian demining assistance, and protect human rights. The resolution also called on the Government of Sudan and rebel groups to resume the Abuja talks and support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur, including ensuring safe access for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

Resolution 1591 criticized the Government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur for having failed to comply with several previous UNSC resolutions, for ceasefire violations, and for human rights abuses. The resolution also called on all parties to resume the Abuja talks and to support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur; it also forms a monitoring committee charged with enforcing a travel ban and asset freeze of those determined to impede the peace process or violate human rights. Additionally, the resolution demanded that the Government of Sudan cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region. Finally, Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and called on the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate with the ICC.

Following the UNSC resolutions and intense international pressure, the Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan resumed negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria in early 2006. On May 5, 2006, the government and an SLM/A faction led by Minni Minawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Unfortunately, the conflict in Darfur intensified shortly thereafter, led by rebel groups who refused to sign. In late August government forces began a major offensive on rebel areas in Northern Darfur. On August 30, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1706, authorizing the transition of AMIS to a larger more robust UN peacekeeping operation. To further facilitate an end to the conflict in Darfur, President Bush announced the appointment of Andrew S. Natsios as the Special Envoy for Sudan on September 19, 2006.

In an effort to resolve Sudan’s opposition to a UN force, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and African Union Commission Chair Alpha Oumar Konare convened a meeting of key international officials and representatives of several African and Arab states in Addis Ababa on November 16, 2006. The agreement reached with the Government of Sudan provided for graduated UN support to AMIS culminating in the establishment of a joint “hybrid” AU-UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur.

International efforts in 2007 focused on rallying support for DPA signatory and non-signatory rebel movements to attend renewed peace talks, and on finalizing plans for the joint AU/UN hybrid operation. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 was adopted on July 31, 2007, providing the mandate for a joint AU/UN hybrid force to deploy to Darfur with troop contributions from African countries. The Joint AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was to assume authority from AMIS in the field no later than December 31, 2007.

Following the passage of UNSCR 1769, a conference was held August 3-5 in Arusha, Tanzania between key UN and AU officials and delegates from Darfur rebel groups. Many movements’ political and military leaderships were brought into the discussion in preparation for earnest peace talks. Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and rebel factions took place in Sirte, Libya on October 27, 2007. However, limited rebel participation and continuing disagreement about objectives and processes limited the effectiveness of these talks. Following the Sirte talks, the SPLM hosted workshops in Juba, Southern Sudan, to unite the rebel groups and allow them to come together to present a common front during negotiations. The Juba talks led to a consolidation of rebel factions down to five groups from an estimated 27. On December 21, 2007 President Bush announced the appointment of Richard S. Williamson as Special Envoy for Sudan, following the resignation of Andrew S. Natsios.

On July 14, 2008 the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced that he was seeking an arrest warrant for President Bashir for allegedly masterminding genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Darfur. In order to move quickly to find a solution to the violence in Darfur under the pressure of a possible ICC indictment, Sudan opened the Sudan People’s Initiative in October 2008. The conference brought together many Darfur rebel groups with the government for a conference to explore solutions and how to better implement the existing framework of the DPA. It culminated in the announcement of a unilateral Darfur ceasefire, which was reportedly violated within days of the declaration.

On March 4, 2009 the ICC announced that it was issuing an arrest warrant for President Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The three-judge panel that issued the warrant did not feel there was enough evidence to include the crime of genocide on the warrant. In response to the ICC indictment, the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international non-government organizations (NGOs) and closed down three Sudanese NGOs, which severely hindered international humanitarian aid efforts in Darfur. Despite the warrant for his arrest, Bashir has traveled freely to a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East since his indictment.

In early 2009, the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole convened talks in Doha, Qatar, between the Government of Sudan and several Darfuri rebel groups, most notably JEM. Although JEM and the government signed a goodwill agreement in February 2009, talks collapsed in May over prisoner swaps and humanitarian access. Throughout the summer of 2009, the AU-UN mediation team worked individually with the parties and civil society to prepare for a new round of negotiations, while President Obama’s Special Envoy to Sudan, J. Scott Gration, supported these efforts by working to unify a number of splintered rebel factions in preparation for negotiations, and pressing the government to commit to a new round of talks. In November 2009, the mediation team organized a series of meetings in Doha between the parties and Darfuri civil society in an effort to better represent the voices of the Darfuri people in the peace process.

On January 15, 2010, Sudan and Chad signed an accord in N’Djamena, Chad, to secure their joint border and remove the threat posed to one another by cross-border rebel proxies operating on Sudanese and Chadian territory. The U.S. supported the signing of this agreement, which, if fully implemented, could help to improve the security situation on the ground in Darfur. On April 13, 2010, the parties announced that elements of the joint border force had been deployed and the border had been officially opened for commerce and transit.

On February 3, 2010, the ICC Appeals Court decided that the original three-judge panel used too high an evidentiary standard to omit genocide from the March 4, 2009, indictment of Bashir, and instructed the panel to revisit its decision. On July 12, 2010 the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for Bashir, adding genocide to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On February 23, 2010, the Government of Sudan and JEM signed a 12-point framework agreement in Doha, in which the parties agreed to a ceasefire, a prisoner release, and the opening of a new round of formal negotiations. In the wake of this initial progress with JEM, several other armed movements, including SLA factions unified by the efforts of the U.S. and Libya, joined together in Doha under the umbrella of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). On March 18, 2010, the Government of Sudan and the LJM signed a framework agreement and a ceasefire. Although negotiations in Doha were suspended during the April 11-15 national elections, talks between the Government of Sudan and the LJM resumed in June 2010. On May 3, JEM announced that it was “freezing” its participation in the Doha talks due to the Government of Sudan’s offensive against JEM positions in Jebel Moon, West Darfur. Since that time, the talks between the Government of Sudan and the LJM have continued. The African Union/United Nations Joint Chief Mediator announced at the beginning of September, along with the host Government of Qatar, a timeline that would produce a final outcome document from these negotiations. Doha mediation teams have continued to work on a final document, with JEM sending a small delegation on December 16, 2010 and Abdul Wahid’s faction of the SLA considering sending representation following a press by the international community for negotiations without preconditions. The Government of Sudan has urged the conclusion of the Doha talks in favor of a Darfur Political Process (DPP). The DPP would include consultations with a broad spectrum of Darfur civil society members, in addition to rebel groups, and culminate in the All-Darfur Conference (ADC), an inclusive forum intended to establish a corporate representation of Darfuris to finalize the elements of a political settlement for Darfur. The United States continues to support the Doha process as there are ongoing concerns about the enabling environment for talks in Darfur.

Humanitarian Situation
Sudan continues to cope with the countrywide effects of conflict, displacement, and insecurity. During more than 20 years of conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), violence, famine, and disease killed more than 2 million people, forced an estimated 600,000 people to seek refuge in neighboring countries, and displaced approximately 4 million others within Sudan, creating the world's largest population of internally displaced people. Since the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which officially ended the North-South conflict, the UN estimates that nearly 2 million displaced people have returned to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei. As of September 2009, the UN estimated that Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)-related violence had displaced approximately 85,000 people in Southern Sudan, including more than 18,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. In addition, inter-ethnic conflict in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Lakes states has killed more than 2,000 people and displaced approximately 250,000 individuals since January 2009.

In March 2009, following the ICC’s issuance of the arrest warrant for Bashir, the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international humanitarian aid organizations from Sudan and shut down three national aid organizations in a decision it publicly claimed was “long-overdue.” These organizations served as U.S. Government and UN implementing partners for the provision of, among other services, water and sanitation, health care, and protection, and their forced departure, according to the UN, affects 50% of aid delivery in Sudan. In the absence of expelled non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN agencies and remaining NGOs stepped in to fill some of the critical gaps and address immediate humanitarian needs. The UN, the United States, and other members of the international community have since urged the Government of Sudan to reverse its decision on the expulsions, to identify and respond to gaps in life-saving operations, and to facilitate an orderly transition to working through the remaining NGOs. On March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the appointment of J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan. Special Envoy Gration negotiated with the Government of Sudan to allow the entry of four new NGOs to help address the humanitarian gaps. The Government of Sudan has been somewhat cooperative regarding the loosening of some administrative and bureaucratic impediments that have hindered the fast and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in the past.

The conflict in the western region of Darfur entered its seventh year in 2010, despite a 2006 peace agreement--the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)--between the Government of National Unity and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Army, that of Minni Minawi. It remains to be seen whether the ongoing Doha peace process will be able to effectively help quell the fighting in Darfur among armed opposition group factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces, and militias, which continued to displace thousands of civilians into 2010--230,000 since January 2008 alone. The complex emergency in Darfur affects approximately 4.2 million people, including more than 2.7 million internally displaced people, approximately 250,000 refugees in Chad, and approximately 50,000 refugees in the Central African Republic.

The U.S. Government is the leading international donor to Sudan and has contributed more than $8 billion in humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance for the people in Sudan and eastern Chad since 2005, including more than $2 billion in FY 2009 alone. The U.S. Mission in Sudan has declared disasters due to the complex emergency on an annual basis since 1987. On October 1, 2009, President Obama renewed the Sudan complex emergency disaster declaration for FY 2010. The U.S. Government continues to lead the international effort to support implementation of the CPA, while providing for the humanitarian needs of conflict-affected populations throughout the country. U.S. Government humanitarian assistance to Sudan includes food aid, provision of health care, water, sanitation, and hygiene, as well as programs for nutrition, agriculture, protection, and economic recovery.

Principal Government Officials
President, Prime Minister, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces--Lt. Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir
First Vice President--Salva Kiir Mayardit
Vice President--Ali Osman Muhamad Taha
Foreign Minister--Ahmed Ali Karti
Ambassador to the U.S.--Sudan is represented by Charge d’Affaires John Ukec Lueth
Ambassador to the UN--Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman

Sudan maintains an embassy in the United States at 2210 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel: (202) 338-8565; fax: (202) 667-2406); and a Consular Office at 2612 Woodley Place, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel: (202) 232-1492; fax: (202) 232-1494).

The regional Government of Southern Sudan maintains a liaison office in the United States at 1233 20th St. NW, Suite 602, Washington, DC 20036 (tel: (202) 293-7940; fax: (202) 293-7941).

ECONOMY
In 2004, the cessation of major north-south hostilities and expanding crude oil exports resulted in 6.4% GDP growth and a near doubling of GDP per capita since 2003. The aftereffects of the 21-year civil war and very limited infrastructure, however, present obstacles to stronger growth and a broader distribution of income. The country continued taking some steps toward transitioning from a socialist to a market-based economy, although the government and governing party supporters remained heavily involved in the economy.

Sudan’s primary resources are agricultural, but oil production and export have taken on greater importance since October 2000. Although the country is trying to diversify its cash crops, cotton, and gum arabic remain its major agricultural exports. Grain sorghum (dura) is the principal food crop, and millet and wheat are grown for domestic consumption. Sesame seeds and peanuts are cultivated for domestic consumption and increasingly for export. Livestock production has vast potential, and many animals, particularly camels and sheep, are exported to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. However, Sudan remains a net importer of food. Problems of irrigation and transportation remain the greatest constraints to a more dynamic agricultural economy.

The country’s transportation facilities consist of 5,978 kilometers of railways, 16 airports with paved runways, and about 11,900 kilometers of paved and gravel road--primarily in greater Khartoum, Port Sudan, and the north. Some north-south roads that serve the oil fields of central/south Sudan have been built; and a 1,400 kilometer. (840 miles) oil pipeline goes from the oil fields via the Nuba Mountains and Khartoum to the oil export terminal in Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

Sudan’s limited industrial development consists of agricultural processing and various light industries located in Khartoum North. In recent years, the GIAD industrial complex introduced the assembly of small autos and trucks, and some heavy military equipment such as armored personnel carriers and the proposed "Bashir" main battle tank. Although Sudan is reputed to have great mineral resources, exploration has been quite limited, and the country’s real potential is unknown. Small quantities of asbestos, chromium, and mica are exploited commercially.

Extensive petroleum exploration began in the mid-1970s and might cover all of Sudan’s economic and energy needs. Significant finds were made in the Upper Nile region and commercial quantities of oil began to be exported in October 2000, reducing Sudan’s outflow of foreign exchange for imported petroleum products. There are indications of significant potential reserves of oil and natural gas in southern Sudan, the Kordofan region and the Red Sea province.

Historically, the U.S., the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have supplied most of Sudan’s economic assistance. Sudan’s role as an economic link between Arab and African countries is reflected by the presence in Khartoum of the Arab Bank for African Development. The World Bank had been the largest source of development loans.

Sudan will require extraordinary levels of program assistance and debt relief to manage a foreign debt exceeding $21 billion, more than the country’s entire annual gross domestic product. During the late 1970s and 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and key donors worked closely to promote reforms to counter the effect of inefficient economic policies and practices. By 1984, a combination of factors--including drought, inflation, and confused application of Islamic law--reduced donor disbursements, and capital flight led to a serious foreign-exchange crisis and increased shortages of imported inputs and commodities. More significantly, the 1989 revolution caused many donors in Europe, the U.S., and Canada to suspend official development assistance, but not humanitarian aid.

However, as Sudan became the world’s largest debtor to the World Bank and IMF by 1993, its relationship with the international financial institutions soured in the mid-1990s and has yet to be fully rehabilitated. The government fell out of compliance with an IMF standby program and accumulated substantial arrearages on repurchase obligations. A 4-year economic reform plan was announced in 1988 but was not pursued. An economic reform plan was announced in 1989 and implementation began on a 3-year economic restructuring program designed to reduce the public sector deficit, end subsidies, privatize state enterprises, and encourage new foreign and domestic investment. In 1993, the IMF suspended Sudan’s voting rights and the World Bank suspended Sudan’s right to make withdrawals under effective and fully disbursed loans and credits. Lome Funds and European Union agricultural credits, totaling more than 1 billion euros, also were suspended.

Sudan produces about 401,000 barrels per day (b/d) (2005 est.) of oil, which brought in about $1.9 billion in 2005 and provides 70% of the country’s total export earnings. Although final figures are not yet available, these earnings may have risen to an estimated $2 billion as of the end of 2004. Oil production in Sudan as of 2007 was at 466,100 barrels of oil a day. With a resolution of its 21-year civil war between the North and South, Sudan and its people can now begin to reap the benefit from its natural resources, rebuild its infrastructure, increase oil production and exports, and be able to attain its export and development potential.

In 2000-2001, Sudan’s current account entered surplus for the first time since independence. In 1993, currency controls were imposed, making it illegal to possess foreign exchange without approval. In 1999, liberalization of foreign exchange markets ameliorated this constraint somewhat. Exports other than oil are largely stagnant. The small industrial sector remains in the doldrums, and Sudan’s inadequate and declining infrastructure inhibits economic growth.

DEFENSE
The Sudan People’s Armed Forces is a 100,000-member army supported by a small air force and navy. Irregular tribal and former rebel militias and Popular Defense Forces supplement the army’s strength in the field. This is a mixed force, having the additional duty of maintaining internal security. During the 1990s, periodic purges of the professional officer corps by the ruling Islamist regime eroded command authority as well as war-fighting capabilities. Indeed, the Sudanese Government admitted it was incapable of carrying out its war aims against the SPLA without employing former rebel and Arab militias to fight in support of regular troops. Additionally, as mandated in the CPA, the Southern Sudanese maintain their own armed forces in the form of the SPLA.

Sudan’s military forces historically have been hampered by limited and outdated equipment. In the 1980s, the U.S. worked with the Sudanese Government to upgrade equipment with special emphasis on airlift capacity and logistics. All U.S. military assistance was terminated following the military coup of 1989. Oil revenues have allowed the government to purchase modern weapons systems, including Hind helicopter gunships, Antonov medium bombers, MiG 23 fighter aircraft, mobile artillery pieces, and light assault weapons. Sudan now receives most of its military equipment from China, Russia, and Libya.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan is currently in the process of transformation from a guerrilla force to a professional military organization.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Solidarity with other Arab countries has been a feature of Sudan’s foreign policy. When the Arab-Israeli war began in June 1967, Sudan declared war on Israel. However, in the early 1970s, Sudan gradually shifted its stance and was supportive of the Camp David Accords.

Relations between Sudan and Libya deteriorated in the early 1970s and reached a low in October 1981, when Libya began a policy of cross-border raids into western Sudan. After the 1985 coup in Sudan, the military government resumed diplomatic relations with Libya, as part of a policy of improving relations with neighboring and Arab states. In early 1990, Libya and the Sudan announced that they would seek "unity," but this unity was not implemented.

During the 1990s, as Sudan sought to steer a nonaligned course, courting Western aid and seeking rapprochement with Arab states, its relations with the U.S. grew increasingly strained. Sudan’s ties with countries like North Korea and Libya and its support for regional insurgencies such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Eritrean Islamic Jihad, Ethiopian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Lord’s Resistance Army generated great concern about its contribution to regional instability. Allegations of the government’s complicity in the assassination attempt against the Egyptian President in Ethiopia in 1995 led to UNSC sanctions against the Sudan. By the late 1990s, Sudan experienced strained or broken diplomatic relations with most of its nine neighboring countries. However, since 2000, Sudan has actively sought regional rapprochement that has rehabilitated most of these relations.

U.S.-SUDANESE RELATIONS
Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the U.S. in June 1967, following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War. Relations improved after July 1971, when the Sudanese Communist Party attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri, and Nimeiri suspected Soviet involvement. U.S. assistance for resettlement of refugees following the 1972 peace settlement with the south added further improved relations.

On March 1, 1973, Palestinian terrorists of the "Black September" organization murdered U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission Curtis G. Moore in Khartoum. Sudanese officials arrested the terrorists and tried them on murder charges. In June 1974, however, they were released to the custody of the Egyptian Government. The U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan was withdrawn in protest. Although the U.S. Ambassador returned to Khartoum in November, relations with the Sudan remained static until early 1976, when President Nimeiri mediated the release of 10 American hostages being held by Eritrean insurgents in rebel strongholds in northern Ethiopia. In 1976, the U.S. decided to resume economic assistance to Sudan.

In late 1985, there was a reduction in staff at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum because of the presence in Khartoum of a large contingent of Libyan terrorists. In April 1986, relations with Sudan deteriorated when the U.S. bombed Tripoli, Libya. A U.S. Embassy employee was shot on April 16, 1986. Immediately following this incident, all non-essential personnel and all dependents left for 6 months. At this time, Sudan was the single largest recipient of U.S. development and military assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. However, official U.S. development assistance was suspended in 1989 in the wake of the military coup against the elected government, which brought to power the National Islamist Front led by General Bashir.

U.S. relations with Sudan were further strained in the 1990s. Sudan backed Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait and provided sanctuary and assistance to Islamic terrorist groups. In the early and mid-1990s, Carlos the Jackal, Osama bin Laden, Abu Nidal, and other terrorist leaders resided in Khartoum. Sudan’s role in the radical Pan-Arab Islamic Conference represented a matter of great concern to the security of American officials and dependents in Khartoum, resulting in several draw downs and/or evacuations of U.S. personnel from Khartoum in the early-mid 1990s. Sudan’s Islamist links with international terrorist organizations represented a special matter of concern for the U.S. Government, leading to Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and a suspension of U.S. Embassy operations in Khartoum in 1996. In October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the Sudan. In August 1998, in the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the U.S. launched cruise missile strikes against Khartoum. The last U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan, Ambassador Tim Carney, departed post prior to this event and no new ambassador has been designated since. The U.S. Embassy is headed by a Charge d’Affaires. The Embassy continues to re-evaluate its posture in Sudan, particularly in the wake of the January 1, 2008, killings of a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) employee and his Sudanese driver in Khartoum.

The U.S. and Sudan entered into a bilateral dialogue on counterterrorism in May 2000. Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against international terrorism since the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes on New York and Washington. However, although Sudan publicly supported the international coalition actions against the al Qaida network and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the government criticized the U.S. strikes in that country and opposed a widening of the effort against international terrorism to other countries. Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list.

In response to the Government of Sudan’s continued complicity in unabated violence occurring in Darfur, President Bush imposed new economic sanctions on Sudan in May 2007. The sanctions blocked assets of Sudanese citizens implicated in Darfur violence, and also sanctioned additional companies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan. Sanctions continue to underscore U.S. efforts to end the suffering of the millions of Sudanese affected by the crisis in Darfur.

Despite policy differences the U.S. has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to the Sudan throughout the last quarter-century. The U.S. was a major donor in the March 1989 "Operation Lifeline Sudan," which delivered 100,000 metric tons of food into both government and SPLA-held areas of the Sudan, thus averting widespread starvation. In 1991, the U.S. made major donations to alleviate food shortages caused by a 2-year drought. In a similar drought in 2000-2001, the U.S. and the international community responded to avert mass starvation in the Sudan. In 2001 the Bush administration named a presidential envoy for peace in the Sudan to explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan's civil war and enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid. Andrew Natsios and subsequently Ambassador Richard Williamson served as presidential envoys to Sudan during the Bush administration. On March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the appointment of J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan.

On October 19, 2009, Secretary Clinton, accompanied by Special Envoy Gration and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, announced the Obama administration’s new Sudan strategy. U.S. strategy in Sudan is comprised of three core principles: 1) Achieving a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; 2) Implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and 3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.

In March 2011, Princeton N. Lyman was appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--vacant
Charge d'Affaires--Robert E. Whitehead
Deputy Chief of Mission--Dennis Hankins
USAID Director--Bill Hammink
Political-Economic Chief--Helen C. Hudson
Public Affairs Officer--William Bellis

The U.S. Embassy in Sudan is located at Embassy Road, Kilo 10, Soba, off Wad Medani Highway, Khartoum (tel. 249-187-022000). Hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Sunday through Thursday.

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April 11, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Background Note: Tanzania

Official Name: United Republic of Tanzania

PROFILE

Geography
Area: Mainland--945,000 sq. km. (378,000 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than New Mexico and Texas combined. Zanzibar--1,658 sq. km. (640 sq. mi.).
Cities: Capital--Dar es Salaam (executive), Dodoma (legislative), Major metropolises--Arusha, Mwanza, Mbeya, Mtwara, Stonetown in Zanzibar.
Terrain: Varied.
Climate: Varies from tropical to arid to temperate.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Tanzanian(s); Zanzibari(s).
Population: Mainland--41.8 million (2010 est.). Zanzibar--1.3 million (est.).
Religions: Muslim 35.0%, Christian 63.0%, other (traditional, Sikh, Hindu, Baha'i) 2.0%.
Language: Official--Kiswahili and English; national--Kiswahili.
Education: Attendance--73.2% mainland (primary), 71.4% Zanzibar. Literacy--females 67.0% mainland, 76.8% Zanzibar; males 79.9% mainland, 86.0% Zanzibar.
Health: Infant mortality rate--68/1,000. Life expectancy--52.4 years (2010 est.).
Work force: Agriculture--80.0%; industry, commerce, government--20.0%.

Government
Type: Republic.
Independence: Tanganyika 1961, Zanzibar 1963. Union formed in April 1964.
Constitution: 1982.
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and commander in chief), vice president, and prime minister. Legislative--unicameral National Assembly (for the Union), House of Representatives (for Zanzibar only). Judicial--Mainland: Court of Appeals, High Courts, Resident Magistrate Courts, district courts, and primary courts; Zanzibar: High Court, people's district courts, kadhis court (Islamic courts).
Political parties: 1. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), 2. The Civic United Front (CUF), 3. Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), 4. Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD), 5. National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), 6. National League for Democracy (NLD), 7. National Reconstruction for Alliance (NRA), 8. Tanzania Democratic Alliance Party (TADEA), 9. Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), 10. United Democratic Party (UDP), 11. Demokrasia Makini (MAKINI), 12. United Peoples' Democratic Party (UPDP), 13. Chama cha Haki na Ustawi (CHAUSTA), 14. The Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), 15. Democratic Party (DP), 16. Progressive Party of Tanzania (PPT-Maendeleo), 17. Jahazi Asilia, 18. Sauti ya Umma (SAU).
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Administrative subdivisions: 30 regions (25 on mainland, 3 on Zanzibar, 2 on Pemba).

Economy
GDP (2010 est.): $23.2 billion.
Real GDP growth annual percentage (2010 est.): 6.4%.
GDP per capita (2009): $509.
Natural resources: Hydroelectric potential, coal, iron, gemstones, gold, natural gas, nickel, diamonds, crude oil potential, forest products, wildlife, fisheries.
Agriculture (2009 est.): 26.6% of GDP. Products--coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, cloves, sisal, cashew nuts, maize, livestock, sugar cane, paddy, wheat, pyrethrum.
Industry/manufacturing (2009 est.): 22.6% of GDP. Types--textiles, agro-processing, light manufacturing, construction, steel, aluminum, paints, cement, cooking oil, beer, mineral water and soft drinks.
Trade (2009 est.): Exports--$2.74 billion (merchandise exports): coffee, cotton, tea, sisal, cashew nuts, tobacco, cut flowers, seaweed, cloves, fish and fish products, minerals (diamonds, gold, and gemstones), manufactured goods, horticultural products; services (tourism services, communication, construction, insurance, financial, computer, information, government, royalties, personal and other businesses). Major markets--U.K., Germany, India, Japan, Italy, China, Bahrain, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, Indonesia. Primary imports--petroleum, consumer goods, machinery and transport equipment, used clothing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals. Major suppliers--U.K., Germany, Japan, India, Italy, U.S., United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa, Kenya.

PEOPLE
Tanzania’s population is concentrated along the coast and isles, the fertile northern and southern highlands, and the lands bordering Lake Victoria. The relatively arid and less fertile central region is sparsely inhabited. So too is much of the fertile and well watered far west, including the shores of Lake Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa (Malawi). About 80% of Tanzanians live in rural communities.

Zanzibar, population about 1.3 million (3% of Tanzania’s population), consists of two main islands and several small ones just off the Tanzanian coast. The two largest islands are Unguja (often referred to simply as Zanzibar) and Pemba. Zanzibaris, together with their socio-linguistic cousins in the Comoros Islands and the East Africa coast from modern-day southern Somalia to northern Mozambique, created Swahili culture and language, which reflect long and close associations with other parts of Africa and with the Arab world, Persia, and South Asia.

Tanzanians are proud of their strong sense of national identity and commitment to Swahili as the national language. There are roughly 120 ethnic communities in the country representing several of Africa’s main socio-linguistic groups.

HISTORY
Consensus scientific opinion places human origins in the Great Rift Valley, which dominates the landscape of much of East Africa. Northern Tanzania’s Olduvai Gorge has provided rich evidence of the area's prehistory, including fossil remains of some of humanity's earliest ancestors.

Interior Tanzania’s great cultural and linguistic diversity is due to the various histories of migrations from elsewhere in the region. In some instances, groups of migrants separated, leading to different cultural developments. In other cases, various groups merged, creating new cultural identities and languages. Most Tanzanians are aware of their cultural origins and the traditional histories of the ethnic community with which they identify. The peoples of the interior traded with coastal communities, which in turn traded with all the countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Long standing patterns of political organization, economic production, and trade were disrupted by the violent escalation of the Arab-led slave and ivory trades in the 18th and 19th centuries. Bagamoyo on the coast and Zanzibar town were major slave ports serving markets for slave labor mostly in the Arab world. These societies, already severely stressed by the violence of the slave trade, came under further pressure once European explorers (mostly military, some missionary) opened the way to European conquest (first by semi-private European companies, later by European states) from the mid-19th century to the early 20th century.

Coastal and island Tanzania organized into city-states around 1,500 years ago. The Swahili city-states traded with the peoples of the interior and the peoples of the Indian Ocean and beyond (including China). Many merchants from these trading partner nations (principally from inland Africa, the Arab world, Persia and India) established themselves in these coastal and island communities, which became cosmopolitan in flavor.

The Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama explored the East African coast in 1498 on his voyage to India. By 1506, the Portuguese claimed control over the entire coast. This control was nominal, however, because the Portuguese did not settle the area (except for a few forts) or explore the interior. Instead, they violently enforced a monopoly on Indian Ocean trade, denying the Swahili city-states their main means of livelihood. The Portuguese also demanded tribute, bombarding and looting communities that refused to pay protection money. The coastal peoples rose up against the Portuguese in the late 1700s. Their resistance was assisted by one of their main trading partners, the Omani Arabs. By the early 19th century the Portuguese were forced out of coastal East Africa north of the Ruvuma River and the Omanis moved in.

Based in Zanzibar, the Omani Sultanate maintained close trade and diplomatic relations with the major trading powers, including the United States as of 1837. They also maintained close relations with some states in the interior with whom they were partners in the ivory and slave trades. European exploration of the interior began soon after the Omanis had consolidated their control of the coast and Zanzibar. Two German missionaries reached Mt. Kilimanjaro in the 1840s. British explorers Richard Burton and John Speke crossed the interior to Lake Tanganyika in 1857, with Speke going on to Lake Victoria. David Livingstone, the Scottish missionary-explorer who crusaded against the slave trade, established his last mission at Ujiji, where he was "found" by Henry Morton Stanley, an American journalist-explorer, who had been commissioned by the New York Herald to locate him.

The Omani Sultanate, which had been heavily engaged in selling African slaves principally to the Arab world, outlawed the slave trade in 1876. British influence over the Sultanate steadily increased in the 1880s until Zanzibar formally became a British Protectorate in 1890.

German colonial interests were first advanced in 1884. Karl Peters, who formed the Society for German Colonization, concluded a series of agreements of dubious validity with "leaders" of questionable standing purporting to accept German "protection" for their inland African states. Prince Otto von Bismarck's government backed Peters in the subsequent establishment of the German East Africa Company. In 1886 and 1890, Anglo-German agreements were negotiated that delineated the British and German spheres of influence in the interior of East Africa and along the coastal strip previously claimed by the Omani sultan of Zanzibar. In 1891, the German Government took over direct administration of the territory from the German East Africa Company and appointed a governor with headquarters at Dar es Salaam.

German rule, which featured "hut taxes" and conscript labor to fund administration and infrastructure that benefitted German settlers at the great disadvantage of African communities, provoked African resistance. The Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-07 united the peoples of the Southern Highlands in a struggle to expel the German administration. The German military killed 120,000 Africans in suppressing the rebellion.

German colonial domination of Tanganyika ended after World War I when control of most of the territory passed to the United Kingdom under a League of Nations mandate. After World War II, Tanganyika became a UN trust territory under British control. Subsequent years witnessed Tanganyika moving gradually toward self-government and independence.

In 1954, Julius K. Nyerere, a school teacher who was then one of only two Tanganyikans educated abroad at the university level (University of Edinburgh, Scotland), organized a political party--the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU candidates were victorious in the Legislative Council elections of September 1958 and February 1959. In December 1959, the United Kingdom agreed to the establishment of internal self-government following general elections to be held in August 1960. Nyerere was named chief minister of the subsequent government.

In May 1961, Tanganyika became autonomous, and Nyerere became Prime Minister under a new constitution. Full independence was achieved on December 9, 1961. Julius Nyerere, then age 39, was elected President when Tanganyika became a republic within the Commonwealth a year after independence. Tanganyika was the first East African state to gain independence.

Zanzibar: Sultanate/British Protectorate to Independence, Revolution, and Union
Under the Sultanate, the Arab population comprised the ruling class and landed aristocracy. Arabs, primarily from Oman, seized large tracts of land on Unguja (except in the less fertile far north of the island) to set up highly profitable spice plantations. Dispossessed indigenous Zanzibaris (known as Shirazis) became agricultural workers, sharecroppers, or semi-serfs. The plantations were also worked by slaves or former slaves, originating from the mainland. There was also significant mainland migration to the islands, especially Unguja, to work menial jobs during the boom years of the spice trade. The Afro-Shirazi population of Unguja mostly resented their Omani and British rulers.

Shirazis from the northern tip of Unguja, the nearby island of Tumbatu, and Pemba enjoyed symbiotic commercial relations with the Arab new arrivals and their Sultanate. They were not dispossessed of their lands. They mostly prospered under the Omanis. Pemban and far northern Ungujan Shirazis tended to identify their interests with the Sultanate.

The British ruled Zanzibar on behalf of the Sultan, not on behalf of his subjects. Their policies explicitly favored Arabs and Asians over Shirazis and mainland Africans (in that order). A series of pre-independence elections revealed two camps: the anti-Sultanate, Africa-oriented, and secular Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) with a stronghold in the densely populated areas of Unguja; and the pro-Sultanate, Arab World-oriented, and explicitly Islamic Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and its Pemban ally (the Zanzibar and Pemban People's Party - ZPPP), which was supported by most Arabs, Asians, far northern Ungujans, Pembans, and those who worked for the state. The ASP consistently received a larger share of the popular vote (though not by much), but the ZNP and its ally received more seats because they predominated in more constituencies. At independence, the British handed power to the two parties friendliest to the Sultanate and the status quo: the ZNP and ZPPP.

In January, 1964, 1 month after independence from Britain, Zanzibar (specifically Unguja) experienced a bloody uprising against the institutions of the Sultanate, the ZNP/ZPPP government, the Arab and Asian communities, and any Shirazis considered friendly to the state (such as ZNP members and Pembans). Although specific figures vary, several thousand Arabs were killed. Rape and other atrocities were widespread. Arabs were expelled or fled in large numbers. Asian shops were looted. Property was expropriated and re-distributed to ASP supporters. After a period of confusion, the ASP leadership and its allies assumed control under a "Supreme Revolutionary Council" and extended their control to Pemba (which had not participated in the uprising). Pemba was ruled by "Commissars" who used floggings, forced labor, and public humiliation to enforce their will over a hostile population. After a few months, the ASP leadership opted to accept an offer of union with Tanganyika (forming the nation of Tanzania), both to prevent a counter-revolution and to buttress the political position of the ASP leaders among other members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. The Union Agreement (signed April 26, 1964) granted wide-ranging autonomy for Zanzibar. This date is observed in Tanzania as Union Day. It is Tanzania's official national day.

United Republic of Tanzania
The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar adopted the name "United Republic of Tanzania" on April 26, 1964. In order to create a single ruling party in both parts of the union, Nyerere merged TANU (mainland) with the ASP (Zanzibar) to form the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi-CCM, Revolutionary Party) in 1977. As the sole legal political party for all of Tanzania, CCM had the role of directing the population in all significant political and economic activities. In practice, Party and State were one. On February 5, 1977, the union of the two parties was ratified in a new constitution. The merger was reinforced by principles enunciated in the 1982 union constitution and reaffirmed in the constitution of 1984.

Nyerere instituted social policies that proved successful in forging a strong Tanzanian national identity, which to this day takes priority in the hearts of the great majority of Tanzanians over ethnic, regional or linguistic identities. Observers are nearly unanimous in attributing Tanzania's unbroken record of political stability to Nyerere's social policies. Nyerere's economic policies were ruinous. They were gradually reversed after he left power, but many in the state bureaucracy remain opposed to modern, market economics.

President Nyerere stepped down from office and was succeeded as President by Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985. Nyerere retained his position as Chairman of the ruling CCM party for 5 more years. He remained influential in Tanzanian politics until his death in October 1999. The current President, Jakaya Kikwete, was elected in December 2005 and re-elected on October 31, 2010. Tanzania's constitution limits presidents to two terms in office.

In Zanzibar, where past elections were marked by violence and widespread irregularities, the 2010 elections proceeded peacefully. After years of intense debates between Civic United Front (CUF) and CCM, the two political parties finally reached a power-sharing agreement. On January 29, 2010, the unicameral Zanzibar House of Representatives adopted as law a bill that outlined the parameters of a government of national unity and called for a popular referendum on the plan. On July 31, 2010, Zanzibari voters gave their approval in the first-ever referendum to amend the constitution to allow for a unity government in Zanzibar. Ali Mohamed Shein, the immediate past Union Vice President, was elected President of Zanzibar on October 31, 2010.

GOVERNMENT
Tanzania's president and Parliament members are elected concurrently by direct popular vote for 5-year terms. The president appoints a prime minister who serves as the government's leader in the Parliament. The president selects his cabinet from among Parliament members. The constitution also empowers the president to nominate 10 non-elected members of Parliament, who also are eligible to become cabinet members. Elections for president and all parliamentary seats were last held in October 2010. The next presidential and parliamentary elections will be in 2015.

The unicameral Parliament has up to 357 members: the Attorney General; the Speaker; five members elected from and by the Zanzibar House of Representatives; 102 special women's seats apportioned among the political parties based on their election results; 239 constituent seats (including 50 from Zanzibar); and 10 members nominated by the president. Although Zanzibar accounts for only 3% of Tanzania's population, it is guaranteed over 15% of seats in the Union Parliament. The ruling party, CCM, holds almost 80% of the seats in the Parliament. The Tanzanian Union Parliament legislates on all union matters (foreign affairs, defense, police, etc.) and non-union matters for the mainland. Laws passed by the Parliament are valid for Zanzibar only in specifically designated union matters.

Under the Union Agreement, Zanzibar has extensive autonomy within Tanzania. Zanzibar has its own President, legislature and bureaucracy ("the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar" led by "the Revolutionary Council") that presides over all non-union matters. The constitutional changes endorsed in the July 31, 2010 referendum provide for a government of national unity which establishes the positions of the first and second vice presidents, the former to be selected from the lead opposition party and the latter from the ruling party. Ministers must be selected from among the members of Zanzibar's House of Representatives. The cabinet must reflect the proportion of seats held by each political party.

There are currently 81 members in the House of Representatives in Zanzibar: 50 elected by the people; 10 appointed by the president of Zanzibar, two of whom must be from the opposition; five ex officio members; an attorney general appointed by the president; and 20 special seats allocated to women. Zanzibar's House of Representatives can make laws for Zanzibar without the approval of the union government as long as it does not involve union-designated matters. The terms of office for Zanzibar's president and House of Representatives are 5 years. The semi-autonomous status of Zanzibar under the Union is frequently debated, both by mainlanders and by Zanzibaris.

Tanzania has a five-level judiciary combining the jurisdictions of tribal, Islamic, and British common law. Appeal is from the primary courts through the district courts, resident magistrate courts, to the high courts, and from the high courts to the Court of Appeals. District and resident court magistrates are appointed by the Chief Justice, except for judges of the High Court and Court of Appeals, who are appointed by the president. The Zanzibari court system parallels the legal system of the union. All cases tried in Zanzibari courts, except for those involving constitutional issues and Islamic law, can be appealed to the Court of Appeals of the union. A commercial court was established on the mainland in September 1999 as a division of the High Court.

For administrative purposes, Tanzania is divided into 30 regions--25 on the mainland, three on Unguja (Zanzibar), and two on Pemba (Zanzibar's second isle). District councils (also referred to as local government authorities) act at the most local level. There are 114 councils operating in 99 districts; 22 urban, 92 rural. The 22 urban units are classified further as city (Dar es Salaam and Mwanza), municipal (Arusha, Dodoma, Iringa, Kilimanjaro, Mbeya, Morogoro, Shinyanga, Tabora, and Tanga), and town councils (the remaining 11 communities).

Principal Government Officials
President--Jakaya Kikwete
Vice President--Mohamed Gharib Bilal
Prime Minister--Mizengo Kayanza Peter Pinda
President of Zanzibar--Ali Mohamed Shein
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Bernard Membe
Ambassador to the United States--Mwanaidi Sinare Maajar

Tanzania maintains an embassy in the United States at 1232 22nd St NW, Washington, DC 20037 (tel. 202-939-6125).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Tanzania held its fourth multi-party general elections on October 31, 2010. The ruling CCM party faced its most serious competition in the multi-party era. President Kikwete was re-elected with 61.7% of the vote, reduced from 80% in 2005. The Chadema party was for the first time the recipient of the most opposition votes. Chadema's presidential candidate, Willibrod Slaa, took 27% of the vote, while CUF's Ibrahim Lipumba received 8%. Voter turnout, at 42%, was by far the lowest in Tanzanian history; previously, at least 70% of registered voters had cast ballots. Although the elections were conducted without major disturbances or irregularities, Chadema officials raised concerns about voting and tabulation procedures and about the constitutional prohibition on challenging presidential election results following their formal announcement.

CCM retained its absolute majority in Parliament, with nearly 80% of the seats. With a total of 47 seats--24 elected and 23 "special seats" for women--Chadema for the first time displaced CUF as the official opposition and selected its Chairman, Freeman Mbowe, as opposition leader. The new Parliament selected Anne Makinda as Tanzania’s first woman Speaker of Parliament. Makinda, a member of Parliament since 1975 and former minister, had served as Deputy Speaker since 2005.

Self-governing Zanzibar (3% of Tanzania’s population) has long been the tempestuous exception to mainland Tanzania's peaceful politics. Serious irregularities and sporadic violence have marred every election in Zanzibar since 1964. However, after years of abortive negotiations the main opposition party, Civic United Front (CUF), and the ruling party were able to reach a power-sharing agreement. The outcome of the July 31, 2010 referendum set the stage for peaceful general elections on October 31 in Zanzibar. The power-sharing deal eliminated the winner-take-all system, giving the losing side one of two vice president slots and ministerial positions in proportion to the seats it holds in the House of Representatives. On October 31, Zanzibar CCM presidential candidate Ali Mohamed Shein won with 50.1% of the vote, while runner-up Civic United Front (CUF) presidential candidate Seif Sharif Hamad received 49.1%. Shein selected Hamad as his First Vice President and Seif Ali, the former Union Deputy Foreign Minister, as his Second Vice President.

ECONOMY
After independence, Tanzania adopted socialist economic policies, resulting in severe economic decline. The state controlled the economy and owned all of the major enterprises. The exchange rate and pricing policies were based on non-market mechanisms, creating low export and real GDP growth, high inflation, and widespread shortages. Agricultural production, the mainstay of the economy, declined steadily.

In 1986, Tanzania began to liberalize its economy and make partial market-oriented economic reforms. Although the government liberalized the agricultural marketing system and domestic prices and initiated financial system reform, economic growth was slow between 1986 and 1995.

Since 1996, Tanzania has taken aggressive steps toward macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. The emergence of a strong Ministry of Finance, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other development partners, was instrumental in accelerating fiscal reforms and fostering a turnaround in fiscal performance. Overall, real GDP growth has averaged about 6% a year over the past 7 years, which was higher than the annual average growth of less than 5% in the late 1990s. Total debt service payments for 2010 were $85 million. The IMF’s most recent Debt Sustainability Analysis indicates that debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative combined with sound macroeconomic policies place it at low risk of debt distress. Public external debt service was approximately 1% of GDP in 2009 and is expected to remain so for 2010 and 2011.

However, economic growth has not translated to significantly improving the lives of average Tanzanians. The economy remains overwhelmingly donor-dependent; 30% of the budget is dependent upon donor assistance. The global financial crisis significantly affected the tourism industry, one of Tanzania's top foreign-exchange earners; however, Tanzania was able to maintain relatively strong growth in 2010. Continued high food prices since a spike in 2008 have contributed to a rise in inflation to over 10%, a substantial increase from more moderate inflation earlier in the decade.

Agriculture constitutes the most important sector of the economy, providing about 27% of GDP and 80% of employment. Cash crops--including coffee, tea, cotton, cashews, sisal, cloves, and pyrethrum--account for the vast majority of export earnings. While the volume of major crops--both cash and goods marketed through official channels--have increased in recent years, large amounts of produce never reach the market. Poor pricing and unreliable cash flow to farmers continue to frustrate the growth of the agricultural sector.

Accounting for about 22.6% of GDP, Tanzania's industrial sector is one of the smallest in Africa. The main industrial activities are dominated by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) specializing in food processing including dairy products, meat packing, preserving fruits and vegetables, production of textile and apparel, leather tanning, and plastics. A few larger factories manufacture cement, rolled steel, corrugated iron, aluminum sheets, cigarettes, beer and bottling beverages, fruit juices, and mineral water. Other factories produce raw materials, import substitutes, and processed agricultural products. Poor water and electricity infrastructure systems continue to hinder manufacturing. In general, Tanzania's manufacturing sector targets primarily the domestic market with limited exports of manufactured goods. Most of the industry is concentrated in Dar es Salaam.

Generally, Tanzania has a favorable attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI) and has made efforts to encourage foreign investment. Government steps to improve the business climate include redrawing tax codes, floating the exchange rate, licensing foreign banks, and creating an investment promotion center to cut red tape. However, Tanzania still must overcome the legacy of socialism. The most common complaint of investors, foreign and domestic, is the hostile bureaucracy and the weak judiciary system.

Zanzibar's economy is based primarily on the production of cloves (90% grown on the island of Pemba), the principal foreign exchange earner. Exports have suffered with the downturn in the clove market. Tourism is a promising sector with a number of new hotels and resorts having been built in recent years. A prolonged electricity shortage from December 2009 to March 2010 delivered a blow to Zanzibar’s economy, severely affecting tourism and causing a rapid increase in commodity prices.

The island's manufacturing sector is limited mainly to import substitution industries, such as cigarettes, shoes, and processed agricultural products. In 1992, the government designated two export-producing zones and encouraged the development of offshore financial services. Zanzibar still imports much of its staple requirements, petroleum products, and manufactured articles.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
After achieving independence, Tanzania's leadership emphasized supporting the efforts of other African nations to gain independence. It supported the struggle against the apartheid government of South Africa, championed some form of political union of African states, and promoted a non-aligned stance toward the Cold War antagonists. To these ends, Tanzania played an important role in regional and international organizations. Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Additionally, Tanzania played an active role in the anti-apartheid front-line states, the G-77, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). One of Africa's best-known elder statesmen, Nyerere was personally active in many of these organizations, and served as chairman of the OAU (1984-85) and chairman of the six front-line states. Nyerere's death, in October 1999, is solemnly observed each year.

Tanzania enjoys good relations with its neighbors in the region. Tanzania has long promoted efforts to resolve chronic conflicts, especially in the Great Lakes region. Tanzania helped to broker peace talks to end the conflict in Burundi. In March 1996, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya revived discussion of economic and regional cooperation. These talks culminated with the signing of an East African Cooperation Treaty in September 1999. The East African Community (EAC) customs union came into effect January 1, 2005 and its Common Market Protocol entered into force on July 1, 2010. Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC as full members in 2007. Tanzania is the only country in East Africa which also is a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Tanzania was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2005-2006. President Kikwete chaired the African Union for a 1-year term in 2009-2010. In March 2008, the Tanzanian military led an African Union-authorized force to restore government authority on one of the islands of the Comoros archipelago. Long a host to substantial refugee populations, in 2009 Tanzania granted citizenship to 162,000 Burundi refugees. Tanzania's participation in UN peacekeeping missions includes deployments to Lebanon and Sudan.

U.S.-TANZANIAN RELATIONS
The U.S. has provided development assistance to Tanzania since independence. Diplomatic coordination between the two countries was limited during the Cold War decades and security cooperation was even more limited. Security and diplomatic cooperation improved sharply after al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998. In February 2008, President George W. Bush made an official 4-day visit to Tanzania. President Kikwete, who has visited the United States several times, made a reciprocal official visit to Washington in August 2008. In May 2009, President Kikwete became the first African president to be received by President Barack Obama at the White House.

The U.S. Government provides assistance to Tanzania to support programs in the areas of peace and security, democracy, health, education, economic growth, and natural resource management. Tanzania is a major recipient of funding for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). In September 2008, Tanzania's $698 million Millennium Challenge Compact entered into force. The Peace Corps provides volunteers serving in education, health, and environment sectors.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Alfonso E. Lenhardt
Deputy Chief of Mission--Robert K. Scott
Director, USAID--Robert Cunnane
Public Affairs Officer--Ilya Levin
Director, Peace Corps--Andrea Wojnar-Diagne

The U.S. Embassy in Tanzania is located on Old Bagamoyo Road, Dar es Salaam. The consulate on Zanzibar was closed in 1979.

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April 11, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Background Note: Zambia

Official Name: Republic of Zambia

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 752,612 sq. km. (290,585 sq. mi.); slightly larger than Texas.
Cities: Capital--Lusaka (pop. approx. 1.7 million).
Other cities: Kitwe, Ndola, Livingstone, Kabwe.
Terrain: Varies; mostly plateau savanna.
Climate: Generally dry and temperate.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Zambian(s).
Population (mid-2009 est.): Approx. 12.9 million.
Annual population growth rate (2009): 2.9%.
Ethnic groups: More than 70 ethnic groups.
Religions: Christian, indigenous beliefs, Muslim, Hindu.
Languages: English (official), about 70 local languages and dialects, including Bemba, Lozi, Kaonde, Lunda, Luvale, Tonga, and Nyanja.
Education: No compulsory education; 7 years free education. Literacy--women: 60.6%; men: 81.6%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--70/1,000. Life expectancy--38.63 years. HIV prevalence (15-49 years of age)--14.3%.
Work force: Agriculture--75%; mining and manufacturing--6%; services--19%.

Government
Type: Republic.
Independence: October 24, 1964.
Constitution: 1991 (as amended in 1996).
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state and head of government), cabinet. Legislative--unicameral National Assembly. Judicial--Supreme Court, high court, magistrate courts, and local courts.
Ruling political party: Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD).
Suffrage: Universal adult.
Subdivisions: Nine provinces subdivided into 72 districts.

Economy
GDP (2008, purchasing power parity): $17.39 billion.
Annual growth rate (2010, projected): 5.8%.
Per capita GDP (2008, current prices): $1,500.
Natural resources: Copper, cobalt, zinc, lead, coal, emeralds, gold, silver, uranium, hydroelectric power, fertile land.
Agriculture: Products--corn, sorghum, rice, groundnuts, sunflower seeds, vegetables, fruits, flowers, tobacco, cotton, sugarcane, livestock, coffee, and soybeans.
Industry: Types--mining, transport, construction, foodstuffs, beverages, chemicals, and textiles.
Trade (2008 est.): Exports--$5.08 billion: copper, cobalt, lead, and zinc, cut vegetables, cotton, tobacco. Major markets--Switzerland, China, Pakistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, Malawi. Imports--$5.06 billion: crude oil, refined petroleum products, manufactured goods, machinery, transport equipment, foodstuffs, chemicals. Major suppliers--South Africa, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Kingdom.
Major donors: Donor contributions totaled $1.181 billion in 2010, as reported by Ministry of Finance and National Planning. The European Commission is Zambia's largest multilateral donor. Other key multilateral donors include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN agencies, and the African Development Bank. Counting direct bilateral assistance and assistance through multilateral agencies, the United States is Zambia's largest country donor, amounting to approximately $390 million in 2010.

PEOPLE
Zambia's population comprises more than 70 Bantu-speaking ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups are small, and only two have enough people to constitute at least 10% of the population. Most Zambians are subsistence farmers. The predominant religion is a blend of traditional beliefs and Christianity; Christianity is the official national religion. Expatriates, a majority of whom are British (about 15,000) and South African, live mainly in Lusaka and in the Copperbelt in northern Zambia, where they are employed in mines and related activities. Zambia also has a small but economically important Asian population, most of whom are Indians. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is ravaging Zambia. Approximately 14.3% of Zambians are infected by HIV. Over 800,000 Zambian children have lost one or both of their parents due to HIV/AIDS. Life expectancy at birth is 38.63 years.

HISTORY
The indigenous hunter-gatherer occupants of Zambia began to be displaced or absorbed by more advanced migrating tribes about 2,000 years ago. The major waves of Bantu-speaking immigrants began in the 15th century, with the greatest influx between the late 17th and early 19th centuries. They came primarily from the Luba and Lunda tribes of southern Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Angola but were joined in the 19th century by Ngoni peoples from the south. By the latter part of that century, the various peoples of Zambia were largely established in the areas they currently occupy.

Except for an occasional Portuguese explorer, the area lay untouched by Europeans for centuries. After the mid-19th century, it was penetrated by Western explorers, missionaries, and traders. David Livingstone, in 1855, was the first European to see the magnificent waterfalls on the Zambezi River. He named the falls after Queen Victoria, and the Zambian town near the falls is named after him.

In 1888, Cecil Rhodes, spearheading British commercial and political interests in Central Africa, obtained a mineral rights concession from local chiefs. In the same year, Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively) were proclaimed a British sphere of influence. Southern Rhodesia was annexed formally and granted self-government in 1923, and the administration of Northern Rhodesia was transferred to the British colonial office in 1924 as a protectorate.

In 1953, both Rhodesias were joined with Nyasaland (now Malawi) to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia was the center of much of the turmoil and crisis that characterized the federation in its last years. At the core of the controversy were insistent African demands for greater participation in government and European fears of losing political control.

A two-stage election held in October and December 1962 resulted in an African majority in the legislative council and an uneasy coalition between the two African nationalist parties. The council passed resolutions calling for Northern Rhodesia's secession from the federation and demanding full internal self-government under a new constitution and a new national assembly based on a broader, more democratic franchise. On December 31, 1963, the federation was dissolved, and Northern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zambia on October 24, 1964.

At independence, despite its considerable mineral wealth, Zambia faced major challenges. Domestically, there were few trained and educated Zambians capable of running the government, and the economy was largely dependent on foreign expertise. Abroad, three of its neighbors--Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola--remained under white-dominated rule. Rhodesia's white-ruled government unilaterally declared independence in 1965. In addition, Zambia shared a border with South African-controlled South-West Africa (now Namibia). Zambia's sympathies lay with forces opposing colonial or white-dominated rule, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. During the next decade, it actively supported movements such as the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

Conflicts with Rhodesia resulted in the closing of Zambia's borders with that country and severe problems with international transport and power supply. However, the Kariba hydroelectric station on the Zambezi River provided sufficient capacity to satisfy the country's requirements for electricity. A railroad to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, built with Chinese assistance, reduced Zambian dependence on railroad lines south to South Africa and west through an increasingly troubled Angola.

By the late 1970s, Mozambique and Angola had attained independence from Portugal. Zimbabwe achieved independence in accordance with the 1979 Lancaster House agreement, but Zambia's problems were not solved. Civil war in the former Portuguese colonies generated refugees and caused continuing transportation problems. The Benguela Railroad, which extended west through Angola, was essentially closed to traffic from Zambia by the late 1970s. Zambia's strong support for the ANC, which had its external headquarters in Lusaka, created security problems as South Africa raided ANC targets in Zambia.

In the mid-1970s, the price of copper, Zambia's principal export, suffered a severe decline worldwide. Zambia turned to foreign and international lenders for relief, but as copper prices remained depressed, it became increasingly difficult to service its growing debt.

In response to growing popular demand, and after lengthy, difficult negotiations between the Kaunda government and opposition groups, Zambia enacted a new constitution in 1991 and shortly thereafter became a multi-party democracy. Kaunda's successor, Frederick Chiluba, made efforts to liberalize the economy and privatize industry, but allegations of massive corruption characterized the latter part of his administration. By the mid-1990s, despite limited debt relief, Zambia's per capita foreign debt remained among the highest in the world.

Although poverty continues to be a significant problem in Zambia, its economy has stabilized, attaining single-digit inflation in 2006-2007, real GDP growth, decreasing interest rates, and increasing levels of trade. Much of its growth is due to foreign investment in Zambia's mining sector and higher copper prices on the world market. In 2005, Zambia qualified for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, consisting of approximately U.S. $6 billion in debt relief.

GOVERNMENT
Zambia became a republic immediately upon attaining independence in October 1964. The constitution promulgated on August 25, 1973, abrogated the original 1964 constitution. The new constitution and the national elections that followed in December 1973 were the final steps in achieving what was called a "one-party participatory democracy."

The 1973 constitution provided for a strong president and a unicameral National Assembly. National policy was formulated by the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the sole legal party in Zambia. The cabinet executed the central committee's policy.

In accordance with the intention to formalize UNIP supremacy in the new system, the constitution stipulated that the sole candidate in elections for the office of president was the person selected to be the president of UNIP by the party's general conference. The second-ranking person in the Zambian hierarchy was UNIP's secretary general.

In December 1990, at the end of a tumultuous year that included riots in the capital and a coup attempt, President Kenneth Kaunda signed legislation ending UNIP's monopoly on power. Zambia enacted a new constitution in August 1991, which enlarged the National Assembly from 136 members to a maximum of 158 members, established an electoral commission, and allowed for more than one presidential candidate who no longer had to be a member of UNIP. The constitution was amended again in 1996 to set new limits on the presidency (including a retroactive two-term limit, and a requirement that both parents of a candidate be Zambian-born). The National Assembly is comprised of 150 directly elected members, up to eight presidentially-appointed members, and a speaker. Zambia is divided into nine provinces, each administered by an appointed deputy minister who essentially performs the duties of a governor.

The Supreme Court is the highest court and the court of appeal; below it are the high court, magistrate's court, and local courts.

Principal Government Officials
President--Rupiah Banda
Vice President and Minister of Justice--George Kunda
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Kabinga Pande
Minister of Defense--Kalombo Mwansa
Minister of Finance--Situmbeko Musokotwane
Minister of Health--Kapembwa Simbao
Ambassador to the United States--Sheila Siwela
Ambassador to the United Nations--Lazarous Kapambwe

Zambia maintains an embassy in the United States at 2419 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel: 202-265-9717/8/9).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The major figure in Zambian politics from 1964 to 1991 was Kenneth Kaunda, who led the campaign for independence and successfully bridged the rivalries among the country's various regions and ethnic groups. Kaunda tried to base government on his philosophy of "humanism," which condemned human exploitation and stressed cooperation among people, but not at the expense of the individual.

Kaunda's political party--the United National Independence Party (UNIP)--was founded in 1959 and was in power under Kaunda's leadership from 1964 to 1991. Before 1972, Zambia had three significant political parties, but only UNIP had a nationwide following.

In December 1972, Zambian law established a one-party state, and all other political parties were banned; this was later enshrined in the 1973 constitution. Kaunda, the sole candidate, was elected President in the 1973 elections. Elections also were held for the National Assembly. Only UNIP members were permitted to run, but these seats were sharply contested. President Kaunda's mandate was renewed in December 1978, October 1983, and October 1988 in a "yes" or "no" vote on his candidacy.

Growing opposition to UNIP's monopoly on power led to the rise in 1990 of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The MMD assembled an increasingly impressive group of important Zambians, including prominent UNIP defectors and labor leaders. Zambia's first multi-party elections for parliament and the presidency were held on October 31, 1991. MMD candidate Frederick Chiluba resoundingly carried the presidential election over Kenneth Kaunda with 81% of the vote. To add to the MMD landslide, in the parliamentary elections, the MMD won 125 of the 150 elected seats, and UNIP won the remaining 25.

By the end of Chiluba's first term as President (1996), the MMD's commitment to political reform had faded in the face of re-election aspirations. A number of prominent supporters founded opposing parties. Relying on the MMD's overwhelming majority in parliament, President Chiluba in May 1996 pushed through constitutional amendments that eliminated former President Kaunda and other prominent opposition leaders from the 1996 presidential elections. In the presidential and parliamentary elections held in November 1996, Chiluba was re-elected, and the MMD won 131 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly. Kaunda's UNIP party boycotted the parliamentary polls to protest the exclusion of its leader from the presidential race, alleging in addition that the outcome of the election had been predetermined due to a faulty voter registration exercise. As President Chiluba began his second term in 1997, the opposition and civil society challenged the results of the election amid international efforts to encourage the MMD and the opposition to resolve their differences through dialogue.

Early in 2001, supporters of President Chiluba mounted a campaign to amend the constitution to enable Chiluba to seek a third term of office. Civil society, opposition parties, and many members of the ruling party exerted sufficient pressure on Chiluba to force him to back away from any attempt at a third term.

Presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections were held on December 27, 2001. Eleven parties contested the elections. The elections encountered numerous administrative problems. Opposition parties alleged that serious irregularities occurred. Nevertheless, MMD presidential candidate Levy Mwanawasa, having garnered a plurality of the vote (29%), was declared the victor by a narrow margin, and he was sworn into office on January 2, 2002. Opposition parties won a majority of parliamentary seats in the December 2001 election, but subsequent by-elections gave the ruling MMD a majority in parliament.

During his first months in office, President Mwanawasa encouraged the Zambian Anticorruption Commission to aggressively pursue its mandate. In July 2002, in a speech before the Zambian National Assembly, President Mwanawasa provided details on a number of corruption allegations targeting former President Chiluba, and called for parliament to consider lifting Chiluba's immunity from prosecution.

On May 4, 2007, a British court found former president Chiluba and several others liable in a civil suit for misappropriating as much as $58 million of public resources, but the case has not yet been registered in Zambian courts and enforced. The government's Task Force on Corruption (originally established by former president Mwanawasa) has successfully prosecuted several cases of abuse of office and high-level corruption. In August 2009, and after 8 years, a Zambian magistrate acquitted Chiluba of corruption and the Government of Zambia declined to appeal the acquittal.

In February 2006 the government agreed to allow the formation of a Constituent Assembly to consider and adopt a draft constitution, subject to certain conditions. In August 2007, the Zambian parliament passed a government-sponsored law creating a National Constitutional Conference (NCC) charged with drafting a new constitution. The NCC, comprised of over 500 members drawn from parliament, political parties, civil society, and government, began meeting in late December 2007 and had its mandate extended into 2010. Some members of civil society refused to participate in the NCC, saying that its membership was too heavily stacked in the government's favor and pushing instead for the promised Constituent Assembly.

The Government of Zambia introduced very limited legislative changes to electoral procedures in mid-2006, including an electoral code of conduct and limits on politically-motivated donations and handouts. However, in parliamentary by-elections held in 2009, candidates from all parties violated the code of conduct, and the Electoral Commission of Zambia had insufficient capacity to enforce it.

President Mwanawasa died August 19, 2008 in a Paris hospital from complications of a stroke suffered June 29. In accordance with the constitution, Vice President Rupiah Banda assumed presidential powers but was required to hold elections within 90 days of Mwanawasa's death. Elections were held on October 30, 2008. Banda was declared the winner after narrowly defeating Michael Sata of the opposition Patriotic Front party by only 30,000 votes. International observers were satisfied overall with the conduct of the election and the management of the Electoral Commission of Zambia, although no voters had been registered since late 2005. Banda was sworn in on November 2, 2008 and announced new cabinet members on November 14. Banda has vowed to continue the business-friendly and corruption-fighting policies of his predecessor, but emerging corruption scandals in the Zambian Government and the acquittal of former President Chiluba have raised speculation about President Banda’s initial commitments to promote fiscal transparency and accountability and about his overall commitment to fighting corruption. Presidential and parliamentary elections are currently slated for 2011.

ECONOMY
About two-thirds of Zambians live in poverty. Per capita annual incomes are well below their levels at independence and, at $1,500, place the country among the world's poorest nations. Social indicators continue to decline, particularly in measurements of life expectancy at birth (about 39 years) and maternal mortality (101 per 1,000 live births). The country's rate of economic growth cannot support rapid population growth or the strain which HIV/AIDS-related issues (i.e., rising medical costs, decline in worker productivity) place on government resources. Zambia is also one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most highly urbanized countries. Over one-third of the country's 12.9 million people are concentrated in a few urban zones strung along the major transportation corridors, while rural areas are underpopulated. Unemployment and underemployment are serious problems.

HIV/AIDS is the nation's greatest challenge, with 14.3% prevalence among the adult population. HIV/AIDS will continue to ravage Zambian economic, political, cultural, and social development for the foreseeable future.

Once a middle-income country, Zambia began to slide into poverty in the 1970s when copper prices declined on world markets. The socialist government made up for falling revenue by increasing borrowing. After democratic multi-party elections, the Chiluba government (1991-2001) came to power in November 1991 committed to an economic reform program. The government was successful in some areas, such as privatization of most of the parastatals, maintenance of positive real interest rates, the elimination of exchange controls, and endorsement of free market principles. Corruption grew dramatically under the Chiluba government. Zambia has yet to address effectively issues such as reducing the size of the public sector and improving Zambia's social sector delivery systems.

For 30 years, copper production declined steadily from a 1973 high of 700,000 metric tons to a 2000 low of 226,192 metric tons. The decline was the result of poor management of state-owned mines and lack of investment. With the privatization of the mines in April 2000, the downward trend in production and exports was reversed as a result of investments in plant rehabilitation, expansion, increased exploration, and high copper prices on the international market. Copper production rose to 535,000 metric tons in 2007, but slumping copper prices in late 2008 put significant pressure on the mining companies and government revenue. Zambia experienced positive economic growth for the eleventh consecutive year in 2009, with a real growth rate of 4.3% (as projected by the government). The rate of inflation dropped from 30% in 2000 to single-digit inflation of 8.9% by December 2007 due to fiscal and monetary discipline and the growth of the domestic food supply. Year-on-year inflation rose above 14% in 2009, due to rising fuel and food prices.

In April 2005, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) provided Zambia significant debt service relief and debt forgiveness under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Zambia was the 17th country to reach the HIPC completion point and has benefited from approximately U.S. $6 billion in debt relief. In July 2005, the G-8 agreed on a proposal to cancel 100% of outstanding debt of eligible HIPC countries to the IMF, African Development Fund, and IDA. Zambia is among the beneficiaries of this additional multilateral debt relief. Zambia also completed a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement with the IMF for the period 2008-2011. The Zambian Government is pursuing an economic diversification program to reduce the economy's reliance on the copper industry. This initiative seeks to exploit other components of Zambia's rich resource base by promoting agriculture, tourism, gemstone mining, and hydropower. The government is also seeking to create an environment that encourages entrepreneurship and private-sector led growth.

Zambia's economy has weathered the effects of the global economic crisis and a subsequent fall in world copper prices. High inflation, currency volatility, rising unemployment, and restricted access to capital dampened Zambia’s economic performance in early 2009; however, copper prices have nearly returned to more stable, profit-yielding levels.

DEFENSE
The Zambian Defense Force (ZDF) consists of the army, the air force, and Zambian National Service (ZNS). The ZNS, while operating under the Ministry of Defense, is responsible primarily for public works projects. The ZDF is designed primarily for internal defense. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has hit the ZDF especially hard.

The ZDF has contributed to African Union and United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, and in 2005 became a partner in the African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) program. The first iteration of ACOTA peacekeeper training took place in 2007, but subsequent training sessions have been delayed.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Zambia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which is headquartered in Lusaka.

President Kaunda was a persistent and visible advocate of change in southern Africa, supporting liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa. Many of these liberation organizations were based in Zambia during the 1970s and 1980s.

President Chiluba assumed a visible international role in the mid- and late 1990s. His government sponsored Angola peace talks that led to the 1994 Lusaka Protocols. Zambia provided troops to UN peacekeeping initiatives in Mozambique, Rwanda, Angola, and Sierra Leone. Zambia was the first African state to cooperate with the International Tribunal investigation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

In 1998, Zambia took the lead in efforts to establish a cease-fire in Democratic Republic of the Congo. After the signing of a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka in July and August 1999, Zambia was active in supporting the Congolese peace effort, although activity diminished considerably after the Joint Military Commission tasked with implementing the ceasefire relocated to Kinshasa in September 2001.

During President Mwanawasa's administration, Zambia contributed troops to support UN peacekeeping operations in southern Sudan. During his tenure as SADC Chair, President Mwanawasa brought the issue of Zimbabwe to the fore in the SADC, taking a lead role in pressuring President Mugabe for reforms in his country. Zambia's history of stability and its commitment to regional peace has made it a haven for large numbers of refugees. Currently, Zambia hosts approximately 56,000 refugees (down from a high of 203,000 in 2002), including roughly 25,300 Angolans and 21,900 Congolese. Refugees of other nationalities are primarily Rwandans, Burundians, Somalis, and Ugandans. Since 2007, 33,000 Congolese refugees have been repatriated from Zambia, and as of 2010 the Government of Zambia and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expected to close two of the refugee camps that had housed Congolese.

U.S.-ZAMBIAN RELATIONS
The United States and Zambia enjoy cordial relations. The United States works closely with the Zambian Government to defeat the HIV/AIDS pandemic that is ravaging Zambia, to promote economic growth and development, and to bring about political reform by promoting democratic principles and responsible government. The United States is also supporting the government's efforts to root out corruption. Zambia is a beneficiary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and in December 2009 was re-selected as eligible for a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) compact, for which it first qualified in 2008. The U.S. Government provides a variety of additional technical assistance and support that is managed by the Department of State, in cooperation with the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Centers for Disease Control, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Peace Corps. The majority of U.S. assistance is provided through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in support of the fight against HIV/AIDS.

In addition to supporting development projects, the United States has provided considerable emergency food aid during periods of drought and flooding through the World Food Program (WFP) and is a major contributor to refugee programs in Zambia through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other agencies.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
In 2008 USAID assistance to Zambia exceeded $210 million, including over $144 million for HIV/AIDS programs utilizing PEPFAR funding and $15 million to fight malaria. Other major programs include training and technical assistance to: promote economic growth with a focus on agriculture-related policy, trade, and production technologies; create health and educational opportunities to improve lives; and reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS through multi-sectoral responses. In addition, USAID helps build the capacity of the Government of Zambia to respond to emergency needs.

Peace Corps
A country agreement inviting the Peace Corps to work in Zambia was signed by the United States and Zambia on September 14, 1993. The first group of volunteers was sworn in on April 7, 1994. In 2010, the Peace Corps program in Zambia continued to increase understanding between Zambians and Americans. More than 150 two-year Volunteers and as many as 15 extension and Peace Corps Response Volunteers promote sustainable development through their activities in agricultural and natural resource management, health, rural education, aquaculture, and humanitarian assistance. Volunteers are working in eight of Zambia's nine provinces building local capacity to manage family fish farms, to promote food security and positive resource management practices near forest reserves, to implement health reforms at the village level, to promote and support rural education, and to extend HIV/AIDS education and prevention efforts through full participation in PEPFAR. Volunteers live primarily in rural villages in remote parts of the country without running water, electricity, or other amenities. New trainees undertake training in local language, culture, and the relevant technical specialty for 9 weeks at a center in the Chongwe district of Lusaka province.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Mark Storella
Deputy Chief of Mission--Stephen Schwartz
Public Affairs Officer--Priscilla Hernandez
Political/Economic Section Chief--Phil Nervig
Consular Officer--Kate McGeary
Defense Attache--Lt. Col. Derek West
USAID Mission Director--Melissa Williams
Peace Corps Director--Tom Kennedy

The U.S. Embassy in Zambia is at the eastern end of Kabulonga Road, Ibex Hill (P.O. Box 31617), Lusaka (tel: +260 (0) 211-357-000; fax +260 (0) 211-357-224).

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April 12, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Background Note: Rwanda

Official Name: Republic of Rwanda

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 26,338 sq. km. (10,169 sq. km.); about the size of Maryland.
Cities: Capital--Kigali (est. pop. 800,000). Other cities--Muhanga (formerly Gitarama), Huye (formerly Butare), Musanze (formerly Ruhengeri), Rubavu (formerly Gisenyi).
Terrain: Uplands and hills.
Climate: Mild and temperate, with two rainy seasons.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Rwandan(s); Rwandese.
Population (2009 est.): approximately 9,997,614.
Annual population growth rate (2008 est.): 2.8%.
Religions (2002 est.): Christian 93.5%, traditional African 0.1%, Muslim 4.6%, 1.7% claim no religious beliefs.
Languages: Kinyarwanda, French, English.
Education: Years compulsory--9. Attendance (prewar)--75%. Literacy (2008)--70%.
Health: Infant mortality rate (2008 est., Rwandan Government)--62 deaths/1,000. Life expectancy (2008 est.)--49.8 years.
Work force (2000): Agriculture--90%; industry and commerce, services, and government--10%.

Government
Type: Republic.
Independence: July 1, 1962.
Constitution: May 26, 2003.
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government). Broad-based government of national unity formed after the 1994 genocide. Legislative--80-seat Chamber of Deputies; 26-member Senate. Judicial--Supreme Court; High Courts of the Republic; Provincial Courts; District Courts; mediation committees.
Administrative subdivisions: 4 provinces plus Kigali; 30 districts; 416 sectors; 2,148 cells.
Political parties: There are 10 political parties, including the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which leads a coalition that includes the Centrist Democratic Party (PDC), the Rwandan Socialist Party (PSR), the Ideal [formerly Islamic] Democratic Party (PDI), the Prosperity and Solidarity Party (PSP), and the Democratic Popular Union (UPDR). Other parties include the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Liberal Party (PL), the Concord Progressive Party (PPC), and the Social Party Imberakuri (PS-Imberakuri).
Suffrage: Universal for citizens over 18--except refugees, prisoners, and certain categories of convicts.
Central government budget (2009-2010 est.): 900 billion Rwandan francs ($1.5 billion).

Economy
GDP (2009 est.): $5.1 billion.
Real GDP growth rate (2010 est., International Monetary Fund): 6.5%.
Per capita income (2009 est.): $510. Purchasing power parity (2006 est.): $1,600.
Average inflation rate (2008 est.): 5.7%.
Agriculture (2009): 36% of GDP. Products--coffee, tea, pyrethrum (insecticide made from chrysanthemums), bananas, beans, sorghum, potatoes, livestock.
Industry (2009): 14.2% of GDP. Types--cement, agricultural products, beer production, soft drinks, soap, furniture, shoes, plastic goods, textiles, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals.
Services (2009): 43.7%.
Trade (2009 est.): Exports--$193 million: tea, coffee, coltan, cassiterite, hides, iron ore, and tin. Major markets--China, Belgium, and Germany. Imports--$963 million f.o.b.: foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, steel, petroleum products, cement, and construction material. Major suppliers--Kenya, Germany, Belgium, France, Uganda, and Israel.

GEOGRAPHY
Rwanda's countryside is covered by grasslands and small farms extending over rolling hills, with areas of rugged mountains that extend southeast from a chain of volcanoes in the northwest. The divide between the Congo and Nile drainage systems extends from north to south through western Rwanda at an average elevation of almost 9,000 feet. On the western slopes of this ridgeline, the land slopes abruptly toward Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River valley, which form the western boundary with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) and constitute part of the Great Rift valley. The eastern slopes are more moderate, with rolling hills extending across central uplands at gradually reducing altitudes, to the plains, swamps, and lakes of the eastern border region.

Although located only two degrees south of the Equator, Rwanda's high elevation makes the climate temperate. The average daily temperature near Lake Kivu, at an altitude of 4,800 feet (1,463 meters) is 73^o F (23^oC). During the two rainy seasons (February-May and September-December), heavy downpours occur almost daily, alternating with sunny weather. Annual rainfall averages 80 centimeters (31 in.) but is generally heavier in the western and northwestern mountains than in the eastern savannas.

PEOPLE
Rwanda's population density is currently the highest in continental sub-Saharan Africa. It is still a very rural society, and many families live in a self-contained compound on a hillside. The urban concentrations are grouped around administrative centers. The indigenous population consists of three groups, or ubwoko--Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa. Traditionally, the population also is affiliated with one of 18 clans--all with more than one ubwoko or group.

Accounts of the respective arrivals of each ubwoko centuries ago in the area of modern Rwanda were highly politicized throughout much of the 20th century, and the Belgian colonialists’ “racialization” of differences among ubwoko was used by the Rwandan Government to fuel the 1994 state-orchestrated genocide. As part of political efforts to overcome divisions that led to the genocide, the Rwandan Government does not collect data on ubwoko and banned its inclusion on identity cards. Rwandans share the same language and culture, so ubwoko today reflects a family identity that has been passed patrilineally and often a historical narrative. The Rwandan Government does not permit politicization of this identity, any form of discrimination, or “genocide ideology” (hate speech) based on ubwoko.

Education
Until 1994, educational opportunities for Rwandans were extremely limited. After the genocide, most primary schools and more than half of prewar secondary schools reopened, though no more than 5% of the adult population received secondary education through 1996. Although educational quality remains an issue, access to education expanded dramatically in recent years and the Government of Rwanda’s Nine-Year Basic Education policy, implemented in 2010, contributed to an increase of the primary school completion rate from 52.4% in 2008 to 75.6% in 2010.

The National University (NUR) in Huye (formerly Butare), Rwanda’s sole university prior to 1994, reopened in April 1995; enrollment is over 7,000 students. Today, there are about 20 institutions of higher learning in Rwanda. Between 1963-1993, Rwandan university graduates numbered roughly 1,900; today, Rwandan university graduates exceed 44,000. Seventy percent of the adult population is literate (2008). Rebuilding the educational system continues to be a high priority of the Rwandan Government. Rwanda has three official languages--Kinyarwanda, French, and English. The recent transition to English as the language of instruction in schools presents pedagogical challenges even as if offers prospects for increased opportunity within the East African Community and internationally.

HISTORY
Beginning in the 15th century, Rwandans established a monarchy headed by a Tutsi mwami (king) with a hierarchy of Tutsi nobles and gentry. In some areas of the country, independent Hutu principalities continued to exist, and in other areas, Tutsi and Hutu lineages lived in interdependent cooperation under the nominal control of the king. Within the monarchy, through a contract known as ubuhake, the Hutu farmers pledged their services and those of their descendants to a Tutsi lord in return for the loan of cattle and use of pastures and arable land, creating a relationship somewhat similar to serfdom. However, membership in a ubwoko and class were fluid. Affiliation was determined by paternal ancestors. Intermarriage and multiple marriage was common. Some Hutus took Tutsi status and some Tutsis lost their status as Tutsis. Most rural Tutsis enjoyed few advantages over rural Hutus). The first European known to have visited Rwanda was German Count Von Goetzen in 1894. He was followed by missionaries called the "White Fathers." In 1899, the mwami submitted to a German protectorate without resistance. Belgian troops from Zaire chased the small number of Germans out of Rwanda in 1915 and took control of the country.

After World War I, the League of Nations mandated Rwanda and its southern neighbor, Burundi, to Belgium as the territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Following World War II, Ruanda-Urundi became a UN Trust Territory with Belgium as the administrative authority. Reforms instituted by the Belgians in the 1950s encouraged the growth of democratic political institutions but were resisted by the Tutsi traditionalists who saw in them a threat to Tutsi rule. Hutu leaders, encouraged by the Belgian military, sparked a popular revolt in November 1959, resulting in the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy. Two years later, the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) won an overwhelming victory in a UN-supervised referendum.

During the 1959 revolt and its aftermath, more than 160,000 Tutsis fled to neighboring countries. The PARMEHUTU government, formed as a result of the September 1961 election, was granted internal autonomy by Belgium on January 1, 1962. A June 1962 UN General Assembly resolution terminated the Belgian trusteeship and granted full independence to Rwanda (and Burundi) effective July 1, 1962.

Gregoire Kayibanda, leader of the PARMEHUTU Party, became Rwanda's first elected president, leading a one-party government chosen from the membership of the directly elected unicameral National Assembly. The Kayibanda government promoted a Hutu-supremacist ideology, and a series of anti-Tutsi “pogroms” and other violence gravely affected internal security and provoked the flight of Rwandan Tutsis.

Rwanda established relations with 43 countries, including the United States, during the first 10 years. Despite some progress made, inefficiency and corruption festered in government ministries in the mid-1960s. On July 5, 1973, the military took power by force under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana, who dissolved the National Assembly and the PARMEHUTU Party and abolished all political activity.

In 1975, President Habyarimana formed the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) as Rwanda’s only legal party. The movement was organized from the "hillside" to the national level and included elected and appointed officials. During his tenure, violence against Tutsis continued without effective prosecution of wrongdoers, prompting more exoduses.

Under MRND aegis, Rwandans went to the polls in December 1978, overwhelmingly endorsed a new constitution, and confirmed President Habyarimana as president. President Habyarimana was re-elected in 1983 and again in 1988, when he was the sole candidate. Responding to international as well as public pressure for political reform, President Habyarimana announced in July 1990 his intention to transform Rwanda's one-party state into a multi-party democracy. He also indicated that Rwanda “had no room” for its largely Tutsi population living in exile, so they were not welcome to return to Rwanda.

On October 1, 1990, Rwandan exiles banded together as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and invaded Rwanda from their base in Uganda. The rebel force, composed primarily of ethnic Tutsis who had not been allowed to return to Rwanda under the Kayibanda or Habyarimana regimes, blamed the government for failing to democratize and resolve the problems of some 500,000 Tutsi refugees living in the diaspora around the world. The war dragged on for almost 2 years until a cease-fire accord was signed July 12, 1992, in Arusha, Tanzania, fixing a timetable for an end to the fighting and political talks, leading to a peace accord and power sharing, and authorizing a neutral military observer group under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity. A cease-fire took effect July 31, 1992, and political talks began August 10, 1992. The talks concluded in a peace accord that was not implemented.

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi was shot down as it prepared to land at Kigali. Both presidents were killed. As though the shooting down was a signal, military and militia groups began rounding up and killing all Tutsis and political moderates, regardless of their ubwoko.
The Rwandan prime minister and her 10 Belgian bodyguards were among the first victims. The killing swiftly spread from Kigali to all corners of the country; between April 6 and the beginning of July, a genocide of unprecedented swiftness left an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus dead at the hands of organized bands of militia--Interahamwe. Even ordinary citizens were called on to kill their neighbors, friends, and even family members by local officials and government-sponsored radio; many complied. The president's MRND Party was implicated in organizing many aspects of the genocide.

The RPF battalion stationed in Kigali under the Arusha accords came under attack immediately after the shooting down of the president's plane. The battalion fought its way out of Kigali and joined up with RPF units in the north. The RPF then resumed its invasion, and civil war raged concurrently with the genocide for 2 months. French forces landed in Goma, Zaire, in June 1994 on a humanitarian mission. They deployed throughout southwest Rwanda in an area they called "Zone Turquoise," ostensibly to quell the genocide and stop the fighting there, though some Rwandans asserted that they were complicit; many members of the genocidal rump regime established after the genocide began escaped through the French zone to eastern Congo. The RPF defeated the Rwandan Army, which crossed the border to Zaire followed by some 2 million Rwandans who fled to Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi as refugees. The RPF took Kigali on July 4, 1994, and the war ended on July 16, 1994. The country was decimated, having been ravaged by war and a brutal genocide. Up to 1 million had been murdered, another 2 million or so had fled, and another million or so were displaced internally.

The international community responded to the humanitarian disaster that developed among the refugees in Zaire with one of the largest humanitarian relief efforts ever mounted. The United States was one of the largest contributors. The UN peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR, was drawn down during the fighting but brought back up to strength after the RPF victory. UNAMIR remained in Rwanda until March 8, 1996.

Following the establishment of armed groups and a local rebellion in the camps in eastern Zaire, Rwandan and Ugandan troops invaded in late 1996. This triggered the return of more than 800,000 back to Rwanda in the last 2 weeks of November, followed at the end of December 1996 by the return of another 500,000 from Tanzania, both of which occurred in huge waves. Fewer than 50,000 Rwandans are estimated to remain outside of Rwanda, and they include remnants of the defeated army of the former genocidal government, its allies in the civilian militias known as Interahamwe, soldiers recruited in the refugee camps before 1996, as well as children of those groups and opponents of today’s government.

In 2001, with over 120,000 Rwandans in prison and virtually no judicial system in existence (most lawyers and judges had been killed or fled during the genocide), the government began implementing a grassroots village-level justice system, known as gacaca to address the enormous backlog of genocide cases. Although many convicted were sentenced to public service rather than prison, because of the continuing high numbers of prisoners, the Government of Rwanda periodically arranged prison releases, including the January 2006 release of approximately 7,000 prisoners. By December 2010, gacaca officials reported having concluded more than 1.2 million cases. These courts planned to complete their caseload in 2010.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
After its military victory in July 1994, the RPF organized a coalition government called "The Broad Based Government of National Unity." Its fundamental law was based on a combination of the June 1991 constitution, the Arusha accords, and political declarations by the parties. The government outlawed the MRND Party. In April 2003, the transitional National Assembly recommended the dissolution of the Democratic Republican Party (MDR), one of eight political parties participating in the Government of National Unity since 1994. Human rights groups noted the subsequent disappearances of political figures associated with the MDR, including at least one parliamentarian serving in the National Assembly. On May 26, 2003, Rwanda adopted a new constitution that eliminated reference to ubwoko and set the stage for presidential and legislative elections in August and September 2003. The seven remaining political parties endorsed incumbent Paul Kagame for president, who was elected to a 7-year term on August 25, 2003. Rwanda held its first-ever legislative elections September 29 to October 2, 2003. A ninth political party formed after these 2003 elections.

In the spring of 2006, the government conducted local non-partisan elections for district mayors and for sector and cell executive committees. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies occurred in September 2008; the RPF won an easy victory in coalition with six small parties, taking 42 of 53 directly-elected seats. As provided in the constitution, 24 seats were also accorded to women candidates in indirect elections. Women now hold 45 of the 80 seats in the Chamber. The elections were peaceful and orderly, despite irregularities. A tenth political party formed in 2010.

Presidential elections were held in August 2010; the National Electoral Commission reported that President Kagame won re-election with roughly 93% of the vote. The presidential election was peaceful and orderly, with heavy turnout. However, the pre-election period was marked by events of concern, including waves of terrorist attacks using grenades in populous areas, the murder of a journalist, the unexplained murder of the vice president of the Democratic Green Party, an assassination attempt on a former high-ranking government official accused of fomenting attacks, and the suspension of two local-language newspapers. In addition, two political opposition figures were arrested on criminal charges, and a party that had been seeking to register for many months was unable to do so.

Challenges facing the government include maintaining internal and regional security, promoting further democratization and judicial reform; completion of prosecution of remaining individuals for crimes relating to the 1994 genocide, either by the regular court system or the gacaca system; integrating former combatants and prisoners; preventing the recurrence of any insurgency directed by ex-military and Interahamwe militia who remain in eastern Congo; and the continuing work on medium- and long-term development.

Principal Government Officials
President--Paul Kagame
Prime Minister--Bernard Makuza
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Louise Mushikiwabo
Ambassador to the United States--James Kimonyo
Ambassador to the United Nations--Eugene-Richard Gasana

Rwanda maintains an embassy in the United States at 1714 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20009 (tel. 202-232-2882).

ECONOMY
The Rwandan economy is based on the largely rain-fed agricultural production of small, semi-subsistence, and increasingly fragmented farms. It has few natural resources to exploit and a small, uncompetitive industrial sector. While the production of coffee and tea is well suited to the small farms, steep slopes, and cool climates of Rwanda, the average family farm size is one-half hectare, unsuitable for most agro-business purposes. Agribusiness accounts for approximately 36.2% of Rwanda's GDP and 45% of exports. Minerals in 2009 accounted for 28% of export earnings, followed by tourism, tea and coffee, and pyrethrum (whose extract is used as a natural insecticide). Mountain gorillas and other niche eco-tourism venues are increasingly important sources of tourism revenue. Rwanda's tourism and hospitality sector requires continued investment. Rwanda is a member of the Commonwealth, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC). Some 34% of Rwanda's imports originate in Africa, 90% from COMESA countries. The Government of Rwanda has sought to privatize several key firms. Since 2007, the telecom and mining sectors have been largely privatized, and the government has sold off several government-owned tea estates and made great strides in completing privatization of the banking sector. RECO, the utility monopoly, remains to be privatized, as do several other parastatals.

During the 5 years of civil war that culminated in the 1994 genocide, GDP declined in 3 out of 5 years, posting a dramatic decline at more than 40% in 1994, the year of the genocide. The 9% increase in real GDP for 1995, the first postwar year, signaled the resurgence of economic activity and massive foreign aid inflows.

In the immediate postwar period--mid-1994 through 1995--emergency humanitarian assistance of more than $307.4 million was largely directed to relief efforts in Rwanda and in the refugee camps in neighboring countries where Rwandans fled during the war. In 1996, humanitarian relief aid began to shift to reconstruction and development assistance.

Since 1996, Rwanda has experienced steady economic recovery, thanks to government reforms and foreign aid (now over $500 million per year). Since 2002, the GDP growth rate ranged from 3%-11% per annum, and inflation ranged between 2%-9%. Rwanda depends on significant foreign imports (over $900 million per year). Exports have increased, up to $193 million in 2009. Private investment remains below expectations despite an open trade policy, a favorable investment climate, cheap and abundant labor, tax incentives to businesses, stable internal security, and crime rates that are comparatively low. Investment insurance also is available through the Africa Trade Insurance Agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The weakness of exports and low domestic savings rates are threats to future growth. The global economic crisis has impacted Rwanda. However, while there was a decline in overall exports (28% between 2008 and 2009), remittances, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) transfers in 2009, the agricultural sector performed strongly, propelling Rwanda to a 4% growth in GDP, well above the sub-Saharan average growth for the year. Amidst obstacles, Rwanda appears committed to economic reform and private sector investment. In the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business" report released in September 2009, Rwanda catapulted from number 143 to number 67; in the 2010 report, Rwanda improved its ranking to number 58.

The Government of Rwanda remains dedicated to a strong and enduring economic climate for the country, focusing on poverty reduction, infrastructure development, privatization of government-owned assets, expansion of the export base, and trade liberalization. The implementation of a value added tax of 18% and improved tax collections are having a positive impact on government revenues and thereby on government services rendered. Banking reform and low corruption also are favorable current trends. Agricultural reforms, improved farming methods, and increased use of fertilizers are improving crop yields and national food supply. Moreover, the government is pursing educational and healthcare programs that bode well for the long-term quality of Rwanda's human resource skills base.

Many challenges remain for Rwanda. The country is dependent on significant foreign aid. Exports continue to lag far behind imports and will continue to affect the health of the economy. The persistent lack of economic diversification beyond the production of tea, coffee, and minerals keeps the country vulnerable to market fluctuations. Perhaps the largest constraint on private sector development is the cost of electricity, which is currently among the highest in the world at about 24.6 cents per kilowatt hour. Given Rwanda's landlocked geography, strong highway infrastructure maintenance and good transport linkages to neighboring countries, especially Uganda and Tanzania, are critical. Transportation costs remain high and, therefore, burden import and export costs. Rwanda has no railway system for port access to Tanzania or Kenya. The limited availability and high cost of power also continues to impede the growth of manufacturing enterprises. The tourism industry has undeveloped potential for growth given the current political stability, travel infrastructure, and extensive national parks as well as other potential tourist sites. In 2006, Rwanda completed the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt initiative, significantly lowering its foreign debt load.

American business interests in Rwanda are modest, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has yet to make a significant impact in Rwanda. In addition to long-standing tea production by an American firm, in 2008 a U.S. corporation concluded an agreement with Rwandan authorities to produce 100 megawatts of electrical power from methane extraction operations in Lake Kivu. In 2009 a U.S.-British consortium signed an agreement with the government to develop a biofuel project based on jatropha, and a U.S. mining company expanded its investment in local mineral production. In 2010, RwandAir signed a contract with Boeing for the purchase of two Boeing 737-800 aircraft, for an estimated $80 million. American exports of aviation, telecommunications, and construction equipment have increased in recent years. Energy needs will stress natural resources in wood and gas, but hydroelectric power development is underway, albeit primarily in the planning stages, as is methane development. Rwanda does not have nuclear power or coal resources. Finally, Rwanda's fertility rate--averaging 5.5 births (2008 est.) per woman--will continue to stress services, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS transmission, malaria, and tuberculosis will have a major impact on human resources.

Rwanda's government-run radio broadcasts 15 hours a day in Kinyarwanda, English, and French, the national languages. News programs include regular re-broadcasts from international radio such as Voice of America, BBC, and Deutsche Welle. There is one government-operated television station. In addition to government-operated Radio Rwanda, there are a number of independent FM radio stations. There are few independent newspapers; most newspapers publish in Kinyarwanda on a weekly, biweekly, or monthly basis. Several Western nations, including the United States, are working to encourage freedom of the press, the free exchange of ideas, and responsible journalism.

DEFENSE
The military establishment is comprised of a well-trained army and a small, rotary-wing air force. The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) is on an aggressive plan to professionalize its military. Following withdrawal of Rwandan Armed Forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in October 2009, the government completely restructured the military and launched an ambitious plan to demobilize thousands of soldiers. At end state, Rwanda will have a small, well-equipped army of 20,000 soldiers and a reserve force of more than 100,000. Rwanda has deployed 3,326 peacekeepers to Darfur and Liberia, as well as 21 police officers to Haiti.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Rwanda is an active member of the international community and has remained in the international spotlight since the genocide. Rwanda is an active member of the UN, having presided over the Security Council during part of 1995. The UN assistance mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), a UN Chapter Six peacekeeping operation, involved personnel from more than a dozen countries. Most of the UN development and humanitarian agencies have had a large presence in Rwanda. At the height of the humanitarian emergency, more than 200 nongovernmental organizations were carrying out humanitarian operations. In addition to receiving assistance from the international community, Rwanda has also contributed to international peacekeeping missions. Currently, the RDF has four 800-strong battalions deployed in support of the UNAMID Mission in Darfur and one company in UNMIS (Khartoum). As of June 2009, Rwanda was training its 22nd peacekeeping battalion since 2006.

Several nations--including Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Libya, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, the Holy See, and all members of the EAC (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi) as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.)--maintain diplomatic missions in Kigali, as does the European Union.

In December 2008, after months of bilateral discussions, Rwanda and the D.R.C. announced a joint military operation against a root cause of instability in the Great Lakes Region--the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), which took place in January and February 2009. In January 2009 the governments of the D.R.C. and Rwanda accelerated efforts to achieve the rapprochement that they had initiated in late 2008. The two nations’ forces also cooperated in reintegrating renegade general Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP rebel force into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC); Nkunda was detained by Rwandan authorities.

In the fall of 2006, Rwanda broke diplomatic relations with France, following a French judge's indictment of senior Rwandan officials on charges of having participated in the shooting down of the presidential jet in 1994. Rwanda rejects these charges. In January 2010, Rwanda and France renewed their diplomatic relations after France indicated it had reopened its investigation of the 2006 charges. Rwanda, along with Burundi, joined the EAC in 2007, and it acceded to the Commonwealth in 2009.

U.S.-RWANDAN RELATIONS
U.S. Government interests have shifted significantly since the 1994 genocide from a strictly humanitarian concern focused on stability and security to a strong partnership with the Government of Rwanda focused on sustainable development. The largest U.S. Government programs are the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative, which aim to reduce the impact of these debilitating diseases in Rwanda. In partnership with the Government of Rwanda, U.S. Government agencies--Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Defense, Peace Corps, State Department, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)--work to strengthen the Rwandan health system and build local capacity.

The USAID program plays a strong role in helping Rwanda to improve the health and livelihoods of its people and increase economic and political development. To achieve this, USAID activities focus on:

Prevention, treatment, and care of HIV/AIDS;
Reducing mortality and morbidity due to malaria;
Increasing access to, and use of, voluntary family planning methods;
Improving maternal and child health;
Promoting rural economic growth through staple crops, specialty coffee, dairy, and eco-tourism;
Reducing post-harvest losses of agriculture produce;
Expanding the use of information technology in primary education;
Encouraging participatory governance and decentralization; and
Promoting a democratic Rwanda, where the government respects human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law.

In September 2008, Rwanda signed a Threshold Country Plan (TCP) agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). USAID implements these programs, which focus on strengthening civil society, the judiciary, police, and media sectors and promoting civic participation and civil society.

The State Department’s Public Affairs section (PAS) maintains an Information Resource Center (IRC) in Kigali, which offers public access to English-language publications, an English language lab for those preparing for English language exams, information on the United States, and information on studying in the U.S. PAS also maintains an American Corner at the National University of Rwanda (NUR) in Huye (formerly Butare) and supports an English Language Resource Center at the Catholic Institute of Kabgayi (ICK) in Gitarama.

American business interests have been small; currently, private U.S. investment is limited to the tea industry, franchising (FedEx, Coca-Cola, Western Union, and Moneygram) and small holdings in service and manufacturing concerns. Annual U.S. exports to Rwanda, under $10 million annually from 1990-93, exceeded $40 million in 1994 and 1995. Although exports decreased in the years immediately after the genocide, in 2007 they were estimated at approximately $17 million, a 20% increase over 2006.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--W. Stuart Symington
Deputy Chief of Mission--Anne Casper
USAID Mission Director--Dennis Weller

The U.S. Embassy is located on 2657 Avenue de la Gendarmerie, Kigali (tel. 250-596-400, fax 250-596-591).

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April 12, 2011Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Background Note: Czech Republic

Official Name: Czech Republic

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 78,864 sq. kilometers; about the size of Virginia.
Cities: Capital--Prague (pop. 1.21 million). Other cities--Brno (367,000), Ostrava (310,000), Plzen (163,000).
Terrain: Low mountains to the north and south, hills in the west.
Climate: Temperate.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Czech(s).
Population (2009 est.): 10.5 million.
Annual population growth rate: 0.1%.
Ethnic groups: Czech (94% or 9.6 million); Slovak (193,000); Roma (200,000); Silesian (11,000); Polish (52,000); German (39,000); Ukrainian (22,000); and Vietnamese (40,000).
Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant.
Language: Czech.
Education: Literacy--99.8%.
Health: Life expectancy--males 73.34 yrs., females 79.7 yrs.
Work force (5.23 million, International Monetary Fund est.): Industry, construction, and commerce--40%; government and other services--56%; agriculture--4%.

Government
Type: Parliamentary republic.
Independence: The Czech Republic was established January 1, 1993 (former Czechoslovak state established 1918).
Constitution: Signed December 16, 1992.
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative--Chamber of Deputies, Senate. Judicial--Supreme Court, Constitutional Court.
Political parties (May 2010 election): Civic Democratic Party (ODS), 53 seats; Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), 56 seats; Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), 26 seats; Public Affairs (VV), 24 seats; TOP 09, 41 seats.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Administrative subdivisions: Two regions--Bohemia and Moravia; 13 administrative districts and Prague.

Economy
Nominal GDP (2010 est.): $262.8 billion.
GDP per capita (2010 est.): $25,600.
Annual GDP growth rate (2010, Czech Statistical Office): 2.2%.
Natural resources: Coal, coke, timber, lignite, uranium, magnesite.
Agriculture: Products--wheat, rye, oats, corn, barley, hops, potatoes, sugar beets, fruit, hogs, cattle, horses, poultry.
Industry: Types--motor vehicles, machinery and equipment, iron, steel, cement, sheet glass, armaments, chemicals, ceramics, wood, paper products, and footwear.
Trade (2010 est.): Exports--$136.3 billion: motor vehicles, machinery, iron, steel, chemicals, raw materials, consumer goods. Imports--$129.3 billion (est.). Trading partners--Germany (31.9%), Slovakia, Poland, France, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, U.K., China, United States.

PEOPLE
The majority of the 10.5 million inhabitants of the Czech Republic are ethnically and linguistically Czech (94%). Other ethnic groups include Germans, Roma, Vietnamese, and Poles. Laws establishing religious freedom were passed shortly after the revolution of 1989, lifting oppressive regulations enacted by the former communist regime. Major denominations and their estimated percentage populations are Roman Catholic (39%) and Protestant (3%). A large percentage of the Czech population claim to be atheists (40%), and 16% describe themselves as uncertain. The Jewish community numbers a few thousand today; a synagogue in Prague memorializes the names of more than 80,000 Czechoslovak Jews who perished in World War II.

HISTORY
The Czech Republic was the western part of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Formed into a common state after World War I (October 28, 1918), the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks remained united for almost 75 years. On January 1, 1993, the two republics split to form two separate states.

The Czechs lost their national independence to the Hapsburg Empire in 1620 at the Battle of White Mountain and for the next 300 years were ruled by the Austrian Monarchy. With the collapse of the monarchy at the end of World War I, the independent country of Czechoslovakia was formed, encouraged by, among others, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson.

Despite cultural differences, the Slovaks shared with the Czechs similar aspirations for independence from the Hapsburg state and voluntarily united with the Czechs. For historical reasons, Slovaks were not at the same level of economic and technological development as the Czechs, but the freedom and opportunity found in Czechoslovakia enabled them to make strides toward overcoming these inequalities. However, the gap never was fully bridged, and the discrepancy played a continuing role throughout the 75 years of the union.

Although Czechoslovakia was the only east European country to remain a parliamentary democracy from 1918 to 1938, it was plagued with minority problems, the most important of which concerned the country's large German population. Constituting more than 22% of the interwar state's population and largely concentrated in the Bohemian and Moravian border regions (the Sudetenland), members of this minority, including some who were sympathetic to Nazi Germany, undermined the new Czechoslovak state. Internal and external pressures culminated in September 1938, when France and the United Kingdom yielded to Nazi pressures at Munich and agreed to force Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland to Germany.

Fulfilling Hitler's aggressive designs on all of Czechoslovakia, Germany invaded what remained of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, establishing a German "protectorate." By this time, Slovakia had already declared independence and had become a puppet state of the Germans. Hitler's occupation of the Czech lands was a clear betrayal of the Munich Pact and still stirs passions in modern-day Czech society, but at the time it was met by muted resistance; the brunt of Nazi aggression was felt by Czech Jews and other minorities who were rounded up and deported to concentration camps in systematic waves. Over 100,000 Jews lived in the Czech lands in 1939. Only several thousand remained or returned after the Holocaust in 1945.

At the close of World War II, Soviet troops overran all of Slovakia, Moravia, and much of Bohemia, including Prague. In May 1945, U.S. forces liberated the city of Plzen and most of western Bohemia. A civilian uprising against the German garrison took place in Prague in May 1945. Following Germany's surrender, some 2.9 million ethnic Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia with Allied approval under the Benes Decrees.

Reunited after the war, the Czechs and Slovaks set national elections for the spring of 1946. The democratic elements, led by President Eduard Benes, hoped the Soviet Union would allow Czechoslovakia the freedom to choose its own form of government and aspired to a Czechoslovakia that would act as a bridge between East and West. The Czechoslovak Communist Party, which won 38% of the vote, held most of the key positions in the government and gradually managed to neutralize or silence the anti-communist forces. Although the communist-led government initially intended to participate in the Marshall Plan, it was forced by Moscow to back out. Under the cover of superficial legality, the Communist Party seized power in February 1948.

After extensive purges modeled on the Stalinist pattern in other east European states, the Communist Party tried 14 of its former leaders in November 1952 and sentenced 11 to death. For more than a decade thereafter, the Czechoslovak communist political structure was characterized by the orthodoxy of the leadership of party chief Antonin Novotny.

The 1968 Soviet Invasion
The communist leadership allowed token reforms in the early 1960s, but discontent arose within the ranks of the Communist Party central committee, stemming from dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the economic reforms, resistance to cultural liberalization, and the desire of the Slovaks within the leadership for greater autonomy for their republic. This discontent expressed itself with the removal of Novotny from party leadership in January 1968 and from the presidency in March. He was replaced as party leader by a Slovak, Alexander Dubcek.

After January 1968, the Dubcek leadership took practical steps toward political, social, and economic reforms. In addition, it called for politico-military changes in the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The leadership affirmed its loyalty to socialism and the Warsaw Pact but also expressed the desire to improve relations with all countries of the world regardless of their social systems.

A program adopted in April 1968 set guidelines for a modern, humanistic socialist democracy that would guarantee, among other things, freedom of religion, press, assembly, speech, and travel; a program that, in Dubcek's words, would give socialism "a human face." After 20 years of little public participation, the population gradually started to take interest in the government, and Dubcek became a truly popular national figure.

The internal reforms and foreign policy statements of the Dubcek leadership created great concern among some other Warsaw Pact governments. On the night of August 20, 1968, Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian, East German, and Polish troops invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government immediately declared that the troops had not been invited into the country and that their invasion was a violation of socialist principles, international law, and the UN Charter.

The principal Czechoslovak reformers were forcibly and secretly taken to the Soviet Union. Under obvious Soviet duress, they were compelled to sign a treaty that provided for the "temporary stationing" of an unspecified number of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Dubcek was removed as party First Secretary on April 17, 1969, and replaced by another Slovak, Gustav Husak. Later, Dubcek and many of his allies within the party were stripped of their party positions in a purge that lasted until 1971 and reduced party membership by almost one-third.

The 1970s and 1980s became known as the period of "normalization," in which the apologists for the 1968 Soviet invasion prevented, as best they could, any opposition to their conservative regime. Political, social, and economic life stagnated. The population, cowed by the "normalization," was quiet.

The Velvet Revolution
The roots of the 1989 Civic Forum movement that came to power during the "Velvet Revolution" lie in human rights activism. On January 1, 1977, more than 250 human rights activists signed a manifesto called the Charter 77, which criticized the government for failing to implement human rights provisions of documents it had signed, including the state's own constitution; international covenants on political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights; and the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although not organized in any real sense, the signatories of Charter 77 constituted a citizens' initiative aimed at inducing the Czechoslovak Government to observe formal obligations to respect the human rights of its citizens.

On November 17, 1989, the communist police violently broke up a peaceful pro-democracy demonstration and brutally beat many student participants. In the days that followed, Charter 77 and other groups united to become the Civic Forum, an umbrella group championing bureaucratic reform and civil liberties. Its leader was the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel. Intentionally eschewing the label "party," a word given a negative connotation during the previous regime, Civic Forum quickly gained the support of millions of Czechs, as did its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence.

Faced with an overwhelming popular repudiation, the Communist Party all but collapsed. Its leaders, Husak and party chief Milos Jakes, resigned in December 1989, and Havel was elected President of Czechoslovakia on December 29. The astonishing quickness of these events was in part due to the unpopularity of the communist regime and changes in the policies of its Soviet guarantor as well as to the rapid, effective organization of these public initiatives into a viable opposition.

A coalition government, in which the Communist Party had a minority of ministerial positions, was formed in December 1989. The first free elections in Czechoslovakia since 1946 took place in June 1990 without incident and with more than 95% of the population voting. As anticipated, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence won landslide victories in their respective republics and gained a comfortable majority in the federal parliament. The parliament undertook substantial steps toward securing the democratic evolution of Czechoslovakia. It successfully moved toward fair local elections in November 1990, ensuring fundamental change at the county and town level.

Civic Forum found, however, that although it had successfully completed its primary objective--the overthrow of the communist regime--it was ineffectual as a governing party. The demise of Civic Forum was viewed by most as necessary and inevitable.

By the end of 1990, unofficial parliamentary "clubs" had evolved with distinct political agendas. Most influential was the Civic Democratic Party, headed by Vaclav Klaus, who later became Prime Minister. Other notable parties that came to the fore after the split were the Czech Social Democratic Party, Civic Movement, and Civic Democratic Alliance.

By 1992, Slovak calls for greater autonomy effectively blocked the daily functioning of the federal government. In the election of June 1992, Klaus's Civic Democratic Party won handily in the Czech lands on a platform of economic reform. Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia emerged as the leading party in Slovakia, basing its appeal on fairness to Slovak demands for autonomy. Federalists, like Havel, were unable to contain the trend toward the split. In July 1992, President Havel resigned. In the latter half of 1992, Klaus and Meciar hammered out an agreement that the two republics would go their separate ways by the end of the year.

Members of the federal parliament, divided along national lines, barely cooperated enough to pass the law officially separating the two nations. The law was passed on December 27, 1992. On January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia were simultaneously and peacefully founded.

Relationships between the two states, despite occasional disputes about the division of federal property and governing of the border, have been peaceful. Both states attained immediate recognition from the U.S. and their European neighbors.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The President of the Czech Republic is Vaclav Klaus. He was re-elected on February 15, 2008 and sworn into office on March 7, 2008. As formal head of state, the president is granted specific powers such as the right to nominate Constitutional Court judges, dissolve parliament under certain conditions, and enact a veto on legislation. Presidents are elected by the parliament for 5-year terms.

The legislature is bicameral, with a Chamber of Deputies (200 seats) and a Senate (81 seats). With the split of the former Czechoslovakia, the powers and responsibilities of the now-defunct federal parliament were transferred to the Czech National Council, which renamed itself the Chamber of Deputies. Chamber delegates are elected from 14 regions--including the capital, Prague--for 4-year terms, on the basis of proportional representation. The Czech Senate is patterned after the U.S. Senate and was first elected in 1996; its members serve for 6-year terms with one-third being elected every 2 years.

The country's highest court of appeal is the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court, which rules on constitutional issues, is appointed by the president. Its members serve 10-year terms.

The June 2-3, 2006 general election resulted in the Chamber of Deputies' 200 seats being evenly divided 100-100 between three center-right parties and two parties on the left, with neither side able to form a majority government. The impasse led to months of protracted negotiations during which Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek formed a three-party coalition of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL), and the Greens (SZ). On March 24, 2009, the coalition government lost a vote of no-confidence, and resigned 2 days later. A new interim, technocratic government was sworn in on May 8, 2009, and Jan Fischer, who had been serving as the head of the Czech Statistical Office, was named Prime Minister.

Parliamentary elections were held in May 2010. Although the CSSD lost 18 seats, the election results made it the largest party in the Parliament. However, a center-right coalition was formed of the established ODS, the formerly local Prague party Public Affairs (VV), and the newly formed TOP 09. Former Labor Minister Petr Necas of ODS was named Prime Minister.

The Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004, and held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from January 1 to June 30, 2009.

Principal Government Officials
President--Vaclav Klaus
Prime Minister--Petr Necas
Foreign Minister--Karel Schwarzenberg
Ambassador-designate to the U.S.--Petr Gandalovic

The Embassy of the Czech Republic is located at 3900 Spring of Freedom Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008, (tel. 202-274-9101).

ECONOMY
The Czech Republic has one of the most developed and industrialized economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Its strong industrial tradition dates to the 19th century, when Bohemia and Moravia were the industrial heartland of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Czech Republic has a well-educated population and a well-developed infrastructure. .

The principal industries are motor vehicles, machine-building, iron and steel production, metalworking, chemicals, electronics, transportation equipment, textiles, glass, brewing, china, ceramics, and pharmaceuticals. The main agricultural products are sugar beets, fodder roots, potatoes, wheat, and hops. As a small, open economy in the heart of Europe, economic growth is strongly influenced by demand for Czech exports and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI).

At the time of the 1948 communist takeover, Czechoslovakia had a balanced economy and one of the higher levels of industrialization on the continent. In 1948, however, the government began to stress heavy industry over agricultural and consumer goods and services. Many basic industries and foreign trade, as well as domestic wholesale trade, had been nationalized before the communists took power. Nationalization of most of the retail trade was completed in 1950-51.

Heavy industry received major economic support during the 1950s, but central planning resulted in waste and inefficient use of industrial resources. Although the labor force was generally skilled and efficient, inadequate incentives for labor and management contributed to high labor turnover, low productivity, and poor product quality. Economic failures reached a critical stage in the 1960s, after which various reform measures were sought with no satisfactory results.

Hope for wide-ranging economic reform came with Alexander Dubcek's rise in January 1968. Despite renewed efforts, however, Czechoslovakia could not come to grips with inflationary forces, much less begin the immense task of correcting the economy's basic problems.

The economy saw growth during the 1970s but then stagnated between 1978-82. Attempts at revitalizing it in the 1980s with management and worker incentive programs were largely unsuccessful. The economy grew after 1982, achieving an annual average output growth of more than 3% between 1983-85. Imports from the West were curtailed, exports boosted, and hard currency debt reduced substantially. New investment was made in the electronic, chemical, and pharmaceutical sectors, which were industry leaders in Eastern Europe in the mid-1980s.

The "Velvet Revolution" in 1989 offered a chance for profound and sustained economic reform. Signs of economic resurgence began to appear in the wake of the shock therapy that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) labeled the "big bang" of January 1991. Since then, astute economic management has led to the elimination of price controls, large inflows of foreign investment, increasing domestic consumption and industrial production, and a stable exchange rate. Exports to former communist economic bloc markets shifted to Western Europe. Despite a general trend over the last 10 years toward rising budget deficits, the Czech Government's domestic and foreign indebtedness remains relatively low.

The Czech koruna (crown) became fully convertible for most business purposes in late 1995. Following a currency crisis and recession in 1998-99, the crown exchange rate was allowed to float. Recently, strong capital inflows have resulted in a steady increase in the value of the crown against the euro and the dollar. The strong crown has helped to keep inflation low. In 2004, inflation was about 2.8%, mainly due to increases in value added tax rates and higher fuel costs, and dropped to 1.9% in 2005. It hovered around 2.5% in 2006. The Ministry of Finance reported an inflation rate of 2.8% for 2007 and 6.3% for all of 2008, due to one-off tax changes and an increase in energy and food prices; however, this trend reversed in 2009, resulting in an inflation rate of 1.0%. The Czech Statistical Office reported an inflation rate of 1.5% in 2010.

The Czech Republic is gradually reducing its dependence on highly polluting low-grade brown coal as a source of energy, in part because of European Union (EU) environmental requirements. The government has offered investment incentives in order to enhance the Czech Republic's natural advantages, thereby attracting foreign partners and stimulating the economy. Formerly state-owned banks have all been privatized into the hands of west European banks and oversight by the central bank has improved. The telecommunications infrastructure has been upgraded and the sector is privatized. The Czech Republic has made significant progress toward creating a stable and attractive climate for investment, although continuing reports of corruption are troubling to investors.

Its success allowed the Czech Republic to become the first post-communist country to receive an investment-grade credit rating by international credit institutions. Successive Czech governments have welcomed U.S. investment in addition to the strong economic influence of Western Europe and increasing investment from Asian auto manufacturers. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the inflow of FDI fell from CZK 110 billion (roughly U.S. $5.7 billion) in 2008 to CZK 52 billion (roughly U.S. $2.7 billion) in 2009, mainly due to the economic slowdown. The inflow of FDI rebounded to CZK 117 billion (roughly U.S. $6.2 billion) during the first three quarters of 2010. By U.S. Embassy estimates, the United States is among the top five investors in the Czech Republic since the revolution.

The Czech Republic boasts a flourishing consumer production sector. In the early 1990s most state-owned industries were privatized through a voucher privatization system. Every citizen was given the opportunity to buy, for a moderate price, a book of vouchers that he or she could exchange for shares in state-owned companies. State ownership of businesses was estimated to be about 97% under communism. The non-private sector is less than 20% today.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs released data in March 2011 showing that unemployment in the Czech Republic fell to 9.6% in February 2011, down from 9.7% in January (and down from a peak of 9.9% in February 2010). The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs uses a different methodology than the EU, which releases its figures for the 27 EU member states several weeks later. According to the EU, the EUROSTAT harmonized unemployment rate for the Czech Republic was 7.9% in January 2011, up from 7.8% in December 2010. Rates of unemployment are higher in the coal and steel producing regions of Northern Moravia and Northern Bohemia, and among less-skilled and older workers.

After experiencing robust growth of around 6% from 2005-2007, the Czech Republic felt the impact of the global economic slowdown in 2009. The economy contracted in real terms by 4.1% in 2009 as the country's main export markets fell into recession, leading to a significant drop in external demand. Though unemployment figures still hover under 10%, 2010 saw an economic rebound for the country as export orders of industrial goods to Western Europe increased, and real GDP growth was reported as 2.2% by the Czech Statistical Office. Real GDP growth estimates for 2011 range from 1.6% to 2.8%, depending on assumptions regarding growth in the neighboring economies and the impact of government austerity measures. The Czech financial system remained relatively healthy during the global economic slowdown, and the Czech Republic is reportedly one of only a handful of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries not to have had to recapitalize its banking system. The Czech Government had brought its budget deficit well within the 3% Maastricht criteria for euro adoption, reaching 0.6% of GDP in 2007 and 1.4% in 2008. Following the economic slowdown, however, and the resulting significant drop in tax revenues, the budget deficit reached 4.8% of GDP in 2010, down from 5.8% in 2009. The Czech Government has yet to set a target date for euro adoption, and Prime Minister Necas stated in December 2010 that the Czech Republic was better served by maintaining its national currency, the Czech crown, for the time being.

The Czech Republic became a European Union member on May 1, 2004. Most barriers to trade in industrial goods with the EU fell in the course of the accession process. The process of accession had a positive impact on reform in the Czech Republic, and new EU directives and regulations continue to shape the business environment. Free trade in services and agricultural goods, as well as stronger regulation and rising labor costs, has meant tougher competition for Czech producers. Future levels of EU structural funding and agricultural supports were key issues in the accession negotiations. Even before accession, policy set in Brussels had a strong influence on Czech domestic and foreign policy, particularly in the area of trade.

Challenges include transforming the economy from a strong reliance on manufacturing (especially the auto sector) toward a more diversified knowledge-based economy, reforming public procurement, increasing transparency, and reforming the pension and health care systems.

NATIONAL SECURITY
The Czech Republic continues to make significant contributions to the international allied coalition in Afghanistan. In early 2008, the Czech Republic established a 200-person Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Logar Province, Afghanistan. In addition, Czech Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) provide training and assistance to the Afghan Army, while Air Mentoring Teams work alongside the Afghanistan National Air Corps, which has also received a donation of 12 excess fully overhauled Czech military helicopters.

A major overhaul of the Czechoslovak armed forces began in 1990 and continues in the Czech Republic. Czech forces have been successfully downsized from 200,000 to approximately 30,000, and at the same time reoriented into a more mobile, deployable force. The Czechs have made good progress in reforming the military personnel structure, and a strong commitment to English-language training is paying off. Compulsory military service ended in December 2004. The Czech Government currently spends slightly less than 1.4% of GDP on defense.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
From 1948 until 1989, the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia followed that of the Soviet Union. Since independence, the Czechs have made integration into Western institutions their chief foreign policy objective.

The Czech Republic became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with Poland and Hungary, on March 12, 1999. Public support for NATO remains high. The Czech Republic became a full member of the European Union on May 1, 2004. Both events are milestones in the country's foreign policy and security orientation. The Czech Republic successfully completed its first-ever EU Presidency during the first half of 2009.

The Czech Republic is a member of the United Nations and participates in its specialized agencies. It is a member of the World Trade Organization. It maintains resident embassies in 85 countries, and 85 countries have permanent representation in Prague.

U.S.-CZECH RELATIONS
Millions of Americans have their roots in Bohemia and Moravia, and a large community in the United States has strong cultural and familial ties with the Czech Republic. President Woodrow Wilson and the United States played a major role in the establishment of the original Czechoslovak state on October 28, 1918. President Wilson's 14 Points, including the right of ethnic groups to form their own states, were the basis for the union of the Czechs and Slovaks. Tomas Masaryk, the father of the state and its first President, visited the United States during World War I and worked with U.S. officials in developing the basis of the new country. Masaryk used the U.S. Constitution as a model for the first Czechoslovak constitution.

After World War II, and the return of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, normal relations continued until 1948, when the communists seized power. Relations cooled rapidly. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 further complicated U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. The United States referred the matter to the UN Security Council as a violation of the UN Charter, but no action was taken against the Soviets.

Since the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989, bilateral relations have improved immensely. Dissidents once sustained by U.S. encouragement and human rights policies reached high levels in the government. President Havel, in his first official visit as head of Czechoslovakia, addressed the U.S. Congress and was interrupted 21 times by standing ovations. In 1990, on the first anniversary of the revolution, President George H.W. Bush, in front of an enthusiastic crowd on Prague's Wenceslas Square, pledged U.S. support in building a democratic Czechoslovakia. Toward this end, the U.S. Government has actively encouraged political and economic transformation.

The U.S. Government was originally opposed to the idea of Czechoslovakia forming two separate states, due to concerns that a split might aggravate existing regional political tensions. However, the U.S. recognized both the Czech Republic and Slovakia on January 1, 1993. Since then, U.S.-Czech relations have remained strong economically, politically, and culturally.

Relations between the U.S. and the Czech Republic are excellent and reflect the common approach both have to the many challenges facing the world at present. The U.S. looks to the Czech Republic as a partner in issues ranging from Afghanistan to the Balkans, and seeks opportunities to continue to deepen this relationship.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Norman Eisen
Deputy Chief of Mission--Joseph Pennington
Political-Economic Officer--Charles Blaha
Consul General--David Beam
Management Officer--Benjamin Dille
Regional Security Officer--Richard Wade
Public Affairs Officer--John Vance

The U.S. Embassy in Prague is located at Trziste 15, 11801 Prague 1, Czech Republic; tel: 420-257-022-000; emergency after hours 420-257022-352.

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April 13, 2011Bureau of African Affairs

Flag of Democratic Republic of the Congo

Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Official Name: Democratic Republic of the Congo

PROFILE

Geography
Location: Central Africa. Bordering nations--Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
Area: 2.345 sq. km. (905,063 sq. mi.; about the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi).
Cities: Capital--Kinshasa (pop. approx. 9 million). Regional capitals--Bandundu, Bukavu, Goma, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani, Lubumbashi, Matadi, Mbandaka, Mbuji-Mayi.
Terrain: Varies from tropical rainforests to mountainous terraces, plateaus, savannas, dense grasslands, and mountains.
Climate: Equatorial; ranges from tropical rainforest in the Congo River basin, hot and humid in much of the north and west, cooler and drier in the south central area and the east.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Congolese.
Population (2011 est.): 71,712,867.
Annual population growth rate (2008 est.): 3.24%.
Ethnic groups: Approximately 250 African ethnic groups; the Luba, Kongo, and Anamongo are some of the larger groups.
Religions: Christian 70% (Catholic 50%, Protestant 20%); Kimbanguist 10%; other sects and traditional beliefs 10%; Muslim 10%.
Languages: French, Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba.
Education: Literacy (2008 est.)--French or local language: 55% (women), 76% (men). Schooling (2007 est.)--none 21%, primary 46%, secondary 30%, university 3%.
Health (2007 est.): Infant mortality rate--92/1,000 live births. Life expectancy (2008 est.)--51.3 yrs.

Government
Type: Republic; highly centralized with executive power vested in the president.
Independence: June 30, 1960 (from Belgium).
Constitution: The D.R.C. has had numerous constitutions, constitutional amendments, and transitional constitutions since independence. The currently operative constitution was approved by 84% of voters in a December 2005 referendum and officially promulgated in February 2006.
Branches: Executive--President is head of state. Cabinet is appointed by the ruling party in the parliament. Prime minister is elected by the parliament. Legislative--The 500-member National Assembly was elected in July 30, 2006 national elections. Provincial Assemblies elected the Senate in October 29, 2006 elections, and provincial governors in early 2007. Judicial--Supreme Court (Cour Supreme).
Administrative subdivisions: Eleven provinces including the capital city, Kinshasa.
Political parties: President Joseph Kabila's party is Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et le Developpement (PPRD). Two main coalitions, the Alliance pour la Majorite Presidentielle (AMP) and the Union pour la Nation (UN), respectively represent President Kabila and former Transitional Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba was Kabila’s principal opponent in the 2006 presidential election (see “Government and Political Conditions” section below), and despite his May 2008 arrest by Belgian authorities and transfer to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, is still the official president of the largest single opposition party, Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC). Another important opposition party is the Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social (UDPS), led by aging Mobutu opponent Etienne Tshisekedi. Although the UDPS boycotted the 2006 elections, the party nominated Tshisekedi in December 2010 as its presidential candidate; UDPS will participate in the 2011 presidential and 2012 parliamentary and local elections. In 2010, former National Assembly Speaker Vital Kamerhe announced that he had left the PPRD and had formed his own Congolese National Union (UNC) party, which was expected to nominate Kamerhe as its presidential candidate for 2011. Other parties include Forces du Futur (FDF), Forces Novatrices pour l'Union et la Solidarite (FONUS), Parti Democrate Social Chretien (PDSC), Mouvement Social Democratie et Developpement (MSDD), Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution--Fait Prive (MPR-FP), Union des Nationalistes et des Federalistes Congolais (UNAFEC), and Mouvement National Congolais/ Lumumba (MNC/L). Former rebel movements-turned-political parties include the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), and independent splinter groups of the RCD (RCD/ML, RCD/N, RCD/G). The former rebel group Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) received official status as a political party in May 2009 and joined the AMP in September 2010.
Suffrage: 18 years of age and universal.

Economy
GDP (2010): $13.1 billion.
Annual GDP growth rate (2010): 6.1%.
Per capita GDP (2010): $189.
Natural resources: Copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, other minerals; petroleum; wood; hydroelectric potential.
Agriculture: Cash crops--coffee, rubber, palm oil, cotton, cocoa, sugar, tea. Food crops--manioc, corn, legumes, plantains, peanuts.
Land use: Agriculture 3%; pasture 7%; forest/woodland 77%; other 13%.
Industry: Types--processed and unprocessed minerals; consumer products, including textiles, plastics, footwear, cigarettes, metal products; processed foods and beverages, cement, timber.
Currency: Congolese franc (FC). The U.S. dollar is also used as legal tender.
Trade: Exports (2010)--$7.5 billion. Products--diamonds, gold, cobalt, copper, coffee, petroleum, wood. Main partners--EU, Japan, South Africa, U.S., China. Imports (2010)--$7.0 billion. Products--consumer goods (food, textiles), capital equipment, refined petroleum products. Partners--EU, China, South Africa, U.S.
Official debt (est.): $13.5 billion.

GEOGRAPHY
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.) includes the greater part of the Congo River basin, which covers an area of almost one million square kilometers (400,000 sq. mi.). The country's only outlet to the Atlantic Ocean is a narrow strip of land on the north bank of the Congo River.

The vast, low-lying central area is a basin-shaped plateau sloping toward the west and covered by tropical rainforest. This area is surrounded by mountainous terraces in the west, plateaus merging into savannas in the south and southwest, and dense grasslands extending beyond the Congo River in the north. High mountains are found in the extreme eastern region.

The D.R.C. lies on the Equator, with one-third of the country to the north and two-thirds to the south. The climate is hot and humid in the river basin and cool and dry in the southern highlands. South of the Equator, the rainy season lasts from October to May and north of the Equator, from April to November. Along the Equator, rainfall is fairly regular throughout the year. During the wet season, thunderstorms often are violent but seldom last more than a few hours. The average annual rainfall for the entire country is about 107 centimeters (42 in.).

PEOPLE
The population of the D.R.C. was estimated at 71 million in 2011. As many as 250 ethnic groups have been distinguished and named. Some of the larger groups are the Kongo, Luba, and Anamongo. Although 700 local languages and dialects are spoken, the linguistic variety is bridged both by the use of French and the native languages Kikongo, Tshiluba, Swahili, and Lingala.

About 70% of the Congolese population is Christian, predominantly Roman Catholic. Most of the non-Christians adhere to either traditional religions or syncretic sects. Traditional religions include concepts such as monotheism, animism, vitalism, spirit and ancestor worship, witchcraft and sorcery, and vary widely among ethnic groups; none is formalized. The syncretic sects often merge Christianity with traditional beliefs and rituals. The most popular of these sects, Kimbanguism, was seen as a threat to the colonial regime and was banned by the Belgians. Kimbanguism, officially "the church of Christ on Earth by the prophet Simon Kimbangu," now claims about 3 million members, primarily among the Bakongo tribe of Bas-Congo Province and Kinshasa. In 1969, it became the first independent African church admitted to the World Council of Churches.

Before independence in 1960, education was largely in the hands of religious groups. The primary school system was well developed at independence; however, the secondary school system was limited, and higher education was almost nonexistent in most regions of the country. The principal objective of this system was to train low-level administrators and clerks. Since independence, efforts have been made to increase access to education, and secondary and higher education have been made available to many more Congolese. According to estimates made in 2007, 21% of the population had no schooling, 46% had primary schooling, 30% had secondary schooling, and 3% had university schooling. At all levels of education, males greatly outnumber females. The largest state-run universities are the University of Kinshasa, the University of Lubumbashi, and the University of Kisangani. The elite continue to send their children abroad to be educated, primarily in Western Europe.

HISTORY
The area known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo was populated as early as 10,000 years ago and settled in the 7th and 8th centuries A.D. by Bantus from present-day Nigeria. Portuguese navigator Diego Cao was the first European known to have visited the area (in 1482), and English journalist Henry Morton Stanley later explored much of the region in the mid to late 19th century. The area was officially colonized in 1885 as a personal possession of Belgian King Leopold II as the Congo Free State. In 1907, administration shifted to the Belgian Government, which renamed the country the Belgian Congo. Following a series of riots and unrest, the Belgian Congo was granted its independence on June 30, 1960. Parliamentary elections in 1960 produced Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president of the renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Mobutu Era
Within the first year of independence, several events destabilized the country: the army mutinied; the governor of Katanga Province attempted secession; a UN peacekeeping force was called in to restore order; Prime Minister Lumumba died under mysterious circumstances; and Col. Joseph Desire Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) took over the government and ceded it again to President Kasavubu.

Unrest and rebellion plagued the government until 1965, when Mobutu, by then a lieutenant general and commander-in-chief of the national army, again seized control of the country and declared himself president for 5 years. Mobutu quickly centralized power into his own hands and was elected unopposed as president in 1970.

Embarking on a campaign of cultural awareness, Mobutu renamed the country the Republic of Zaire and required citizens to adopt African names. Relative peace and stability prevailed until 1977 and 1978 when Katangan rebels, staged in Angola, launched a series of invasions into the Katanga region. The rebels were driven out with the aid of Belgian paratroopers.

During the 1980s, Mobutu continued to enforce his one-party system of rule. Although Mobutu successfully maintained control during this period, opposition parties, most notably the Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social (UDPS), were active. Mobutu's attempts to quell these groups drew significant international criticism.

As the Cold War came to a close, internal and external pressures on Mobutu increased. In late 1989 and early 1990, Mobutu was weakened by a series of domestic protests, heightened international criticism of his regime's human rights practices, and a faltering economy. In April 1990, Mobutu agreed to the principle of a multi-party system with elections and a constitution. As details of a reform package were delayed, soldiers in September 1991 began looting Kinshasa to protest their unpaid wages. Two thousand French and Belgian troops, some of whom were flown in on U.S. Air Force planes, arrived to evacuate the 20,000 endangered foreign nationals in Kinshasa.

In 1992, after previous similar attempts, the long-promised Sovereign National Conference was staged, encompassing more than 2,000 representatives from various political parties. The conference gave itself a legislative mandate and elected Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo as its chairman, along with Etienne Tshisekedi, leader of the UDPS, as prime minister. By the end of the year Mobutu had created a rival government with its own prime minister. The ensuing stalemate produced a compromise merger of the two governments into the High Council of the Republic-Parliament of Transition (HCR-PT) in 1994, with Mobutu as head of state and Leon Kengo Wa Dondo as prime minister. Although presidential and legislative elections were scheduled repeatedly over the next 2 years, they never took place.

Beginning in late 1994, the war and genocide in neighboring Rwanda had spilled over to Zaire. Rwandan Hutu militia forces (Interahamwe), who fled Rwanda following the ascension of a Tutsi-led government, were using Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire as bases for incursions against Rwanda.

In October 1996, Rwandan troops (RPA) entered Zaire, simultaneously with the formation of an armed coalition led by Laurent-Desire Kabila known as the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). With the goal of forcibly ousting Mobutu, the AFDL, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, began a military campaign toward Kinshasa. Following failed peace talks between Mobutu and Kabila in May 1997, Mobutu left the country.

From Dictatorship to Disintegration
Laurent-Desire Kabila marched into Kinshasa on May 17, 1997 and declared himself president. He consolidated power around himself and the AFDL and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.). Kabila's Army Chief and the Secretary General of the AFDL were Rwandan, and RPA units continued to operate tangentially with the D.R.C.'s military, which was renamed the Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC).

Over the next year, relations between Kabila and his foreign backers deteriorated. In July 1998, Kabila ordered all foreign troops to leave the D.R.C. Most refused to leave. On August 2, nationwide fighting erupted as Rwandan troops in the D.R.C. "mutinied," and fresh Rwandan and Ugandan troops entered the country. Two days later, Rwandan troops flew to Bas-Congo, with the intention of marching on Kinshasa, ousting Kabila, and replacing him with the newly formed Rwandan-backed rebel group called the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD). The Rwandan campaign was thwarted at the last minute when Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian troops intervened on behalf of the D.R.C. Government. The Rwandans and the RCD withdrew to eastern D.R.C., where they established de facto control over portions of eastern D.R.C. and continued to fight the Congolese army and its foreign allies.

In February 1999, Uganda backed the formation of a rebel group called the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), which drew support from among ex-Mobutuists and ex-Zairian soldiers in Equateur Province (Mobutu's home province). Together, Uganda and the MLC established control over the northern third of the D.R.C.

At this stage, the D.R.C. was divided de facto into three segments--one controlled by Laurent Kabila, one controlled by Rwanda, and one controlled by Uganda--and the parties had reached military deadlock. In July 1999, a cease-fire was proposed in Lusaka, Zambia, which all parties signed by the end of August. The Lusaka Accord called for a cease-fire, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the launching of an "Inter-Congolese Dialogue" to form a transitional government leading to elections. The parties to the Lusaka Accord failed to fully implement its provisions in 1999 and 2000. Laurent Kabila drew increasing international criticism for blocking full deployment of UN troops, hindering progress toward an Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and suppressing internal political activity.

On January 16, 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated, allegedly by a member of his personal bodyguard corps who was in turn killed by an aide-de-camp. Kabila was succeeded by his son Joseph, who reversed many of his father's negative policies. Over the next year, the UN peacekeeping mission in the D.R.C. (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, known by its French acronym MONUC) deployed throughout the country, and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue proceeded. By the end of 2002, all Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops had withdrawn from the D.R.C. Following D.R.C.-Rwanda talks in South Africa that culminated in the Pretoria Accord in July 2002, Rwandan troops officially withdrew from the D.R.C. in October 2002. However, there were continued, unconfirmed reports that Rwandan soldiers and military advisers remained integrated with the forces of an RCD splinter group (RCD/G) in eastern D.R.C. Ugandan troops officially withdrew from the D.R.C. in May 2003.

National Dialogue, Transitional Government, and Nascent Democracy
In October 2001, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue began in Addis Ababa under the auspices of Facilitator Ketumile Masire (former president of Botswana). The initial meetings made little progress and were adjourned. On February 25, 2002, the dialogue was reconvened in South Africa. It included representatives from the government, rebel groups, political opposition, civil society, and Mai-Mai (Congolese local defense militias). The talks ended inconclusively on April 19, 2002, when the government and the MLC brokered an agreement that was signed by the majority of delegates at the dialogue but left out the RCD/G and opposition UDPS party, among others.

This partial agreement was never implemented, and negotiations resumed in South Africa in October 2002. This time, the talks led to an all-inclusive agreement, which was signed by delegates in Pretoria on December 17, 2002, and formally ratified by all parties on April 2, 2003. That same day, a transitional constitution was adopted.

Following nominations by each of the various signatory groups, President Joseph Kabila on June 30, 2003 issued a decree that formally announced the transitional government lineup. Four vice presidents (each representing a specific party, faction, or region) took their oaths of office on July 17, 2003, and most incoming ministers assumed their new functions within days thereafter.

During the transitional government period, President Joseph Kabila made significant progress in liberalizing domestic political activity and undertaking economic reforms in cooperation with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, serious human rights problems remained in the security services and justice system.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
In December 2005, roughly two-thirds of eligible Congolese voters participated in a referendum that resulted in approval of a new constitution. This constitution entered into force in February 2006. Extensive executive, legislative, and military powers are vested in the president. The legislature does not have the power to overturn the government through a vote of no confidence. The judiciary is only nominally independent. The president, due to the absence of the as-yet-unestablished Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature (supreme judicial council; CSM), has the power to dismiss and appoint judges. The president is head of a cabinet of ministers. The current cabinet, appointed in February 2010, has 37 ministers.

On July 30, 2006 the D.R.C. held its first free, democratic, multi-party elections in more than 40 years. Over 25 million registered voters cast ballots for president (from among 33 candidates) and National Assembly deputies (from among over 9,500 candidates vying for 500 seats). Voter turnout was over 70%, and despite technical and logistical difficulties as well as isolated incidents of violence and intimidation, the elections were largely calm and orderly. International observers also judged them to have been credible. According to the D.R.C.’s Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) incumbent President Kabila won 44.81% of the vote, compared to 20.3% for Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, his nearest challenger. Hours after these tallies were released, the Gombe area of central Kinshasa saw clashes between militias loyal to these two candidates. With no one winning a majority, a second round was held on October 29; Kabila beat Bemba by a margin of 58% to 42% and was inaugurated on December 6, 2006, to a 5-year term.

The National Assembly elections held simultaneously with the July 2006 first presidential round resulted in the election of 500 deputies representing 169 electoral districts. Winners in multiple-seat districts (approximately two-thirds of the total districts) were determined based on a complex formula involving the percentages of overall votes cast for a given party and proportional representation using open party lists. Like the president, National Assembly deputies serve 5-year terms. Unlike the president, however, they are not term-limited. The National Assembly held its first session on September 22, 2006. Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga and his cabinet formally took office the following February. In May 2007, Kengo Wa Dondo was elected Senate President. In September 2008, Antoine Gizenga resigned for reasons of age and ill health. On October 10, 2008, President Kabila named Adolphe Muzito to succeed him. Muzito in turn appointed a new cabinet of ministers with a total of 37 ministerial positions. On February 22, 2010, President Kabila reshuffled his cabinet, with particular emphasis on his economic and finance team.

The D.R.C.'s July 2006 elections presented significant organizational challenges. The presidential and legislative ballots were printed in South Africa and altogether weighed nearly 1,800 tons, requiring 75 round-trip flights between the D.R.C. and South Africa. The CEI, greatly supported by the MONUC peacekeeping mission, ran more than 50,000 polling stations nationwide and employed some 300,000 poll workers on election day and to oversee the ballot-counting process. In July 2010, President Kabila signed into law the establishment of a permanent National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) to replace the transitional CEI. The CENI formally succeeded the CEI in February 2011. Presidential elections are scheduled for November 27, 2011. Parliamentary and provincial assembly elections are slated for April 2012. Local elections have been tentatively scheduled for late 2012 and early 2013.

After operating in the D.R.C. as MONUC for 10 years, the UN, at the Congolese Government’s insistence, altered its mission as of July 1, 2010, renaming it the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Established under UN Security Council Resolution 1925, MONUSCO differed from MONUC in its enhanced cooperative relationship with the D.R.C. Government, its coordinated, regional approach to counter threats posed by armed groups in the country, and its stated logistical role in assisting the D.R.C. in its electoral activities, all designed to stabilize what MONUC’s peacekeeping operations had accomplished. On June 30, 2010, MONUSCO was inaugurated on the 50th anniversary of the D.R.C.’s independence from Belgium with a largely symbolic drawdown of some 1,500 troops from MONUC’s forces.

Principal Government Officials
President--Joseph Kabila
Prime Minister--Adolphe Muzito
Foreign Minister--Alexis Thambwe Mwamba
Defense Minister--Charles Mwando Nsimba
Finance Minister--Matata Ponyo Mapon
Minister of International and Regional Cooperation--Raymond Tshibanda

Eastern Challenges
The Kabila administration identified five areas requiring particular attention: education, health, infrastructure, water/electricity, and job creation. The government has made little progress in these areas, however, due in large part to continuing insecurity and intermittent returns to armed conflict in several eastern provinces, particularly North and South Kivu and the Ituri, Bas-Uele, and Haut-Uele Districts of Orientale Province. A number of illegal Congolese and foreign militias have operated largely with impunity in these areas since before the overthrow of Mobutu in early 1997. Their relative strength and influence have waxed and waned over time, but two are of particular importance to the current situation: the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), led by individuals involved in perpetrating the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a Congolese group, which ostensibly agreed to integrate into the D.R.C. military (FARDC). These groups--the first predominantly Hutu, the second predominantly Tutsi--have fought each other and the FARDC, illegally exploited and exported D.R.C. natural resources to fund their weapons, and committed gross human rights violations (including indiscriminate killings, rapes, mutilations, and forced child soldier recruitment) in the areas under their control.

On January 23, 2008, the Government of the D.R.C. and over 20 Congolese armed groups (including the CNDP) signed a peace accord in Goma, North Kivu Province, under which they agreed on the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the disengagement of troops, improved adherence to human rights standards, and the creation of UN buffer zones between and among the various factions. Between January and August 2008, most of the parties worked to implement the Goma Accords’ provisions, albeit with regular cease-fire violations. In late August 2008, intense fighting began again between the CNDP and the FARDC in the southern part of North Kivu Province, also called the “Petit Nord.” Over the next 4 months, this fighting resulted in the internal displacement of a quarter million residents of North Kivu and led some 40,000 to flee into Uganda. Hundreds of people were killed, and by late October 2008, Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP forces--much stronger and better disciplined than the Congolese military--got to within a few miles of Goma before declaring a unilateral cease-fire. During this period, the United States, European Union, and United Nations all worked to develop plans for a lasting peace, and seek adherence to past agreements, but progress was slow.

By January 2009, a dramatic series of events significantly altered the political-military landscape in the Petit Nord. Infighting within the CNDP leadership led to a schism in which Nkunda’s military chief of staff staged a de facto internal coup and then signed an agreement with the D.R.C. Government to integrate his forces into the FARDC. A smaller but also dangerous militia group, PARECO, made a similar commitment. Meanwhile, the governments of the D.R.C. and Rwanda, which had been engaged in the gradual pursuit of rapprochement over several months, announced plans for Rwandan forces to enter the D.R.C. and join with the Congolese military in a concerted effort to eliminate the FDLR once and for all. On January 20, 2009, several thousand Rwandan soldiers crossed into the D.R.C. for the third time in 12 years, but this time at the invitation of the Congolese Government in Kinshasa. Two days later, Laurent Nkunda fled into Rwanda, where Rwandan officials took him into custody. He remains in custody, pending the resolution of Rwandan court proceedings. Between January 20 and the end of February 2009, the joint Rwandan-Congolese-CNDP-PARECO coalition of forces pressured the FDLR, engaged in a small number of battles with FDLR units, and convinced several hundred FDLR members and their families to return voluntarily to Rwanda. On February 25, 2009, the Rwandan forces left the D.R.C.

On March 23, 2009, the Government of the D.R.C. signed separate peace agreements with (1) the CNDP, (2) the North Kivu armed groups, and (3) the South Kivu armed groups. The rebel groups agreed to transform their movements from military to political in nature, while the government promised to work toward integrating rebel soldiers and officials into the FARDC, national police, and national and local political and administrative units. Many details of the agreements still require implementation, but the CNDP has already been registered as a political party, and various other rebel groups have declared their intention to establish political parties. The FARDC, with support from MONUC, offered ex-combatants the opportunity to undergo “accelerated integration” into the national army, a process that was less thorough than traditional integration but allowed for more expeditious demobilization of rebel forces. As part of the peace agreements, parliament passed and the president signed an amnesty law that pardoned people for crimes committed in the eastern D.R.C. during the fighting, other than crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Late 2010 and early 2011 saw an increasing number of Mai Mai and other rebel groups similarly opt for negotiated surrender that includes FARDC integration.

The FARDC, with MONUC support, launched Operation Kimia II, a military operation against the FDLR in North and South Kivu in May 2009 and July 2009, respectively. Kimia II, which ended on December 31, 2009, registered some noticeable success, including pushing the bulk of the FDLR away from population centers and money-making enterprises, notably illegal mining. In addition, according to MONUC, in 2009 (roughly the same time period as Kimia II), 1,114 FDLR members were killed, and 1,522 FDLR combatants and 2,187 of their dependents were repatriated to Rwanda. However, human rights violations by the FDLR and by undisciplined FARDC elements increased during Kimia II operations. MONUC estimated that as many as 1,714 civilians were killed during the military operation. A follow-on operation, Amani Leo, was launched by the FARDC and MONUC in January 2010. Amani Leo has been more selective in its targets, as well as concentrating on holding re-captured territory and developing state institutions and authority in these areas. In July 2010, Amani Leo operations successfully targeted the camps of ADF-NALU, a Ugandan rebel group, which was operating along the Ugandan border in the northern Beni District of North Kivu. Nevertheless, the continued proliferation of newly-formed, loosely-organized, and less politically motivated local militia groups (Mai Mai) remains a menace to the fragile situation in North and South Kivu. Curbing random acts of violence targeting civilians, particularly those living in the remote, largely inaccessible, and densely forested regions of the provinces, perpetrated by both FDLR remnants and assorted Mai Mai groups continues to be a challenge for FARDC and MONUSCO.

Beginning in late 2010, the defection or capture of significant FDLR commanders, coupled with the arrests in France and Germany of key FDLR political leaders, dealt the organization a decisive blow. While a number of FDLR stalwarts have increased the scale and intensity of their attacks, many of the rank and file have surrendered to MONUSCO and have offered to be demoblilized or integrated into the FARDC.

Northeastern Challenges
The northeastern D.R.C. has also been the scene of fighting as the FARDC has engaged a Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), that operates in the D.R.C. Since 1987, the LRA, led by Joseph Kony, has waged an on-again, off-again insurgency against the Ugandan Government from bases in southern Sudan and, since 2005, in the D.R.C. The group is infamous for its brutal attacks on local populations, including looting, rapes, mutilations, and killings. It abducts young boys to serve as child soldiers and girls as sex slaves and porters. On December 15, 2008, the governments of Uganda, the D.R.C. and southern Sudan launched a joint military operation, Operation Lightning Thunder, to capture or kill senior LRA commanders. The operation was launched after it became clear to regional governments that Kony was not interested in signing a UN-negotiated peace agreement. The D.R.C. Government authorized troops from the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) to enter the D.R.C. The operation officially ended in March 2009 when the majority of UPDF troops withdrew from the D.R.C. A small residual UPDF element remains to support Operation Rudia II, a follow-on operation by FARDC and MONUSCO jointly targeting the LRA. These operations--Lightning Thunder and Rudia II--have succeeded in killing or capturing some LRA commanders, as well as dispersing the LRA into much smaller different groupings, thus significantly limiting its ability to carry out major fighting. However, the LRA is still committing gross human rights violations in the region (including the southeastern-most part of the Central African Republic) and Kony, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court, remains at large. In December 2009, the LRA massacred 321 inhabitants of villages in the Haut-Uele district of Orientale Province during a 4-day period. The LRA attacked a series of Haut-Uele villages in February 2010. The group continues to pose a threat to those inhabitants of the sparsely populated region along the Sudanese and C.A.R. border and in and around Garamba National Park. After a period in which the LRA seemed to predominate in C.A.R. and southern Sudan, early 2011 saw the LRA return to northern D.R.C. with Increased activity, especially around larger population areas in Haut-Uele.

Western Challenges
Fighting erupted in the western province of Equateur in late October to early November 2009 between two rival clans over a long-standing fishing dispute. Combatants from the Enyele clan killed approximately 45 police officers who had been sent to the region to restore order. The government responded by deploying a special, Belgian-trained brigade to the area, and MONUC shifted some of its resources to Equateur to assist. Over 120,000 Congolese have fled into the neighboring Republic of the Congo and approximately 20,000 into the Central African Republic. There are over 30,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region. Humanitarian assistance to IDPs remains difficult because of geographical obstacles and fears of renewed fighting. On April 4, 2010, a group of Enyele rebels attacked the provincial capital of Mbandaka, killing at least 16 people, after hijacking a riverboat. They held the airport for some 24 hours before the arrival of MONUC soldiers. There were reports of FARDC reprisals and extrajudicial killings in the days that followed. The ensuing violence caused further refugee movement across the Ubangi River into Republic of the Congo. In June 2010, Enyele leader Odjani Mangbama was captured and arrested by Republic of the Congo authorities, who began negotiations for his extradition to the D.R.C. Following Odjani’s arrest, the fighting has largely abated and the government security forces appear to have restored a modicum of security to the impoverished Equateur region.

Human Rights
Internal conflict in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, as well as in the LRA-affected areas in the Haut- Uele and Bas-Uele Districts of Orientale Province has an extremely negative effect on security and human rights. The interethnic conflict in Equateur Province increased both refugee and IDP flows and further highlighted the fragile security situation. In July 2010, fighting between ADF-NALU and the FARDC contributed to the IDP and refugee situation in North Kivu. Armed groups continue to commit numerous, serious abuses with impunity--some of which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity--including unlawful killings, disappearances, mass rape, and torture. They also recruit and retain child soldiers and compel forced labor.

In 2009, there were reports of more than 1,100 women and girls raped each month in the east alone; many more go unreported. Members of illegal armed groups, the FARDC, and the police were responsible for 81% of all reported cases of sexual violence in conflict zones and 24% in non-conflict areas. While many of the armed rapes occur in the east, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is pervasive throughout the D.R.C. The lack of gender equality puts women and girls at a disadvantage both economically and socially. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimated that 200,000 Congolese women and girls had become victims of sexual violence since 1998. In addition, 15,996 new cases of sexual violence were registered in 2008 throughout the country, including 4,820 cases in North Kivu. An estimated 50% of rape victims do not have access to medical treatment and less than 2% of the cases are brought to court. The 2006 sexual violence law is effective in principle, and while there are generally few instances of prosecution, there have been several high-profile cases in Fizi and Kalehe where FARDC troops have been arrested, tried, and sentenced for rape. However, impunity is still a significant factor in the lack of prosecutions, particularly for high-ranking military officials.

Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees
As of November 2010, there were a total of 1.7 million IDPs in the D.R.C. The majority (approx. 1.26 million) are found in North and South Kivu. The overwhelming majority of these IDPs resulted directly or indirectly from armed conflict in the region. Additional IDPs are present in Orientale Province, Equateur Province, and northern Katanga. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are nearly 415,000 Congolese refugees hosted in the D.R.C.’s eight neighboring countries and in other areas. The November 2009 conflict in Equateur created 140,000 refugees in Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. The D.R.C. is currently host to an estimated 161,000 refugees from seven neighboring countries.

ECONOMY

Overview
Sparsely populated in relation to its area, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is home to vast natural resources and mineral wealth. Nevertheless, the D.R.C. is one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita annual income of about U.S. $189 in 2010. This is the result of years of mismanagement, corruption, and war. Agriculture is the mainstay of the Congolese economy, accounting for 42.5% of GDP in 2007.

The main cash crops include coffee, palm oil, rubber, cotton, sugar, tea, and cocoa. Food crops include cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts, and rice. However, commercial agricultural production or processing remains limited, with many producers engaged in subsistence food production. Industry accounted for 28.4% of GDP in 2007, of which 6.4% was from manufacturing, and services accounted for 29.1% of GDP in 2007. The export of goods and services constituted 28.2% of GDP in 2007. The D.R.C.'s formal economy is dominated by the mining sector. Minerals account for the vast majority of the D.R.C.’s exports and represent the single largest source for foreign direct investment (FDI). Copper, cobalt, gold, coltan, tin, and zinc are the big metals being mined and produced in the D.R.C. The D.R.C.'s main copper and cobalt interests are dominated by Gecamines, the state-owned mining giant. Gecamines production has been severely affected by corruption, civil unrest, world market trends, and failure to reinvest. The diamond sector currently accounts for about 10% of the D.R.C.'s export revenue. This is from both gem and industrial-grade diamond sales that were around $875 million in 2008 and were projected to approach an estimated $1 billion in 2009. Production by the D.R.C. parastatal, MIBA, has significantly declined from past decades; operations stopped during 2009 due to technical and financial difficulties. MIBA is currently working to restructure its operations and administration. All diamond production in the D.R.C. is currently artisanal.

For decades, corruption and misguided policy have created a dual economy in the D.R.C. Individuals and businesses in the formal sector operated with high costs under arbitrarily enforced laws. As a consequence, the informal sector now dominates the economy. In order to combat corruption, in September 2009, President Kabila launched a “zero-tolerance” campaign. Within this framework, he established the D.R.C. Financial Intelligence Unit to combat money laundering and misappropriation of public funds.

In recent years, the Congolese Government approved a new investment code and a new mining code and designed a new commercial court. The goal of these initiatives was to attract investment by promising fair and transparent treatment to private business. The D.R.C. Government recently established an inter-ministerial committee called the “Steering Committee for Investment and Business Climate Improvement” to support reforms that would improve the business climate. In December 2009, the Congolese parliament approved a law authorizing the D.R.C.’s accession to the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), and President Kabila promulgated this law in February 2010. The Government of the D.R.C. officially launched the National OHADA Commission in April 2010. The D.R.C. expected to sign and deposit the instrument of OHADA accession by November 2010, and the OHADA treaty was supposed to take effect in the D.R.C. on January 1, 2011. However, President Kabila ordered that judges be trained in the OHADA law first before signing and depositing the instrument of OHADA accession. As of January 2011, no new date had been given for depositing the instrument of OHADA accession. Other measures undertaken by the Government of the D.R.C. to improve the business and investment climate include President Kabila’s promulgation of a new customs code and new law related to the value-added tax (VAT) in August 2010. The new customs code took effect on February 20, 2011. In 2007, shortly after the Joseph Kabila administration took office, the government launched a wholesale review of mining contracts that had been entered into from 1997-2002. In theory, the purpose of this contract review was to determine which negotiations may have been colored by corruption and revisit/renegotiate their terms as needed. In practice, this process itself was opaque and plagued with numerous delays, with little information provided by the government to foreign (including American) investors. The Government of the D.R.C. reached agreement in December 2008 with the vast majority of the companies under review and formally announced the completion of the process in November 2009. In October 2010, the Government of the D.R.C. reached agreement with the final remaining company, a U.S. investor.

Effects of the World Financial Crisis
The D.R.C.’s economic environment changed dramatically beginning in late 2008 and throughout 2009 as the country was significantly and negatively impacted by the global financial crisis. The once-robust mining sector significantly contracted during late 2008 and early 2009 due to falling international commodities prices, a tightening of international credit, and dampened investor confidence in the sector. GDP growth for 2009 was estimated at only 2.7%, a significant reduction from earlier projections. By early 2009, the D.R.C. was facing a serious fiscal and monetary crisis, with international reserves near zero and the exchange rate rapidly deteriorating. The international community responded quickly to the D.R.C.’s deteriorating economic situation by providing emergency financial assistance, including from the IMF (U.S. $200 million), the World Bank (U.S. $100 million), and the African Development Bank (U.S. $97 million). The European Union and Belgium also provided emergency assistance. This assistance helped stabilize the economy and ensure the continuation of basic services. With the support of international emergency assistance and improved prices for key export commodities, the D.R.C.’s macroeconomic situation has stabilized and the economy has recovered significantly. GDP growth for 2010 was 6.1% and is projected to be 6.8% in 2011.

Economic and Structural Reforms
The Government of the D.R.C. continues to build on economic reforms initiated in 2001 aimed at stabilizing the macroeconomic situation and promoting economic growth. Reforms included liberalization of petroleum prices and exchange rates and adoption of disciplined fiscal and monetary policies. These policies have been successful in reducing inflation and supporting the resumption and acceleration of economic growth since 2002. The D.R.C.’s economy grew by 5.6% in 2006, 6.32% in 2007, and 6.15% in 2008. Inflation was reduced from over 501% in 2001 to approximately 27.6% in 2008. As a result of unexpected internal and external economic shocks in 2009, the annual inflation rate stood at 53.44% in 2009. However, inflation was significantly reduced during 2010 and the annualized rate was estimated at less than 10%.

The D.R.C.’s development framework includes implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), approved in mid-2006 by the IMF and World Bank boards, and the government's 5-year program, approved by the National Assembly in February 2007. The 5-year program, known as the five pillars or “cinq chantiers” in French, is based on the PRSP and focuses heavily on President Kabila's five priority areas: infrastructure; employment; education; water/electricity; and health. Many donors had disengaged from the D.R.C. prior to 2002.

Paris Club creditors suspended interim debt relief when the D.R.C. failed to complete its sixth IMF review in 2006 due to fiscal slippages and slow implementation of key structural reforms. In early 2008, the Government of the D.R.C. concluded a U.S. $9.2 billion minerals-for-infrastructure agreement with the Chinese Government. Under pressure from international financial institutions and donors concerned about the potential negative effect of this deal on the D.R.C.’s debt burden, the Government of the D.R.C. and the Chinese amended the agreement in November 2009, reducing the overall value of the agreement by $3 billion among other changes. As a result, the IMF Board of Directors approved on December 11, 2009, a new, 3-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program. Paris Club creditors, including the United States, agreed in February 2010 to resume interim debt relief for the D.R.C. On July 1, 2010, the D.R.C. reached the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point following a determination by the IMF and World Bank boards that the D.R.C. had successfully implemented the policy measures (“triggers”) under the program. Debt relief will help alleviate the D.R.C.’s official debt burden (estimated at U.S. $13.5 billion), and provide critically needed resources for poverty-reducing programs.

Natural Resource Exploitation
In June 2000, the United Nations established a Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Congolese Resources to examine links between the wars and natural resource exploitation. Reports issued by the panel indicated that countries involved in the war in Congo developed significant economic interests in the D.R.C. that complicated Congolese Government efforts to control its resources and the mining sector. Although the original Panel of Experts was disbanded when its mandate ended in late 2003, a separate UN Group of Experts continued to look into these issues due to the apparent links between the illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the D.R.C. and natural resource exploitation. The Group of Experts published a report in December 2008 that documented how armed groups in eastern D.R.C. finance their activities through the exploitation of natural resources and provided evidence of the collaboration and support of Rwandan authorities and the Government of the D.R.C. in supporting such groups. In November 2009, the Group of Experts issued a new report, which stated that armed groups in eastern D.R.C. continue to engage in the illegal extraction of minerals to finance their activities. The report also documented that these armed rebel groups, in particular the FDLR, as well as members of the FARDC, continue to engage in human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians.

In 2008, the D.R.C. became a candidate country for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a multi-stakeholder effort to increase transparency in transactions between governments and companies in the extractive industries. Though the Government of the D.R.C. took some positive steps under EITI, including establishment of a National EITI Committee, publication of the first report on EITI in the D.R.C., and the hiring of an independent auditor to carry out the validation of the EITI process, the D.R.C. did not meet its March 9, 2010 validation deadline. The EITI Secretariat granted the D.R.C. a 6-month extension (until September 9, 2010) to complete validation. The report was subsequently validated by the independent auditor, approved by the National EITI Committee and transmitted to the President of the International EITI Secretariat in Berlin, Germany on September 8, 2010. The validation of the first EITI report was hailed as an important step toward improving transparency and accountability in D.R.C.’s management of natural resources. On December 14, 2010, the EITI Board designated the D.R.C. as a candidate country that is “close to compliant” and gave the D.R.C. 6 months (until June 12, 2011) to complete the remaining steps in order to achieve “compliant” status. The EITI Board reserves the right to require a new validation if these actions are not completed by the June 2011 deadline.

A number of initiatives have been launched at the national, regional, and international level to promote greater control and transparency of the minerals trade in eastern D.R.C. The U.S. Financial Reform Act contains provisions related to minerals sourced in the D.R.C. Specifically, these provisions require companies whose products contain certain minerals to disclose to U.S. regulators whether they are sourcing these materials from the D.R.C. or its neighbors. They must also document their due diligence to ensure that their sourcing arrangements are not benefiting armed groups.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
The D.R.C.'s large size and strategic location in the center of Africa, as well as its vast mineral wealth, have made the country a key regional player since even before independence. The D.R.C.'s relations with its neighbors have often been driven by security concerns, leading to intricate, interlocking, and shifting alliances. The complexities and dangers of these relations were never clearer than in the 1997-2003 period described in the “From Dictatorship to Disintegration” section above. In addition, internal conflicts in Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda have at various times created bilateral and regional tensions.

Over the past 7 years, the D.R.C. Government has signed agreements with its neighbors to improve the security of the D.R.C. and the wider region. In October 2004, with significant U.S. involvement and facilitation, the D.R.C. joined with Rwanda and Uganda in signing a Great Lakes regional security agreement that established a “Tripartite Commission” to address issues peacefully rather than militarily. (Burundi joined a year later and the expanded agreement is now known as “Tripartite Plus.”) In September 2007, the D.R.C. and Uganda signed the so-called “Ngurdoto Agreement” committing to strong bilateral efforts to eliminate all illegal armed groups operating in and between the two countries. In November 2007, with significant assistance from the UN, United States, and European Union, the D.R.C. reached a similar agreement with Rwanda. Known as the “Nairobi Communique,” this accord was designed to lay the groundwork for D.R.C.-Rwandan cooperation to disarm, demobilize, reintegrate and/or repatriate all foreign armed groups operating in the D.R.C., particularly the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (later the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, FDLR).

Following up on enhanced military cooperation with Rwanda and Uganda, the D.R.C. re-established full diplomatic relations with Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in 2009. President Kabila held bilateral talks with Rwandan President Kagame in January 2009, August 2009, and September 2010. The 2009 meetings were the first heads-of-state meetings between the D.R.C. and Rwanda in over 10 years.

U.S. CONGOLESE RELATIONS
U.S. relations with the D.R.C. are very strong. The success of the D.R.C.’s presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006 was the culmination of the Congolese people's efforts to choose their leaders through a peaceful, democratic process and international support for numerous domestic and international peace agreements. The United States has pursued an active diplomatic strategy in the region and has supported internal reconciliation and democratization in the D.R.C., facilitating the Nairobi Communique, Goma Accords, and the Tripartite Plus mechanism, all described above.

The United States is proud to have played a role in the peace process in the D.R.C., and continues to encourage Congolese peace, prosperity, democracy, and respect for human rights. The U.S. Government provided $306 million in bilateral assistance to the D.R.C. in 2010 to support economic reform and transparency efforts. The United States is also the largest donor to the United Nations stabilization mission in the D.R.C. (MONUSCO), contributing almost one-third of MONUSCO’s $1 billion annual budget.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited the D.R.C. in August 2009, meeting with President Kabila and other senior officials, civil society representatives, and victims of the current conflicts. The Secretary reinforced the U.S. commitment to help the D.R.C. reduce sexual and gender-based violence and address corruption.

The D.R.C. appointed its current ambassador to the United States in 2000. The State Department has consistently issued cautionary travel information about Zaire/D.R.C. since 1977.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--James F. Entwistle
Deputy Chief of Mission--Samuel C. Laeuchli

The U.S. Embassy is located at 310 Avenue des Aviateurs, Kinshasa (tel. 243-81-2255872; fax 243-81-3010561). Mailing address is American Embassy Kinshasa, Unit 2220, DPO AE 09828.

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April 18, 2011Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Background Note: Brunei

Official Name: Brunei Darussalam

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 5,765 sq. km. (2,226 sq. mi.), slightly larger than Delaware.
Cities: Capital--Bandar Seri Begawan.
Terrain: East--flat coastal plain rises to mountains; west--hilly lowland with a few mountain ridges.
Climate: Equatorial; high temperatures, humidity, and rainfall.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Bruneian(s).
Population (2009 est.): 406,200.
Annual population growth rate (2009 est., Government of Brunei): 2.1%.
Ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese, other indigenous groups.
Religion: Islam.
Languages: Malay, English, Chinese; Iban and other indigenous dialects.
Education: Years compulsory--9. Literacy (2006)--94.7%.
Health: Life expectancy--men 76.6 years, women 79.8 years. Infant mortality rate (2008, Government of Brunei)--7.0/1,000.

Government
Type: Sultanate (Malay Islamic Monarchy).
Independence: January 1, 1984.
Constitution: 1959.
Branches: Executive--Sultan is both head of state and Prime Minister, presiding over a 14-member cabinet. Legislative--a Legislative Council has been reactivated after a 20-year suspension to play an advisory role for the Sultan. Judicial (based on Indian penal code and English common law)--magistrate's courts, High Court, Court of Appeals, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (sits in London).
Subdivisions: Four districts--Brunei-Muara, Belait, Tutong, and Temburong.

Economy
GDP (2009, Government of Brunei): U.S. $12.0 billion (BND 15.6 billion; 2009 GDP figures released by Department of Economic Planning and Development).
Growth rate (2008, Government of Brunei): -1.9%.
Natural resources: Oil and natural gas.
Trade: Exports--oil, liquefied natural gas, petroleum products, garments. Major markets--Japan, Korea, Indonesia, India, Australia. Imports--machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods. Major suppliers--ASEAN, United States, European Union, Japan, China.

PEOPLE
Many cultural and linguistic differences make Brunei Malays distinct from the larger Malay populations in nearby Malaysia and Indonesia, even though they are ethnically related and share the Muslim religion.

Brunei has hereditary nobility, carrying the title Pengiran. The Sultan can award to commoners the title Pehin, the equivalent of a life peerage awarded in the United Kingdom. The Sultan also can award his subjects the title Dato, the equivalent of a knighthood in the United Kingdom, and Datin, the equivalent of damehood.

Bruneians adhere to the practice of using complete full names with all titles, including the title Haji (for men) or Hajah (for women) for those who have made the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca. Many Brunei Malay women wear the tudong, a traditional head covering. Men wear the songkok, a traditional Malay cap. Men who have completed the Haj can wear a white songkok.

The requirements to attain Brunei citizenship include passing tests in Malay culture, customs, and language as well as the national Malay Islamic Monarchy (MIB) philosophy. Stateless permanent residents of Brunei are given International Certificates of Identity, which allow them to travel overseas. The majority of ethnic Chinese in Brunei are permanent residents, and many are stateless. An amendment to the National Registration and Immigration Act of 2002 allowed female Bruneian citizens to transfer their nationality to their children. In May 2006, the law changed to allow citizenship to permanent residents who have contributed to the country's economic growth, to women married to a citizen for 2 years, to women married to permanent residents for 5 years, and to children of permanent resident fathers after the age of 2 years and 6 months. According to unofficial sources there are approximately 20,000 "stateless" persons in the country, including persons born and raised in the country who were not automatically accorded citizenship and its attendant rights but were granted permanent resident status. In July 2009, the Land Code Strata Act, which allows permanent residents to own units of multistory property for a maximum of 99 years, came into force.

Oil wealth allows the Brunei Government to provide the population with one of Asia's finest health care systems. Malaria has been eradicated, and cholera is virtually nonexistent. There are five general hospitals--in Bandar Seri Begawan, Tutong, Kuala Belait, Bangar, and Seria--and there are numerous health clinics throughout the country.

Education starts with preschool, followed by 6 years of primary education and up to 7 years of secondary education. Nine years of education are mandatory. Most of Brunei's college students attend universities and other institutions abroad, but approximately 3,669 (2008) study at the University of Brunei Darussalam. Opened in 1985, the university has a faculty of more than 300 instructors and is located on a sprawling campus overlooking the South China Sea. A second university, Sultan Sharif Ali Islamic University, was established in 2007 and offers programs such as Islamic Finance and Law. As of December 2009, the university had about 300 students. Institut Teknologi Brunei (ITB) was upgraded to the status of a university as of October 2008. The institute still offers several "Higher National Diploma" programs.

The official language is Malay, but English is widely understood and used in business. Other languages spoken are several Chinese dialects, Iban, and a number of native dialects. Islam is the official religion. While religious freedom is guaranteed under Brunei’s constitution, non-Islamic faiths face a variety of restrictions, including confiscation of religious materials intended for distribution and sale, and prohibitions on religious teachings in private non-Islamic schools. Christmas and other non-Islamic holidays are widely recognized in Brunei and many faiths are permitted to be practiced in private.

HISTORY
Historians believe there was a forerunner to the present Brunei Sultanate, which the Chinese called Po-ni. Chinese and Arabic records indicate that this ancient trading kingdom existed at the mouth of the Brunei River as early as the seventh or eighth century A.D. This early kingdom was apparently conquered by the Sumatran Hindu Empire of Srivijaya in the early ninth century, which later controlled northern Borneo and the Philippines. It was subjugated briefly by the Java-based Majapahit Empire but soon regained its independence and once again rose to prominence.

The Brunei Empire had its golden age from the 15th to the 17th centuries, when its control extended over the entire island of Borneo and north into the Philippines. Brunei was particularly powerful under the fifth sultan, Bolkiah (1473-1521), who was famed for his sea exploits and even briefly captured Manila; and under the ninth sultan, Hassan (1605-19), who fully developed an elaborate Royal Court structure, elements of which remain today.

After Sultan Hassan, Brunei entered a period of decline due to internal battles over royal succession as well as the rising influences of European colonial powers in the region that, among other things, disrupted traditional trading patterns, destroying the economic base of Brunei and many other Southeast Asian sultanates. In 1839, the English adventurer James Brooke arrived in Borneo and helped the Sultan put down a rebellion. As a reward, he became governor and later "Rajah" of Sarawak in northwest Borneo and gradually expanded the territory under his control.

Meanwhile, the British North Borneo Company was expanding its control over territory in northeast Borneo. In 1888, Brunei became a protectorate of the British Government, retaining internal independence but with British control over external affairs. In 1906, Brunei accepted a further measure of British control when executive power was transferred to a British resident, who advised the ruler on all matters except those concerning local custom and religion.

In 1959, a new constitution was written declaring Brunei a self-governing state, while its foreign affairs, security, and defense remained the responsibility of the United Kingdom. An attempt in 1962 to introduce a partially elected legislative body with limited powers was abandoned after the opposition political party, Parti Rakyat Brunei, launched an armed uprising, which the government put down with the help of British forces. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the government also resisted pressures to join neighboring Sabah and Sarawak in the newly formed Malaysia. The Sultan eventually decided that Brunei would remain an independent state.

In 1967, Sultan Omar abdicated in favor of his eldest son, Hassanal Bolkiah, who became the 29th ruler. The former Sultan remained as Defense Minister and assumed the royal title Seri Begawan. In 1970, the national capital, Brunei Town, was renamed Bandar Seri Begawan in his honor. The Seri Begawan died in 1986.

On January 4, 1979, Brunei and the United Kingdom signed a new treaty of friendship and cooperation. On January 1, 1984, Brunei Darussalam became a fully independent state.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Under Brunei's 1959 constitution, the Sultan is the head of state with full executive authority, including emergency powers since 1962 which is renewed every 2 years. The Sultan is assisted and advised by five councils, which he appoints. A Council of Ministers, or cabinet, which currently consists of 14 members (including the Sultan himself), assists in the administration of the government. The Sultan presides over the cabinet as Prime Minister and also holds the positions of Minister of Defense and Minister of Finance. His son, the Crown Prince, serves as Senior Minister. One of the Sultan's brothers, Prince Mohamed, serves as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In May 2010, the Sultan appointed the first female Deputy Minister and elevated the position of both State Mufti and Attorney General to ministerial rank.

Brunei's legal system is based on English common law, with an independent judiciary, a body of written common law judgments and statutes, and legislation enacted by the Sultan. The local magistrates' courts try most cases. More serious cases go before the High Court, which sits for about 2 weeks every few months. Brunei has an arrangement with the United Kingdom whereby United Kingdom judges are appointed as the judges for Brunei's High Court and Court of Appeal. Final appeal can be made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London in civil but not criminal cases. Brunei also has a separate system of Islamic courts that apply Sharia law in family and other matters involving Muslims.

The Government of Brunei assures continuing public support for the current form of government by providing economic benefits such as subsidized food, fuel, and housing; free education and medical care; and low-interest loans for government employees. In 2004 the Sultan issued amendments to the constitution and re-introduced an appointed Legislative Council with minimal powers. Currently, four of the 29 seats on the Council are indirectly elected by village leaders.

Brunei's economy is almost totally supported by exports of crude oil and natural gas, which account for over 90% of GDP and over 50% of exports. The government uses its earnings in part to build up its foreign reserves. The Brunei Investment Agency manages the bulk of the nation's foreign investments, which are reported to have reached more than $30 billion. The country's wealth, coupled with its membership in the United Nations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference give it an influence in the world disproportionate to its size.

Principal Government Officials
Sultan and Yang di-Pertuan, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Finance--Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah
Senior Minister--Crown Prince Billah
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Prince Mohamed Bolkiah
Ambassador to the United States--Yusoff Hamid
Ambassador to the United Nations--Latif Tuah

Brunei Darussalam maintains an embassy in the United States at 3520 International Court, NW, Washington, DC 20008; tel. 202-237-1838.

ECONOMY
Brunei's economy enjoyed moderate growth in the mid-2000s, primarily due to high world oil and gas prices. However, Brunei's growth has fallen sharply in recent years. In 2009, GDP shrank from U.S. $15.6 billion (BND 20.4 billion) to U.S. $12 billion (BND 15.6 billion). Brunei continues to have one of the lowest GDP growth rates of any ASEAN nation; however, Brunei is also ranked as having one of the highest rates of macroeconomic stability in the world and the highest in Asia. Brunei’s conservative economic policies insulated it from much of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009.

Brunei is the fourth-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia, averaging about 175,000 barrels a day in 2008. It also is the ninth-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas in the world (according to the Brunei Economic Development Board). Like many oil-producing countries, Brunei's economy has followed the swings of the world oil market. Economic growth has averaged around 2.8% in the 2000s, heavily dependent on oil and gas production. Liquefied natural gas output averages 895 million cubit feet/day. Overall oil production has declined in recent years, and growth rates have fallen significantly. Brunei’s oil reserves are expected to last 25 years, and natural gas reserves 40 years. However, potential new onshore fields may add to the lifespan of the reserves.

Brunei Shell Petroleum (BSP), a joint venture owned in equal shares by the Brunei Government and the Royal Dutch/Shell group of companies, is the chief oil and gas production company in Brunei. It also operates the country's only refinery. BSP and four sister companies--including the liquefied natural gas producing firm BLNG--constitute the largest employer in Brunei after the government. BSP's small refinery has a distillation capacity of 10,000 barrels per day. This satisfies domestic demand for most petroleum products.

The French oil company Total (formerly ELF Aquitaine) became active in petroleum exploration in Brunei in the 1980s. The joint venture Total E&P Borneo BV currently produces approximately 35,000 barrels per day and 13% of Brunei's natural gas. As the operator of the recently resolved Brunei-Malaysia deepwater block CA-1, Total's production of oil and gas will be significantly increased in the future.

In 2003, Malaysia disputed Brunei-awarded oil exploration concessions for offshore blocks J and K (Total and Shell respectively), which led to the Brunei licensees ceasing exploration activities. The two countries have stated they have reached a joint production resolution to the conflict. Two on-shore blocks are being explored following awards to two consortia--both Australian-led operations. Australia, Indonesia, India, and Korea were the largest customers for Brunei's oil exports, consuming more than 70% of Brunei's total crude exports. Other countries, including New Zealand and China, each purchased more than 7% of Brunei’s total crude exports (2009 Brunei Darussalam--External Trade Statistics).

Almost all of Brunei's natural gas is liquefied at Brunei Shell's Liquefied Natural Gas (BLNG) plant, which opened in 1972 and is one of the largest LNG plants in the world. Some 90% of Brunei's LNG produced is sold to Japan under a long-term agreement renewed in 1993. According to BLNG, the agreement calls for Brunei to provide over 6 million tons of LNG per year to three Japanese utilities, namely to TEPCo, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (J.TER or 5001), Tokyo Gas Co. (J.TYG or 9531) and Osaka Gas Co. (J.OSG or 9532). The Japanese company, Mitsubishi, is a joint venture partner with Shell and the Brunei Government in Brunei LNG, Brunei Coldgas, and Brunei Shell Tankers, which together produce the LNG and supply it to Japan. Since 1995, Brunei has supplied 700,000 tons of LNG annually to the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) as well. In the second quarter of 2008, total natural gas production reached 0.855 billion cubic feet per day. A small amount of natural gas is used for domestic power generation. Since 2001, Japan remains the dominant export market for natural gas. Brunei is the fourth-largest exporter of LNG in the world (according to the Brunei Economic Development Board) behind Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia.

The government sought in the past decade to diversify the economy with limited success. Oil and gas and government spending still account for most of Brunei's economic activity. Brunei's non-petroleum industries include agriculture, forestry, fishing, aquaculture, and banking. The garment-for-export industry has been shrinking since the United States eliminated its garment quota system at the end of 2004. However, with 75% of total garment exports valued at U.S. $66 million, the United States remains the largest export market for garments. The Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB) announced plans in 2003 to use proven gas reserves to establish downstream industrial projects. In 2006, the Brunei Methanol Company, a joint venture between Petroleum Brunei, Mitsubishi, and Itochu, was established. The $400 million methanol plant, fed by natural gas, came on line in 2010. The plant has the capacity to produce 2,500 metric tons of methanol per day. The government has plans to build a power plant in the Sungai Liang region to power a proposed aluminum smelting plant that will depend on foreign investors. A second major project depending on foreign investment is in the planning stage: a giant container hub at the Muara Port facility. BEDB appointed a port operator, International Container Terminal Services Inc. (ICTSI) from the Philippines.

The government regulates the immigration of foreign labor out of concern it might disrupt Brunei's society. Work permits for foreigners are issued only for short periods and must be continually renewed. Despite these restrictions, the estimated 100,000 foreign temporary residents of Brunei make up a significant portion of the work force. The government reported a work force of 188,800 in 2008, with a derived unemployment rate of 3.7% (2009 Brunei Darussalam Key Indicators--BDKI).

Oil and natural gas account for almost all exports. Since only a few products other than petroleum are produced locally, a wide variety of items must be imported. Nonetheless, Brunei has had a significant trade surplus throughout the past decade. Official statistics show Singapore, Malaysia, the United States, and China as the leading suppliers of imports in 2009. The United States was the third-largest supplier of imports to Brunei in 2009.

Brunei's substantial foreign reserves are managed by the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA), an arm of the Ministry of Finance. BIA's guiding principle is to increase the real value of Brunei's foreign reserves while pursuing a diverse investment strategy, with holdings in the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.

The government encourages foreign investment in Brunei. New enterprises that meet certain criteria can receive pioneer status, exempting profits from income tax for up to 5 years, depending on the amount of capital invested. The normal corporate income tax rate is 30%. There is no personal income tax or capital gains tax. However, foreign direct investment (FDI) outside the oil and gas industry remains limited.

One of the government's priorities is to encourage the development of Brunei Malays as leaders of industry and commerce. There are no specific restrictions of foreign equity ownership, but local participation, both shared capital and management, is encouraged. Such participation helps when tendering for contracts with the government or Brunei Shell Petroleum.

Companies in Brunei must either be incorporated locally or registered as a branch of a foreign company and must be registered with the Registrar of Companies. Public companies must have a minimum of seven shareholders. Private companies must have a minimum of two but not more than 50 shareholders. At least half of the directors in a company must be residents of Brunei.

The government owns a cattle farm in Australia through which the country's beef supplies are processed. At 2,262 square miles, this ranch is larger than Brunei itself. Eggs and chickens are largely produced locally, but most of Brunei's other food needs must be imported. Agriculture, aquaculture, and fisheries are among the industrial sectors that the government has selected for highest priority in its efforts to diversify the economy. The Philippines and China are currently involved with the largest joint projects with the Government of Brunei to increase agriculture and fisheries production. American firms are consulting on aquaculture projects.

Since 2002, the government has worked to develop Brunei as an international offshore financial center as well as a center for Islamic banking. Brunei is serviced by a large number of banks given its size. Islamic banking is growing, primarily in the Islamic bond (sukok) market. Offshore banking and business incorporation remains a small sector in the overall financial services market. Brunei is keen on the development of small and medium enterprises and has established a technology incubator to encourage the development of an information technology industry. Brunei has also promoted ecotourism to take advantage of the over 70% of Brunei's territory that remains primal tropical rainforest. Brunei is a participant and seeks to take a leadership role in the trilateral Heart of Borneo conservation initiative. While ecotourism is growing, the overall impact for economic diversification is limited.

DEFENSE
The Sultan is both Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (RBAF). All infantry, navy, and air combat units are made up of volunteers. There are three infantry battalions equipped with armored reconnaissance vehicles and armored personnel carriers and supported by Rapier air defense missiles and a flotilla of coastal patrol vessels armed with surface-to-surface missiles. Brunei ordered three offshore patrol vessels from the U.K. but is reportedly seeking to sell these to a third country. The Royal Brunei Navy has ordered several "Itjihad" class patrol boats from German ship manufacturer Lurssen Werft.

Brunei has a defense agreement with the United Kingdom, under which a British Armed Forces Ghurka battalion (1,500 men) is permanently stationed in Seria, near the center of Brunei's oil industry. The Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) has joint exercises, training programs, and other military cooperation with the United Kingdom and many other countries, including the United States. The United States and Brunei signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation in November 1994. The two countries conduct the annual military exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). RBAF joined a peacekeeping mission in Lebanon under the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) and has been sending troops to the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao to help safeguard the ceasefire between the Philippines Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Brunei’s growing commitment to peacekeeping missions is in line with its defense white paper.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Brunei joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on January 7, 1984--1 week after resuming full independence--and gives its ASEAN membership the highest priority in its foreign relations. The chairmanship of ASEAN will rotate to Brunei in 2013. Brunei joined the UN in September 1984. It also is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Brunei hosted the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in November 2000 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2002.

U.S.-BRUNEI RELATIONS
Relations between the United States and Brunei date from the 1800s. On April 6, 1845, the USS Constitution visited Brunei. The two countries concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in 1850, which remains in force today. The United States maintained a consulate in Brunei from 1865 to 1867.

The United States welcomed Brunei Darussalam's full independence from the United Kingdom on January 1, 1984, and opened an Embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan on that date. Brunei opened its embassy in Washington in March 1984. Brunei's armed forces engage in joint exercises, training programs, and other military cooperation with the United States. Two Royal Brunei Armed Forces cadets are attending the U.S. Air Force Academy and U.S. Naval Academy. RBAF has a West Point graduate in its work force. A memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation was signed on November 29, 1994. The Sultan visited Washington in December 2002 and visited the Pacific Command in Hawaii with then-Ambassador William E. Todd in November 2008. The Sultan also attended the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders meeting in September 2010 in New York.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Daniel Shields
Deputy Chief of Mission--Alexander Barrasso
Management Officer--Matthew Miller

The U.S. Embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan is located in the diplomatic enclave at Simpang 336-52-16-9, Jalan Kebangsaan BC4115; tel: 673-2384616; fax: 673-2384603; e-mail: amembassy_bsb@state.gov.

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April 15, 2011Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

Background Note: Curacao

Official Name: Curacao

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 444 sq. km. (171 sq. mi.); close to three times the size of Washington, DC.
Cities: Capital--Willemstad (metropolitan).
Terrain: Hilly.
Climate: Curacao has a semi-arid climate. Although precipitation is very slight, it is sufficient for growth of short and sparse vegetation. The annual average temperature is 81°F (27°C) with a constant trade wind from the east. The rainy season is from late October to late January. The annual rainfall averages 570 mm (22 inches). Curacao lies outside the hurricane belt.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Dutch.
Population (2010): 142,180.
Annual population growth rate (2010): 0.29%.
Ethnic groups: Mixed black 85%, other 15% (mixed Latin American, white, East Asian).
Religions: Roman Catholic (72%), Pentecostal (4.9%), Protestant (3.5%), Seventh-Day Adventist (3.1%), Jehovah’s Witness (1.7%), other Christian (4.2%), Jewish (1.3%), other (1.2%), none (5.2%).
Languages: Dutch (official), Papiamento predominates, English is widely spoken, Spanish.
Education: Literacy (2003)--96.3%.
Health: Infant mortality rate--6.1 deaths per 1,000 live births; 62.6 live births per 1,000 women 15 to 44 years old. Life expectancy--female, 79.9 yrs.; male, 72.8 yrs.
Work force (62,627; 2009): Agriculture--1%; industry--15%; services--84%.

Government
Type: Parliamentary.
Independence: Semi-autonomous part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Constitution: December 1954, Statute of the Realm of the Netherlands, as amended.
Branches: Executive--monarch (head of state) represented by a governor, prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative--unicameral parliament. Judicial--Joint High Court of Justice appointed by the monarch.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Political parties: Real Alternative Party or PAR; Movement for the Future of Curacao or MFK; Pueblo Soberano or Sovereign Party; MAN (not an abbreviation, refers to the Socialist Party); People's National Party or PNP; Workers' Liberation Front or FOL; Democratic Party of Curacao or DP.

Economy
GDP (2009, market prices): U.S. $2.887 billion.
Real growth rate (2009): -0.2%.
GDP per capita: Data not available for the relatively new political entity of Curacao.
Natural resources: Beaches and offshore diving sites.
Tourism, financial sector, and other services: 84% of GDP.
Industry (15% of GDP): Types--petroleum refining, petroleum transshipment facilities, and light manufacturing.
Agriculture (1% of GDP): Products--aloe, sorghum, peanuts, vegetables, tropical fruit.
Trade (2009): Exports ($117 million)--machine and transport equipment 52%; food and live animals 13%; manufactured goods 11%; petroleum products not included. Major markets--Data not available. Imports ($1.282 billion)--machinery and transport equipment 32%; manufactured goods 16%; food and live animals 16%; crude oil (for refining and re-export) not included. Major suppliers--Data not available.
Exchange rate: U.S. $1=1.78 ANG (fixed).

PEOPLE AND HISTORY
The Arawaks are recognized as the first human civilization to inhabit the island of Curacao. A Spanish expedition led by Alonso de Ojeda claimed Curacao for Spain in 1499, and it remained under Spanish rule until the Dutch took control in 1634. Curacao was a strategically important point for Dutch military advances against the Spanish and as the center of the Dutch Caribbean slave trade.

In 1845 the Dutch Windward islands united with Curacao, Bonaire, and Aruba in a political unit. The islands' economy remained weak until the early part of the 20th century when oil was discovered in Venezuela’s Lake Maracaibo and a refinery was established on Curacao. During the same period, an offshore financial sector was created to serve Dutch business interests.

Curacao became the seat of the Netherlands Antilles Government in 1954. The federation of the Netherlands Antilles (Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba) was a constituent part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and was semi-autonomous in most internal affairs. The Kingdom retained authority over foreign affairs, defense, final judicial review, and "Kingdom matters", including human rights and good governance. Aruba was part of this federation until January 1, 1986, when it gained a separate status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Netherlands Antilles ceased to exist on October 10, 2010. The islands that formed the Netherlands Antilles assumed new positions within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Curacao and Sint Maarten gained semi-autonomous status similar to Aruba, and the remaining BES islands (Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba) became special overseas public entities, much like municipalities, within the Netherlands.

About 85% of Curacao's population is of African derivation. The remaining 15% is made up of various races and nationalities, including Dutch, Portuguese, North Americans, natives from other Caribbean islands, Latin Americans, Sephardic Jews, Lebanese, and Asians. Roman Catholicism predominates, but several other religions are represented, including Anglican, Jewish, Protestant, Mormon, Baptist, Muslim, and Hindu. The Jewish community is the oldest in the Western Hemisphere, dating back to 1634.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Current political relations among the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba stem from 1954. They are based on the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a voluntary arrangement among the Netherlands, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles. At the time, the Charter represented an end to colonial relations and the acceptance of a new legal system in which each of the three would look after its own interests independently, as well as provide mutual assistance and promote common interests on the basis of equality. Suriname left the Kingdom's political alliance and became independent in 1975. Aruba has had a separate status within the Kingdom since 1986 when it left the Netherlands Antilles.

The Netherlands Antilles dissolved on October 10, 2010, and its successor political entities remain part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Curacao and Sint Maarten now have a status similar to Aruba, and the remaining BES islands (Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba) are special overseas municipalities within the Netherlands. Aruba, Curacao, and Sint Maarten enjoy autonomy on most internal matters and defer to the Kingdom of the Netherlands in matters of defense, foreign policy, final judicial review, human rights, and good governance.

Curacao is governed by a popularly elected unicameral "Staten" (parliament) of 21 members. It chooses a Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers, consisting of six to eight other ministers. A governor, who serves a 6-year term, represents the monarch of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Following August 27, 2010 elections, an 11-seat coalition government was formed consisting of the Movement for the Future of Curacao (MFK), the Sovereign Party (PS), and the MAN party. The MFK, led by Gerrit Schotte, and the PS, led by Helmin Wiels, won 5 and 4 seats respectively, and the MAN party won 2 seats. The Real Alternative Party (PAR) won 8 seats, and the Workers' Liberation Front (FOL) and People's National Party (PNP) won 1 seat each.

Drug smuggling and trafficking in persons continue to be issues for Curacao. Drug smuggling has been significantly reduced through intensive cooperation among U.S., Dutch, Curacao, and international law enforcement authorities.

Principal Government Officials
Governor--Frits Goedgedrag
Prime Minister and General Affairs--Gerrit Schotte (MFK)
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transportation--Charles Cooper (MAN)
Minister of Finance--George Jamaloodin (MFK)
Minister of Economic Development--Nasser Hakim (MFK)
Minister of Public Health, Environment and Nature--Jacinta Constancia (MFK)
Minister of Justice--Elmer Wilsoe (Sovereign Party)
Minister of Management, Planning and Service--Lia Willems (Sovereign Party)
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports--Lionel Jansen (Sovereign Party)
Minister of Social Development and Welfare--Hensley Koeiman (MAN)
Chairman of Parliament--Ivar Asjes (Sovereign Party)
Minister Plenipotentiary in The Hague--Sheldry Osepa (MFK)
Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, DC--vacant
Director, Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten--Emsley D. Tromp
Attorney General--Dick A. Piar

ECONOMY
Curacao enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the Caribbean and a well-developed infrastructure. Since 1918, oil refining has been a key part of the island’s economy, at one time representing as much as 90% of exports. Since the 1970s, tourism and financial services have become mainstays of Curacao’s economy.

Upon dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles, Curacao and Sint Maarten formed a monetary union with a common currency. The Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten is in charge of monetary and financial supervision of the two islands. Policy coordination and the legislative harmonization of monetary policy, the financial sector, and financial integrity supervision will be needed for a successful monetary union.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Curacao conducts foreign affairs primarily through the Dutch Government. Curacao continues to strengthen its relations with other Caribbean governments.

U.S.-CURACAO RELATIONS
The United States maintains positive relations with Curacao and works cooperatively to combat narco-trafficking and trafficking in persons, as well as to ensure the safety and security of the many thousands of American citizens who reside in or visit the island every year.

Principal U.S. Officials
Consul General--Valerie Belon
Vice Consul--Winifred L. Hofstetter
Management Officer--Eric J. Kramp

The U.S. Consulate General for Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Saba, and St. Eustatius is located at J.B. Gorsiraweg #1, Willemstad, Curacao; tel. 599-9-461-3066, fax: 599-9-461-6489; Monday-Friday, 8:00 am-5:00 pm. Email: acscuracao@state.gov

Other Contact Information
U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration
Trade Information Center
14th and Constitution, NW
Washington, DC 20230
Tel: 1-800-USA-TRADE

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